A Supplement?

We looked forward to publishing this article by our friend, Thomas Zacharis, in Thessaloniki, but we thought it might be too long for a newsletter. The newsletters are limited by the file size. Too large a file can be awkward to send. But it gave us an excuse for a supplement, and that gives us an opportunity to add a few items for which there wasn’t room in the November-December Newsletter.

There’s not much in the way of pictures of Donzelot. This one was done by André Dutertre, one of the savants who joined Napoleon for the Egyptian campaign, and drew 184 portraits of the soldiers and scientists he met. Fortunately, one of them was Donzelot.

THE IONIAN ISLANDS IN THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE: THE PERIOD OF DONZELOT (1808-1814)
by Thomas Zacharis

The first Chief of Staff of the right wing of the Army of the Rhine, Comte François-Xavier Donzelot was born in Mamirolle (Doubs) on 7 January 1764 and died at the castle of Ville-Évrard (Neuilly sur Marne, Seine-St.-Denis) on 11th June 1843. He managed first to bring himself...
to the attention of General Moreau, while later he struck up a friendship with General Desaix, who took him to Egypt. There he took part in the campaign against Murat Bey, in which his brother lost his life.

The Emperor appointed him to a government post in Apulia, and then, after making him a baron, sent him as governor to Lefkada (St. Maura), on 9 October 1807. He was later made a divisional administrator, on 6 December of the same year, and then governor of Cephalonia. By a secret decree of 28 January 1808, he took over from César Berthier the administration of the Ionian Islands. However, he did not officially take up his position until 28 March 1808, because the Emperor wished for a detailed briefing from Berthier on the various problems of the administration.

The first major problem that confronted Donzelot was Ali Pasha of Ioannina, the worst ally France ever had. The first item Donzelot had to deal with was the issue of the bridgehead at Vouthroto (Boudino). The Venetians had surrendered to the French a large fortress at this location. During the hostilities of 1798 General Chabot had ordered the fort to be mined and blown up. Ali Pasha later built a smaller fortress on the same site. After the Treaty of Tilsit the French were insistent that the site be conceded to them so that they could keep the straits of Corfu under cross-fire. This, of course, was just a pretext to build a larger bridgehead. Berthier came under pressure from Napoleon to detach a force to seize Vouthroto; which together with troops sent by Marmont from Dalmatia would amount to 8,000 men. This presented Berthier with a problem; he was afraid it would leave the Corfu garrison under strength.

In February 1808 Ali Pasha received a letter from Berthier informing him that the Sultan had agreed to concede Vouthroto to the French. Ali Pasha refused to comply with the Sultan’s wishes and began to put obstacles in the way.

Napoleon was now learning the mysteries of Oriental diplomacy. The courier bringing the Sultan’s decree could not find a horse to bring him to Epirus. On another occasion he mislaid the satchel containing his messages. On another he took the wrong road. Meanwhile Ali Pasha summoned to Preveza all the Beys and informed them that the Porte was at war with the French, claiming that the messengers who were to have brought the news had been prevented from arriving by snowstorms. Berthier issued an ultimatum: Vouthroto must be surrendered to him within ten days, or he would take it by force.

In March 1808 relations deteriorated further. Marmont ordered the 3rd Light Artillery Regiment to prepare for action. Four officers sent forward to reconnoiter entered the fortress of Antivari (Bar) without the permission of the governor and were killed by the garrison. To the protests of the French, the Porte replied that the men had no pass-

What are these islands called?

It can be hard to keep track of some of the placenames used two centuries ago. Many used the Venetian names, as they had been the recent rulers. These were often mangled by French or British writers. Of course today the Greek names are official, but old English names like Corfu and Zante are still popular.

The seven islands constituting the Republic were:

- Kerkyra (Corfu)
- Paxi (Paxos)
- Lefkada (Leucada or Santa Maura)
- Kefalonia (Cefalonia)
- Ithaki (Ithaca)
- Zakynthos (Zante)
- Kythira (Cythera/Cerigo).

Across the sea, in Greece and Albania, the names can be more confusing, with Serb and Albania variants in frequent use, with many options in spelling. So when Thomas Zacharis refers to Vouthroto (Boudino), on modern maps it’s the city of Butrint. It’s best not to worry too much.

The Septinsular Republic existed from 1800 to 1807. Russia and Turkey created it out of old Venetian territories grabbed after Napoleon dispossessed Venice. But Napoleon regained them by treaty after his victories in 1805.

When it was a part of Napoleon’s Empire, the islands were known in French as the République Septinsulaire or République des Sept-Îles. Napoleon thought the islands would control the Adriatic and project French power in the direction of the Eastern Mediterranean and Egypt.

When the British took over in 1814, they liked Corfu so much it was 1864 before they left. They finally handed it over to their friend, Greece, which had been waiting patiently since its independence in 1826.
The dispatch of troops by Marmont was deferred, while Ali Pasha received a ‘gift’ from the British in the form of a ship with military equipment and artillery for use against the ‘common enemy’ – the French.

“What can the French do? For months now they have been threatening the Pasha of Shkodra. They will get nothing, not a single sheep. Not all the armies of France can take Antivari. Your Emperor wants to treat me as a subject, but he will never have me in the position to which Spain has been reduced.” This was the response of Ali Pasha to the protests of Pouqueville that he was siding with the British. Ali Pasha’s position had been strengthened in a way because at the same time that Donzelot assumed his post, the position of Political Commissar was taken up by Gerard-Pierre-Julien Bessieres (a cousin of the Marshal). Bessieres was to employ the tactic of friendship with the despot of Epirus.

In addition to the questions of policy towards Ali Pasha, Donzelot also found himself confronted by problems of a financial nature.

The worst ally Napoleon ever had? This is portrait of Ali Pasha with his favorite, Kira Vassilik, painted by Paul Emil Jacobs in 1848. I suspect Jacobs had little idea what Ali Pasha really looked like. But we really need a good biography of Ali Pasha.
As Berthier was to inform him, there was an annual deficit of 400,000 francs, and the supplies left by the Russians were so badly damaged that he refused to pay for them and was compelled to purchase new provisions to build up a sufficient store to withstand a six-month siege.

The fortifications, too, were in a wretched state, but Berthier had not ventured on the necessary repairs for want of money.

A lively discussion took place between the two generals.

Finally, Donzelot summoned the courage to request in May 1808 – as a gift marking the assumption of his duties – a subsidy of 200,000 francs per month. Napoleon’s response was daunting: ‘Is General Donzelot perhaps unaware that 200,000 francs a month is 2,400,000 francs a year? The artillery should not cost more than 30-40,000 francs a year. I also see in General Donzelot’s budget 120,000 francs a month for ships and 20,000 for maritime transport, which makes 140,000 francs a month. It is my intention that all these items should not cost so much each year. There is also no need for the headquarters to be so well supplied, and as for transport for the artillery, you should make do with oxen. All I see in Corfu are incompetent administrators, to whom economy means nothing, and first and foremost I refer to Political Commissar Bessieres’. The Emperor’s remarks were unjust, because the Greek islands, like all the French possessions and those of her allies, were subject to the continental system of embargo.

