HISTORY
of
114th INfanTRY REGIMENT
during
THE INVASION OF ITALY
on
THE GULF OF SALERNO

by
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SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO 36, U. S. ARMY

OPERATION "AVANGUARD"

9 - 21 SEPTEMBER 1943

ANNEX #6

141st INFANTRY

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HMS THUNDER and HMS ORIONs in small landing craft for the invasion of the continent of Europe on a beach in the Gulf of SALERNO north of AGROPOLI, ITALY—the first American troops to carry the fight to the homelands of the Axis. As each boat wave moved off into the night to a rendezvous area to circle and re-circle until all the waves were formed. The sky on the left flank in the vicinity of SALERNO was rent with the flashes of bombs and gunfire. Fires of an unknown source could be seen burning on the mainland as the boat waves drew closer to shore.

At 0330 assault waves of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Infantry landed on BLU3 and YELLOW designated beaches two and one-half miles north of AGROPOLI—beaches dominated in front and on the right by high hills from two to four miles from the shoreline. The 1st battalion was landed approximately 500 yards south of their designated BLU5 beach. The first two boat waves proceeded inland towards the battalion objective, but as the third wave landed German machine guns, riflemen, tanks and artillery began firing from well prepared and strongly defended positions. Elements of the 1st Battalion worked their way to the vicinity of the railroad bridge over the SALERNO River with the bulk of the battalion between that point and its landing area south of BLU3 beach. Here it was cut off from the regiment by German counter-attack which struck the right of the 3rd Battalion. The remainder of the 1st Battalion was immediately pinned to the ground. The beach had been mined and was constantly swept by enemy fire. BLU5 beach was abandoned by landing craft and the subsequent waves of the 1st Battalion began landing on YELLOW beach.

The 3rd Battalion landed on YELLOW beach meeting machine gun, rifle and other small arms, tank and artillery fire on the beach which was directed at all boat waves. The assault wave proceeded inland approximately 100 yards where the infantry began to engage the enemy.

The 2nd Battalion landed on YELLOW beach at 0530 and proceeded along the left flank of the 3rd Battalion, meeting the same type of fire from the enemy as the 1st and 3rd Battalions.

Landing craft of the fifth and subsequent waves were shelled by tanks from the plain and a battery of 80's on Hill 78. A number of landing craft were hit but the Navy crewmen displayed great courage and headed their boats into the blistering fire directed straight at them. Several of the boats were hit some distance from the shore and the personnel in the craft abandoned their equipment and swam for shore as the craft sank under them. The boat carrying a detachment of Company "D" led by Lt. Claude D. Reese of Brownwood, Texas, was sunk near shore. The men were picked up by a boat returning to its ship from the beach. Upon reaching the ship, Lt. Reese and his men were hastily re-equipped with sub-machine guns and left the ship on the first landing craft to land on YELLOW beach. Several landing craft hit on the beach or near shore burned or drifted helplessly as the crews were either killed or wounded.

The Regimental Combat Team command group commanded by Colonel Richard A. George of San Antonio, Texas, landing at 0550, was just behind. Colonel George, Colonel Epron and all his staff officers were available and were immediately directing the attack of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Colonel George visited the beach area, placing Lt. Colonel Andrew W. Price of Fort Worth, Texas, in charge and went forward to contact Lt. Colonel Edward D. McGill, commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion. Upon reaching the forward elements of the troops, it was apparent that heavier fire than that possessed by the infantry would be required.
HISTORY
of
115TH INFANTRY REGIMENT, RIFLE
from
9 September to 21 September 1943

On 5 September 1943, the 115th Regimental Combat Team composed of the
115th Infantry Regiment, 131st Field Artillery Battalion, Company "A", 111th
Engineer Battalion, Company "A", 111th Medical Battalion and the 1st Platoon,
36th Reconnaissance Troop left ORAN, ALGERIA, in convoy to commence the operation
"Avalanche"—the invasion of Italy on the Gulf of SALERNO. The convoy proceeded
along the North African coastline to BIZERTA, TUNISIA, and around the extreme
western tip of SICILY, heading for the Gulf of SALERNO.

The days of the convoy were enrivous—save the nights were cool and
clear. The voyage was a welcome respite from the days of rigorous training and
the many hours of detailed planning for the operation. Although the soldiers
were to face actual combat for the first time, there was no evidence of fear
among them—they gambled, sang, enjoyed the navy food and especially appreciated
the shower facilities and established life of the Navy. The extreme heat, cold
and dirt of Africa was forgotten. The atmosphere was more that of a pleasure
cruise until the maps and details of the invasion were issued to all officers and non-commissioned officers. Then, small groups were observed clustered
together all over the ships, planning each minute detail of what each man
would do upon landing. The officers checked and rechecked maps, photographs and
orders.

The convoy was joined by a British convoy, carrying the British 10th Corps,
on 8 September at 1500. Ships could be observed as far as the eye could see—
the destroyers being more pinpoints in the distance as they guarded the ships from
attack by submarines. The convoy was not of the gigantic proportions of the
Sicilian invasion. It was a concentrated, powerful force depending upon its punch
to establish a beachhead for the troops that were to follow. The convoy was attacked
by enemy aircraft on the far left flank after dark on 8 September. The Navy
sprang to its battle stations as the troops filed below decks to clear the weather
docks for action. The attacked flank of the convoy threw heavy concentrations of
anti-aircraft shells into the night sky—the tracers forming a wall of red fire.
Although the news of the surrender of Italy had been received a few hours earlier
and had caused great jubilation among the troops, the finding of the ships by enemy
planes eliminated the element of surprise upon which the invasion force depended
a great deal.

At 2300 8 September the call to General quarters was issued. Immediately the
sound of the ships' winches moving landing craft to positions for lowering into
the water, the placing of ammunition, weapons, radios and numerous kinds of various
military material used by a combat force in their designated places for unloading,
and troops collecting their packs and weapons, hummed throughout the ships.

At 0015 9 September the first boat teams were polled with orders by
the ships' loud-speakers—the 115th Regimental Combat Team engaged in attached units,
began disembarkation from the USS CHANCELLOR, USS JEFFERSON, USS CAROLINA and ARTHUR.
to repel the enemy. Colonel Turner instructed Captain Frederick A. Booth of San Antonio, Texas, Commanding Officer of Company C, to return to the beach and locate the naval gun emplacement, designated Sample, in order to radio a message for naval gun support. While searching for Design Sample on the beach, Captain Booth was hit by shell fire and seriously wounded. Colonel Turner then returned to the beach area and was able to locate Design Sample. Design Sample tried again and again to contact the naval gunners but they were too far out to sea to establish radio contact.

The enemy counter-attack at approximately 0730, accompanied by eight tanks on the right flank, was fought off by the infantry assisted by the fire of one 50mm anti-aircraft gun. The landing of small craft on both BLUE and YELLOW beaches was stopped by the navy for several hours due to constant shelling by the enemy. The twelve guns of the 1st Field Artillery Battalion were not ashore as yet. The Dukw (two and one-half ton amphibious trucks) carrying the artillery put back out to sea due to the shelling except for two 105mm Howitzers brought in by Captain John Ayers of Lubbock, Texas, which gave the combat team its first artillery support. Design Sample, after many difficulties, finally contacted the naval gunners and the first naval gun fire was received at 0915. Naval gun fire and artillery began to take effect on enemy positions and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were able to move inland to a point just along the bank of the railroad. The combat team artillery, except for the two guns under Captain Ayers, advanced. The small craft to the north and began to move into position.

