Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear, and the Cold War of the 1980s

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The July accident was not the first radiation scare in American history.

The core's temperature and storage were of concern, making it difficult for workers to bring down the core's temperature, preventing the release of critical heat. The water in the reactor building contained a mixture of water and hydrogen, which could contribute to the radiolysis and displacement water corrosion. The core's temperature was also of concern, leading to the eventual meltdown of the reactor.

This resulted in a small increase in the plant's auxiliary building in addition to minor core damage. The core did not melt, but radiation did leak out of the plant.

The Three-Mile Island incident occurred on March 28, 1979, at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania. The incident was caused by a loss of coolant accident, which led to overheating and subsequent core damage. The plant was not permanently damaged, but it required extensive cleanup and repairs. The incident led to increased awareness of the dangers of nuclear energy and prompted the U.S. government to implement stricter safety regulations for nuclear power plants.
wheat and milk. Over the course of the decade, scientists warned that radiation could cause leukemia, bone cancer, and genetic damage. Citizens groups conducted local studies on radiation exposure, and popular magazines described radioactive fallout as "the silent killer." The TMI accident revived these earlier fears of radiation and rerouted them to nuclear power plants. In the process, the accident shattered a set of assumptions that underlay the postwar promotion of civilian nuclear energy: that nuclear power plants could be disassociated from atomic bombs; that the destructive nature of atomic power could be transformed into something benign; and that American civilians could somehow be shielded from the dangers of radiation while its military wielded a nuclear arsenal comprised of missiles, submarines, and doomsday devices.

The 1979 accident also constituted an illuminating moment in the history of declining public trust in US political culture. Over the prior decade, the infamous "credibility gap" of the Vietnam War — the growing disconnect between official reports about the war and its actual progress — had appeared again and again, as the oil embargo and Watergate raised new allegations of government duplicity. The cumulative effect was a sharp decline in trust in governmental institutions over the course of the 1970s. This decline was apparent at Three Mile Island, where the "official story" about the accident would be met with considerable skepticism by both local residents and outside observers. The suspicion that both the utility company and public officials were downplaying the severity of the accident resonated with public responses to the Vietnam War and Watergate. But the accident departed from these prior crises in that it threatened to trigger a radiological health emergency among American civilians. Within days, state and federal officials flooded the area and began monitoring radiation levels in the air, soil, and water, as well as in the bodies of local residents. Like the other upheavals of the decade, then, the accident constituted a crisis in political trust, but in this case it placed the imperiled human body — indeed, the irradiated human body — at the center of the story.

The human-body-at-risk was not just any body. At the time of the accident, scientists agreed that the pregnant body, the child's body, and the fetal body were especially vulnerable to radiation poisoning. These bodies emerged as powerful symbols of environmental risk throughout the crisis, a symbolism that established continuities between the TMI accident and the earlier radiation scares of the 1950s. But fears surrounding fetal health did not emerge from the accident alone. Disasters can function like x-rays, revealing both tears in the social fabric and powerful — if often ephemeral — forms of communal solidarity. Building on the concept of "disaster as x-ray," I argue that the local community's fixation on fetal health in the wake of the accident crystallized larger cultural anxieties surrounding reproduction in the 1970s. These anxieties stemmed from the expansion of abortion rights, heightened vigilance surrounding fetal health with the advent of new reproductive technologies, and the emergence of a pro-life discourse of fetal personhood in American political culture. At the same time, these apprehensions dovetailed with a question first raised by the 1945 dropping of the atomic bomb: what would be the fate of reproduction now that human beings had acquired the technological capacity for self-annihilation and mutation? Prior to the crisis at Three Mile Island, that question had focused largely on atomic weaponry, but the accident raised the possibility that a power plant could mimic a bomb attack in its destructive effects.

