



GENERAL BOYAROV by VYACHESLAV KEVORKOV, Chapter  
*TRIANON*

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1 September 2003

The “Trianon” case began with very sparse information received from a source in Colombia. He reported that American intelligence recruited a Soviet diplomat in Bogota. All efforts to clarify more precisely the rank, post or even the age of the diplomat came up without results. Apparently, the information came to the source as a result of the Americans’ scornful attitude toward the rules of conspiracy. They did not consider that in Latin America a good many people sympathize totally with the idea of socialism and with the Soviet Union in particular.

“We will look for a needle in a haystack” – concluded Vitaly Boyarov<sup>ii</sup> with displeasure after being briefed.

**NEEDLE IN A HAYSTACK**

By a fortunate coincidence, by this time a security group<sup>iii</sup> had come into its own in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The embedding of the group into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs required substantial efforts from state security. The foreign policy

establishment at that time was headed by a member of the Politburo, Andrei Gromyko<sup>iv</sup>. He built foreign policy in the Stalin era, when only granite was recognized as building material. All foreign policy at that time was hard as stone, and Gromyko himself had a reputation as “Mister No.” He remained the same in the 1970s. No one could really judge Gromyko’s intellect, because if some kind of complicated situation arose, he quickly switched on not his mind but his memory, from which he pulled out and followed one already known path from many precedents accumulated from many years of service. The security group was created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the first time. There was no precedent.

Vitaly [Boyarov] met with officers of the service (*sluzhba*<sup>v</sup> [*bezopasnosti*]) with information received from Colombia. A search began for a person without a name, post, and even without a personal description.

The only applicant for the role of a traitor after a grueling check was a certain Ogorodnik, an employee of the Directorate of Planning for Foreign Policy Issues (UpVM) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR<sup>vi</sup>. There was no direct evidence of his treachery, but there were facts providing a basis to suspect him.

Ogorodnik possessed almost the entire set of qualities described in numerous instruction manuals of American intelligence. This drew the attention of its officers focused on recruiting Soviet citizens: a despairing careerist, egoist, with an incredibly heightened sense of self value. And something else caught one’s attention. Upon his return to Moscow, Ogorodnik was offered a fairly solid post at the Institute for Latin American Affairs at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR with a decent salary for that time – 350 rubles. He declined and with maximum effort proposed that he remain at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the salary was almost half. And Ogorodnik even had the reputation of being a miser!

An operational analysis of several factors also did not turn out to Ogorodnik’s advantage. His return from Colombia coincided with the appearance on a new radio channel with encrypted transmissions, which were broadcast to Moscow by the American intelligence radio center in Frankfurt. We analyzed the

transmissions and concluded that the person receiving them was most likely a bachelor living in a separate apartment or a well-isolated room because the transmissions came in at a very late hour. The surveillance service reports noted that Ogorodnik constantly checked for surveillance and often left the surveillance team in a difficult position before traveling around the city.

On arrival in Moscow, Ogorodnik actually divorced his wife and lived in a two-room apartment which consisted of one isolated room. As a result of observation, there were cases when the lights in his apartment were lit at night during the broadcasts of the Frankfurt Radio Center.

Even though Ogorodnik worked in a not very important position of low status, he worked in a solid spot. In the Directorate of Planning for Foreign Policy Issues (UpVM), the annual reports of ambassadors, the summary and analytical materials of the directorates and departments of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs were concentrated - in general, everything that undoubtedly could be of interest to the Americans.

In practice, for Vitaly more often than not, coincidences turned out to be random. But he knew that the number of coincidences could not be infinite. At some point, they turn into evidence.

## **OLGA, PILAR AND OTHERS**

In Colombia after several tumultuous love affairs with diplomats' wives, Ogorodnik set his sights on the wife of a coworker in the trade mission, Olga Serova. She was the only daughter of a famous Moscow therapist, smart, observant, and by no means frivolous. Her marriage was unsuccessful. She could not resist Ogorodnik's advances, and began to see him, which was not easy in the Soviet colony where everything was visible. The secret lovers agreed that when they returned home each of them would divorce and they would join their fates together.

Ogorodnik, however, wasn't a monogamous man. Yet another woman appeared in his orbit. This time it was the charming Pilar from a noble Spanish family.

No wonder the French teach that in every crime, first of all, look for a woman. Pilar was skillful not only in love but also in business. Wasting no time, she took

Ogorodnik to the Hilton Hotel where recruiters who flew in from the United States proposed that Ogorodnik cooperate with the American spies. He was promised standard compensation in dollars, future American citizenship and a comfortable existence. After thinking about it for a short while, Ogorodnik agreed.