Patrols were sent out to contact the 1st Battalion from whom no communication had been received, but the patrols were unable to get through due to enemy machine gun and artillery fire sweeping the dunes and beaches. Enemy snipers were very active.

An attack by eight tanks on the 2nd and 3rd Battalion positions was repelled by the infantry with anti-tank launchers and rocket guns and by naval gun fire. Two tanks were knocked out and the remainder retreated to positions in the hills to the east and south.

The Regimental combat team command post was moved 500 yards directly inland from YELLOW beach at 1200. Communications had been established with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions but the 1st Battalion was still out of contact and its exact position was not known. The beachhead and dunes were continually swept by artillery fire of the Germans and the loading of equipment and personnel proceeded again on YELLOW beach under extremely hazardous conditions. The command post was bracketed by fire from 80s but no direct hits were made. Patrols from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions continued to inch themselves along taking out sniper and machine gun opposition. The artillery and naval gun fire began to silence the enemy fire from Hill 70 and Hill 71.

The terrain just in the rear of the beach on which the 1st Battalion landed under command of Lt. Colonel Carlos C. Smith of Gonzales, Texas, was absolutely flat, cut by shallow irrigation ditches bordered by scrub bushes and trees with a few isolated patches of brush growth scattered through the area. The area was dominated on the immediate right and front by hills only one to one and one-half miles away. The flat area was defended on the beach proper by machine gun positions in depth; on the hills to the right by a battery of four guns; the flat
and proper guns in depth and two 75mm mortars. The four guns and two mortars were captured. The battalion was hit by heavy machine gun fire from both ground positions and from tanks and was scattered and pinned to the ground. The men sought cover in the shallow irrigation ditches whereupon the Germans placed their machine guns to fire directly down the ditches, causing several casualties. The only cover afforded was the scattered scrub growth which the enemy constantly swept with fire.

On the beach three 75mm self-propelled cannons of the regimental Cannon Company came in on the 3rd boat wave of the 1st Battalion. One of the landing craft carrying one cannon was turned back by the Navy but the other two cannons were landed under the direction of Lt. Clair F. Carpenter of Omaha, Nebraska, commanding the 1st platoon of the Cannon Company. One cannon vehicle under the direction of Sergeant Guy E. Spencer of Ocoee, Tennessee, hit a mine before it could clear the beach, knocking it out and wounding Sergeant Spencer, Corporal Alfred D. Heimswich of Portland, Pennsylvania, Technician V Jasper O. Reynolds of Smithfield, Texas, and Private Bill Davis, Jr., of Amagle, West Virginia. Lt. Carpenter’s cannon vehicle secured the mines and pulled up into a defile on the dunes. The defile was swept by machine gun fire from both flanks and the gun sight was hit and put out of commission. Lt. Carpenter ran across the beach under enemy fire and obtained the gun sight from the cannon hit by the mine. The sight being undamaged, Lt. Carpenter brought it back to his vehicle. Corporal Edgar L. Blackman, of Garland, Texas, endeavored to place the gun sight in position but was hit by machine gun fire and instantly killed. Lt. Carpenter then tried to adjust the sight and was severely wounded by the same machine gun.

Meanwhile, the flat terrain occupied by the 1st Battalion, being ideal for tank operations, was overrun by five TANK IV tanks. The tanks ran over the position occupied by Company "C" under the command of Captain Henry E. Lohman of San Antonio, Texas. Captain Lohman kept his men in irrigation ditches as the tanks rolled over them on three separate occasions. As the tanks passed the ditches they would open fire with machine guns directly on the men. A Company "B" detachment led by Lt. Eugene H. Bell of Fort Worth, Missouri, was caught by the tanks in an open field. The tanks fired their machine guns on the men killing and wounding several of them. Lt. Bell was run over by a tank but recovered enough to walk back to the battalion aid station where he died. A Company "A" platoon led by Staff Sergeant James A. Whittaker of San Antonio, Texas, was also caught by the tanks. Sergeant Whittaker emptied a clip of ammunition from his submachine gun into the driving aperture of the tank. The tank lurched as though the driver had been hit and another man was taking his place. Machine gun fire from the tanks caught Sergeant Whittaker across the legs. As he lay wounded on the ground, Sergeant Whittaker placed another clip of ammunition in his submachine gun and again opened fire. The tank then turned and moved off in another direction which undoubtedly saved many men of Sergeant Whittaker’s platoon.

The 1st Battalion attempted to reorganize but the slightest movement of grass or brush or the snapping of a twig immediately brought enemy fire to bear on them. Three railway guns captured by Company "A" during the night and prepared for demolition by the 1st platoon of Company "A", 118th Engineer Battalion, were destroyed when it became apparent that they could not be defended properly. The Germans would open fire with rifles apparently shooting at no particular target. Then our troops would open fire at these scattered rifle, the enemy would observe our positions and lay mortar and machine gun fire on them. This tactic was quickly adopted by our own troops and the Germans gradually began to withdraw. The 2nd platoon of Company "B" led by
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2nd Lt. Stanley Schuyler of Brooklyn, New York, had not been pinned down by the Germans. Lt. Schuyler's platoon operated very effectively and reduced several German machine gun positions. The platoon would observe the machine gun fire, creep in close and fire a grenade with excellent results.

The terrain over which the 2nd Battalion commanded by Major Herman A. Webster of San Antonio, Texas, and the 3rd Battalion commanded by Lt. Colonel Edward D. McCall of San Antonio, Texas, operated consisted of a narrow beach and a low sand dune line with very gentle rolling country beyond. This area was covered by a number of irrigation ditches and a fairly large canal, patches of scrub growth and many rock fences four feet high that separated farms and homesteads. The fences were of advantage to both the Americans and Germans but caused the advance to be slow due to each house and fence having to be taken separately.

Due to the strong enemy fire the 3rd Battalion companies were unable to reorganize after landing. The major portion of Company "L" commanded by Captain Edgar Ford of Rusk, Texas, pressed well forward but the remainder of Company "L" and Companies "M" and "K" were unable to reform and fought their way inland mostly in groups of two or three. The battalion had no contact with Companies "L" and "I" and only a small portion of Company "K". Company "K" was badly disorganized due to the loss of the company commander, Captain Lowell C. Gosh of Placentia, Texas, who was injured in jumping over a rock wall. Captain Harold R. Adams of San Antonio, Texas, Operations Officer of the 3rd Battalion, upon seeing Company "K" disorganized, took command of the scattered troops and reformed them. Captain Adams led a charge by the infantry against enemy tanks and successfully broke up the attack although his men had to press forward under mortar, machine gun and small arms fire. Captain Adams was wounded in the leg during the attack and was placed on the side of a canal after receiving medical attention. He directed his troops to leave him and continue the attack. The enemy tanks had reformed and again pressed forward. In this attack Captain Adams was again exposed to enemy fire and was killed.