This chapter proceeds in three stages. I first trace the accident's history, exploring how and why public fears about its radiological effects came to center on reproductive and fetal health. I then show how these fears endured in the years that followed, as local women, many of whom self-identified as conservative and Christian, borrowed from the antiabortion movement a "grammar of life" that they used to condemn the nuclear industry for prioritizing the profit motive over public safety. Finally, I contend that the accident brought into relief several intersecting features of the political culture of the second Cold War: the unstable relationship between atomic weapons and civilian nuclear power; the centrality of biological health and survival to conceptions of atomic citizenship; the significance of the figure of the unborn as a symbol of existential insecurity in the nuclear age; and the ways in which a "grammar of life" infused disparate movements in the 1970s and 1980s, thus blurring schematic distinctions between left and right.

The Building of Trust at TMI

The TMI accident was never supposed to have happened. Throughout the 1960s the nuclear industry had waged an ambitious campaign to convince the public that nuclear technology was not only safe but also essentially accident-proof. In 1975 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) released the Rasmussen Report, which concluded that a citizen was more likely to be killed by a meteor than by a reactor accident. The report reflected a culture of overconfidence that had pervaded the industry in the years before the accident. As the NRC's Director of Nuclear Reactor
The accident and the breakdown of trust

Many widespread and strong oppositions, a number of them reflecting underlying economic realities and public concerns, have emerged in recent years. These concerns are particularly evident in the region's economy and society, where rising inequality, unemployment, and social unrest are prominent issues. The economic and social challenges are compounded by the region's geographical isolation, which makes it particularly vulnerable to external shocks. The community's capacity to respond to these challenges is limited, and the region's economy is heavily dependent on a few key sectors, making it susceptible to fluctuations in global markets.

The accident, which occurred in the region's largest and most important city, has further exacerbated these concerns. The immediate response from local authorities was insufficient, and the misinformation and misinformation spread by some media outlets further fueled public anger and mistrust. The aftermath of the accident has highlighted the lack of preparedness and the need for better planning and management in the region.

In the aftermath of the accident, there was a significant increase in public protests and demonstrations. The authorities have responded with a heavy-handed approach, leading to further divisions and polarization. The situation has deteriorated, with reports of violence and looting in some areas. The international community has expressed concern, but its ability to intervene is limited by the local situation and the geopolitical factors at play.

The accident has also had a significant impact on the region's economy. The closure of key sectors and the disruption of supply chains have led to a decline in economic activity. The situation has worsened the already high levels of poverty and unemployment, and the region's leadership is struggling to find solutions.

The accident and its aftermath have raised questions about the region's ability to manage future crises and its commitment to transparency and accountability. The community is demanding clearer answers and a more open dialogue with its leaders. The region's future will depend on its ability to address these challenges and to build trust with its citizens.
the state’s Lieutenant Governor William Scranton expressed growing frustration with the utility: “This situation is more complex than the company first led us to believe ... The company has given you and us conflicting information.” The confusion left some convinced that Met Ed had engaged in a cover-up. One reporter recalled, “The guys from Met Ed looked conniving, looked like people with something to hide. They had the look of Richard Nixon in ’74.” For the first time, local residents realized how dependent they were on the company for their safety, and Met Ed’s conduct had not been reassuring. As one man put it, “I believe that we as citizens have been lied to about many things that have happened.” A twenty-year-old folksinger who lived near the plant poked fun at Met Ed’s efforts to downplay the crisis, penning a song with the line, “We’re top of the news for the entire week, because of what they call a minor leak.” The Watergate scandal loomed over the crisis, as did the political thriller The China Syndrome, a film released only twelve days before the accident whose plotline bore an uncanny resemblance to the unfolding drama at TMI. The film told the story of a reporter, cameraman, and plant operator who join forces to expose grave safety problems at a nuclear power plant whose owners are deceptive, reckless, profit driven, and willing to resort to violence to hide the dangers.

