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SYNOPSIS OF THE PAPERS PRESENTED TO THE  
CONFERENCE ON CANADA-U.S. SECURITY,  
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PANEL 1A: THE DEBATE OVER CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

Canada and the Neutrality Issue  
in the Context of a "Widening Atlantic"

John D. Young, Queen's University

Neutralist sentiment in Canada has peaked during two distinct phases of the American-Soviet relationship in the post-World War II era. These were periods marked by heightened tensions, one from 1959 to 1962, and one from 1979 to 1986.

This paper links the neutrality option to the perceived state of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Domestic legitimization of neutralist thinking has been more pronounced in the recent turn of the cycle than in the earlier one. Increasing Canadian skepticism about American foreign and defence policy has contributed to this widening of the arc of the neutralist swing, but the amplification is also -- and, it can be argued, ultimately so -- consistent with consolidation of the perceptions (and realities) of Soviet strategic equivalency.

At the core of Canadian debates on the relative merits of alignment and neutrality lie opposing threat assessments. Young argues that relations of power (i.e., the "structure" of the international system) condition the way in which pressure groups' and even parliamentary and governmental definitions of the threat have been articulated. He develops his argument by drawing on the Canadian pro-neutralist literature, public opinion survey data, government source materials, and political party policy statements.

Placing current Canadian neutrality thinking in the context of the "widening-Atlantic" thesis, Young concludes that Canada has a stake both in the continuation of détente and the preservation of its alliance commitments.

The Military Consequences of a Neutral Canada

Douglas L. Bland, National Defence College

The contemporary debate over Canadian defence policy has featured an upsurge of advocacy for Canadian neutrality. By this is meant a withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance, as well as from the North American Aerospace Defence Command. The basis of this advocacy is that neutrality would not only enhance the prospects of peace (on the assumption that a causal link can be established between alliances and war) but would also enable Canada to spend much less on defence than it now does.

Typically, however, such entreaties to dismantle collective defence have tended to skirt over the practical consequences that would attend their implementation. In this paper, Bland assumes that Canada, even if it became a neutral state, would still have certain security obligations under international law -- obligations that, ironically, might require greater military expenditures on its part. He sets out to elaborate those obligations, and to discuss their practical military consequences in terms of force structure, capital costs, and deployments.

**"No East or West":  
Canadian Churches and Collective Defence in the 1980s**

Roger Epp, Queen's University

In Canada, as elsewhere, the major churches recently have taken a more active, critical approach to foreign and defence policy, but their positions have been shaped by a distinctly Canadian context. While they have rejected nuclear deterrence "without reservation," they have given more attention, for example, to the extent of Canadian cooperation with American weapons programs and to membership in a nuclear alliance. This paper, after establishing how religious sanction, in a qualified sense, might still be significant to the justification of policy, examines the churches' critique and its sources. The critique includes a case against nuclear weapons, modified by a concern for bilateral disarmament and a crucial distinction between "mutual deterrence" and war-fighting weapons and doctrines; the demonstration of Canadian complicity; and, the urging of a "non-provocative" defence posture, which demands greater control of Canadian territory so as to enhance strategic stability. Such a position finds parallels in the "mentor-state" internationalism ascribed to the Trudeau government, wherein national initiatives are taken ostensibly on behalf of the global community. While Epp criticizes the churches on several points, he argues that they should be situated within the voluntaristic tradition in Canadian foreign policy and understood as "connected critics" who often adopt government declarations as criteria.

One of his more intriguing contentions is that the Canadian churches, while committed to nuclear disarmament in theory, have in practice shown "a somewhat surprising preference for mutual assured destruction as the posture from which to move toward nuclear disarmament." To be sure, this preference is rooted in a comparative context, one that finds the churches vehement in their denunciation of a perceived shift toward war-fighting strategies. Nevertheless, the preference does, to Epp, raise interesting questions from the perspective of just-war theory, among which are "the moral status of targeting civilian populations and of threatening, for the sake of the deterrence relationship, to do what could not in conscience be carried out."

PANEL 1B: THE CANADIAN NUCLEAR-SUBMARINE PROPOSAL

Making Waves: The Strategy and Politics of the  
Nuclear-Submarine Decision

Joel J. Sokolsky, Royal Military College

From the start, the announcement in the 1987 White Paper that Canada would acquire a fleet of 10 to 12 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) has been controversial. This paper argues that the SSNs would not change the fundamental anti-submarine warfare (ASW) emphasis of the Canadian Navy or its missions in NATO and in North American defence. Given likely trends in American and Soviet naval strategy and posture, the SSNs make strategic sense for Canada and for its allies. They will also further Canadian national-sovereignty interests by affording Canada a better capability to operate in all three of its oceans. However, Canada's allies would have preferred more surface ships and more resources for European defence; thus the SSN program could raise questions about Canada's future in NATO.