Sergeant Leslie A. Duff and Sergeant Harvey Sellers of Winklet, Texas, and Private First Class Kenneth McNamara of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, all members of Company "L", displayed great courage when their small detachment was cut off from the main body of their company. The detachment was trapped on three sides by enemy fire. Sergeant Duff and Sergeant Sellers exposed themselves to the enemy fire in getting their men dug in. Private McNamara gave aid to the injured and assisted in bolstering the morale of the men besides carrying a wounded man back to safety. Corporal Arthur W. Hunter of Gonzales, Texas, a member of Company "K", was killed when he undertook to flank a machine gun nest that was harassing his company. Staff Sergeant Raymond H. Shig and Staff Sergeant Cecil B. Hunter of Gonzales, Texas, both members of Company "K", led a flanking move by their platoons on enemy machine gun positions. After causing
the Germans to withdraw to new positions. Sergeant Ehrig and Sergeant Hunter built up a defensive line along the side of a canal. While directing the placement of his men, Sergeant Ehrig was exposed to enemy fire and was killed. The machine squad of Company "H" of which Private First Class Edward L. Roos of Oswego, New York, and Private Laverne Counselman of Saginaw, Michigan, were members, was attacked by four Jerry IV tanks. Upon seeing the tanks coming towards their position Private Roos and Private Counselman obtained an anti-tank rocket launcher from a wounded man and launched it within thirty yards of the tanks. Their firing of the rocket launcher was so effective that combined with the efforts of the other members of the machine squad, the tanks were forced to withdraw. Sergeant Theodore J. Mitchell of Luling, Texas, a member of Company "H", was knocked unconscious by the concussion of an exploding 88mm shell which killed two members of his squad. Sergeant Mitchell was quickly evacuated to the beach and then to a ship. Upon regaining consciousness, Sergeant Mitchell begged the ship's doctor to let him return. When the doctor refused, he asked permission to see the ship's captain who reconsidered his case and sent him ashore on the first boat. 1st Lt. John G. McManus of Yuma, Arizona, Executive Officer of Company "H", took command of a scattered group of soldiers and successfully led them in an assault upon enemy machine gun positions which stood in the way of his battalion's advance.

Captain Ford of Company "I", established communication with the 3rd Battalion by radio and directed mortar fire so effectively that a tank attack was broken and forced back several hundred yards. 1st Lt. William G. Brown of Essex Junction, Vermont, Forward Observer of the 13th Field Artillery Battalion, attached to the 3rd Battalion, then sent forward an observation point and directed naval gun fire on the immediate front of the battalion disabling several tanks and causing the others to withdraw.

The 2nd Battalion, landing fifty minutes late, passed through rear elements of the 3rd Battalion dug in on the beach and proceeded along the left flank of the 3rd Battalion towards its objective. Company "G", commanded by Captain John L. Chapin of El Paso, Texas, was able to reorganize at 0615 by approximately 300 yards from the beach, and drove forward until an attack by five German tanks forced the men to take cover. By firing rifles, machine guns, hand grenades and rifle grenades the tank attack was repelled and the tanks withdrew to a distance of 500-600 yards from the beach. Company "F", commanded by Captain Charles H. Henre of Lufkin, Texas, lost one platoon of his company when the landing craft the platoon was in fell from the ship while being lowered into the water. With his depleted force Captain Henre reorganized his company by 0700 and went forward on the extreme left flank of the regiment until his men sought cover from an attack by eight tanks running across the front of both Companies "G" and "F". The tanks kept maneuvering across the front line harassing the troops and inflicting numerous casualties with machine gun fire until they were forced to retreat slowly through the efforts of infantry weapons. Detachments of Company "G", commanded by Captain Charles H. Bestall of San Antonio, Texas, worked well forward and assisted in repelling the tank attack.

Corporal Benito G. Dominguez of San Antonio, Texas, knocked out an enemy half-track with a rifle grenade. Private First Class Juan R. Padilla of Del Rio, Texas, effectively used his rocket gun against the tanks and as the tanks withdrew he followed them continuing to fire his weapon. Corporal Manuel G. Gonzalez of Uvalde, Texas, in diving in on a tank position, was observed by the enemy and was shot through the legs. As he lay helpless to move, one of the tanks ran over him and killed him. Private First Class Thomas M. Carillo of Rock Springs, Texas, apparently shot through the legs, is listed KIA. Private R. C. Gonzalez is listed KIA. Private C. R. Gonzalez is listed as KIA. Private C. R. Gonzalez is from Uvalde, Texas, according to U.S. records.
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tried to remove Corporal Gonzales from the path of the tank, and narrowly escaped being run over. Private First Class Solomon Sanabas, Jr., of Fresno, Texas, and Private First Class Amed R. Carrasco of El Paso, Texas, as gunner and assistant gunner of a light machine gun squad, placed their machine gun on top of a rock wall under fire from enemy machine guns and fired upon the German tanks menacing the front line position. Their fire was effective in forcing the tanks to withdraw. Private Harold B. Boevar of Ringtown, Pennsylvania, scored a hit with his anti-tank grenade by slapping it in a nearby tank. Private First Class Juan Pruit of Pearland, Texas, placed his Browning automatic rifle on top of a stone wall and maintained a heavy volume of fire against the enemy until his position was located by a German gunner who opened fire and killed him. Private Raymond G. Gutierrez of Somera, Texas, was wounded while firing his Browning automatic rifle at the enemy. Two bullets pierced Private Gutierrez's helmet in such a way as not to injure him, but a third bullet caught him in the arm. Private Gutierrez, although wounded, moved forward, located an enemy machine gun and killed the German gunner to death. 1st Sergeant Gabriel L. Navarrete of El Paso, Texas, having been given the mission of reaching the battalion objective and determining the enemy strength if the enemy was encountered, was wounded in the hand when a German machine gun knocked the signal projector from his hand that he was attempting to signal with. Private First Class Alfredo F. Ruiz of El Paso, Texas, a member of Sergeant Navarrete's patrol, closed up on a tank and exchanged fire with a member of the tank crew who was firing with a machine pistol of the turret. Private Ruiz approached so close to the tank that he was caught in the hand of a machine gunner of the Germans and pulled for about ten yards before being able to break loose. Staff Sergeant Enrique Ochoa, Sergeant Carlos Irobol, Sergeant Jesus R. Lucio, Sergeant Rafael L. Torres, Sergeant Marcelino Vidal, and Technician 3 Daniel D. Madrid, all of El Paso, Texas, exposed themselves to enemy fire on numerous occasions while leading their men and exhibited great courage to bolster the morale of the men facing the tank attacks. 1st Lt. James R. Humphries of Jacksonville, Florida, worked tirelessly and exposed himself to direct fire from the enemy on numerous occasions. Lt. Humphries and all of the above-named enlisted men are members of Company "F" which played a vital part in protecting the beachhead against repeated enemy attacks which possessed much greater fire power than that of the infantry. The aggressive action of every member of Company "F" was instrumental in keeping the enemy tanks from driving down to the beach itself.