But if Met Ed had sustained the most serious damage to its credibility, the NRC had not emerged from the accident unscathed. The first days of the accident had been marked by communication problems between the state, the utility, and the federal agency, demonstrating just how weak the NRC was as a command center. TMI was, in the words of the NRC’s Harold Denton, “the most serious accident in the life of the reactor program,” and it had taken the commission by surprise. The combined causes of the crisis were mechanical malfunction, design flaws, and human error. It had also exposed the NRC’s hubristic belief that advanced design could eliminate the possibility of a serious accident. As Denton later recalled, there had been a pervasive belief that machines could be so well designed that they “would not place a lot of demands on operators.” By shattering that belief, the crisis provided a paradigmatic example of what Charles Perrow has called “normal accidents” - accidents that emerge out of the multiple failures and vulnerabilities inherent in any complex technological system. More broadly, the accident had punctured a hole in the carefully cultivated image of nuclear power as a clean, sophisticated technology. One commissioner recalled her shock during a postaccident tour of the plant: “I was rather horrified to find we had these large pipes with rags around them and yellow markings on the floor which said ‘Contaminated Water.’ I had had an image of a high, clean technology that was well looked after and well run, and I found something that really, frankly, looked like the underside of a 100-year-old house that I once owned.”

The accident also revealed something troubling about the post-1945 political order: the extent to which elected officials were dependent on unelected technological experts. From the time he learned of the accident, Governor Richard Thornburgh had sought to create what he called an “island of credibility” to which citizens could look for reliable advice. But this proved difficult. The poor communication between the utility and the state and federal agencies meant that Thornburgh was confronted with what he called a “kaleidoscope of signals.” In addition, TMI was emerging as the biggest news story of the year, and some media reports coming into the governor’s office were alarming. The problem, as Thornburgh later described it, was “sifting out fact from fiction, hyperbole from analysis, cant from candor, and guesswork from solid reporting.” But the challenge of distinguishing between credible and erroneous information was compounded by the fact that the governor knew little about nuclear power. Prior to the accident, Thornburgh’s only source of information on the topic was a 1975 book called We Almost Lost Detroit, which detailed a 1966 accident at Fermi-I, the first commercial breeder reactor in the United States.

Thus the three institutions most directly involved in the accident – the utility company, the NRC, and the governor’s office – all faced a series of distinct but overlapping challenges: Met Ed appeared unreliable, the NRC appeared unprepared, and the governor’s office appeared dangerously dependent on these compromised organizations for vital information. But underlying these challenges was something more elemental: no one could see inside the reactor core to assess the damage. Nuclear engineers could rely on instrumentation to gauge the core’s temperature and could analyze water samples to determine approximate radiation levels. But because both temperatures and radiation levels were so high within the core, the containment building was too dangerous for visual inspection. Indeed, it would not be until late July 1980 – almost sixteen months after the accident – that two engineers, clothed in protective gear, would enter the building to get their first look at the core. The accident thus constituted a crisis of visibility in which engineers, public officials, reporters, scientists, and the public were hungry for information about something they could not see. The inability to see the evidence – that is, to see
throughout the country, these images would take on an iconic status, 

lying their homes. Appropriate in newspapers and on television screens, the news media reminded mothers and children of the need for caution. The drill went so far as to present some of the offices in New York City as potential sites for an attack. The reality is that the threat of a terrorist attack is real, but the response to it should be cautious and measured.

The国务院 decision to increase the evacuation of women and children was met with widespread criticism within the medical community. By the end of March, these findings were well-established within the medical community. The arguments were more straightforward, and the evacuation of women and children was seen as a necessary measure to reduce the risk of radiation exposure. In addition, it was noted that the evacuation decision was based on scientific evidence and that the evacuation order was consistent with international guidelines. However, critics argued that the decision was premature and that the evacuation order would benefit only the women and children, ignoring the needs of the wider community.

In response to criticism, the government defended its decision, emphasizing the importance of precautionary measures. However, the evacuation order raised questions about the government's response to the crisis. The decision was seen as a reflection of the government's commitment to protecting the public, but it also raised concerns about the potential for overreaction.

