

Religion & Philosophy Syllabus Senior Secondary Section C: Philosophy

1 What is Philosophy?

A philosopher was originally defined as a 'lover of wisdom'.¹ Philosophy is taken as consisting of those important questions which cannot be answered by ordinary processes of observation and experiment. Some other definitions are:

- 'Critical reflection on the justification of basic human beliefs and analysis of basic concepts in terms of which such beliefs are expressed'²
- Philosophy is thinking about thinking; Philosophy is rationally critical thinking, of a more or less systematic kind about: the general nature of the world (metaphysics or theory of existence), the justification of belief (epistemology or theory of knowledge), and the conduct of life (ethics or theory of value).³

Philosophy concerns the practice, of questioning and inquiry. It probes assumptions, thinking processes, methods of reasoning, ways of forming beliefs, arriving at conclusions, how we come to know things, and what it *means* to know something. Philosophy does not take *what* we know or *how* we know, or *what* we think or *how* we think, for granted.

The three major areas of Philosophy are:

- *Metaphysics*, concerning *existence*, and what it *means* to exist;
- *Epistemology*, concerning *knowledge* and how we can know anything;
- *Ethics* (or *Moral Philosophy*) concerning the 'rightness' and 'wrongness' of things, especially action – how *should* we act?

Other areas of philosophical inquiry related to those above are:

- *Logical Inquiry* – Reflecting on the rules of Inquiry and the need for principles when considering different types of thinking.
- *Aesthetic Inquiry* – Exploring problematic issues involved in relations between artistic creation, aesthetic appreciation, and aesthetic criticism.

More broadly, philosophy can reflect on and inquire into any area of life or experience. Other examples are: Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Religion, and indeed, since Philosophy is the practice of critical reflection, Philosophy of anything. Philosophy reflects on our thought processes and is sometimes known as *higher-order* thinking. Philosophical questions are usually controversial and contestable, for example: What does it mean to exist as a human person? Do animals have minds? Does God exist? Are there any objective truths? and if so, How can we know them? What makes a 'good life', and to whom or what do I owe

¹ The term 'philosopher' originally meant "lover of wisdom", and took its origin from a famous retort which Pythagoras made when he was called "wise". He said that his wisdom only consisted in knowing that he was ignorant, and that he should therefore not be called "wise", but "a lover of wisdom" ' A C Ewing: *The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy* 1951, London, Routledge.

² Paul Edwards: *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy* 1973, New York, The Free Press, p xiv.

³ Ted Honderich: *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* 1995, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p 666.

responsibility? These kind of questions often involve the *clarification of concepts* – what defines a particular concept (for example, ‘a person’), and what meets that definition (for example, A human? An animal? A robot? An alien?).

Because of their reflective nature, philosophical questions are not answerable within the traditional disciplines. They present opportunities to ‘peer’ at the disciplines, and ask questions about them, without being bound by the norms of the disciplines themselves. Important philosophical questions are usually *central, contestable, and common*.

2 What is a Person? Could Animals or Machines be Persons?

Philosophers have approached the issue of ‘persons’ in various ways. One approach has been to describe the various features which compose a person, while another approach has been to consider what it means to *experience being* a person. While both approaches often intersect, they are sometimes addressed separately. Questions which the first approach might generate could be: What is a ‘person’? what makes me *me*? Do I have a soul? Am I just a bunch of chemicals? Do I remain being the same person over time, even though I am constantly changing? Are all human beings persons? And are all persons human beings? Questions which the second approach might generate could be: ‘What does it feel like to be me?’ ‘What does my life mean to me?’ ‘How should I live my life?’ ‘Is there a purpose to my life?’ ‘How do I know how to act?’ ‘How do I become an individual?’ ‘How do I deal with the awesome freedom of life?’ There is no single answer to any of these questions, but they are of central importance as they affect and reflect how we treat each other and ourselves, and also how the law treats – or should treat - us. The first –more objective– approach of what constitutes a person is addressed by considering some major historical and contemporary views. Following this, the more subjective approach is addressed by a brief consideration of *Existentialism*.