1st Lt. Parkhurst C. Rough of Fredericktown, Missouri, and 2nd Lt. Ralph J. McWatters of Minneapolis, Minnesota, both officers of Company "F," displayed great courage in fighting off the attack of the eight tanks on the 2nd Battalion front. They exposed themselves almost continuously to enemy fire for forty-five minutes until infantry fire forced the tanks to withdraw. Private Herman E. Randhauen of Elmhurst, New Jersey, a member of the Medical Detachment attached to Company "F," advanced through an open field covered by enemy fire to give aid to an American soldier and a German soldier who lay helpless from their wounds. 2nd Lt. Richard W. Delanson of Maywood, Illinois, New York, Staff Sergeant Andrew F. Snyder of El Paso, Texas, Sergeant George G. Potwin of Queens Village, New York, and Sergeant Jack M. Townsend of El Paso, Texas, all members of Company "F," advanced their machine gun section across the beach in the face of intense enemy fire to a position ahead of the front line rifle companies. Their machine guns opened up against the tanks and aided in forcing their withdrawal as well as knocking out two enemy machine gun nests. Corporal Leander Hallaway of Brooklyn, New York, led his Company "F" machine gun squad along a stone wall under heavy machine gun fire to a position where the squad could use its weapon against a
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German half-track firing from a chafed position beside a house. Corporal
effective placement of their fire on the half track that it was
withdrawal enabling our troops to advance several hundred yards. Private
First Class Edward G. Horsemann, Jr. of Big Rock, Iowa and Private Julian C.
Dillard of Salem, Virginia, members of the 2nd Battalion Headquarters Company,
laid and maintained a wire line to Company FF from the battalion command post—a
distance of over one mile. Several times Private Horsemann and Private Dillard,
while harassed by enemy machine gun, sniper and artillery fire, exposed them-
selves to repair the line and keep communications established.

1st Lt. Roy M. Pas of San Antonio, Texas, commander of the Regimental
Headquarters Company Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, organized scatter-
ed troops of several companies immediately after landing and defended the right
flank of the regiment throughout the entire day and night. The Intelligence and
Reconnaissance Platoon forwarded valuable information to Colonel Werner during
this period which enabled artillery and gun fire from the navy to keep the enemy
retreating.

At 1900 an attack plan was formulated to move the 2nd and 3rd Battalions
to initial objectives on hills to the east and south of the beaches under cover
of darkness. Enemy positions in the towns of CAPACIO and CELESTICO and the
roads leading up to and beyond them were heavily shelled by our artillery and
naval gun fire. The beach was attacked by enemy bombers but heavy anti-
aircraft fire made their missions extremely hazardous. The German planes flew
in at high speed, dropped their bombs hopelessly trusting to make a lucky hit
on the numerous craft unloading supplies and personnel, very sharply to the east
from the beach and make a run through the flank to the mountains. Friendly
fighter plane coverage, however, kept the skies relatively clear of enemy planes,
during the day.

At 0001 10 September the 2nd and 3rd Battalions began their move to posi-
tions to the hills south and east of the beaches. The 3rd Battalion moved to
HILL 102/103 just northeast of AEGOPULI, bypassing the 1st Battalion which
was still held down by strongly entrenched machine guns and mortars. A small
amount of enemy sniper activity failed to slow the movement and the battalion
closed in on its position before daylight. The 2nd Battalion, moving east of
Highway 16, also bypassed the 1st Battalion positions. Enemy activity could be
observed but the march was completed without drawing enemy fire. Patrols pre-
ceeding the battalions noted signs of a hasty retreat by the enemy—abandoned,
burned and wrecked vehicles and quantities of supplies.

At 0750 Colonel Werner received his first radio contact with the 1st
Battalion when Captain Selma R. Hambro of Warton, Texas, commanding
Company "G", radiated that he had approximately 300 men of the 1st Battalion
who were proceeding to mop up enemy opposition still remaining in their sector.
A detachment of Company "H" led by Staff Sergeant Claude G. Sherry of Flatonia,
Texas, and a platoon of Company "D" surrounded a house in the 1st Battalion area
from which sniper and machine gun fire was coming. Orders were called in both
German and English, as several Polish prisoners had been captured, to surrender.
Seventeen Germans surrendered and were sent to the prisoner of war enclosures on
the beach.

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Remnants of the disorganized 1st Battalion began to drift into the 2nd and 3rd Battalions' and regimental headquarters' positions. At 1200 the regimental command post was moved from the beach area to a position at the base of the hills one and one-half miles northeast of AGROPOLI. During the movement of the command post, Colonel Turner contacted Lt. Colonel Smith and Major Minor L. Williams of Robstown, Texas, Executive Officer of the 1st Battalion, and ordered them to reassemble their battalion at the regimental reserve north of the 3rd Battalion position. Patrols were sent into AGROPOLI and CEGILADE and found the towns clear of the enemy. The Italians clearly indicated their relief at the arrival of our troops. Italian soldiers still remaining in this area were valuable with their information about the Germans. The populace of AGROPOLI was especially grateful over German atrocities committed before they retreated and were very eager to assist in Company "A", commanded by Captain Cecil B. Rubens of San Antonio, Texas, moved into Agropoli at the request of the people to Major General Fred L. Doolittle, Commanding General of the 36th Infantry Division.

The apparent withdrawal of the enemy was a welcome respite from the harrowing events the Germans had inflicted the previous day. Since there was no evidence that the enemy would launch counter-attacks from the south or west and as the combat team defended the entire right flank of the invasion force, proper caution was taken to prepare strong defensive positions and maintain active and alert patrols. Although the men had suffered the severest physical and mental strain and were practically exhausted, they did not rest until they had dug in and established a secure defense.

On 11 September Colonel Turner instructed Major Rafter to move the 2nd Battalion to new positions south and east of the towns of CEGILADE and ORCELINE. Patrols were sent from the regimental headquarters Company Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon to CEGILADE and ORCELINE. Lt. Bass established an observation post on Mt. CECILADE which afforded a superior view of the country to the south and east. In conjunction with the Regimental Intelligence Officer, Captain Russell W. Dougherty of Wellesley, Massachusetts, this post afforded excellent information for Colonel Turner on enemy movements or suspicious operations in the large area observed. The terrain in this area was covered by high hills rising into precipitous mountains. The tortuous, narrow roads, bordered in many places by our naval and artillery shelling and strewn with the wreckage of German destroyed and abandoned tanks and vehicles, was covered itself out of sight to the south. Nine miles were laid and two bridges blown at vital positions on Highway 18 by Company "A" of the 111th Engineer Battalion and the 1st Platoon of the 36th Reconnaissance Troop. 57mm anti-tank guns of the Anti-Tank Company commanded by Captain George C. Gubriel of San Antonio, Texas, were placed in strategic positions commanding approaches from the south and east that might be used by the Germans for tank operations. The Cannon Company under the new command of Lt. Robert T. Henry, Jr. of Fort Worth, Texas, was split into platoons to support the three battalions.