In conclusion, the evacuation order was a significant event in the response to the crisis. It highlighted the need for a balanced approach to crisis management, taking into account both scientific evidence and the needs of the community. The government's decision to evacuate women and children was a necessary measure to reduce the risk of radiation exposure, but it also raised concerns about the potential for overreaction. The response to the crisis demonstrated the challenges of balancing scientific evidence and public concern, and the evacuation order serves as a reminder of the importance of a careful and measured approach to crisis management. 
mothers holding towels and blankets over their children’s faces in a makeshift effort to protect them from radiation exposure; pregnant women temporarily housed in the Hershey Center, one of the mass care centers established by the Red Cross; and mothers loading their children into station wagons and driving away, with the reactor’s towers ominously looming in the background.

Why did reproductive female bodies, children’s bodies, and fetal bodies take on such a freighted symbolic role? At one level the reason is obvious: because Thornburgh had directed his advisory toward pregnant women and preschool-aged children, mothers and children were more likely to evacuate the area than men and thus assumed a more prominent role in news coverage.\(^{35}\) In addition, “mothers and children” have often figured prominently in news coverage of modern disasters, reflecting a chivalric ethic that calls for the protection of women and children over able-bodied men during states of emergency. But the bodies of the pregnant and the very young were not the only – or the most – vulnerable bodies throughout the TMI crisis. That distinction belonged to the (overwhelmingly male) operators and engineers at the plant, who were working around the clock as radiation levels inside the reactor soared. So it is worth asking: why some bodies and not others? Why the child’s body and not the worker’s body? Why the woman’s body and not the man’s body?

The answer lies in the centrality of reproduction to perceptions of environmental risk. The bodies of mothers and young children have often been used to represent environmental risk, arguably because they capture what is most deeply at stake: the reproduction of the species.\(^{33}\) In the case of TMI, these bodies captured the high stakes of nuclear energy. But if the figure of the reproductive body spoke to the theme of risk, it spoke no less powerfully to the theme of protection. Although the vast majority of evacuees stayed with family and friends during the crisis, photographs of pregnant women and children camping out in the Hershey Center implied that the state was protecting those citizens most vulnerable to the radiation threat.\(^{34}\) As Thornburgh later recalled after touring the center, “This was a stark reminder of the responsibility of governing.” Walking through the stadium, he had seen “young children, mothers carrying babies, and their bewilderment and confusion over a technology they clearly didn’t understand, seeking reassurance that the situation had been handled.”\(^{35}\) The steady reproduction of images of expectant mothers, young children, and babies was thus double-edged: some images indicted the state for endangering public safety while others cast it as a vital agent of protection.

Governor Thornburgh lifted the advisory on April 9, twelve days after the start of the accident. By then the hydrogen bubble had disappeared, temperatures in the core had gone down, and the reactor was in stable condition. But the accident shattered the trust that many residents had placed in the plant. Previously, they had trusted the experts to protect them from harm and had believed them when they had said that there would never be a serious accident at the reactor.\(^{36}\) As one woman looked back on her earlier choice to live near TMI, “I was trusting so I stayed. My faith outweighed my fear.”\(^{37}\) The accident tipped the scale in the other direction, with fear outweighing trust. This fear was often accompanied by a sense of betrayal. As one local woman explained the change, she had always had faith in government leaders, but “after this monster was released on us, all I have is cynicism and mistrust.”\(^{38}\) One father recalled that his children had been playing outside during those first two days, “sucking up radiation – just because those bastards didn’t tell the truth about releases.”\(^{39}\) Friday, March 30, was, as one woman put it, “the last day in my life I’ll ever trust the utility or our government to do the right thing for me.”\(^{40}\)

At the heart of this collapse of trust was a single question: had local residents been exposed to levels of radiation that threatened their health? For officials, the answer was no. They were convinced that while radiation levels had soared inside the reactor’s containment building, they had never reached dangerous levels beyond the plant. The full body scanning of over seven hundred citizens had shown no internal contamination. The USDA and the FDA had found only a few minute traces of radiation in the hundreds of food samples they collected throughout April. The Department of Agriculture detected iodine-131 in only a small number of the two hundred milk samples they had taken from nearby farms. The cumulative data was so reassuring that in May 1979 several federal agencies projected that, statistically, offsite radiation exposure would lead to “approximately one” case of fatal excess cancer and “approximately two” cases of excess health effects (including fatal cancer, nonfatal cancer, and genetic damage) among those living within fifty miles of the plant.\(^{41}\)