Sokolsky argues that while the SSNs, and for that matter the White Paper itself, might indicate a higher priority for North American and national roles, NATO political interests will actually be better served in the long run. The SSN program does not enjoy parliamentary or public support despite the growing consensus within Canada in favour of higher defence spending, especially for more naval forces. There are several reasons for this, chief among them the negative, not to say sinister, connotation of the word "nuclear." In light of domestic and allied opposition, the waves made by the SSN proposal could well sink the Navy it was intended to save.

Technical Considerations Regarding Canada's SSN Proposal

S. Mathwin Davis, Queen's University

This is not the first time that the Canadian Navy has looked at SSNs. But in the past, their acquisition has been rejected on the grounds that they were too expensive and unnecessary. In the early 1980s, however, sovereignty emerged as a major defence-policy consideration, particularly with regard to the Arctic. Thus simultaneously with the on-going study of conventional submarine (SSK) options, DND initiated a Nuclear Submarine Option Study at the behest of the Minister during the preparation of the White Paper. By March 1987 it was evident that the Navy could proceed with the SSNs, and this of course was confirmed in the June White Paper. Canada is to select between the British Trafalgar and the French Rubis classes.

Davis, who was involved in previous SSN studies, argues that while these boats have certain clear advantages over SSKs, "the proposed Canadian contribution obtained at an expense which would appear to constrain or unbalance the overall defence budget, seems to be of somewhat doubtful significance" in relations to the overall East-West balance of power. Nor are these the best weapons for NATO or for sovereignty protection. What is more, he deems it unwise for Canada to commit itself to a 27-year program that he argues cannot possibly be sustained, given political realities. The paper concludes that, as an alternative, Canada should acquire SSKs, in batches of six at a time. Technological developments such as Air Independent Propulsion, may give SSKs some of the advantages now associated with nuclear submarines.

### The SSNs and the Question of Nonproliferation

David G. Haglund, Queen's University

One of the most unanticipated objections to the Canadian nuclear-submarine proposal has turned out to be the argument that a Canadian SSN acquisition would have adverse implications for the global nonproliferation regime. This would be so, critics of the SSN program maintain, because of the "precedential" implications of Canada's becoming the first state to avail itself of a clause in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) allowing for the "non-proscribed" military use of nuclear materials. Haglund analyzes this argument, and finds that logically one implication of the SSN program might be such a weakening. There are, however, two other logically tenable assumptions: that the Canadian program might, ironically, strengthen the nonproliferation regime (as the government maintains); or that it might have no impact on the regime, as it appears that other states (e.g. Brazil, Argentina, India) have been developing their own SSN programs irrespective of any Canadian actions.

In addition to his analysis of the precedential issue, Haglund explores a second major connection between nonproliferation and the Canadian SSN program. This inheres in the complicating impact that American nonproliferation mechanisms (in the event two bilateral agreements -- one with the U.K., the other with Canada -- dating back to the late 1950s) could have on the Canadian boat-acquisition process. This nonproliferation question, he argues, could well be a major factor in Ottawa's eventual choice between the British Trafalgar-class SSN and the French Améthyste update of the Rubis-class boat.

## PANEL 2A: THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN DEFENCE

### Canada's Part in North American Air-Defence Modernization

John Anderson, Queen's University

This paper describes and analyzes Ottawa's approach to the 1985 Canada-U.S. agreement on air-defence modernization. The author, who was directly involved in various stages of planning and discussion of this project, seeks to trace its origins from the first appearance, in the United States, of a conceptual plan for modernization during the late 1960s.

Anderson argues that, from the Canadian point of view, the impetus toward modernization derived more from the need to replace obsolete surveillance and warning systems than it did from any new departure in strategic thinking. He further shows the extent to which specific Canadian interests were incorporated into the final design of the modernization program.

### Current Status of SDI: Implications for Canadian Defence

Boris Castel, Queen's University

In the half decade since it was unveiled in President Ronald Reagan's celebrated speech of March 1983, the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative has occasioned a great deal of debate, both in the United States and elsewhere. Although a variety of questions have been posed concerning SDI, the two most important issues addressed by analysts have been the program's feasibility and its desirability. Castel directs his inquiry toward both these concerns, with the view to assessing their likely implications for Canada. Although the full-blown, and oft-caricatured, strategic-defence system known as "star wars" is unlikely ever to eventuate, there is a reasonable prospect that a more modest ballistic-missile-defence capability could be developed by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Customarily, commentators in this country have adopted a wary attitude toward ballistic-missile defence, usually on the assumption that it must by definition prove de-stabilizing to the overall strategic balance between the superpowers. Castel challenges this position, and argues that limited BMD, if accompanied by meaningful arms-control measures, might not only be stabilizing, it might also provide a context for Canadian initiatives undertaken to enhance -- within the context of the BMD/arms-control symbiosis -- global and therefore Canadian security. Specifically, he argues that Canada might make a major contribution in the area of arms-control verification.