First of all Donzelot directed his efforts to increasing domestic production, especially the cultivation of wheat – in which he achieved great success, thanks to the planting of large areas of land, in Corfu that had previously been regarded as infertile.

At the same time, new taxes were levied. Commissar Bessieres secured ratification from the Senate in 1808 of a law on stamp duty, which had been passed four years before but never enacted.

When some senators objected to the new tax, Bessieres replied ironically that he could perfectly well enforce it without the consent of the Senate, which ‘being of no use, might as well be closed.’

Faced with this ultimatum, the Greeks decided to make a virtue of necessity and voted to approve the law ‘as a clear demonstration of their respect for and devotion to the Emperor Napoleon.’

The levying of stamp duty was the origin of the first complaints by the Greeks against the French, just as it had been the occasion of the American uprising against the British.

To reduce even further the cost of occupation, Napoleon ordered all the French vessels guarding the islands to gather at Ancona (January-March 1809), while the war with Austria provided him with a justification for returning three regiments to Italy to reinforce the army there. However, this meant that the islands were left unprotected. On Zakynthos and Cephalonia there remained no more than two French officers with 25-30 men, supposed to train the foreign troops, i.e. 1,200 Albanians and as many Greeks as enlisted voluntarily.

On Zakynthos and Cephalonia there were Corfu, Parga and Paxoi. The reader should be reminded here that the representatives of the occupied territories retained their seats in the Senate of Corfu. It is also worth pointing out that one of the first measures taken by the British in the ‘liberated islands’ was to abolish the stamp duty.

The situation in which the remaining French possessions found themselves prompted Napoleon to take immediate steps to consolidate their defences. In a memorandum dated 21 June 1810 he writes: ‘I believe it is necessary that at the advanced positions, eight hundred or a thousand yards from
the San Remo abutment, at points which offer control of the terrain, we should create five or six abutments, extending to the shore to the right and left, over an area of two thousand two hundred yards... As the abutments are constructed stores of powder should be placed within them, with reinforced walls and covered with earth.’

The Emperor continued: ‘As soon as the first line is in place a second should be created, starting at the San Salvador fort, with the salt marshes before it, abutting on the sea and preventing the enemy from gaining a foothold on the Agios Panteleimon peninsula. We shall add two forts to the system of lines: one between the San Salvador fort and the salt marshes, the other between the salt marshes and the sea – the two to be connected by a line to the rear if this appears necessary.’

On 21 April Napoleon ordered the Minister for War to send provisions to Corfu, enough to last for many years, as well as artillery shells.

General Donzelot was under the command of the King of Naples, who acted ‘not as a king, but as the commander of the Italian armies.’ The greater the threat to Corfu, the keener the Emperor’s interest in the island. On 28 September 1810 he wrote: ‘Day by day Corfu acquires greater importance, because of the fact that when the British seize control of it they will be masters of the Adriatic Sea.’

He had the same message for the delegation from the Corfiote Senate which came to visit him and congratulate him on the birth of his son, the King of Rome, on 18 August 1811. The delegation consisted of E. Theotokis, who was to be made a baron, Dionysios Romas and Iakovos Halikiopoulos. ‘I have built substantial fortifications for your island; I have assembled a large body of troops there with munitions of all kinds. I do not grudge the cost to my Exchequer, for Corfu is the key to the Adriatic.’

As chance would have it, the Greek delegation were in attendance on the Emperor at the same time as a delegation from the prefec ture of Lippe – envoys from the most distant regions and the most different of peoples come together to fawn on the descendant of Charlemagne. “That divine providence,” said Napoleon to the delegation from Lippe, “which has assisted me in restoring the throne of Charlemagne, has returned you, with the Netherlands and the Hanseatic cities, to your place in the Empire.”

Previously, on 28 July 1811, the Greeks had addressed to the Duc de Feltre, Minister for War, a report on the administration of General Donzelot, for whom they had nothing but praise: “The man who has dedicated the last three years to making Corfu capable of defending herself using her own resources; the man whose vigilance in preserving order, obedience, prosperity and peace has encouraged the development of individual skills and the creation of many factories and workshops; the man whose unremitting care and gentleness of character have led the people he governs, and by whom he is much loved, to an affluence it has never known before.”

The people of Corfu had every reason to be content, because from May 1810 the General had as his Political Commissar Mathieu de Lesseps (father of the famous engineer), who had replaced the spokesman of Ali Pasha, Bessieres. Addressing the session of the Senate on 1 May 1810, accompanied by Bessieres, the new imperial commissioner, Mathieu Lesseps, first praised the good intentions and prudence of his predecessor and then expressed the hope that he would find among the members of the Senate the enlightenment and knowledge that he himself lacked. Then, speaking to the people of the Ionian Islands, he asked that they adopt a strict embargo on all British products. The President of the Senate, commended the policy of the Emperor on the question of the freedom of the seas and went on to say that the Senate would be derelict in its duty and betraying the common European cause if it allowed smugglers to circumvent the right and proper measures to which all Europe had submitted, acknowledging their necessity and justice.

Lesseps, in a decree dated 4 June, asked the merchants to declare within two days all the British merchandise they had in stock. Once the two days had passed, the police were ordered to visit the city’s commercial premises to inspect the goods declared and confiscate any items the merchants had failed to declare. All British goods were then sealed and an order was issued that any British goods found in future not to bear the seal of the police would be impounded. Not only would the goods be seized, but the merchant would be fined three times the value of the goods, and in the event of a second offence would be liable to corporal punishment. The goods seized and confiscated by the Customs were to be burned, by order of the police, in the main square of the city, in the presence of the Customs Inspector and the
Chief of Police.

Meanwhile, on Paxoi, on 29 May 1810, an uprising had occurred against the French authorities, accompanied by looting and killings. The British sent a ship which fired its guns as a signal for insurrection, but did not land troops to occupy the island. After a while a detachment was sent from Corfu to restore order.

A short while later a military court was set up by Donzelot to try the instigators of the uprising. The verdict was handed down on 24 September 1811: 36 of the accused were found guilty and sentenced to death, their property to be forfeit to the state. Only seven of these were present to hear the sentence; the others had fled the island. Four of them were condemned in their absence to life imprisonment, one to imprisonment of two years and a fine of five hundred francs, while five were acquitted. Sentence was carried out on those in custody on 25 September.

Napoleon also ordered a lifetime pension of 3,000 francs to be paid to the widow of Count Makris, the French administrator on Paxoi, who had been murdered during the insurrection.

Lesseps also drew up a new procedural code for the workings of the Senate, and on 15 October issued a decree ordering the merger of the municipal police of Corfu with the Police Superieure, under the command of the new Director-General of Police, V. Fauchier.