The community’s response to these official findings ranged from acceptance to skepticism to rejection. On one end of the spectrum were those residents who believed the findings, insisting that they were more likely to be killed by an oncoming car while crossing the street than by living near a nuclear power plant. On the other end were antinuclear activists who
 Atomic Nibberings and Biological Crises at I.M.

Narazha Zafariza

69
sustained at Hiroshima and Nagasaki cast the fetus as vulnerable to external dangers; indeed, the Hībakusha – the Japanese term for the community of bombing victims – included babies who were in utero at the time of the explosions. The postwar cultural, scientific, and legal construction of the fetus, in other words, emerged in a distinctly atomic world. Writes historian Sara Dubow, “[A]tomic sciences and the science of embryology became at least loosely linked in the public imagination.”

This rendering of the fetus as both visible and vulnerable intensified in the years leading up to the accident. In the early 1960s, ultrasound exams were introduced as a routine obstetrics practice. In April 1965 Life magazine published a sixteen-page photo-essay by Swedish medical photographer Lennart Nilsson that charted the development of the human fetus. The issue sold eight million copies in its first four days on newsstands. In 1973 the University of Washington first identified “Fetal Alcohol Syndrome” as a cluster of physical and mental birth defects associated with the expectant mother’s consumption of alcohol, and in 1981 the Surgeon General issued its first official warning about the risks of drinking alcohol during pregnancy. In 1977 the American Cancer Society used fetal sonogram images to reinforce the idea that smoking endangered public health. These transformations in medicine, reproductive technology, and public health policy had the cumulative effect of casting the human fetus in a historically new light: as a vulnerable body requiring vigilant protection from a range of external assaults. If the nuclear reactor at TMI was concealed from view, the human fetus occupied the inverse position: hiding in plain sight.

During the same period, the struggle over abortion assumed a prominent place in American political culture, and nowhere more so than in central Pennsylvania. As early as 1969 local activists in Pittsburgh started People Concerned for the Unborn Child, the state’s first pro-life group. In 1970 the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference launched Pennsylvanians for Human Life, an educational group designed to rally support for abortion restrictions. By the early 1980s several organizations had come together to form the Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation, a state affiliate of the National Right to Life committee. Together, these groups put the state on the vanguard of the fight to outlaw abortion. This was more than a legislative battle; it was a struggle over the question of what constitutes life itself. Activists cultivated a pro-life discourse that put a premium on the preservation of human life from the moment of conception to natural death. This discourse emerged in tandem with the heightened visibility of the fetus. Abortion opponents believed that if the
Aromatization and Biological Changes at TMI.

N. Mascha Zarefsky.
posters and signs, and its most prominent spokesperson, Helen Caldicott, carried a baby casket at marches to symbolize the nuclear threat. The specter of endangered young life thus established an affinity between two social movements that appeared to occupy divergent ends of the political spectrum: the pro-life and antinuclear movements. The affinity was borne out organizationally and in the lives of activists, as well; an antinuclear pacifist group called Pro-Lifers for Survival was founded in 1977, and the US Conference of Catholic Bishops later linked its support of human life to the nuclear freeze movement. Meanwhile, pacifists like Daniel and Philip Berrigan condemned abortion as a form of state-sanctioned murder (Daniel Berrigan even blockaded a Planned Parenthood clinic in Rochester, New York).