Out of all the lessons that Kim Philby gave after the war to future employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, Americans worst of all have mastered the section on conspiracy. Olga, lacking counterintelligence training but having well-developed feminine intuition, very quickly figured out the contacts between Ogorodnik and Pilar and later with the Americans.

Upon their return to Moscow, Ogorodnik and Olga implemented the first part of their plan – they divorced and met constantly, preparing for their life together. But it was here that Olga noticed several moments of Ogorodnik's strange behavior. And she committed a fatal mistake – she honestly told her "fiancé" about her suspicions. Ogorodnik tried to calm her: alleging that he was a deep undercover Soviet intelligence agent like Stierlitz<sup>vii</sup> and was preparing to carry out complex missions abroad. Olga was too intelligent to believe this nonsense...

Life with a person who knows more about you than you would like turns into a nightmare. The American spies were diligent in their work but in instructing Ogorodnik, but they neglected to teach him the main commandment: a person working against his own country should not leave any written records, even the most innocent. Ogorodnik actually kept a diary in which he naturally did not write anything about his relationships with the Americans, but he described his state of mind in great detail.

Vitaly [Boyarov] read a copy taken from it and was surprised not only by the carelessness of the Americans, preparing the traitor, but also by the behavior of Ogorodnik himself. He was a careful person – and suddenly he was making notes from which even a person who wasn't looking for something would understand that something unusual was going on with the author. So, right after being recruited, Ogorodnik wrote in his diary: "I have never been as upset as I was yesterday. Now I am a man who long ago decided for myself that I would not die having grown decrepit in bed... I suddenly began to fear danger more than I should."

After the unfortunate conversation with Olga, Ogorodnik felt even more hurt. This beloved woman, whom he wanted to marry, was becoming a threat. Any minor quarrel could push her to share her suspicions with someone. And this meant his death. He could be saved only by removing Olga. He saw no other way.

Ogorodnik kept in contact with officers of the American CIA Station in Moscow through a drop. He asked them to deliver a poison pill in the event of failure. They delivered it to him. It was exactly that pill that he used to remove an important witness against him – Olga. He seriously prepared for her murder by buying books on the effect of poison on the human body. (These books led to certain thoughts of the officers who had surreptitiously visited his apartment.)

In order to hide the crime, Ogorodnik totally cold-bloodedly calculated and timed the murder of his girlfriend to coincide with the beginning of a flu epidemic in the city. He added the poison into Olga's food in small doses, gradually destroying her body as he had learned in the books about poison. When Olga became very ill, he called her father who quickly took her to the hospital where she died. The father did not allow a postmortem examination. During the burial, Ogorodnik, sobbing inconsolably, put a wedding ring on the deceased. It is possible he sincerely grieved and was distressed. But the fear of exposure was stronger.

Having used up the poison pill on Olga, Ogorodnik requested they send him another pill which considerably puzzled his American bosses. Nevertheless, they fulfilled his request. A second container with poison was delivered again through a dead drop. A written request was attached to it: "We are very reluctant to give you another special cartridge for your fountain pen. We hope that you will treat it carefully and not use it rashly ... Always remember exactly where you put it ..."

## **OLGA-2, OR SON-IN-LAW OF A SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE**

Finished with one lady of the heart, Ogorodnik quickly began to search for her replacement. He therefore decided to renew his acquaintance with the family of a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Rusakov<sup>viii</sup>. Ogorodnik had socialized with their daughter Olga during his studies at MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations) and during graduate school. Now that marriage would open unbelievable perspectives: a luxurious

career in the Foreign Ministry and an incredible take-off in the eyes of his American bosses. But he could not force the marriage, he had to let that situation mature.

Vitaly's subordinates continued to follow Ogorodnik, compiling seemingly irreconcilable facts.

It was the end of April in 1977. At six o'clock in the evening, it was still light on the street. Returning home from work, Ogorodnik shut the windows tightly and turned on the light. At the same time, the American radio intelligence center began transmitting to Moscow. The transmission from Frankfurt ended, the curtains on the window parted, and the chandelier went out. In order to disorient Soviet counterintelligence, the Frankfurt center repeated its transmission several times a day. Ogorodnik's actions during one of these transmissions might appear to be a happenstance coincidence.

Ogorodnik's walks around the Staromozhayskoe Shosse near Victory Park (Park Pobedy) were recorded by surveillance. The fact that Ogorodnik had a car but chose to get to Victory Park on city transportation; that he even took a trolleybus to a bus on the same line raised some eyebrows. Once Ogorodnik strolled along Staromozhayskoe shosse during a downpour. An officer of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Jack Downing<sup>ix</sup>, slogged through the mud along the same route, repeating it exactly.