At 1600 Colonel Turner, having received orders from General Walker, instructed Lt. Colonel Smith to move the 1st Battalion to positions in the vicinity of the towns of HUNGAND and TREMNITABA. The battalion made a march uphill over a route vehicles could not travel in order to occupy these positions. Vehicles, of necessity, traveled north on Highway 18, cutting back east on the road leading to
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CARACAO and widening up to TRENTHAMAR. The terrain in this area consisted of gentle rolling hills rising in a steep slope to GIUNHARD. At this point sheer cliffs rising to heights of 800 feet jutted slightly causing the foot troops to make long detours to positions they could establish. The town of TRENTHAMAR was on the crest of a high hill that afforded a commanding view to the east, south and west but was overshadowed on the north by Mt. PITTAB. The battalion reached its assigned positions at 1230 12 September and attempted to dig in defensive positions. The ground was almost solid rock and only a very small percentage of the men were able to dig positions; the remainder taking cover and concealment in rock crevices and behind parapets built from the rocks.

The 3rd Battalion, except for moving Company "I" to adjust the line with the 2nd Battalion and removing Company "B" from AGOROLI for regimental reserve, remained in its position.

Captain Claus P. Jorgin of Fort Worth, Texas, Regimental Supply Officer, worked tirelessly on the beach with members of the Service Company to maintain food, water and ammunition supplies, collect regimental property stranded for several miles along the landing beaches and establish a dump for resupply of the regiment. The beaches were frequently being bombed and strafed by German planes despite their losses from anti-aircraft fire. The position of the Service Company men on the beach was very hazardous.

On 12 September Colonel Warner and Lt. Colonel Smith inspected the 1st Battalion area and re-adjusted company positions. Anti-tank guns were placed at advantageous positions commanding the roads to the east and approaches from the south. A platoon of Company "A", 111th Engineer Battalion, prepared demolitions at four bridges along the narrow road leading to the east so that the bridges could be blown at the first sign of an enemy attack. The bridges were blown later in the day as a defensive measure. Patrols were sent to MONTENEGRO, M. VIRGOLA and CARACAO, but no enemy activity was observed. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions maintained active patrols in their sectors without special event.

At 1035 13 September, Colonel Warner was ordered by General Walker to move the regiment, less the 1st Battalion which was to remain in its present sector and Companies "H", "I" and "M" which would remain in the locations occupied by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions under command of Lt. Colonel Price. At 1230 Colonel Warner contacted Colonel Harold F. Gibson, Chief of Staff of VI Corps who advised that the regiment, less the units remaining in positions ordered by General WALKER, would be attached to the 65th Division. The regiment was to occupy a sector southwest of PARTHACIA and stop a gap between the American VI Corps and the British 10th Corps on the left flank of the 65th Division. Captain Isadore M. Scott of Jenkintown, Pennsylvania, Regimental Adjutant was instructed to contact Lt. Colonel McCall and Major Webster and have them meet Colonel Warner at a rendezvous point in the sector to be occupied, entrust the troops in their present areas and bring them to a detracking point behind the area to be occupied.

Colonel Warner, accompanied by a British liaison officer, went forward to reconnoiter positions after being advised by General Walker that the 133rd Field Artillery Battalion, less one battery, would be attached to the regiment. It was decided to occupy positions selected and surveyed by the 23rd British Armored Regiment who had fought over that area and would be the unit on our immediate left flank. A circuitous route for the movement of motor vehicles was established by the British for our troops entering the area. The troops began detracking just at dusk. Lt. Colonel McCall and Major Webster had met Colonel Warner and
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completed the reconnaissance of their positions and the troops began filtering into the selected locations under cover of darkness. The 3rd Battalion occupied the front line with the 2nd Battalion in reserve in depth, while the troops were closing in they were bombed by enemy planes and shelled by artillery fire. The regimental command post being established by Major John L. Willmann of San Antonio, Texas, Regimental Plans and Operations Officer, was bombed with numerous anti-personnel bombs followed by an enemy artillery concentration that fell directly upon the command post. At 2200, orders were received from VI Corps removing the 2nd Battalion from regimental control and returning it to the 36th Division control. The 2nd Battalion moved by truck to an area south of the SEK River and east of Highway 18 in the hills to reinforce the 113rd Infantry Regiment which was withdrawing from an attack on Hill 123 above ALTAVILLA. The battalion closed in on its position at 0530 11 September, replacing the 2nd Battalion of the 113rd Infantry Regiment which was pulled out of the lines to reorganize.

At 2100 13 September Lt. Colonel Smith received orders from General Walker to assemble the 1st Battalion and march to a point one and one-half miles northwest of CAPADDO and assume defensive positions. Positions were dug as well as could be in the rocky ground. The artillery had to blast holes with dynamite to prepare their positions. The battalion encountered no enemy activity in this sector.

Companies "F" and "K" were removed from the DELLASTRO and AGENOLE areas to reinforce positions threatened by the German thrust from ALTAVILLA. Lt. Colonel Price was placed in command of a battalion of the 53rd Shore Engineer Regiment to defend the southern sector vacated by the regiment.

At dawn on 14 September, Regimental Headquarters and the 3rd Battalion were fairly well established in their positions. Company "F" was on the right and Company "L", then under command of Lt. James E. Pepson of Rock Springs, Texas, was on the left. With Company "K" detached from the battalion, the one and one-half mile line was thinly held. The machine guns and mortars of Company "F", commanded by Captain William H. Haupert of San Antonio, Texas, were placed to cover the two rifle companies. It was necessary to take personnel of the 3rd Battalion Headquarters Company, commanded by Captain Admiral M. McDonald of San Antonio, Texas, to build up a reserve position. The enemy placed scattered rifle and machine gun fire on our right flank which failed to displace any of our troops. Company "H", 75th Tank Battalion, Company "A", 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Company "D", 916th Chemical Battalion were attached for regimental control. The addition of these units was most welcome as they added a great deal of firepower to our forces. The eight 81/2 mortars of Company "A", 916th Chemical Battalion, were placed in positions to the rear of the rifle companies. The tanks and tank destroyers were placed in the few concealed positions available.

The area occupied was extremely crowded with British troops and vehicles behind us and on our left flank. newly landed units pouring in from the beaches added to the congestion. The sector occupied was the narrowest portion of the beachhead, being only one and one-half miles from the shoreline to the regimental command post. Had the Germans realized the small force that was opposing them, they could have attacked with a strong force and split the bridgehead and the two Corps of the Fifth Army. Before the Germans could obtain any knowledge of our positions, two observation posts were established that afforded a fair view of the terrain to our front. These observation posts reported enemy movements so accurately and so quickly that our artillery and naval gun fire prevented the
Germany from testing a force of sufficient strength to attack our sector in force. Through the fire direction center of the 133rd Field Artillery Battalion, an excellent liaison was effected with the British artillery on our left and with the Navy gun through Ensign Sampol’s radio. A British artillery observation plane operated with this group very effectively. The massed fire power of the guns was of such a superior nature that captured Germans stated the shelling was utterly demoralizing to their forces and had caused many casualties. The Germans, in turn, countered with light artillery that fell on our front lines.

Technician 4 Walter J. Long of Rusk, Texas, a member of the Medical Detachment attached to Company L, was killed by this German shelling. At montime Captain Rubanks of Company "F" went forward with a British officer to check the company sector. Captain Rubanks and the British officer were placed under machine gun fire by tanks and became separated. The British officer returned to Company "F" and reported that he had been unable to recontact Captain Rubanks. A complete search was made of the area where Captain Rubanks had been, but no trace of him was found. It was later learned that he had been captured by the Germans.