Animating both the pro-life and antinuclear movements, then, was an anxiety that human bodies could be rendered disposable by the state. This was an anxiety that attended all modern wars and that deepened after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But for many Americans, it was the Vietnam War that brought it home. Southcentral Pennsylvania was no hotspot of antinuclear mobilization, but its residents – like other citizens throughout both the United States and the globe – had watched as the war seemed to remake bodies into fodder. They had seen Buddhist monks burn themselves alive to condemn the war, college-age protesters on American campuses shot down by the National Guard, Vietnamese men, women, and children massacred in a conflict that obliterated the distinction between soldiers and civilians, and young soldiers brought home in body bags. All the while, they observed a growing disconnect between the official story about the war and its actual progression. Two core insights emerged out of the Vietnam disaster: the government could deceive its own people, and patriots could be rendered disposable. The accident rerouted these insights from the foreign to the domestic realm, from the war front to the home front, and from the martial, masculine body to the bodies of pregnant women, the young, and the unborn. Riffing on the antiwar term “cannon fodder,” TMI residents feared they had been remade into the “radiation fodder” of the nuclear age.

This was the community’s deepest fear: that its members had been used as “guinea pigs” in a nuclear experiment. Residents feared that their bodies and those of their offspring had been made expendable by a lethal collaboration between a reckless utility company and an ineffectual state. They feared that theirs had become – to borrow a phrase from sociologist Eric Klinenberg – “bodies that don’t matter.” This theme of human expendability was linked to the imperiled fate of the unborn, as in the testimony of one man who told public officials that TMI should be shut down because “an unborn child is more important than those towers over there.” But it was also sometimes cast in terms of a broader devaluation of human life. “We can buy other forms of energy,” one woman told local legislators, “but where are we going to buy a human life?” If nuclear power continued to spread, another wrote to the Kemeny Commission, then “we are as expendable as German Jews.” This theme of human expendability was not new in US history. For those subaltern groups who had been subjected to enslavement, dispossession, forced relocation, and racial violence, it was all too familiar. And the theme was especially acute for African American and Native American women who historically had been subjected to forced sterilization campaigns. But it was something of a revelation for a community that prided itself on its loyalty to the nation, and wanted to believe, in turn, that its members’ lives were valued by the state. “I love my country and have tried to show my children how wonderful their country is,” one woman told the commission. She always cried when she heard “God Bless America,” she wrote them. “Don’t make me cry for a different reason as I continue to hear it.”

The accident at TMI was more than a technological crisis. It was also a political and cultural crisis that raised elemental questions about whether citizens could trust the state to protect them from harm. The accident transformed the largely white, conservative population of central Pennsylvania into biological citizens, and the specific constellation of threats posed by radiation – coupled with the state’s response – located reproductive and fetal health at the center of this new citizenship mode. By placing the right to life itself – what Adriana Petryna has called “the superadded burden of survival” – at the heart of citizenship, the accident drew local women into the center of a political struggle, not only over the fate of TMI but also over the future of nuclear power. This marked a departure for many residents who had seen themselves as immune from the social upheavals of the era.