Ogorodnik acted like a recruited agent. But all of this was only suspicion, facts were needed.

In the Directorate of Planning for Foreign Policy Issues (UpVM), Ogorodnik had access to classified information. Sometimes, in the absence of a staff member of the Directorate's Secretariat, he filled in for her. At that time all the encrypted telegrams went through him. It was permissible to read them only in a specially equipped room. When he was on duty, the room was closed by key. Many thought Ogorodnik was in there taking a nap or doing his own business: either writing his thesis or reading books. His colleagues were not far from the truth. Ogorodnik really did read locked in the room, but not classical literature, secret documents. And he not only read them, he also photographed them. At first the camera was mounted in a lighter, and after that when Ogorodnik quit smoking – in a felt-tip pen. Just photographing documents by itself, even secret ones, would

be difficult to qualify as espionage. The exposed "photographer" could justify the fact that he wanted to use materials for his classified dissertation.

In the second half of May 1977, Ogorodnik and his new fiancée vacationed in Georgia. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the republic received a call from the apparatus of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Rusakov. In the name of Konstantin Viktorovich they were informed of the trip to Tbilisi of a certain Ogorodnik. They would need to pay special attention to him and make sure he had a comfortable and relaxing stay.

Counterintelligence used the absence of Ogorodnik to "equip" his home with their systems.

A month later, Ogorodnik and his fiancée returned to Moscow. Upon arrival, Olga went to see her parents, and Ogorodnik retired to his room. Analyzing the information received, Vitaly came to the conclusion that the vacation did not go well for Ogorodnik. As the observers reported, he silently wandered around the room from corner to corner, then he suddenly sat down and for a long time, without moving, looked at one point, then he began to conduct conversations with himself. He slept poorly and screamed out something in a dream.

Even the usual tinkering with the microfilm now caused him more nervous stress.

## **DEATH OF A SPY**

Any agent, working in foreign intelligence, has a plan to save himself in the event of a threat of discovery – usually an illegal exfiltration from the country where he is staying. And the Americans worked out such a plan for Ogorodnik. Under danger of exposure he was to give a signal to the American CIA Station in Moscow. Then he was to travel by train to Leningrad, and from there to Sestroretsk on the local tram. There at the gas station near the tram station, he was to get in a car waiting there with the Americans who would hand him an American passport and take him through Vyborg into Finland. Of course, he could have acted differently - to sever ties with the Americans, destroy all the evidence and, as they say, lay low. This would greatly complicate his further development. It could not be ruled out that, having fallen into a depression, Ogorodnik would commit suicide.

There was still a very small but significant blank spot in the investigation – texts on microfilms. What would they show? Counterintelligence officers entered Ogorodnik's apartment and made copies of the films.

“Dear S”! – wrote the Americans – “We thank you for your May package. Document “A” proved to be very valuable and we immediately sent it up the chain of command.” And further: “Your work is extremely important to us. And thank you for the excellent choice of materials sent in April, especially about the PRC and the USA... You did quite a bit to benefit our mutual interests... We express our sincere thanks. Ron N., Moscow and Headquarters jointly salute you.”

After touching thanks and greetings, financial calculations followed: “In this packet are 2 thousand rubles, one thousand for June and July and also a bonus. That is - 60,000 U.S. dollars. A total of 319,928.92. Subtracted for purchases of jewelry in May 1977 3,337.63 ”

They began the arrest of Ogorodnik on 22 June 1977. In the evening, the capture group, investigators, and witnesses concentrated near Ogorodnik's home on Krasnopresnenskaya Naberezhnaya. They waited a long time. It had already gotten dark when his car pulled up in the courtyard. Climbing up to his floor and approaching the door, Ogorodnik put the key in, but the lock did not yield. Obviously, the technicians who opened the door for the covert search had treated the lock too roughly. “Someone has been here,” - loudly pronounced Ogorodnik. The officers of the capture crew arrived to help the poor fellow open the door and entered the apartment with him. Ogorodnik invited them to sit down and immediately turned on the receiver loudly. Ogorodnik's home was located not far from the American embassy, and receiver manipulation could be a signal for the U.S. CIA Station. They requested that he turn off the receiver. Investigators read out the prosecutor's order for the arrest and search. They invited witnesses. They searched Ogorodnik and sat him on the couch between two officers. They presented him with material evidence - a flashlight, batteries with microfilms. Then they found an encryption notebook with a transmission code from the intelligence center in Frankfurt. To the investigators' great surprise, sheets of transcribed transcripts scattered across various books were discovered. Amazingly, Ogorodnik had not destroyed them, contrary to the strictest instructions.