As we have seen, the British did not have enough troops to take control of Paxoi. In Corfu there was a garrison of 8,000 men, of whom 400 were artillerymen and 1,000 were sailors, while there were enough supplies to arm 50,000 men, as Napoleon recalls in his Memoirs written on St. Helena. The British would have needed a force of at least 30,000 to attack Corfu, and this number was not available to them. This is why no official blockade of the island was proclaimed only on 10 November 1810. Donzelot immediately asked the Senate to see that every family supplied itself with food from the country regions; if any household were inspected and found to be without provisions, they would be exiled from the city. The Senate agreed but pointed out that there were many poor families in the city who would be unable to secure supplies from the countryside; special measures would need to be taken to assist them. The British did not venture on direct action against the island, contenting themselves with attempts to sow discord among the islanders. But the people of Corfu retained their composure. For the islanders, the French occupation was a time of unprecedented prosperity. Roads were built, great defensive works constructed with money from France, and justice administered efficiently and fairly. Corfu even acquired its own Academy, on 3 October 1808.

The British in any case had now cast off the mask of the liberator: on Zakynthos the flag of the Septinsular Republic had been replaced by the British flag. All who had collaborated with the French were prosecuted, many forced to leave the island.

To balance the budget for 1812 Donzelot issued a written demand for duties to be levied on imported luxury goods, and for a municipal tax to be imposed (octrois). The Greek Senate voted for the imposition of additional, new taxes on imported goods, tobacco, salt, imported fish, luxury goods, foreign wines and other alcoholic drinks, but stubbornly refused to impose municipal taxes. In other respects, the remaining two years passed without particular problems on Corfu, until the dawning of the year 1814.

‘This is the state of affairs on 30 April,’ Lesseps wrote on 14 May 1814 to Comte Laforet, Minister for Foreign Affairs. ‘Paxoi and Parga have been occupied by the British and thus we have no communication from the East. Nor do we have direct routes to the Kingdom of Naples, as the ruler of this country (i.e. Murat) is at war with France. Ali Pasha has closed his ports to our vessels. We have no option but to rely on our own resources and these, scant as they are on an island under blockade and producing few commodities of its own, will soon be completely exhausted, at which point all public services, despite all our care and protection, will come to a standstill.’

Yet in spite of all these difficulties, the garrison did not surrender. Not only was the island well fortified and provisioned, but the Emperor himself had issued the following threat: ‘If you surrender before the last sack of flour is consumed, before all the advanced fortifications have fallen, before the moat in front of the main walls has been vaulted by the enemy, before the crack in the wall is so large that the enemy can enter and the garrison is pushed back to the last ditch – anyone who signs an instrument of surrender will be regarded as guilty and shot on his return to France.’

It was thus not a warm welcome that the French extended to the envoy who appeared on 1 May,
under the British and French flags, to announce that peace had been signed and that Donzelot should hand over the town and island of Corfu, unconditionally, with its dependent territories, to the British Vice-Admiral John Gore. The British Admiral had issued instructions that General Donzelot should be given the latest newspapers with their account of events in France up to 14 April. It was with some irony that he assured Donzelot: ‘I share your feelings and those of every true Frenchman. Allow me to congratulate you from the bottom of my heart on the fall of the usurper and despot (Napoleon) who led France to the verge of ruin and for twenty years disrupted the peace and security of civilized Europe’.

The news of the fall of the Empire struck the French like a thunderbolt. The latest news they had previous to this was that the Tsar Alexander had been drowned in his flight to Metz, the enemy forces had withdrawn from France and Napoleon was victorious on all fronts.

Donzelot asked the British Admiral to allow one of his ships to sail for France and request instructions from his government. Gore categorically refused the request. On the next day, 2 May, his second envoy was held for four hours outside the town. The terms offered by Gore to the French general were as follows: if the town surrendered unconditionally, with all within it, the garrison would not be held captive, but dispatched to France on the best vessels available; Donzelot himself would sail on the Themis, with a special safe-conduct and passport, to Toulon or whichever destination he wished, and with an entourage of his choice.

But the more pressing the British became, the more Donzelot dug in his heels. The haste of the British made him suspect that Russia and Austria had not agreed to a British occupation. He told Gore that he could not surrender the island without explicit instructions from his government to do so, and that to request and receive such instructions would take at least six weeks. This incensed Gore: ‘The flag of your rightful monarch,’ he wrote to Donzelot on 3 May, ‘was first raised by your own citizens in Bordeaux; only you continue to fly the flag of the dethroned ruler of revolutionary France… The tricolor has now no official or legal status; any hostili-
ties perpetrated under that flag will be regarded as acts of piracy and will be punished accordingly.’

The British emissary, Lieutenant-General Campbell, tried to make Donzelot understand that he was now acting more like a rebel than a loyal citizen. To all his entreaties Donzelot merely replied: ‘Are we at war? In that case Your Excellencies are entitled to send me an ultimatum to surrender, but not to be surprised if I choose not to comply. If we are at peace, on the other hand, you cannot send me ultimatums without presenting the treaties signed by the lawful ruler of the place whose surrender you require’.

On 9 May a French officer boarded the Vengeur and had a long conversation with Lieutenant-General Gore, who explained to him that the Ionian Islands could not belong to either France or Russia, but were *ipso jure* possessions of the British crown.

On 12 May Gore formally presented Donzelot with an official missive from the emissary Comte L’Epine, who informed Donzelot of the agreement signed in Paris on 23 April 1814 suspending hostilities on land and sea. However, this agreement did not necessarily entail that Corfu should be surrendered to the British, and Donzelot told Gore that while he acknowledged the authority of the French envoy, he still required instructions from his government before he could surrender the island.

This reply infuriated the British. Gore issued an order that Donzelot and the French garrison must vacate the town’s fortresses before the eighth hour in the morning of the following day. Donzelot, naturally, refused, and for eight days there was a stand-off between the two forces, their fingers on the trigger. Meanwhile on 18 May Donzelot informed the Senate of the new papers he had received and asked it to recognize Louis XVIII as the legitimate head of the French state. Lesseps drafted the text of an oath of allegiance, sworn by all, both French and Greeks. At the same time he asked the Senate to be vigilant, because the Decree of 1807 remained in force, since the Paris Treaty and its provisions on the fate of the islands had not been officially announced. At its session of 21 May the Senate passed a motion calling for ‘The Septinsular Republic to be free of all subjugation and to have returned to it the towns of Central Greece: Preveza, Parga, Vonitsa and Youthroto.’

Donzelot swore his loyalty to the new King of France, replaced the phrase ‘In the name of His Majesty the Emperor of France’ with the phrase ‘In the name of His Majesty the King of France,’ and even ordered an artillery salute to mark Louis’ ascent to the throne, but nevertheless refused to fly the white flag of the Bourbons.

The British negotiators, Campbell and Gordon, gave him until 1 June to surrender the town.