The terrain in this area was absolutely flat but cut up by numerous farms. Hedge rows and trees blocked the vision for more than 300 yards. In many places the ground was swampy with numerous buffalo willows filled with water. Irrigation ditches and gutters through which small streams flowed crossed and recrossed the sector. Mosquitoes abounded in this atmosphere and from dusk to dawn made life miserable for the men. At 2300 an order was received from General Middleton, Command General of the 15th Division, that our line must be held at all cost—there must be no retreat by our troops.

The 2nd Battalion remained in their defensive position to which they had moved on the night of 13-14 September until 18 September. Continual harassing artillery fire was directed on the battalion positions by the enemy from ALTAVILLA. Company "F" was attacked by two enemy tanks which were supported by artillery fire and the brush on the crest of the hill above the company was set ablaze. Private Lino Porrini of Danbury, Connecticut, a member of the Medical Detachment attached to Company "F", although threatened by the blaze creeping down towards the company position and exposed to artillery fire and enemy tanks, left the company to render first aid for twenty minutes to a wounded engineer. Corporal Larry V. Fenton of New Brunswick, New Jersey, Communications Corporal of Company "F", repeatedly exposed himself to artillery fire and enemy tanks to lay communication lines and repair them when broken by artillery shelling.

The 1st Battalion received orders at 1200 on 14 September from General Walker to move from its present location to an area east of Highway 18 near the SELE River. Company "A", commanded by Captain Herbert E. Beall of San Antonio, Texas, was ordered to proceed to P. S. CILARDO and drive the enemy from the northwest slope of VINGOLO DI CAPPA SANTA. Prior Colonel L. Williams, directing the company movement, was injured when seeking cover from enemy artillery shelling the movement of the company. Patrols were sent out from Companies "E" and "F" as far as two and one-half miles in front of their positions. A Company "F" patrol led by 2nd Lt. Martin J. Tully of Chicago, Illinois, brought back accurate and valuable information besides capturing two Germans. The prisoners had been advised by their officers that the Americans always killed prisoners and were in great fear of what we would do to them. When the prisoners were assured that they would not be killed, they talked freely and apparently answered all questions to the best of their knowledge. The company positions of the battalion were continually harassed by enemy artillery fire but few casualties were sustained.
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On 15 September, battery "A", 115th Coast Artillery, Anti-Aircraft (Air Warning) Battalion, was attached to the 133rd Field Artillery Battalion under regimental control. The half tracks of this unit were dispersed in the rear of the artillery batteries. Throughout the day medium bombers and P-40's and P-38's bombed the towns of Battaglia and Solli and the road network used by the Germans. The ground shook as far back as the regimental command post from this terrific bombing. Besides the terrific effect this bombing must have had on the Germans, the morale of our troops was raised immeasurably by this assistance. The Germans used smoke extensively to cover their withdrawal of certain portions of their forces from our front line. The 4.2 mortars of Company "A", 84th Chemical Battalion, were used to fire on German observation posts. German infantry attempted to dig in on our front line during the night but were forced to withdraw by our artillery fire. The enemy counterattacked with a small amount of mortar and artillery fire on our front line. SMALL patrols were sent out by the rifle companies but encountered German snipers and machine guns.

The 1st Battalion remained in their position of 14 September. The Germans kept up accurate and effective artillery fire on every vehicle and troop movement. Friendly tanks made a movement 600 yards in front of the battalion command post over a flat, unwooded plain. Enemy 88's opened up on the tanks but failed to score a hit. After a brief sortie, the tanks withdrew. This operation afforded the infantry a show as heretofore they had not observed any tank activities. The battalion wire crew composed of Sergeant Robert A. Coller of Fredericksburg, Texas, Technician V Glenn H. Hoy of Pueblo, Colorado, Private First Class Lendy Richter of Tellaro, Georgia, Private First Class Leonard J. Bates of Edgewood, Pennsylvania, Private First Class Kenneth Cover of Pine Bluff, West Virginia, Private First Class Russell H. Fitzgerald of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, Private Frank S. Peña of San Antonio, Texas, and Private Clyde G. Glenn of Toledo, Ohio, worked night and day under extremely hazardous conditions to maintain battalion communications. Time and time again it was necessary to work under enemy artillery fire to repair breaks in the lines.

The 1st Battalion remained in their position until 19 September. The troops soon caught on to the enemy tactics and tricks and there were few casualties.

On the morning of 16 September, the 3rd Battalion was attacked by tanks and infantry, but the attack was repulsed by British mechanized units and our own artillery. Company "B" knocked out a German half-track with small arms fire and captured one prisoner from the vehicle. American bombers were very active again on our front. American parachutists who had landed behind the German lines shifted back to our positions. They advised that our artillery and naval gun fire had created great destruction and many casualties in the sector northwest, west and southwest of Battaglia.

On 17 September, Battery "A", 120th Engineer Battalion, less one platoon, was attached to the regiment. This unit was placed in position as the regimental reserve. During the morning, a Company "F" patrol reported enemy activity in their sector and our 4.2 mortars opened fire. Three German half-tracks pulling guns left this area and our artillery immediately laid fire on them. The 45th Engineers replaced the 36th Engineers on our right flank and the British 151st Brigade replaced the 29th Armored Regiment on our left flank. A German medical unit, wearing red shirts, worked most of the day in the sector we had shelled so heavily, evacuation casualties and removing their dead. A British patrol returning at 1430 reported that there were at least 200 German dead in the area we had been shelling. Enemy activity was observed approximately two miles from our front and after dark.

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An artillery concentration was placed on this area resulting in terrific explosions and a large fire. Two other large fires were started in enemy territory during the night by our artillery fire.

Communications men of the 3rd Battalion performed their duties all through these operations under the most hazardous battle conditions. They worked night and day under enemy fire and observation to maintain wire lines. Took Sergeant Jack J. Dixon, Jr. of San Antonio, Texas, Sergeant George W. Pirtle of Oxford, Alabama, Technician V. Davis Hino of Lousiana, Private George A. Jones of Soroan, Pennslyvania, and Private Gilber T. McHluskey of Anderson, Texas, all members of the 3rd Battalion Headquarters Company, perform their communication duties with great courage and efficiency. Sergeant Carl M. Brown, Communication Sergeant of Company "I", from Cameron, Texas, laid and maintained wire to his company during daylight hours under enemy fire and observation. He exposed himself to enemy fire four times in one day to repair the line broken by artillery shells.

The liaison, intelligence information and communications of the British units on our left flank was of a most superior nature throughout our entire stay in this sector. The men were greatly impressed with the fighting qualities of the British and their comradelyship was most apparent. Gifts of food and cigarettes were frequently exchanged between the two groups.

On 18 September Colonel Warner received a warning order from the Commanding General of the 15th Division that Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company would be relieved sometime during the night. The 3rd Battalion was to remain under control of the 15th Division with all the regimental attached units. At 1730 the 3rd Battalion began its movement forward to positions between Battagalia and Eoli. The troops observed signs of hurried German evacuation—quantities of ammunition, small arms and abandoned and destroyed vehicles. Patrols moved out well in advance of the battalion positions. At 0545 on 19 September the 3rd Battalion was ordered to occupy new positions again and this was accomplished by 0730.