Nevertheless, he managed to lull the vigilance of the investigators. Approximately at 2 o'clock in the morning he said that he was ready to confess his guilt. They sat him at the table, put a piece of clean paper in front of him and he began to write: "To the Committee for State Security (KGB), a Statement. I, Ogorodnik, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich confess..." Finishing only the first line, he did something to the pen and suddenly leaned back, wheezed and began to crawl out of the chair. They called an ambulance. However, all attempts to save him were not crowned with success. About four o'clock in the morning the doctors recorded his death.

## **FAILURE BECAME VICTORY**

Boyarov, heading the operation, was forced to admit what happened was a serious failure. Naturally, it would be followed by a whole set of troubles - explanations, a reprimand, an order on non-compliance of the position, but most offensive, a rebuke of unprofessionalism. And all of that was correct because he was the leader and was in charge of everything.

Grigorenko<sup>x</sup>, the head of the Directorate, phoned and asked to come in. He listened carefully to the saga about the night and asked, smiling sadly:

"Well, how can we please our boss, besides your sad story?"

"The future," Vitaly answered grimly. "We have ciphers in our hands and communications with the Americans. We can receive instructions from them and maintain secret communications. We can set up a radio game, bring the American intelligence officer into a contact and take him into detention during a dead drop.

"Now that is very interesting," Grigorenko became more animated. Radio intelligence games was his bag. Back during the war, he organized them as part of front-line intelligence, luring agents of the German Abwehr to capture or destroy them.

We were not able to discuss the plan for a game with the Americans to the end, since a call came in from Andropov's Secretariat. The boss called us on the carpet. Contrary to expectations, Andropov was not at all in as bad a mood as one might have expected. He listened carefully to the story of Ogorodnik's suicide. He interrupted in only one place – he asked us not to go into detail. He listened to

the plan to continue the games with the Americans without interrupting and then immediately summed up:

Well, congratulations, the enemy agent is neutralized, and this is very important. As for the exposure of the American intelligence officer, I rely on your high professionalism. Only one request: everything should be at the highest level of legality.

The circumstances that so softened the reprimand did not occur to Boyarov and Grigorenko. But they were such. Ogorodnik was dating the daughter of the Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR, Rusakov. Plans for marriage were even forming. For Rusakov, any mention of his name, and even more so of his daughter and wife at the traitor's trial, would be a serious blow to State Security, and therefore to Andropov, who even without this was not regarded very favorably by members of the Politburo.

There was one other serious factor. The spy is under the oldest member of the Politburo, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who liked to emphasize that his ministry employees did not commit treason!

Andropov clearly understood that any trial is a tribune for the accused himself. In the process Ogorodnik could completely communicate a lot of interesting things about his personal connections and about procedures in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, Gromyko oriented the foreign policy of the USSR primarily toward the United States. Regardless of any turn of events, he always had an unsinkable argument in store: "Should we needlessly annoy the Americans?"

So a high-profile trial could seriously undermine the prestige of Rusakov and Gromyko. Andropov's plans did not include making enemies of them.

Vitaly Boyarov will later come to the conclusion that the tragic outcome in the Ogorodnik case was convenient even for the United States. [Malcolm] Toon<sup>xi</sup>, the American ambassador to Moscow, appears at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, apologizes and expresses his urgent request not to make the incident public, "which would be highly appreciated by the government of the United States of America."

But the ambassador's apologies were preceded by a brilliant counterintelligence operation. One of the indispensable signals for a meeting was that Ogorodnik's

car was left in a certain spot. It was urgent to prepare his double, and his companion - Olga-2. The Directorate of State Security engaged in surveillance was perhaps the most numerous, so it was from its employees that a young couple was selected by outward resemblance. Theatrical make-up artists took care of the rest. The theatrical extras and the car were placed exactly in that spot and at the time prescribed in the radiogram received from Frankfurt. American intelligence officers drove by and slowed down slightly. However, the flow of traffic did not allow them to take a close look at the parked car, a la Trianon and his companion.

The meeting, according to instructions, should have taken place on July 15. And the container, camouflaged as a piece of cement, was supposed to be located in the opening of the tower of the old Krasnokaluzhsky railway bridge across the Moscow River.

Vitaly led the operation at the scene: on the opposite bank of the river, a tank night vision device was installed in the building under construction. The capture group was located in close proximity to the bridge tower.

When it got dark, a woman, a vice-consul of the American Embassy, Martha Peterson, suddenly appeared. She climbed the stairs and walked up to the opening of the tower where she was immediately detained. Quickly evaluating the situation in which she had fallen, Peterson began to loudly shout in order to warn Trianon: she assumed he might have been nearby.