Finally, on 7 June, General Bullen-oire arrived with a fleet of French vessels to take over the garrison. On the 14 June he met with the British negotiators, and on 21 June Corfu, the last stronghold beyond the French frontiers, was surrendered.

General Donzelot addressed a moving speech to the people of Corfu. ‘Already the prows of our ships are turned towards France. I am leaving you before I can complete, prevented by war, all the good I had intended to do you. Others will soon arrive who will have the satisfaction of completing my work. You were so kind as to call me “father”; this will be my only consolation at the hour of my departure.’

As Donzelot embarked for France the Senate presented him with a gold sword, and the general’s memory is still preserved in the modern city, in the name of one of its central thoroughfares. Yet France herself seemed ungrateful. The general was forced to borrow one hundred thousand francs to pay the wages of his Greek staff, but the new government of Louis XVIII refused to pay his own salary, of which almost 90,000 francs was owing.

Finally, on 26 June, the British entered the city. Campbell closed down the Academy and the University; the printers’ workshops were destroyed. The Senate was abolished and its members were forbidden to travel to Vienna to seek the independence of the Ionian Islands. But a new era had now dawned for the Greek nation, one that would slowly but surely lead to the creation of the modern Greek state.

**Sources:**
Assistant Professor Andreadis, *The Septinsular public economy in the period 1797-1814*.
M. T. Laskaris, *Napoleon and the Seven Islands, the archive of General Berthier*, Ionian Anthology 1937.
In recent issues there hasn't been room to include all the splendid items that Sotheby's have been auctioning. So in this supplement we can catch up.

On the July 3 in London, the auction house offered a pair of gilt-bronze and patinated bronze hard-paste candelabra with porcelain mounts. The candelabra are attributed to Pierre-Philippe Thomire (1751-1843), but the porcelain is attributed to Piat-Joseph Sauvage (1744-1818),

With such an Egyptian theme a date in the 1790s would be expected when the Egyptian expedition inspired a fashion frenzy for all things Egyptian. But Sotheby's dated them as Louis XVI, circa 1790, and they are experts.

The bases bear cameos, most depicting neoclassical maidens with instruments, including a horn, a harp and a wreathed trumpet. Other maidens have a ewer in one hand and cup in another, and there's a bacchic male figure.

They're 3 feet, 2¼ inches high, and 13 inches wide.

They were originally acquired by the son-in-law of Charles-François Lebrun (1739-1824), the Third Consul in the Consulate. Napoleon later made Lebrun the duc de Plaisance and Prince Arch-Treasurer of the Empire. That does suggest a later date than Louis XVI. They must be Directoire or Consulate.

Sotheby's put an estimate on them of $325,000 to $490,000, but couldn't sell them at that price.

*At right, close-ups of the cameos.*
On 26 June, in Paris, Sotheby's offered a silver plate engraved with the arms of Napoleon. It was made by Martin-Guillaume Biennais, one of Napoleon's favorite craftsmen, between 1809 and 1815. It sold for $34,250 including hammer price.

Below, the engraved Imperial arms. It's numbered 149 and signed Biennais under the border.
Here is a pair of Italian silver statues of Poseidon and Amphitrite riding sea horses. The horses have detachable heads and sit on black wood bases. They were made by Vincenzo Contini in Rome, circa 1810. Each one has a small glass vase with engraved leaves, perhaps for flowers. They're each 33½ inches long, which suggests an impressive table setting. Sotheby's estimated $11,000 to $16,500, but didn't get it.

If the Emperor's plate is worth $34,250, what's a British Royal Duke worth. This silver meat dish cover belonged to Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland (1771-1851), son of George III and brother to George IV. He later became King of Hanover in 1837 when the Salic Law prevented Victoria inheriting that kingdom when she became Queen of England.

The answer is $8,600, which was the price Sotheby's got for it on December 3. Of course he was always the least popular of the Royal Dukes.

It is 21½ inches wide and was made by John Mewburn in London, 1806. It's engraved on both sides with the royal arms and the Garter motto below a royal coronet. It's further engraved EA Fs, which is a shortened version of Ernest Augustus Fidekommiss. This was added when Ernest Augustus was King of Hanover to indicate items entailed to his estate. This included a large silver dinner service of which this meat dish cover was part.
On November 7, Sotheby's in Paris tried to auction off this commode. It's a mahogany commode, with gilt-bronze fittings. It's Empire, circa 1810, and stamped by its maker JACOB.D./R. MESLEE. It has a white marble top, and the decorations are sea horses. Inside the two front doors are three drawers. It's 38½ inches tall, 54¾ wide, and 26¼ deep.

The quality of the piece and the similarity to other examples suggested to Sotheby's that it was made by Jacob Desmalter, a noted cabinet-maker who made many pieces for Napoleon. A very similar one dated to 1810 sits in the Château de Fontainebleau in Napoleon's bedroom. The story is that this one was given to his friend and ally, Emmerich von Dahlberg, for his Schloss Herrnsheim palace, and then passed into a German collection.

Jacob Desmalter first worked for Napoleon when Josephine redecorated their house in the rue Chantereine. He learned his trade in the studio of his father, and watched him make chairs for Marie Antoinette's dairy at Rambouillet. Using designs by Percier et Fontaine, he also made a lot of furniture for Josephine at Malmaison and Napoleon at the Tuileries. By 1807, his workshop employed some 350 artisans. Sotheby's estimate was $69,000 to $110,000, but it didn't sell.
SPAIN TRIUMPHANT: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813 IN TEXAS

A bicentenary that almost passed unnoticed last year was the Battle of Medina of August 18, 1813. If remembered at all, the battle is seen as either a marginal event of the Mexican Revolution, or as a rehearsal of the Texas Revolution of 1835-1836. But it is a good story of the last days of the Spanish Empire in the Americas and the days of American recklessness. After all, if you’re declaring war on Britain, why not invade the Spanish Empire as well.

Revolution in Texas.
The Mexican War of Independence was begun on September 16, 1810 by Father Miguel Hidalgo. When his initial efforts were defeated, he hoped to rouse the northernmost provinces, especially Spanish Texas, in the hopes that this would attract American support. The plan got off to a good start when, on January 21, 1811, Juan Bautista de las Casas, a retired militia captain from Nuevo Santander, led a group of army sergeants in a coup in San Antonio (or San Antonio de Bexar, then generally known as Bexar). They arrested the governor of Texas, Manuel María de Salcedo, and his entire military staff. But it was not a good sign when, even as Salcedo was led away, the rebellious soldiers instinctively saluted him. Las Casas chained Salcedo, Simon Herrera, the governor of Nuevo Santander who was living in San Antonio, and twelve other Hispanic officers and humiliated them in front of the townspeople. The prisoners were then transferred to Monclova in Coahuila.