2.1 Plato (429 –347 BC)

A person comprises a body and a soul. The soul is the most important part, pre-exists the body, and continues to exist after the body dies. Before and after life, the soul lives in a supernatural realm of the Forms, which are eternal, perfect, unchanging ideas or ‘archetypes’ of things which exist in the world. The Forms are of both concrete things, such as a table or a circle, and abstract ideas, such as justice. They are the only ‘real’ things, as things in *this* world only exist in the form of ‘appearance’, not in the form of ‘reality’. When in this life, the soul yearns for the eternal realm, and can access the Forms through contemplation, thereby rediscovering eternal ideas such as Beauty, Truth, and Goodness. While both body and soul are required to live in this world, the body is inferior to the soul, and ‘imprisons’ the soul during its earthly existence. To act morally in this world, one must know the Eternal Truths; this can only be done by contemplation of the Forms, not by looking at this world. See: Plato, *The Last Days of Socrates* 1959, London, Penguin, especially *Phaedo (Wisdom and the Soul)* pp 93-191, in which Socrates explains why he is unafraid to die, as he knows that the most important part of him, his soul, will live on. See also: Plato, *The Republic* 1955, Harmondsworth, Penguin, especially *Part X1: The Immortality of the Soul and the Rewards of Goodness*, pp 440-455.

2.2 Aristotle (384 – 322 BC)

A person comprises a body and a soul. The soul is not separate from the body, but is the body’s ‘life-principle’ – they are together one substance. The soul is not immortal, and dies with the body. The soul gives the body its ‘form’ and its

capacities, so can be thought of as each person's set of powers or capabilities. For humans, the particular capacity of the soul is *rationality*. Plants have *vegetative* souls, animals have *sensitive* souls, and human persons have *rational* souls. All things in the world have their own particular purpose or end, towards which their souls' capacities orient them. For humans, the use of reason, which is seen by Aristotle as both moral and intellectual, is what distinguishes humans from lower animals. Humans are free to use or reject reason. To use reason is to become aware of what constitutes a virtuous life. For Aristotle, this is the 'golden mean' between 'excess' and 'deficit' – that is, the middle road between expressing too much or too little of an emotion or action, for example, between cowardice (deficit) and recklessness (excess); the golden mean between the two would be *courage*. See: Renford Bambrough, *The Philosophy of Aristotle* 1963, New York, New American Library, especially *Ethics*, pp 286-378.

2.3 Descartes (1596-1650)

A person comprises two separate substances, a body and a mind. No distinction is made between the mind and the soul. Our senses can deceive us about the outside world, whereas the 'understanding' of the mind is the only source of certainty. The starting point of certainty is the thought that I exist – 'Cogito ergo sum' – 'I think, therefore I am'. The essential quality of the mind is thinking, and the essential quality of the body is 'extension'. The mind is non-corporeal, completely separate from the body, and capable of independent existence from the body. The mind is also superior to the body, as the senses of the body can deceive us. For example, we cannot tell from the senses alone whether a piece of wax is really solid or fluid, only the understanding, supported by an undecieving God, can inform us of the true nature of things. See Rene Descartes, *Discourse on Method and The Meditations* 1968, London, Penguin, especially *Mediations* pp 93-169.

2.4 Locke (1632 – 1704)

A shift in thinking about what constitutes a human being occurred in Locke's time. The concern was now about moral responsibility for actions, both legally (in this life), and eternally (in the next life). Thus a person was a *certain kind* of being, which met a certain criteria. Locke specified that a person is a thinking, rational being whose essential quality is *consciousness*, specifically first-person consciousness of his or her own actions. This is today understood as first-person memory. Consciousness is not necessarily tied to a human body or a soul. This view does not rule out non-human persons. For example, as Locke suggests, a 'rational parrot' could be a person. Providing it fulfilled the requirements, so also could a machine or an alien (although Locke does not specify this). Some human beings, however, may not be persons, such as someone who is brain-damaged. Because identifying you as a person is tied to memory, the loss of memory suggests that you may no longer be a person (and maybe not responsible for your previous actions). Numerous other problems have emerged from Locke's view, and spawned a plethora of contemporary theories, each designed to overcome these problems, but each of which generates another set of its own. See John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Volume 1* 1959, New York, Dover Publications Inc, especially *Chapter XXV11 Of Identity and Diversity*, pp 439-470. Locke's seminal statement on personal identity is on p 449 of this publication (Book 11, Ch XXV11:11).