The 2nd Battalion moved from their position to the hill mass just below and to the west of Altavilla.

At 0020 on 19 September orders were received from the 15th Division relieving Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company from their control and reporting to the 36th division control. The command post was closed and moved under cover of darkness to a position near the SRE River east of Highway 10 were it bivouacked for the night. Colonel Warner was ordered by General Walker to reassemble the regiment under regimental control and occupy the area around Altavilla. The 2nd Battalion was to remain in its position. The 1st Battalion made slight adjustments from its location, sending outpost lines up to the Colores River. The 3rd Battalion was relieved from its sector at 1620 by a battalion of the 179th Infantry Regiment and moved by motor to the assembly area selected by the regiment. Before the 3rd Battalion moved into its assembly area, orders were received from General Walker to relieve the 52nd Parachute Regiment occupying Hill 442 above Altavilla. The Altavilla road was narrow and wound in a wokkered Fashion very steeply up to the town of Altavilla which was situated on a high hill commanding observation to the north and west. Hill 442 was still higher above Altavilla and vehicular traffic was limited to jeeps just beyond the limits of the town. All supplies, weapons and ammunition had to be laboriously hauled

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up the steep hills by the troops. Three enemy shells fell below the 3rd battalion area during the night which were evidently fired from a great distance. Otherwise, all sectors were very quiet although patrols were maintained as far as possible throughout the night.

On 20 September, other units still occupying positions in the regimental sector were withdrawn. Colonel Moore received orders from General Walker to clear the ALTAVILLE area of dead and wounded and the battalions began searching their areas for bodies. Many were found in the hills above ALTAVILLE—both American and German. All American dead were brought off of the hills and a cemetery was established below ALTAVILLE. So many of the German dead were in such a bad state of decomposition that burial spots were selected on the hills. Many of the German dead bore no identification. The town of ALTAVILLE itself was a shambles. Not one building seemed to have escaped the shelling of both American and German forces. Many houses were utterly demolished. The water line for the town had been broken by shell fire and the entire populace had to use the tap from a small artesian well for their water supply. Troops entered and searched each building in the town, finding dead and wounded civilians. As quickly as possible medical aid was given to the wounded and the dead removed. The stench of death was everywhere. Men, women and children walked the streets and stood in corners in a dazed manner. The Germans had taken all of their tools and they were powerless to excavate the dead from demolished buildings where they had been trapped. AECF officials arrived in the town and civilian police were appointed to help control the populace and endeavor to restore some order. With the assistance of our troops, all available manpower was drafted to assist in removing the dead and clearing the streets. The removal of the military dead took all day, all night and part of the next day. The task of clearing ALTAVILLE went on for days.

On 21 September General Walker ordered the regiment into a bivouac area below ALTAVILLE near the SELSE River to re-organize, replace equipment and secure a much needed rest.

Through all of the operations the members of the Regimental Headquarters Company commanded by lst Lt. Harold S. Hulscig of San Antonio, Texas worked tirelessly to maintain regimental communications, provide reconnaissance and intelligence information, prepare command post protection by members of the Band under Chief Warrant Officer Homer A. Tapp of San Marcos, Texas, and carry on the multifarious duties of a regimental headquarters. The communications platoon of Regimental Headquarters Company under lst Lt. Robert A. Cano of High Point, North Carolina, laid and maintained approximately 250 miles of telephone wire since the invasion date and provided radio communications with battalions, divisions and supporting units. Master Sergeant Rex L. Passmore of San Antonio, Texas, Tech Sergeant Clasus H. Blair of San Antonio, Texas, Technician VI Viviano Reyes of San Antonio, Texas, Technician VI George Meurer of Lockhart, Texas, Technician Arthur M. Henry of Port Neches, Texas, Private First Class Herman Rass of Fredericksburg, Texas, Private First Class Wills of Gilmer, Texas, Private First Class Toy J. McCoy of Vernon, Texas, Private First Class Billie J. Bean of Corswall, Texas, Private First Class Lester H. Loom of Clinton, Ohio, Private First Class J. N. Fair of Dallas, Texas, Private First Class H. C. Buchner of Rusk, Texas, Private Hills V. Fandon of Liberty, Texas, Private Henry G. Irwin of Stumett, Texas and Private Walter A. Stolitz of Bronx, New York, all members of the communications platoon, worked night and day under shell fire, enemy snipers and strafing of enemy planes. The work of this platoon...
played an important part in the successful operations of the regiment.

The enlisted personnel of the Regimental staff sections composed of Master Sergeant John B. Kyle of Little Rock, Arkansas; Master Sergeant Thomas O. Clark of Hobart, Indiana; Staff Sergeant Robert D. Deloria of Detroit, Michigan; Technician IV John E. Power of Eek, Illinois; Technician IV Richard E. Sanders of Painesville, Texas; Technician V Frank H. Roehke of Scranton, Pennsylvania; Technician V Bridger F. Honby of Harrington, Texas, and Private Forrest A. Bennett of San Antonio, Texas, maintained the operations intelligence maps, performed the necessary administrative details, and worked ceaselessly for several days and nights without rest during certain periods of the operation when enemy activity demanded constant vigilance.

The end of the operation "Avalanche" found the regiment in good condition. Morale amongst them was high. They were proud of their achievement of being the first American troops to land on the continent of Europe—the first troops to meet the Germans on the beaches and drive them back. Their pride was thoroughly justified.

Casualties of the 11th Infantry Regiment for the operation "Avalanche" were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KILLED IN ACTION</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOUNDED IN ACTION</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSING IN ACTION</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Enemy casualties, captured and destroyed matériel are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Known</th>
<th>Estimated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th Infantry</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>1 (destroyed)</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137 mm Anti-Tank Gun</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 (destroyed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 mm Anti-aircraft Gun</td>
<td>1 (captured)</td>
<td>2 (destroyed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar</td>
<td>1 (captured intact)</td>
<td>2 (captured intact)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun</td>
<td>1 (captured intact)</td>
<td>2 (captured intact)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 mm Gun with ammunition</td>
<td>1 (captured intact)</td>
<td>2 (captured intact)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105/155 mm Guns (Italian) with 1800 rounds of ammunition</td>
<td>1 (captured intact)</td>
<td>3 (destroyed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Guns (caliber unknown)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5000 rounds (captured intact)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun Ammunition</td>
<td>1 (captured intact)</td>
<td>3000 (captured intact)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Grenades (Italian)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200 (captured intact)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1a1 Carabin</td>
<td>5000 rounds (captured intact)</td>
<td>150 (captured intact)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Barbed wire in rolls
HEADQUARTERS 143RD INFANTRY REGIMENT, RIFLE
W/O 36, U. S. ARMY

11 December 1943

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Regimental History

TO: Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, AFO 36, U. S. Army

1. Enclosed is the regimental history of the 143rd Infantry Regiment covering operations in Italy during the month of November 1943.

2. Operations in this mountainous country indicate a need for certain preparatory measures. There is no need for a large number of specially trained or organized mountain troops. There is, however, a positive need for pack trains, properly organized and trained for each division. This will enable the pack trains to rest when the division rests.

