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CANADA'S FRONTIERS - A SOVEREIGN PRESENCE

Lecture to STAR Course

CFC Toronto

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by

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## CANADA'S FRONTIERS - A SOVEREIGN PRESENCE

For many countries in Europe, there is a history of centuries of conflict over territory between neighbours. Defence was centred on the frontiers, and wars were fought in order to adjust territorial boundaries.

### Canadian Geography, Demography

- only close to one other country
- very large in area
- population very unevenly distributed
  - clings to southern border
  - highly urbanized
- early history was punctuated by colonial wars involving France, Spain, Britain, and USA

### History (Since Confederation 1967)

- close ties of blood and trade to Europe
- economy largely dominated by exports of raw materials to USA, Europe, Japan
- no military threat from USA - protection of Monroe doctrine plus Pax Britannica (with British naval supremacy)
- participation in distant wars as junior member of large alliance: British Commonwealth (South Africa, WW I, WW II), UN (Korea, peacekeeping)

- policy of collective defence in NATO
  - cornerstone is deterrence of war through collective strength
  - deterrence requires strategic offensive forces (provided by USA)
    - forces to defend these (including warning as well as active defence), Canadian roles in air and sea
    - conventional forces - standing armies and air forces in Europe - means to reinforce and resupply these - transatlantic SLOC
    - European TNF - not Canadian
  
- very limited requirement for territorial defence
  - obviously underwritten by USA
  
- Canada has never joined the OAS (wisdom confirmed by recent events in Central America)
  
- recent concerns over questions of sovereignty
  - some caused by changes in LOS, economic discoveries offshore and in North, increasing effectiveness and competition in exploring maritime resources
  - some artificially stimulated for political reasons (anti-American isolationist sentiments)

#### Wartime Naval and Air Operations

- in past, very much oriented across the Atlantic
  
- seaborne supply of W. Europe

3.

- First Battle of the Atlantic 1917-18 vs U-boats, surface raiders
- Second Battle of the Atlantic 1939-45 vs U-boats, aircraft, surface raiders
- importance of Canadian seaports
  - ships
  - aircraft
- Canadian occupation of Iceland (1940)

Charts

- |     |                                       |                                       |
|-----|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 100 | (North Atlantic convoys 1939-40)      | Threat of raiders, U-boats from north |
| 101 | (North Atlantic convoys 1941-42)      | Route more northerly                  |
| 102 | (U-boats on American Seaboard 1942)   |                                       |
| 103 | (North Atlantic convoys 1943)         | Air cover                             |
| 104 | (Areas of Sinkings in Atlantic WW II) |                                       |
| 105 | (New Supply Routes in WW II)          |                                       |

- WW II air ferry - NE route (Crimson)
  - NW staging route to Alaska & USSR (airfields and Alaska highway)

Charts

- |     |   |   |
|-----|---|---|
| 106 | (Convoy & Transit Routes '39, '40, '41, '44, '84) | - ASW escort                                      |
| 107 | (AS Barrier in GIUK Gap)                          | - GIUK gap and air defence more for NATO partners |

- surveillance of approaches to N. America by ICBM, bomber aircraft, SSBN

- SSBN now able to remain far from target

(although recent Soviet reactions to deployment of LRINF in Europe has included forward positions of some SSBNs)

Charts

- |     |                                      |
|-----|--------------------------------------|
| 108 | (Soviet submarine routes)            |
| 109 | (Bomber approaches to North America) |

- Arctic passages negotiable by submarines, even when ice-covered

4.

Charts

110 (ICBM trajectories vs  
North America)

- anti-bomber defence more of North than E or W. Pinetree, MCL, DEW Line interceptors, joint program, NORAD
- Canada did not participate in the short-lived US program for BMD in the early 1970s
- space surveillance already important
- future of military use of space full of unknowns
- SDI, Canadian participation in Teal Ruby trials of SBIR
  
- Pacific Ocean
  - what role for Canada?
    - USN does surveillance over nearly all the area
    - is there a need to defend transpacific SLOC?  
to where? Alaska - US oil route?
    - regional conflict in Western Pacific?
  - importance of US Trident SSGN base in Bangor, Wash.
  
- Arctic Defence
  - lodgements?
  - is it necessary? what purpose for enemy?
  
- Naval Priorities: how much concentration on ASW? AAW ASuW  
attempt a balanced force?

LANTERN OFF

Sovereignty and Independence

- in spite of alarms, ownership of land is not in question

- water, ice, rights of passage, rights of exploration of sea and seabed, control of pollution
  - some legitimate questions, mostly on Arctic front
  - UNCLOS deadlock
  
- independence, although it has great symbolic significance, can only be a matter of degree in the modern world
  - unless economically prosperous, Canada will be dependent on stronger neighbours
  - to be economically prosperous, Canada needs voluminous international trade - with other states
    - rail and roadborne trade across US border is very important to Canada
    - of seaborne trade, greater than half is to US and other countries of Western Hemisphere, 23% to W. Europe, 11% to Japan, about 65% in bulk cargoes (coal, iron ore, grain....)
  