2.5 Contemporary Views

Following from Locke, the debate about what constitutes a human person has become a debate about *personal identity* - what makes me the person that I am, and what makes me stay the *same* person over time. The question is: if what makes me a person is not ground in a soul (or similar unchanging entity), then what grounds my identity when all my physical and mental states are constantly changing? Thus, rather than identifying persons in terms of a specific soul or mind, contemporary views specify identity in terms of *criteria*. Criteria could apply to either the body or body parts, or the mind or mind parts. The main versions of these approaches are briefly outlined.

BODILY CRITERION: a person is the same person over time in virtue of retaining the same physical body. Identity resides in the body. See: Eric Olsen, *The Human Animal* 1997, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Problems arising from Bodily Criterion: Intuitively, many theorists find the bodily criterion inadequate, as it does not take into account the relevance of human psychology. It seems to them that a being a human person involves more than having a certain kind of body. According to this view, if my brain and all my mental states were transferred to a different body, my identity would remain with the brainless body. The only possibility of an afterlife lies in the notion of a bodily resurrection, rather than in the permanence of a soul or mind.

BRAIN CRITERION: a person is the same person over time in virtue of retaining the same physical brain. Identity resides in the brain. In the case of a 'brain-transfer' operation, in which the brain of one person were transferred into the body of another person, identity would be retained in the brain. See: Sydney Shoemaker, *Self-Knowledge and Self-identity* 1963, London, Cornell University Press, especially pp 23-25; 30; 193; 250-251.

Problems arising from Brain Criterion: Taking the brain only as the locus of identity does not take into account the fact that the brain is part of a larger bodily system, such that the theoretical separation from the body makes no sense. The brain criterion denies any significant influence from the body, the environment, and all that goes with it. The brain criterion also spawns the problems associated with 'fission' – the notion that the brain could be repeatedly split and several 'same' persons generated.

PHYSICAL CRITERION: a person is the same person over time in virtue of retaining enough physical matter, such as a *part* of the brain, as long as it is enough to generate sufficient memories of the earlier person. Theoretically, if it were possible to split a brain into two or more parts, and each part was put into a different skull, there would be several 'versions' of a single person. See: Harold Noonan, *Personal Identity* 1989, London, Routledge, especially pp 5-10.

Problems arising from the Physical Criterion: The notion of individual, personal identity begins to be lost if we reduce personal identity to brain parts. No longer is a specific brain or a specific body the determining factor in personal identity. The relevance of the brain part seems to be in the information it carries, rather than in the physical matter, thus leaving the way open that identity could theoretically be retained merely by the artificial duplication of memories. The problem of fission then becomes even greater.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITERION: a person is the same person over time in virtue of retaining sufficient of his or her memories and other psychological states, such as intentions and beliefs. On this view, persons could change identity over time and become different persons, such as (as one theorist suggests) when at least 50% of their memories were lost. Similarly, if it were possible to 'copy' a person's memories, you could have more than one version of the same person. Because this view is not tied to bodily identity, machines and aliens could be persons, but some human beings who did not meet the specified criteria may not be. See: Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* 1984, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Problems arising from the Psychological Criterion: (1) *Metaphysical:* Due to a person's constantly changing mental states and periodic loss of memories, persons may lose their identity at a later time from what it was at an earlier time. They may become different persons, compromising relationships between people, and changing the way we identify persons in society. In cases of severe loss of memories, an individual may not be a person at all. Any artificial entity which displayed evidence of memories could be counted as a person. (2) *Ethical:* If a person's identity 'changed', he or she may no longer be morally responsible for earlier actions, and may thus deserve less punishment, and maybe no punishment at all. The ability for moral reform in individuals and society would be compromised. According to Derek Parfit (book referenced above), personal identity becomes redundant, and 'does not matter'. It is thus a mute point whether we are one person or a different person. Individuality is completely insignificant, but retention of psychology is all-important.