## The Air Defence Initiative and Canada

Charles Tutwiler, Queen's University

This paper analyzes the continuing relevance of continental air-defence systems in the late 1980s, and argues that -- the current mood of superpower détente notwithstanding -- recent changes in weapons technology, especially in the realm of the "air-breathing threat," have been forcing a relative re-emphasis upon North American air defence. One important component of this reassessment has been the U.S. Air Defence Initiative (ADI), which seeks to develop the technology necessary to counter Soviet capabilities in low-observable bomber and cruise-missile systems that are anticipated for the 1990s.

In the 1987 Defence White Paper, reference was made to Ottawa's desire to participate in ADI-related projects. Although some academics have assumed that such participation would, at minimum, require an American invitation to take part in the program, Tutwiler shows that there already is Canadian involvement in ADI -- involvement that includes both the Canadian Forces (through representation, *inter alia*, on the NORAD staff) as well as the private sector -- and that there is likely to be further such involvement, at least in the short term. Probing both the sovereignty-protection and security interests that Canada can be said to have in ADI, Tutwiler concludes by suggesting that longer-term collaboration in this project could be greatly affected by shifting political tides in Canada, and by the perception of those political changes in the United States.



## PANEL 2B: CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

### The Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1988

Christopher Conliffe, Queen's University

The oldest of the Canada-U.S. defence organizations, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), has proved to be surprisingly enduring yet, as this paper argues, its effectiveness has been of variable quality. Indeed, "the PJBD has been effective for only six of its forty-eight years." The Board has gone through six phases. In its first one, the war years (1940-1945), the PJBD went from an initial three-year period of high activity and relevance to inactivity in the subsequent two years. There followed phase two, the years of uncertainty (1945-1950), succeeded by the third phase (1950-1953), in which the PJBD had its "last fling" in terms of effectiveness. During the next three phases, and up to the present, the Board has hardly been the focal point of bilateral defence cooperation; to be blunt, it has been in "limbo" since 1963.

Key to the PJBD's importance, Conliffe argues, has been the use made of it by its "patrons," whether the President and Prime Minister or the Chiefs of the armed forces. When they elected to achieve their aims by other means, "the PJBD was reduced to house-keeping or make-work activity." And yet, he concludes that since it is Canada's military alliances that are integral to its defence policy, the very existence of the PJBD is more important than its practical and concrete achievements.

### The INF Treaty: Its Potential Impact on Flexible Response, NATO, and North America

Hans-Jochen Annuss, Queen's University

The INF Treaty has rekindled the debate over NATO strategy. This paper argues that a strategy designed to prevent war of any kind must not be changed overnight if one class of weapons is taken away for political reasons. In military-strategic terms the dismantling of the INF missiles restricts allied escalation options. The structure of NATO's weaponry, has become imbalanced, according to Annuss.

Annuss argues that the treaty has revealed the weakness of current NATO policies. It is time to bring conceptual order into western arms-control policy and to orient it to the overall picture of threat and strategy. He calls for a comprehensive concept for security, arms control, and disarmament, which must take into account the close links between the various weapons categories as well as their relationship to arms control.

In the context of the two-pillar thesis, Annuss urges that consideration be given to the North American pillar. He warns of a situation in which Canada, squeezed out in a new transatlantic bargain, might withdraw from the allied military commands, or even the Alliance itself. Stressing, however, that the Western Alliance is primarily threatened by the strong arsenal of the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, Annuss concludes that the improvement of defence capabilities in this region must remain the primary goal of NATO, notwithstanding the importance of North American defence.

### Implications of Conventional Defence Improvements Initiatives

Bruce Harris, Queen's University

NATO's most recent program to enhance the third leg of the allied triad, the Conventional Defence Improvement (CDI) initiative is the latest in a series of CDIs dating back to the beginnings of the Alliance. The improvement of NATO's conventional posture has not moved in a steady linear progression, but rather can be characterized as a sine wave with increasing amplitudes, followed by declines. The current CDI must be examined with reference to the present strategic and political environment. While flexible response remains valid, it will demand continual conventional force modernization on the part of the allies. But if the Alliance is to stay together, with the maintenance of large American forces in Europe, some kind of new transatlantic bargain may have to be negotiated wherein the European pillar assumes more responsibility and cohesion.

The current CDI can help both to sustain the credibility of flexible response and to provide a basis for greater equality among member states, thereby supporting evolutionary change within the Alliance. As Canada is about to undertake a consolidation and improvement of its air and ground forces in Germany, the CDI is also relevant to NATO's other North American member. Harris concludes that the CDI and complementary national efforts at conventional force improvements represent a "window of opportunity on the high side" of NATO's conventional sine wave, one that can and should be exploited.