The rest of Texas quickly fell to the revolutionaries. There was little resistance in Nacogdoches or in La Bahia, which were the only other important places in Texas. Las Casas confiscated the property of Spanish residents (Peninsulares), and proclaimed himself the head of a provisional government. But Las Casas’s arbitrary ways disenchanted many of his soldiers, and they soon joined together the remaining royalists. On March 2, the rallied royalists marched on the government house. Las Casas and Ignacio Aldama, Hidalgo’s ambassador to the Americans, were arrested. Las Casas’s regime had lasted only 39 days.

Meanwhile Salcedo, a captive but not a passive one, had slowly turned his captor, Ignacio Elizondo, with promises of a promotion and further rewards. After receiving news of the counter-coup in San Antonio, Salcedo’s captor changed sides. With his help, on March 21, Salcedo and his military officers were able to capture Hidalgo and much of his army, which had fled to Saltillo. On April 26, 1811, Salcedo was appointed president of a tribunal to try the revolutionaries. The sentence was swift and Hidalgo and others were shot on 30 July 1811.

Las Casas didn’t last much longer. He was shot in the back and beheaded on August 3, 1811. His head was shipped to San Antonio and displayed on a pole in the military plaza. Salcedo was restored as governor. But the Mexican Revolution survived the loss of its leader, and the Texas revolutionaries did not forget Salcedo.

Gutiérrez’s Mission.
Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara was one of those Texas revolutionaries. Gutiérrez was in his mid-30s, and owned properties on the Río Grande. He chose to continue Aldama’s mission to the United States. His family were persecuted as a result and his properties plundered. But he got away, though in his flight, he was stripped of everything, including his credentials, until he crossed the American border near naked. His credentials would have been from Hidalgo anyway, and Hidalgo was dead. In America he found a sympathetic reception, and he was helped on his way.

He was in Washington by December 11, 1811. He was encouraged by Monroe, the Secretary of State, and received at the White House by President Madison. The American government wouldn’t promise anything but appeared favorable to the Mexican revolution, which was compared to America’s own.

Gutiérrez reached New Orleans on March 23, 1812. US Government agents openly supported him, while more senior figures looked the other way. His main American contact was William Shaler, who was forty years old. Shaler had been appointed a confidential agent by Madison to observe the Mexican Revolution. The suspicious Spanish had thrown him out of Cuba, but in 1812 he turned up in Louisiana to be Gutiérrez’s advisor.

Lieutenant Augustus Magee, 24 years old, resigned his army commission to lead “The Army of the North.” American volunteers
seem to have believed that the expedition not only had the blessing of the American government, but would also help the US in the War of 1812. Gutiérrez and Magee openly recruited men from Louisiana and beyond without any interference, which most interpreted as tacit government blessing. Gutiérrez appeared to be little more than a figurehead, while Magee raised the force. It was Magee that turned an assembly of brigands and adventurers into a military force. Magee was described as “a very tall, robust Bostonian, handsome of person and countenance…” The Army of the North adopted an emerald green flag, probably because of Magee’s Irish heritage. Volunteers were offered forty dollars a month and a league of to-be-captured land.

Texas invaded.
August 7 1812, the Republican army entered Texas. Nacogdoches fell without a fight. On September 13 the Army moved on, with about 300 Americans and 100 Mexicans. By October it was 600 strong, with both more Americans and Mexicans signing on. But on October 15 arrived Dr. John Robinson, an envoy sent by James Monroe, travelling under the American flag, to negotiate with the Spanish authorities to settle any border disagreements. Though many thought that Monroe was taking the precaution of playing both sides, it must have been a shock to many who had thought the expedition had American blessing.

Still the Army moved on, and on November 7 occupied La Bahia without a fight. La Bahia and San Antonio were the only points of importance in Texas. The garrison of 200 not only surrendered at once, but most joined the insurgents. Six or ten days later the Royalists arrived. Their initial attack was repulsed, but they settled down to a four month siege, hoping to starve out the Republicans.

The Republicans became demoralized. Not was there the thought of Robinson treating with the Royalists, but rather than soldiers and civilians deserting the Royalist cause to come over to them, such people were deserting the Republican army instead. At one stage a council of war recommended to Magee that the army should surrender, and terms were negotiated. The Royalist terms were too harsh and the rank and file rejected them. Both Magee and Gutiérrez were naturally discouraged, the latter going as far as to request America annex at least some of Texas, seeing that as the only way to protect his local supporters from Royalist reprisals.

But the Republicans were still 600 men strong, well armed, and in passably good spirit yet. They won most of the skirmishing. They were also in shelter while the Royalists had to face a Texas winter in the open. Desertion started to favour the Republicans again. On February 19 the Royalists gave up, retiring to San Antonio. The Republicans took their baggage, and inhabitants of San Antonio began to appear, joining the revolutionary cause.

On his return to San Antonio, Governor Salcedo discovered that during his absence with his troops, Indian raids had severely harassed San Antonio. 55 people had been slain, 5,000 sheep and 10,000 horses and mules had been stolen. Now the Republicans were advancing, their army said to be 1,500 strong now. But Magee wasn’t with them. He had died of fever on February 8, though there no lack of people saying he had been poisoned, by Gutiérrez or border ruffians or whoever.

The army had received reinforcements above the number of locals changing sides. 25 more Americans and 180 more Republican Mexicans from Nacogdoches arrived, while 55 to 300 Lipan and Tonkawa Indians were recruited. Samuel Kemper took over the army, with Reuben Ross as his second-in-command. Now he wasn’t overshadowed by Magee, Gutiérrez became more dominant in the leadership.

The Republicans reached Salado creek, five leagues from San Antonio, on March 29. By one account there were 270 Americans now, 200 Mexicans and 30 Coushatta Indians. Other accounts say there 600 effectives overall, while Gutiérrez wrote that were 900, though he doesn’t say they were effective soldiers. One source says there were 100 Indians, including some “Bedi, Towakanays & Lepans, none of whom were any account except the Cochattes who fought bravely & suffered much.”

The Royalist waited in ambush with “the entire male population of Texas.” Actually the Spanish leaders, Salcedo and Herrera, seem to have had as many as 1,200 men and six brass cannon. The action was brief and bloody, lasting less than an hour. The royalists were routed, losing the cannon, much of their arms, and 1,500 horses and mules. Over time the name of the battle changed from Salado to Rosillo.

San Antonio taken.
On April 1 San Antonio surren-
Distrust grew between the Americans and Mexicans. The Americans were accused of spending all their time at dances where they were too successful with the women. Some Mexicans even sought to transfer the blame for the murders to the Americans. The Americans thought their Mexican allies were becoming lukewarm and they were being left to fight the battles without help.

The new Texan constitution began by proclaiming Texas as inviolably part of the Mexican Republic. This dismayed many of their American sympathizers in the American government, like Shaler, who had other ambitions. They feared Texas falling into the hands of French intriguers, who were allegedly gathering in New Orleans and Barataria, ready to make their move. Shaler and his colleagues had been wondering if Texas should have been included in the Louisiana Purchase and therefore should be part of the United States. But for the moment they were backing a friendly Republican government in San Antonio.