3 **Questions arising from the above theories (there are plenty more)**

- Could we learn about morality, truth, goodness, justice, and beauty purely through contemplation? (Plato)
- What is the moral and legal status of humans who are not rational? (Aristotle)
- Can I know the contents of my own mind for certain, without reference to the outside world? (Descartes)
- Would I still be *me* if I lost all my memories? (Locke)

Contemporary Views:

- Would I still be me if I had a different body?
- Would I still be me if I had a different mind?
- Are all persons human beings? - Could non-humans be persons?
- Are all human beings persons?
- Does being a person require first-person reflective self-consciousness?
- If so, could animals and machines have these things?
- Does being a person entail rationality and moral responsibility?
- If so, do animals, and could machines have these things?
- Am I still responsible for my actions if I have forgotten them?
- Are brain-damaged humans lesser persons than other humans?
- What is our moral responsibility to disabled humans?
- Are babies and children persons?
- Should abortion and Euthanasia be permitted?
- If artificial intelligence were possible, what would be its moral status?

- If aliens visited earth, what would be their legal and moral status?

4 Resources

Some resources for teachers to gain background information are listed above. There are many more. Any good philosophy encyclopaedia should contain useful information. See also Richard Taylor, *Metaphysics* 1992, New Jersey, Prentice Hall. Any material referring to *personal identity, the mind-body problem, the soul, the self*, or similar subjects, should be of help. Most texts will have a bibliography of related texts also. Some of these texts will be useful for students. Also good is Stephen Law, *The Philosophy Gym* 2003, London, Headline Book Publishing, Sections 2, 6, 12, 13, and especially 22. Alternatively, any good story, film, play, newspaper article, or similar, can generate a way into the topic. Science fiction stories which refer to robots, artificial intelligence, aliens, or similar, could stimulate discussion on some of the above issues, and test intuitions. In accordance with good philosophy, sound reasons must be given for any views offered. Stories about loss of memory, past crimes and moral responsibility, would also be useful. The short story by Phil Cam (*Twister, Quibbler, Puzzler, Cheat* 1998, Hale & Iremonger) *Double Trouble* is a very user-friendly way to get into the topic. Algernon is a robot whose parts are gradually replaced, until none of his original parts remain. When it is discovered that his old parts have been reassembled into a new robot, during which time 'Algernon' has continued to operate in his usual way, it becomes an insoluble problem as to which of the robots is Algernon, and indeed, who is the other one?

5 Existentialism

A completely different way to think about the question: 'What is a Person?' is to think about what it means to an individual's own experience of himself or herself. Existentialism begins with the individual human person, existing in the world. For existentialists, there is a certain 'angst' in experiencing the human condition. This becomes apparent once we realise that we are 'free' to choose how we live our lives - the burden of freedom can become overwhelming. For some existentialists, such as Sartre, there is no fixed human essence or nature which gives a structure to human life, and thus we *create* ourselves. We are not already something *there*, waiting to be discovered. We are nothing until we make ourselves, and this we need to do as there is no real purpose to life. Unless we grasp this – the need to create our own goals and purposes, we could experience the darkness of complete nihilism – the realisation that there is no justification for values or morality, and no purpose to life in general. To avoid this darkness, we need to seize life and make of it what we will. See: J P Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism* 1948, London, (no publisher given). Any texts which delve into a person's reflective, introspective experiences could be used to generate discussion of this approach. See: Albert Camus, *The Stranger* or *The Myth of Sisyphus*. If you want to get the 'feel' of Existentialism, listen to the repeat of 'Encounter' on radio national at 7.10pm on Wednesday 8th December, 2004 (text available on the Web), in which the work of Albert Camus is discussed. Although Camus did not think of himself as an existentialist, his work is often referred to in this regard.

6 What are *Human Persons*?- Summary in Pictures

Plato's View

My Soul
(Me)



I am me because I have a soul. And I can contemplate the Eternal Truths! When I die, my soul will go back to the Eternal Realm, where it used to live.

Aristotle's View



I am an integral unity of body and soul. I have a rational soul and I know how to be good! Unfortunately my soul will die when my body dies!

Descartes' View



I have a body and a *completely* separate mind. Beats me how they are joined together, but my mind is always right! And I know that I exist because I can think about it!

Locke's Memory Criterion



My identity is in my **MEMORIES**. But I have forgotten who I am!

The Bodily Criterion

My identity is in my **BODY** I must keep the same body to stay being me. If someone takes my body, they will take me also!



2 The Brain Criterion



My Identity is in my **BRAIN**. If you can describe everything about my brain, you will have described everything about me! (But how on earth are you going to do that??)