Peterson was taken to the KGB reception room. They called the American consul, who, having learned all the details of what had happened, took her to the American embassy. When opening the container, employees found a written warning: "Attention, comrade! You accidentally entered someone else's secret, picking up someone else's package and things ... Take the money and gold, but do not touch the other things so as not to endanger your life and the life of your loved ones ... You are warned !!!" Under the warning laid a packet with money and gold articles.

After Peterson was caught red-handed and expelled from the country, Andropov considered the Trianon case to be completed.

The book by V. Kevorkov "General Boyarov" was published by Publishing House "Collection 'Top Secret,'" and can be ordered by calling (095) 291-51-44 and 290-04-38.

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<sup>i</sup> Translation of extract from <https://www.peoples.ru/military/general/boyarov/> "In the early 1980s, the television series "TASS Authorized to Announce" was broadcast with great success in the Soviet Union. The movie was shot based on the script of Julian Semenov, and the basis of its plot was the so-called "Trianon case." . This case was a total success for the KGB. The film character General Konstantinov, who was played by People's Artist of the USSR Vyacheslav Tikhonov, was based on Vitaly Boyarov. It was he who directed this operation, it was he who owned the idea of creating the film, and he was the main consultant.

Wikipedia in Russian: Кеворков, Вячеслав Ервандович

<https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2,%D0%92%D1%8F%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%95%D1%80%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%91%D0%BE%D1%8F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2,%D0%92%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B9%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87>

<sup>ii</sup> Wikipedia in Russian: Бояров, Виталий Константинович

<https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%91%D0%BE%D1%8F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2,%D0%92%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B9%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87>

<sup>iii</sup> [Translator: for background on the security group, formally (Clandestine) Security Service of the MFA, see <http://shieldandsword.mozohin.ru/kgb5491/reserv/min/mid.htm> "In 1973, the KGB Ministry of Foreign Affairs' clandestine Security Service (*законспирированная*) *служба безопасности КГБ МИД (Министерство иностранных дел СССР)* was created. It was subordinated to the 7th (then 12th) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (SCD) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Its employees were part of the Special Department (*спецотдел*) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the activities of the Security Service (SB, *sluzhba bezopasnosti*) were supervised by [MFA] Deputy Minister I. N. Zemskov." Also see Russian Wikipedia entry for Zemskov:

<https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%97%D0%B5%D0%BC%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2,%D0%98%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%8C%D0%9D%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87>

KGB Colonel Mikhail Ivanovich Kuryshev was Chief of the KGB Security Service of the MFA:

<sup>iv</sup> Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrei\\_Gromyko](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrei_Gromyko)

<sup>v</sup> From Igor Peretruxhin's *Agent Codename TRIANON* on this security group (*gruppa*) or *security service (sluzhba)*: "In the extremely complicated international situation during the Cold War, when the intelligence services of the opponent stepped up their activities, the Second Chief Directorate perfected its work methods. There were subunits with new functions both directly in the directorate and beyond its

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boundaries in the form of security services in facilities with possible agent penetration. In 1975 one such service was created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

The creation of the Security Service did not happen without some difficulties associated with the ambiguity of evaluating its future activities in the leadership circles of the ministry. But eventually Andrey Gromyko gave his consent. After that, a group of operatives led by Col. Mikhail Ivanovich Kuryshhev for the first time officially entered into the staffing of one of the ministry departments and occupied the rooms given to them in the building on Smolenskaya Square. Besides this, a number of officers from other units of our department, and also graduates of the higher school of the KGB of the USSR who earlier had graduated from civilian higher education institutions and then undertook language training, were sent to staff the Seventh Department for Work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Sedmoy otdel po rabote po MID*): Grechayev, Udalov, Shitikov, Leytan, and Molodtsov. It was determined that Kuryshhev's communications with the minister on all questions would be carried out through the Deputy Minister, Igor Nikolayevich Zemskov.”

<sup>vi</sup> Also called “Global Affairs”+

<sup>vii</sup> Famous character in Julian Semenov’s novel and TV series, see <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stierlitz>

<sup>viii</sup> Konstantin Rusakov, member of the Central Committee CPSS

<https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Konstantin+Rusakov><https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Konstantin+Rusakov> or Russian Wikipedia:

<https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A0%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2,%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%92%D0%B8%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87>

<sup>ix</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack\\_G.\\_Downing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_G._Downing)

<sup>x</sup> <https://persona.rin.ru/eng/view/f/0/18190/grigorenko-grigory-fyodorovich>

<sup>xi</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malcolm\\_Toon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malcolm_Toon)