Shaler and his party had been grooming an alternative candidate for Texan leadership. José Álvarez de Toledo y Dubois was 34, and had been born in Havana, the son of a Spanish naval captain. He joined the Spanish Navy himself. In 1810-1811 he had represented Santo Domingo in the Cádiz Cortes. He favored independence for Spain’s American possessions and fell afool of the Spanish Regency. He went into exile in Philadelphia, where he campaigned for the independence of the Americas. James Monroe gave him funds to try and form a revolution in Cuba. That didn’t work, so he joined Gutiérrez, and when the Army of the North marched into Texas, he remained in Nacogdoches to govern the rear areas with Shaler’s support. Gutiérrez recognized the danger posed by Toledo and ordered him out of Texas, claiming rumors that Toledo was in fact a Spanish agent made it impossible for him to remain. But Toledo was the better man when it came to propaganda and soon began a revolutionary newspaper called El Mexicano. The newspaper quickly called for Gutiérrez’s resignation.

The turncoat returns.

Down on the Rio Grande, Elizondo, the man who betrayed Father Morales and Las Casas, was gathering men. He had the troops from Coahuila and the fugitives from San Antonio. His superior, Arredondo, was bringing up more men from the south, but in the meantime Elizondo was to move up to the Rio Frio to keep an eye on the Republican in San Antonio. He was not to get engaged until the Royalist troops concentrated, but Elizondo wanted the glory for himself. He swept north, taking several outposts of the Republicans, and even reached the outskirts of San Antonio summoned the rebels to surrender. Arredondo was furious and ordered Elizondo back, but it was too late.

Many people were passing back and forth between Republican and Royalist territory. After all, many locals had families and business on both sides of the line, if in that wide sparsely settled expanse any line could be said to exist. Both sides were getting a fair amount of information about the other. But the appearance of Elizondo outside San Antonio was a complete surprise. Gutiérrez was rattled and called for retreat to the American border,
and from there offer Texas to the Americans in return for protection. Ross thought the Mexicans were about to betray the Americans, and he fled, abandoning his command. His troops however stayed.

The troops gave the command to Henry Perry. During the night the Americans formed a square, and slept with their arms by the side. At the morning parade at 8 o’clock not a Mexican showed up, which convinced the Americans they were to be betrayed to Elizondo. By ten the Mexicans appeared, showing great eagerness for action. The rest of the day was spent in preparations.

During the night the Republicans marched out, hauling their cannon by hand. At dawn they were on a low ridge overlooking Elizondo’s camp on Alazan Creek.

It was the 20 June, 1813. Elizondo was at mass. Immediately he formed his men up in a ravine, with two cannon on his left to guard against an attack around the head of the ravine. His cavalry stood behind the cannon. He may have had as many as 1,050 men, What happened next is confused by conflicting accounts. The American cannon dismounted on the Spanish ones, and the Spanish cavalry were also driven back. The Republican line advanced and drove the Royalists from the ravine, back into two log pens to their rear, presumably erected to hold their livestock. The battle was hard fought and lasted perhaps four hours. In the end the Royalist infantry, surrounded in the pens, surrendered, Elizondo and the cavalry had fled earlier.

The accounts of the casualties differ. The American volunteers seem to have had nine dead and seventeen wounded, their Mexican comrades twenty dead with no wounded reported, and one of the Indians was wounded. The Royalists are said to have 350 killed, and 130 captured, half of them wounded. It all seems very one-sided. In any event, Republican daring had once again thrown the Royalists out of Texas. Elizondo fled back to the Presidio del Rio Grande.

José Joaquin de Arredondo was a 45 year old career officer who had defeated the Revolution in Nuevo Santander. In 1812 he had marched south to fight the revolutionaries around San Luis Potosi, but by March 1813 he had heard of the deteriorating position in Texas and decided the bigger threat to Spain came from that direction. Early in June he arrived in Laredo to find he had been appointed to an extraordinary command to crush the rebellion in Texas, Coahuila, Nuevo Santander and Nuevo Leon. He also found his lieutenant, Elizondo, had been routed.

The Republicans had failed to pursue, glutted with the spoils of war and all the prisoners. The captured cannon they rejected as useless. Gutiérrez is said to have been well to the rear during the fighting, but he still thought the victory would strengthen his position. However, heartened by the good news, Toledo was said to be on the way from Nacogdoches with four hundred or so reinforcements.

**Change in command.**

Toledo friends had prepared the ground for him. They had won over the American contingent already, and were working hard on the Mexican party. It was said that a large loan from the United States would soon cover all their past and future pay. Another promise was that Texas would remain free, and able to join a Mexican Republic if so desired. All this was possible under Toledo’s leadership.

Gutiérrez again declared that Toledo was a Spanish agent. But the American volunteers threatened to leave. The Mexican Republicans knew that without them they could resist the Royalists, who would have little mercy. The Revolutionary Junta invited Toledo to San Antonio.

After bitter argument, on August 4 Gutiérrez resigned and Toledo was named Commander-in-chief by the Junta.

In letters to Monroe, William Shaler claimed the credit for the changeover in San Antonio. He was on the way there himself to supervise events in person, but he was soon disabused. A dispatch from Monroe caught up with him on the road, with strict orders to return to Louisiana. The Americans weren’t ready to commit to Texas, especially with the war with Britain proving harder than expected.

Shaler’s dismay was probably turned to relief later. His intrigues had dealt a shattering blow to the Texas cause. The *Tejanos* preferred their countryman Gutiérrez; Toledo was a foreigner to them. Humble men left no records, but it’s probable that the rank and file were demoralized, while their leaders renewed their intrigues.

To take control of the army, Toledo reorganized it. Up to now, the Americans, Mexicans and Indians had fought as a unit, and together they won. Now Toledo divided it into an American divi-
sion, and a Mexican-Indian one. It provided him with a command for a Mexican supporter, but it was not popular. In fact Toledo simply couldn’t cope with the army, being no warrior himself. He even antagonized the American leader, Perry. He had no time to grow into the role. News arrived that Arredondo was marching on San Antonio.

**Arredondo’s arrival.**

Reliable information as to the size of the armies is not available. Later accounts make the Republican army anywhere from a thousand to three thousand strong. There were probably between 1,500 to two thousand men present, a third of which was likely American. The Americans were divided into regiments named Washington and Madison. The Republicans had seven cannon, all of which were three-pounders.

Toledo reported he had, once he gathered in the remains of Elizondo’s force, 1,830 men, of which 635 were infantry and 1,195 cavalry. This apparently didn’t include his artillerymen and he had eleven cannon with him.

