FORT LAUDERDALE AIRPORT SHOOTING JANUARY 6, 2017

Kenneth A Scheppke, MD
Medical Director
Broward Sheriff's Office and Palm Beach County Fire Rescue
What Really Happened?

Why Did The Event Last So Many Hours?

What Can We Do Better?
PATH OF SHOOTER

• Arrives on Delta flight from Alaska

• Retrieves stowed handgun from baggage carousel

• Loads gun in nearby bathroom stall.

• He then returns to the baggage carousel
SECURITY FOOTAGE OF SHOOTER
85 SECONDS OF SHOOTING FOLLOWED BY HOURS OF CHAOS
COMMUNICATION IS KEY

“We’re Not Gonna Make it”
ANOTHER SHOOTER?
MASS PANIC HITS THE AIRPORT

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=iMNCqU8uJY
VICTIM COUNT

Shooting Victims
• 5 Dead
• 6 Wounded

Mass Panic Victims
• 37 Wounded
PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED

• Undercover Officers Guns Drawn wearing Masks
• 2000 Police Officers Responded some self deploying leaving cars unattended and an “impassable parking lot”
• TSA Officers Run for Cover
• Mass panics erupted when bystanders overheard officers mention possibility of “shots fired”
• Once passenger running began, it spread rapidly
PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED

• Medical Issues Continue in Addition to Trauma Victims

• Flights still arriving while people are running onto taxi and tarmac

• 12,000 People left stranded on tarmac for up to 10 hours without food, water, toilet, meds
FINDING HIDDEN PEOPLE
HOURS LATER
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass communication to public</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reliable communication with responders</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A way to sound the all clear</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evacuation/sheltering/basic med and food</td>
<td>needs for mass gatherings</td>
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</table>
MASS EVACUATION VEHICLE
### LESSONS LEARNED

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Need</td>
<td>PD Vehicle Staging that preserves ability to transport</td>
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<td>Need</td>
<td>Control surrounding urban traffic to allow mass exodus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need</td>
<td>Better unified command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Need</td>
<td>Immediate shutdown of flights</td>
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An SAS RTF for an LAS RTC
The response of the London Ambulance Service to the London Bridge terror attacks; why was this different?

Dr Fionna Moore MBE
Previously CEO and Medical Director
SAS support to MPS
The Emergency Services in London have been repeatedly tested over the last twelve months...
Incident summary from the last twelve months

- Croydon Tram crash, Major Incident
- Westminster Bridge attack, Major Incident
- **London Bridge attack, Major Incident**
- Finsbury Park attack, Significant incident
- **Grenfell Tower fire, Major Incident**
- Public Disorder at Emirates, Significant Incident
- **Parsons Green Tube, Major Incident, downgraded to Significant Incident**
- Exhibition Road, Significant Incident
- Covent Garden, Significant Incident
London Bridge terrorist attack
3 June 2017
MAJOR incident
48 injured / 8 dead
London Bridge; the LAS response

Saturday 3\textsuperscript{rd} June at 21:58hrs – a van vehicle drove at speed into multiple pedestrians on London Bridge, killing three. The assailants abandoned vehicle, proceeded on foot armed with 12 inch ceramic bladed knives and imitation suicide vests & ran towards Borough Market
LAS Response

- Specialist Operations Centre opened
- Full Major Incident Pre Determined Attendance including:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 Operational Commanders</td>
<td>London’s Air Ambulance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Ambulances</td>
<td>Equipment Vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Solo responders</td>
<td>Tactical Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Advanced Paramedics</td>
<td>Medical Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 HART Teams</td>
<td>PLATO Command team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Tactical Response Unit</td>
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- Standby resources
Scene Geography

- Rapidly changing
- Sectorised – North / South / Specialist
- North Sector - CCP established quickly patients evacuated from bridge by police / members of public / LAS
- Sectors split by assailants abandoned vehicle, cordon around
- South more challenging
Response to London Bridge

98 frontline staff
66 ambulance vehicles
14 control room staff
Timeline and Response

22:09 First 999 call received to reports of road traffic collision pedestrian vs van
22:11 First resources dispatched including a motorcycle responder and single responder in car
22:11 First operational commander dispatched to scene
22:12 Surge in 999 calls received at both control rooms
22:13 First resource on scene
22:16 Initial windscreen report stating multiple casualties
22:17 MPS declared major incident and establish tri-service conference call
22:17 Confirmation via ES5 (interoperability talkgroup) Police treating as Terrorist Incident
22:18 Reports of member of the public hiding in buildings for safety
22:18 Auto-dispatch turned off
22:19 Advanced paramedic declared a major incident and provides initial METHANE report
22:19 999 call advising men had walked in to a restaurant and stabbed one of the customers
22:20 Call from other Ambulance Services as London 999 calls presenting to them
22:25 First operational commander arrived on scene
22:25 Reports of shots being fired
22:27 Armed police on scene and members of public evacuating the area
22:28 Specialist Operations Centre in operation and incident talk groups opened
22:30 On call tactical commander en route to Waterloo SOC
22:31 MPS declare “Operation PLATO”
23:26 Update report from BRONZE at NORTH Rendezvous point
23:26 Ambulance Intervention Team confirmed London Bridge clear of casualties
23:44 BRONZE MEDIC NORTH – reports possible active shooter
23:46 Active shooter being reported on the Southbank
23:52 Update from Bronze Medic – Active shooter both side of London Bridge, Special Forces deployed
00.01 Information from Multi-agency Tactical Meeting
00.20 Request from tri-service conference call for 2 ambulance to enter hot-zone with armed escort
03:03 Incident downgraded to significant incident
Challenges at London Bridge

- Time of evening that incident occurred
- Already a busy night in London
- 999 calls – all routine types of calls
- Scene rapidly changing
- Where was safe…….
- Resources sent to Rendezvous Points (RVP)
- South of river rendezvous point
- Ambulance Personnel stranded
- Police information

- Casualty clearing
- Declaration of PLATO
- Arrival of special forces
- Triage
- Media
- Run, Hide, Tell
What have we learnt?

- Working out what’s going on is difficult
- We will get there quick – which is a risk!
- Maintain situational awareness
- Keep the hospitals informed
- Triage is dynamic
- Benefits of close interagency working
- Staff welfare – same staff involved
And...........

The next major incident may be sooner than you think

Grenfell Tower fire
14 June 2017
MAJOR incident
70+ injured / 71 dead
QUESTIONS?

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Thank you