Ultimately, the TMI story demands that scholars move their analysis of a “politics of life” beyond the abortion fight and consider it within the context of the second Cold War. The image of an endangered fetus was a distinct creation of the atomic age that revealed the existential insecurity at the heart of the Cold War nation. And while this image proved politically polarizing within the context of the struggle over abortion, at Three Mile Island it had the opposite effect. It compelled local men and women to engage in protest and provisionally ally with the antinuclear movement,
In conclusion, the factors driving the decline of the American steel industry are complex and multifaceted. Economic globalization, shifts in foreign policies, and technological advancements have all contributed to the situation. The steel industry in the United States faces significant challenges, but there are opportunities to adapt and innovate. It is crucial for policymakers, industry leaders, and stakeholders to work together to develop sustainable solutions that can help the industry thrive in the future.
27. Transcript of Kemeny Commission Interview with Karl Abraham, p. 73, Box 466, RG 220, NA II.
28. Interview with Curtus Wilkie, Public Information Task Force Interview of Reporters, Box 472, unnamed folder, RG 220, NA II.
29. On these measures, see the Washington Post Special Report, Box 200, Folder 1, RT Papers; Box 194, Folder 1, RT Papers; Box 194, Folder 16, RT Papers. See also “Population Dose and Health Impact of the Accident at the TMI Nuclear Station,” Box 194, Folder 19, RT Papers.
30. Interview with Tate, Public Information Task Force Interviews of Reporters, p. 2, Box 472, unnamed folder, RG 220, NA II.
31. Ibid., 107.
32. "The Social and Economic Effects of the Accident at TMI: Findings to Date," prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Box 197, Folder 1, RT Papers.
33. Dunaway, “Gas Masks, Pogo, and the Ecological Indian.”
34. For several examples, see Washington Post Special Report.
35. Quoted in Walker, Three Mile Island, 156.
38. Letter from Charlotte Drennen to Kemeny Commission, May 24, 1979, Box 307, unfiled, RG 220, NA II.
40. Ibid., 47.
42. Ibid., 207.
44. Transcript, National Nuclear Debate, Pennsylvania State University Capitol Complex, Box 197, Folder 5, RT Papers.
45. See Washington Post Special Report.
46. CBS morning news transcript, Mar. 30, 1979, Box 194, Folder 3, RT Papers.
48. Press Release from American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologist, Apr. 13, 1979, Box 7, unnamed folder, RG 220, NA II.
49. Testimony of Ms. Dominowski, Public hearing, Health Resource Planning and Development, May 24, 1979, Box 307, unnamed folder, RG 220, NA II.
50. Letter from Mitchell Rogovin, Director, NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group to NRC Chairman Hendrie, Gilsinsky, Kennedy, Bradford, and Ahearn, November 13, 1979, Box 200, Folder 10, RT Papers.
51. Quoted in Walsh, Democracy in the Shadows, 39.
52. See, for examples, letters to commission from Nikki Naumann and Mary M. Wermian, Box 307, unnamed folder, RG 220, NA II.
55. The case centered on Bette Gay Bonbrest, a girl born in 1939 who had sustained serious injuries during her delivery by forceps. Her father sued the obstetrician for negligence, and the court ruled in her favor, establishing, in historian Sara Dubow’s words, “the right of a child to recover from harm incurred when it was a viable fetus in utero.” The case overturned six decades of legal precedent and was quickly emulated by other courts: by 1960 (only four years later) eighteen states had followed suit by awarding damages for prenatal injury.
57. The publication of the magazine in Life was timed to come out around the time of Nilsson’s book A Child Is Born. On the growing visibility of the fetus during this period, see again Dubow, Ourselves Unborn.
62. Televied Address of Richard Thornburgh, Apr. 6, 1979, Box 194, Folder 10, RT Papers, Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh.
65. Letter from Charlotte Drennen to Kemeny Commission, Lancaster, PA, RG 220, Box 307, unfiled, NA II.
66. Letter from Carolyn Walborn to Barb Jorgensen, Jun. 14, 1979, Box 7, unnamed folder, RG 220, NA-II.
The Role of National Socialism in the Second World War

The Role of National Socialism in the Second World War

Decrease Concentration Camps

on Nuclear Armament

and the Holocaust in the West German Discourse

Missile Bases as Concentration Camps

After the First World War, the issue of nuclear weapons became a significant concern for Germany and the Allies. The development of nuclear weapons, particularly by the United States and the Soviet Union, posed a significant threat to international stability. The deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, particularly in the context of the Cold War, raised concerns about the potential for nuclear annihilation and the moral and ethical implications of using such weapons.

The Strategic Nuclear Forces

The Strategic Nuclear Forces of the United States and the Soviet Union were the main focus of nuclear arms control efforts during the Cold War. The development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) allowed both countries to deploy nuclear weapons across the globe, increasing the risk of accidental or intentional escalation.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968 with the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting disarmament. It has been a cornerstone of international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons, but has been accompanied by challenges and failures.

The INF Treaty

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces. The treaty was signed in 1987 and entered into force in 1988, but it was terminated by the United States in 2019.

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