Both armies probably had quite a few muleskinners, drivers, horse tenders, and camp followers, which may have doubled their numbers. Both were ragged. Some Royalist soldiers were said to be barefoot and clad in loincloths. Perhaps they had adopted Indian clothing as better for south Texas conditions. The armies were pretty equal, though Arredondo had a major problem in that he had haul his supplies over 150 miles of desolate country from the Rio Grande, while Toledo could stay in his base in San Antonio and just wait.

Arredondo had marched out of Laredo about August 1, though his march was delayed waiting for Elizondo and his troops. So it was August 18 when he approached the Medina River. It’s uncertain exactly where he was as the location of the battlefield is unknown, he didn’t know where the Republicans were but he expected that they would sortie out of San Antonio to meet him.

Why did the Republicans march south, rather than wait in one the positions they knew so well outside town. The Americans were prepared to stay there, but it seems the Mexicans wanted to march out to meet the Royalists, and the Americans were content to go along with that. Perhaps the Mexicans didn’t want the battle fought too close to their homes. They finally marched out on August 15. They had intended to go a week earlier, but disagreements delayed them. Both the Mexican and American contingents seem to have balked at Toledo’s leadership. Only the imminent arrival of the Royalist army made them behave. Toledo had decided to ambush the Royalists as they advanced along the Laredo road. The Army seemed happy at his choice of position. If only we knew where it was. It must have been 20 or so miles from San Antonio. But a Royalist scout stumbled across the Republicans, and attracted rifle shots. The ambush was exposed.

**The Battle of Medina.**

Some accounts have the Republicans deployed in alternate companies of Americans and Mexicans. Another has an American regiment on each flank and the Mexicans in the center. They may have been quarrelsome, even mutinous, but the Republicans were confident. They were used to victory in battle. With surprise lost, the Republican line advanced on what they thought the Royalist advanced-guard, intending to press on before the Royalists could make new dispositions.

What the Republicans faced was a scouting party of 180 cavalry under Elizondo. They made a good fire, but as the Republicans were coming on strongly, they naturally fell back. As they were all horsemen, and many of the Republicans were on foot and dragging seven cannon, they soon outpaced the pursuit. The cavalry made another stand for a moment, to delay the Republican advance, but not for long. They probably lost a mere handful of men. Arredondo sent up 150 more cavalry and two small cannon, but the Royalists still wisely fell back. Meanwhile Arredondo sent his baggage train to the rear, and readied the rest of his army, less than 1300 men presumably, to meet the oncoming enemy. The Royalist cavalry, and Elizondo, had done well. With minimal losses, they had fallen back in good order. The advancing Republicans were still confident, but they were getting tired. It was hot day, they were thirsty, and the ground was soft sand, so it was heavy going for those on foot, especially those pulling the artillery. But they went on, apparently with a brief pause at a waterhole. They seem to have captured the two small guns sent up to Elizondo’s aid. Probably the Royalist left behind as it was too slow towing them through the sand where they sank a half-wheel deep. The Republicans left some of their guns behind for the same reason. In the end they may have had only two up front. So they advanced on, with
increasing fatigue and disorder. At times one wing was in advance, then the other, as they passed through a thick scrub of oak. They burst unexpectedly into the open where they saw Arredondo’s main line. The scrub must have left them unable to really tell what enemy they faced until then. Why did Toledo make this foolish pursuit? He probably had little idea of what was going on, and probably wasn’t strong enough to give orders to officers who despised him. Some accounts say he feared if he called off the advance, many of his men would just go home. Others say Toledo tried to get the army to resume its former position, but some Mexican officers defied him, saying they weren’t used to retreat. So Toledo ordered the advance to continue rather than have his authority seen to be flouted.

Arredondo’s account told later make it sound like he had everything under control after the ambush was flushed. His cavalry screen delayed and wore out the impetuous enemy until they arrived before line where he stood ready for them. Then his cannon, placed on the flanks, roared at the startled foe. While Republican accounts said after the event they had fallen into a clever trap. The Americans later said the Royalists were waiting for them behind breastworks. There were no breastworks. At most it was a line of hastily piled packs and baggage. Though he had no lack of vanity, Arredondo never claimed the credit for such cleverness in his report. Probably he was relieved that he was ready when the time came.

The Royalist artillery fire tore off tree limbs and brush over the Republicans. The Mexicans always fired high. So the Republicans came on after a surprised pause. Later the Americans said the Mexicans hung back or even fled. But then other American accounts say the Mexicans advanced too impetuously. After a defeat it’s always the allies who lost the battle. But in fact the action was to be sustained for some hours. The Republicans did well to get themselves back into some order and press on. Arredondo says the Republicans came within pistol shot, and that the Republican guns poured in devastating fire from only forty paces. He says Toledo tried to outflank him, even sending troops into his rear, but that his well-placed pickets fended off such efforts.

Confused American accounts mention that this main part of the battle went on for an hour at least. The Royalist guns were well served. The Mexican and Indian cavalry were well ‘smartly engaged’ on the left, but eventually broke. Toledo was able to rally them. The dastardly Mexican infantry held back, leaving the work to the Americans, but eventually even they eventually began to fade. But this wasn’t until the Republicans had taken two more cannon. More, some say all, were silenced by accurate rifle fire. Apparently the Republicans occupied much of the ground where the Royalist initially stood.

Both sides were near fought out. One American wrote later that both armies seemed to be fleeing from the other. Arredondo apparently was about to retreat, when an aide told him there were almost no Republicans still in line. Another story has him countermanding his orders to retreat only when a defector from the Republican side told him that he had won. These stories were perhaps wishful thinking by the Americans who lost the battle. But in fact the Royalists were working behind them too. Arredondo said it was a pincer movement to capture the Republican artillery. The Republican leaders fled when they saw what was happening, both Perry and Toledo riding off while there was still time.

The pursuit.

The Royalist vengeance was swift. Arredondo wrote from the battlefield that a hundred prisoners were being shot, while six hundred Republicans lay on the battlefield. “This rabble lost their seven cannon, wagons of muskets and carbine ammunition, much plain shot, grape and lead, many fire arms, banners, war chests and medicine box,” he wrote.

Arredondo sent Elizondo with 200 men to seize San Antonio and catch those fleeing. Some of the fleeing Mexican Republicans are alleged to have changed sides, trying to curry favour with the victors by killing fleeing Americans. Half the Americans who survived the battlefield were slain before they reached San Antonio. They were of course stood out more than fleeing Mexicans and didn’t know any place to hide. The Royalists and the traitors were said to have mutilated their bodies, hanging them or parts of them from the trees. As many as fifty Americans who did reach San Antonio were captured by the townspeople and handed over to Arredondo. But three hundred local families fled the town towards the American border just before Elizondo arrived.