- does seaborne trade require protection by naval forces?
  - if so, by the flag state? the port states?
  - highly questionable in time of peace (except for piracy)
    - Liberia, Japan, Greece, Norway, Panama
  - in time of war, a matter of great strategic importance, but not dependent on flag
    - life or death in a long war
    - could be very important in forecasts of results by those planning a war or negotiating peace
  - in case of NATO, over one-third of its population and over half its GNP is on the Western shore of the North Atlantic
  - campaign in Europe could be determined by relative speed of buildup by WP NATO
    - WP by interior land lines
    - NATO by transatlantic sea and air communications

Peacetime World ShippingCharts

- 115 (Worldwide Oil Flow 1974)
- 117 (Shipping Routes: 200-mile zone)
- 116 (Ice and Arctic Shipping)

Canadian Territorial Sovereignty

- the practical approach of the government has been to establish "functional jurisdiction" in certain areas beyond the shoreline
    - inland waters: complete jurisdiction, as on land
    - 12-mile territorial sea: same jurisdiction as on the mainland, but innocent passage by foreign ships permitted
    - 100-mile Arctic pollution zone (N of 60N): legal rules
    - 200-mile Economic Zone: foreign fishermen, prospectors, drillers, miners subject to Canadian regulations, but navigation unrestricted. Very significant because of large Canadian continental shelf, rich fishing grounds used by fleets from USSR, Japan, Norway, Portugal, other European, USA and offshore oil and gas (Landlocked states want economic rights)
    - wild life protection zone: certain species protected from hunters (e.g. polar bears)
    - search and rescue zone: Canadian responsibility for marine SAR
    - CADIZ: aircraft approaching Canada from overseas subject to control
    - High Seas: all ships have complete immunity from any jurisdiction other than that of their flag state
    - extension of zones from 3 - 12 - 200 miles has caused problems of boundary determination between USA and Canada (four undetermined boundaries)
- 119 (Canadian Continental Shelf)



- no direct confrontation as yet on some unresolved problems
  - e.g. right of international passage through Arctic archipelago
  - outer limit of EEZ 200 miles or limit of continental shelf?
  - status of ice islands
  
- these developments represent a distinct movement in Canadian policy
  - away from the doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas
  - towards an increasing degree of Ocean Management
  
- similar trends around the world
  - changes are being led by national initiative, only followed up later by international law
  
- some parallel to colonization in the nineteenth century
  - state practice, based on power rather than law
  - rules are made to change by making them effective, through threat or use of force
    - often involving naval presence or coercion
  
- it may require naval force to establish rules, and resist foreigners who do not accept them
  - but the normal enforcement of regulations, whose legality is accepted but whose precepts may not be obeyed, may be better done by civil agencies e.g. fisheries, coastguard, RCMP  
(whether against foreigners or nationals)

#### Type of Maritime Forces for Canada

- balance between military defence (security) and protection of sovereignty

- balance between a high-seas navy and a coastal navy
  - most of the sovereignty tasks likely to be close to the coasts, though perhaps beyond the easy reach of civil agencies
  - some of the defence tasks will be coastal, but the most important are "blue water"
  
- coastal navy implies smaller ships, shorter range aircraft
  
- sovereignty tasks imply good reconnaissance and communication, speed, ability to board, some modest short range surface-to-surface weaponry (shot across the bow)
  
- military tasks imply long range and endurance, good sea-keeping, antisubmarine, antiair, antimissile and long range antiship weaponry, able to compete with sophisticated opponents and countermeasures
  
- recent developments in maritime technology have added to potential capabilities
  - highly capable helicopters on destroyer-size ships
  - highly capable missiles on ships smaller than destroyers
    - ASSM SAM hitting power of FPB
  - developments in passive sonar, esp. towed arrays
  - self-propelled mines
  - electronic warfare
  - new types of ships, hovercraft, hydrofoils, SWATH
  - VSTOL a/c of high performance on small carriers

Requirements for the Three Coasts

- defence of SLOC, primarily the Atlantic

- surveillance for protection of the deterrent
  - 1. Atlantic 2. Pacific 3. Arctic
  
- fisheries
  - 1. Atlantic 2. Pacific 3. Arctic
  
- pollution
  - 1. Atlantic 2. Pacific 3. Arctic
  
- could be modified by new tanker routes
  
- SAR
  - 1. Atlantic 2. Pacific 3. Arctic
  
- mineral exploration and extraction
  - 1. Arctic 2. Atlantic 3. Pacific
  
- icebreaking
  - 1. Atlantic 2. Arctic 3. Pacific
  - could be modified by new traffic patterns and technology

#### International Implications

- coastal states are gaining powers with respect to maritime states
  
- Canada is a coastal state more than a maritime state
  
- economic interests are coastal: security interests are maritime. US & UK are maritime states, primarily
  
- landlocked states form a bloc trying to minimize coastal state rights in favour of an international EEZ

- maritime states want maximum freedom of the seas
- coastal states want large coastal zones with considerable power for security and commerce
- landlocked states want large international zones with considerable economic power
- problems more likely to be resolved by international negotiation than by sea battle
  - but an evident maritime capability and a sovereign presence would be a factor