The Physical Criterion



My Identity is in the *TINIEST CELL* of my brain. If you split my brain up you will get lots of Mees!

The Psychological Continuity Criterion

My identity is in *MY MIND*. As long as my psychological states are connected to each other, I will still be me. But how do I know that my mental states are really mine???



Existentialism



Who am I? What is this awesome thing I experience called freedom? There is no point to life, so I must create my own goals. How shall I do this? I am like Sisyphus, rolling the stone to the top of the hill, only to see it fall back down again! Yet I can find joy in that, because I can overcome the burden of existence!

7 The Nature of Agency: Action and Intention; Freedom and Determinism⁴

An agent is a person (or being) who initiates and carries out an action. *Agency* is a *causal power*, that is, the power to bring something about. Agents thus have the capacity to choose between options, and to do what they choose to do. *Action* as understood here, refers to a species of event, that is, something which occurs. An action is an event which occurs intentionally, rather than accidentally. Actions thus require agents who can intend them.

Intention refers to a state of mind of a person's intending to do something, which may be present even when the thing itself is not actually done. The intention is thus *the state of mind* which is oriented towards the action, regardless of the action itself. It can be seen that the notion of agency, action, and intention, presuppose the notion of *free will*, because, if we did not have the free will to choose and intend, we would not be 'free agents' able to carry out the actions we choose to do. In Philosophy, the notion of 'free will' – the ability to freely chose our actions – is contrasted with the notion of 'determinism' – the notion that we are not free, and that we are 'determined' by previous events and circumstances to do what we do, and could not have done otherwise. It is an important question, because if we are not free to choose our actions, then the notion of responsibility and punishment for crimes is thrown into question also. Some major approaches to this issue are outlined.⁵

8 Freedom

To be free is to be able to do what I wish to do, for example, move my finger. This requires at least two conditions:

- 1) That there is *no impediment* to my activity: that is, there is no physical constraint or obstacle, such as that my finger is strapped up so that it cannot physically move.
- 2) I am not *constrained* or *forced* to act in one way rather than another, such as if a person or machine forced my finger, rather than it moving by my own choice.

The above could be seen as the basic *physical* conditions required to perform a free action. I am free within the limitations of my physical circumstances and capacities (I am not free to fly like a bird, for instance). There are, however, other kinds of possible constraints to consider when exploring the concept of 'free-will'.

9 Hard Determinism

Hard Determinism is the theory that there are no free actions. The three major claims are:

1. Determinism is true
2. If determinism is true, there are no free actions
3. There are no free actions.

According to Robert Blatchford, the will is not free, it is ruled by heredity and environment. The feeling that we have free will is a delusion. We can, in fact, only choose our actions in accordance with the influences we have received from heredity and environment. They have, in a sense, already fixed our options for us, and the one which we will 'choose'. If, for example, we are faced with the choice of whether or not to shoot a rabbit, the person whose heredity

⁴ Ted Honderich, *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* 1995, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp 4-5; 18; 411-412.

⁵ The following views are taken from *Freedom, Determinism, and Responsibility* in Klemke, Kline, & Hollinger, *Philosophy: The Basic Issues* 1982, New York, St Martin's Press, pp 99-127.

and environment have 'caused' him to become a hunter, will 'chose' to shoot the rabbit, whereas the humanitarian, shaped by a different set of circumstances, argues Blatchford, will 'choose' to leave it be. In both instances, the notion of choice is an illusion. What has 'happened' to us previously makes us the persons which we are, forms our consciences, and determines the actions we carry out. Moreover, given the state of things at any moment in time, the entire future of the universe can be predicted.

Problems with Determinism

It seems to me that I do have free will. I am aware of deliberating on my actions, weighing up alternatives, making decisions. This does not accord with the idea that everything is mapped out for me and I am unable to change it. If I do not have free will and could not have done otherwise, then I cannot be held morally responsible for my crimes, and should not be punished for them.