Two hundred prisoners were taken. They were stuffed into a small house overnight where eight American survivors. In any event the Republican right broke. The left held out a little longer but soon the Royalists were working behind them too. Arredondo said it was a pincer movement to capture the Republican artillery. The Republican leaders fled when they saw what was happening, both Perry and Toledo riding off while there was still time.
suffocated. The next day 160 were selected to live, and set to cleaning the streets. Of the remaining forty, they were shot, three a day until they were gone. These prisoners were mainly Mexicans. Other accounts give much higher numbers for those captured, suffocated and shot. Arredondo says he shot only 112 on the battlefield, 215 more were captured in San Antonio, of which those deserving it were shot, and the rest imprisoned. The Americans said eight or ten of them were saved by Elizondo, and that thirteen or fifteen American prisoners were later taken to Monterrey the following April and eventually set free.

Many of the female family members of Republicans left in San Antonio were also imprisoned and treated with great brutality. After fifty four terrible days, they were freed but left destitute as their homes and property had been seized. They were left to beg in the streets.

Eighty men were sent to La Bahia, where they found eleven Republicans had already been caught and hung by the inhabitants.

Elizondo was sent to continue the pursuit with 500 mounted men. He moved with commendable speed, wearing out his horses in his haste. Many fleeing Republicans had been caught, including many families. Elizondo is said to have executed seventy one insurgents in flight, but he let go many Americans, perhaps as many as fifty. He told then he only wanted friendship between their two countries.

Elizondo started his march back to San Antonio on September 12. He carried with him a hundred men as prisoners and as many women, with many children and a lot of loot. Five days later one of his officers went amok, crazed by the battle and the slaughter. He managed to kill Elizondo’s cousin and badly wounded Elizondo with a saber thrust into his side. The march resumed with Elizondo on a stretcher, but he soon died.

The prisoners were delivered to Arredondo in San Antonio. He awaited them on the plaza, which was surrounded by his men and the locals. The prisoners were insulted and humiliated. The men were then shot and the women set to work grinding corn for tortillas, while their children were set to beg.

Texas was then restored to Royalist rule. Two thousand of its inhabitants had fled to American territory, along with some Indian tribes. By the time Arredondo returned south in the spring of 1814, he had restored he said “complete quietude.”

The fates of the leaders

Gutiérrez, Toledo and Perry reached the American border safely. They were ready for another attempt on Texas, but Americans in general were rather busy with the war against the British. All three, with many others who survived, fought with Andrew Jackson at New Orleans.

They continued to hope for another chance at Texas, but they kept trying. Monroe was no longer interested. The United States was recovering from its war. The loss of most of the American volunteers last time must have discouraged recruitment. After all Toledo and probably Perry were responsible for losing the battle, and it must have been hard to cooperate with Gutiérrez after forcing him out.

In San Antonio, on July 18, 1821, the governor declared for Iturbide and his independent Mexico. For many this was a happy conclusion. Gutiérrez was treated with honor by the Emperor Iturbide, but he still voted for Iturbide’s death in 1824. He opposed the independence of Texas and moved south of the border, where he died in 1841.

Toledo made another invasion of Texas in 1814, but didn’t get far. Broke, he reconciled with the Spanish in 1816, which gives some credibility to Gutiérrez’s claim he was a Spanish agent all along. He became a Spanish diplomat, dying in Paris in 1858.

After the battle of New Orleans, Perry joined Toledo in his 1814 abortive invasion of Texas. When that fizzled out, in 1817 he joined Mina, the famous Spanish guerrilla leader, when he made an attempt to invade Mexico and overthrow the Royalists. He broke with Mina and branched off on his own, but facing capture by the Royalists, he committed suicide.

Reuben Ross gave up filibustering and returned to Virginia. When the Republicans finally triumphed he had the strange notion of returning to San Antonio to claim some reward for his services. On the road in Texas, he was killed by bandits.

William Shaler wisely gave up the Texas business which he had mismanaged. He kept the confidence of Monroe, who appointed him Secretary to the Peace delegation in Ghent. He got on well with Jonathan Russell and Henry Clay, but John Quincy Adams distrusted him. From 1815 to 1828 he was U.S. Consul in Algiers, another hotspot. He then became Consul in Havana in 1829, but he died in a cholera epidemic in 1833.

In 1821, when Iturbide succeeded
in his coup that gave Mexico independence from Spain, Arredondo initially went along and swore allegiance to the Republic of Mexico. Perhaps he found there was no room for him in an independent Mexico as retired to Havana, where Spain still ruled. He died in 1837, living long enough to see Texas win its independence in 1836. Unfortunately he didn’t leave his thoughts on why Mexico failed where Spain had succeeded in 1813 in keeping Texas and keeping the Americans out.

One man who should have learned from Arredondo was Santa Anna, who was a lieutenant at the Battle of Medina. He was too junior to leave much trace, but he was cited for bravery there.

What happened to Texas?
The repression following the battle of Medina did a good job of depopulating Texas. Given the number of Mexican residents who had been slain and those who fled the province, there was a sizable decline in the population if anyone had bothered with a census. The province was desolated and impoverished, and once Arredondo went south descended into anarchy.

The line of settlement to the west receded a long way. The barrier to the aggressive Indian tribes further north had been removed. The Royalist Spanish army had no troops to spare to replace the provincial forces that had been destroyed. Between 1817 and 1821, Comanche and Apache parties several thousand strong penetrated deep into not only Texas but also the provinces further south.

It was so bad that even Arredondo had to approve the immigration of American settlers to fill the void. On January 17, 1821 he approved the petition of Moses Austin to bring in three hundred settlers with a grant of 211,000 acres with in Texas. Admittedly they were required to convert to Catholicism, but they also had to be allowed to arm and organize themselves to against the Indian invasion. Further waves American settlers followed, including Jim Bowie in 1828. By then it was Mexican authorities they were giving permission.

These new settlers were to make a new Revolution two decades later, but the Spanish and Mexican authorities didn’t know that at the time and had little choice. There were a few survivors of 1813, but not many as few Americans survived. But the memory was still green. Sam Houston hadn’t been there, but in 1837 he wrote this advice to Albert Sydney Johnson, “the enemy may yield at first so as to draw our army into an ambuscade as they did at the battle of Madena when the Americans due to their impetuosity and want of order were all destroyed.”

A fairly good summary of what happened at Medina, though few belief Arredondo actually planned it that way.

Where is the battlefield?
No one knows. The Republicans were slaughtered, the Royalists later displaced by the new Mexican Republic. No one thought to mark the site. In 1822 the Mexican governor Trespalacios kindly gathered all the bones on the field and buried them, but he left no memorial.

All we know that it was six or ten miles south of the Medina river on one of the roads leading from San Antonio towards Laredo. No archaeologists have made any finds. There are two historical markers placed by the side of different roads, the first placed in 1936, the second in but these are just wishful thinking. The historian Ted Schwarz thought it was a four miles northwest of Leming, TX. In 1985 he wrote the best book on the subject, so I side with him. In 2013 a historian called Robert P. Marshall placed a marker on Old Pleasanton Road south of the intersection with Bruce Road, his own research apparently placing it a little east of where Ted Schwarz placed it. We shall probably never know.