10 Soft Determinism

Soft Determinism attempts to take a middle road between the view that actions are determined, and the view that there is free will. It tries to back both options, and is sometimes referred to as *Compatibilism*. Its three major claims are:

1. The thesis of determinism is true, and therefore, all human behaviour is caused and determined
2. Voluntary behaviour is free to the extent that it is not externally constrained or impeded
3. In the absence of such constraints, the causes of voluntary behaviour are certain states, events, or conditions within the agent, namely volitions, choices, decisions, desires, and so on

Persons are thus free and responsible for what they choose to do, but what they choose is caused by their own inner choices and volitions.

Problems with Soft Determinism

If my choices are based on my inner states and volitions, we need to consider where these come from, and whether I could have done otherwise. A determinist would reply that I could only have done otherwise if my internal states had been different, and that therefore, my choices weren't in fact free. For example, if I chose to move in a certain way and am not impeded in doing so, in accordance with Soft Determinism, my actions are free. But if we consider that I have in fact been 'programmed' to have these volitions by an external force, such as a mad scientist, I would seem to be acting in accordance with my own wishes, but would in fact, be acting in accordance with states which were caused by things *other* than myself, and therefore, would not really be free. In other words, if we attribute 'freedom' to inner states which are themselves dependent on causes *outside* of me, we have robbed the notion of freedom of any real meaning.

11 The Theory of Agency

The Theory of Agency is a version of *Libertarianism*. Libertarianism holds that we do have free will, and are responsible for our actions. Its three main claims are:

1. If Determinism is true, then no actions are free
2. Some actions are free
3. Determinism is not true

According to Libertarianism, regardless of what has happened in the past, we can freely chose to act and make our own decisions, thereby changing the outcome from anything which could be predetermined or predicted. The Theory

of Agency is one way of explaining how this happens. An agent is an entity which can make free choices, and 'intervene' in the chain of events, in a way which is not determined by prior circumstances, and in a way which could have been otherwise. On this view, antecedent conditions are insufficient to explain or justify the outcome of events. While agents act for reasons, these reasons themselves are not the cause, the agent himself or herself is. Agents are thus not merely *acted upon*, but are themselves the *initiators of actions*.

Agency theory differentiates between types of actions to show the difference between those which we chose and those which we do not. My body's pulse, for example, is caused by conditions in my body, not by my free will. By contrast, the decision to eat my lunch, is caused by myself, I could have done otherwise. This view suggests two important things: 1) that I am not simply a bundle of events or thoughts (physical and mental states), but have a substantial self, which is not merely a *passive* recipient of the activities of others; 2) I am a being which is capable of self-motivated activity, and am efficacious in my own right. I can cause things to occur *without* anything causing me to do so. This does not mean I do not have *reasons* for what I do (I do not, for instance, act in a capricious and undirected way, for no reason whatsoever), but means rather that I am not bound by any particular reason (there may be several, each pulling in different directions). I can freely choose which reasons to follow, and originate by own actions and chains of reactions. I can begin a new 'ethical chain', and am not bound by previous ones.

Problems with Agency Theory

My feeling that I freely deliberate could be an illusion. If determinism is true, then I may simply *feel* that I am free, but may be being deluded. I may not be aware that my past is influencing me, and may not know that although I think I am freely choosing, I am in fact, only responding to a set of predetermined conditions. After all, if my past had been different, how would I know whether my actions would have been different also?

12 Conclusion

An interrelationship exists between the concept of a 'person' and the notion of 'free will' The type of entity which is capable of free will, and therefore of moral responsibility, is the type of entity which is capable of initiating action, rather than merely being the passive recipient of actions. Thus how we conceive of persons is important. If persons have a substantial 'essence' or 'substance', such as an immortal or rational soul, or an independent mind or similar notion, the concept of moral responsibility is comprehensible. If, on the other hand, persons have no such 'essence' or 'substance', and are purely determined by what happens *to* them, we need to consider whether the notion of responsibility for our actions makes any sense.

13 Resources

Any good philosophy encyclopaedia with entries on freedom and determinism; books on basic philosophy, such as Klemke, Kline, Hollinger, *Philosophy: The Basic Issues* 1982, New York, St Martin's Press; Ted Honderich, *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* 1995, Oxford, Oxford University Press; Stephen Law, *The Philosophy Gym* 2003, London, Headline Book Publishing, Section 15. Any good story, play, film, newspaper article which deals with moral responsibility for actions could generate discussion into the topic, for example, William Shakespeare's *MacBeth*.