3. There is a positive need for additional engineers who can create trails and mountain roads and assist in haul-carrying supplies where animal trains cannot operate. In the present operations combat troops have been required to do this work.

Richard S. Knows
Colonel, 143rd Infantry
Commanding

cc:
- Regimental History (octuple)
- Casualty List (octuple)
- Unit Journal (1 copy)
- Maps (1 set of 5)
  a. Vapresco, Sheet 161 III
  b. Cassino, Sheet 160 II
  c. Tesano, Sheet 172 IV
  d. Caserta, Sheet 172 II
  e. Osazal Di Princi, Sheet 172 III

[Signature]

[Regrades]

[Security Classification]

[Date]

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OPERATIONS IN ITALY, NOVEMBER, 1943
of
131st INFANTRY REGIMENT, RIFLE

Having left the AMATILIA area on 13 October 1943, the regiment moved via motor truck to a bivouac area three (3) miles southwest of GUIDALTO where the training of replacements was conducted until 31 October. On 31 October the 3rd Battalion left the bivouac area and moved by motor truck to the Island of ANZIO in the Bay of NAPLES to participate in amphibious training preparatory to making an amphibious landing further up the coast near GAETA. On 1 November, the 1st and 2nd Battalions participated in the same type of amphibious training as had the 3rd Battalion on the previous day.

On 2 November, the Regimental Combat Team, less the Cannon Company, Anti-Tank Company, Co "A", 11th Field Artillery and Co "A", 111th Engineers Battalion, left the GUIDALTO bivouac area and were transported to the Island of ANZIO where it was loaded on a number of LCT's (Landing Craft - Tanks) at the wharves on the island. Vehicles, guns and communications equipment had been waterproofed the previous day and was already loaded aboard the LCT's when the troops arrived. The men were in good spirits although many of them viewed the operation from a serious aspect. Ninety-five per cent (95%) of the men had participated in the invasion of ITALY on the Gulf of SALERNO and knew full well the danger of making an amphibious attack against prepared German positions.

The loading of the LCT's was completed at 1930 hours and the troops stood or sat quietly on the craft awaiting the hour of departure which had been set for just after sunset. At 1930 hours, upon orders from the Regimental Combat Team Commander, Colonel Richard J. Warner, O-216669, of San Antonio, Texas, officers in each landing craft, after first advising the men to make no demonstration or outward evidence of any kind, announced to the troops that there actually would be no landing of any kind made. Careful preparations had been made by Fifth Army Intelligence to equip the 131st Infantry Combat Team for an amphibious operation and conduct amphibious training within full view of known German espionage agents. Information as to the place of the proposed landing had also been allowed to leak out. The entire operation was designed to draw German troops from the present front lines to the coastal sector near GAETA, thus weakening their forces in the mountain region for an attack by Allied troops. Fifth Army Intelligence reported that the Germans had already shifted one (1) panzer division to the coastal sector to repel the amphibious landing with the result that the amphibious demonstration was already a success. Prior knowledge to the fact that there actually would be no landing had been restricted to the Regimental Commander, a selected few staff members, each battalion commander and the 131st Field Artillery Battalion commander. All other personnel prepared for the demonstration and loaded on the landing craft strictly on the basis of an actual operation.
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The troops aboard the IOT's complied with the order of no outward demonstration upon being advised that no landing would be made, but it was a difficult order to obey. The reaction from the tension of making an amphibious attack was manifested on the faces of the men and in the low-toned exhilarating talk that hummed through the boats.

However, the entire demonstration was not completed after the announcement was made. The men were to remain on board the IOT's until sundown at which time they were to file off quietly and disperse among the buildings and wharves. Just after sundown when visibility from the mainland was screened, troops, vehicles and equipment were removed from the landing craft and the IOT's moved out into the harbor to meet naval escort vessels, forming a convoy which proceeded north up the coast just as though the entire amphibious force was actually going to take place. Naval warcraft were to shell the beaches shortly before dawn as though fulfilling a prearranged fire mission for an attacking amphibious force.

At midnight the troops left the Island of NISIDA and filed across the pier connecting the island to the mainland where they were loaded into trucks and returned to the bivouac area near GUILLIANO.

At 2250 hours, 9 November, Colonel Werner was ordered by Major General Fred L. Walker, Commanding General of the 35th Infantry Division, to move the combat team by motor truck to a new bivouac area in the vicinity of PIETRABARO, leaving the GUILLIANO area by 1000 hours 6 November. All units of the combat team were informed of the move that night and a march order was prepared and dispatched to unit commanders.

At 1000 hours, 6 November, the first serial of the convoy left the bivouac area and the combat team moved to PIETRABARO via a circuitous route laid out by II Corps. British convoys coming south created great deal of confusion in the march serials, splitting the serials and generally delaying the movement. The roads were very dusty and a thick layer of white dust obscured men, vehicles and equipment at the end of the movement.

Shortly after the command post was established on the outskirts of PIETRABARO, General Walker arrived at the OP with orders from II Corps to move the combat team to the vicinity of PIETRABARO and close into a bivouac area in that region 1000 hours 7 November. Since telephone communication had not been established to the various units, I was sent to each unit to advise them of the change in plans.

On 7 November, the combat team moved to a bivouac area four (4) miles southwest of PIETRABARO. Traffic problems again created confusion among the march serials. One way bridges over streams, culverts, and rivers had been put up by construction engineers to meet initial temporary needs of front line troops.
Although priority had been given to the 31st Infantry on the selected route, II Corps military police had a great deal of difficulty in maintaining the flow of traffic in order for the combat team to close into its bivouac area by 1800 hours.

Prior to the movement of the combat team, a quartering party had been sent to the FIOVADA area to locate the various battalion and separate company areas. Captain William O. Wettlin, O-401929, of San Antonio, Texas, and Corporal William R. Strout, 3220399, of Brooklyn, New York, members of Headquarters Company 1st Battalion, were reconnoitering for a bivouac area for the 1st Battalion when their jeep ran over a German land mine that had been left by the Germans when they retreated.

An immediate reconnaissance of the area was made by Colonel Werner, Captain Howell H. Biehler, O-282472, Regimental Intelligence Officer and 1Lt. Ray H. Bass, O-410997, of San Antonio, Texas, leader of the Regimental Headquarters Company Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon. The area was found to have a considerable quantity of German mines placed haphazardly around. Bridges, culverts, and roads were blown up and enemy engineers were working night and day to provide by-passes and temporary repairs. The entire area was a quagmire of mud. Vehicular traffic crossed the roads in every direction.

Just as the 1st Battalion was closing into its bivouac area seven German planes broke through the front line anti-aircraft defenses and strafed and bombed the main highway. No casualties were suffered by the 1st Battalion from this enemy air action.

On 11 November an urgent request was received from the 94th Evacuation Hospital located near the Regimental Cemetary Post for donors of type "O" blood. Over eight hundred (800) men volunteered as donors but due to the length of time required for taking the blood, only ten to twenty per cent (10-20%) of the donors were used. Colonel Lee R. Price, Commanding Officer of the 94th Evacuation Hospital, wrote the following quoted letter to the Regimental Commanders: "It gives me great pleasure to commend your entire unit for its splendid cooperation in helping this hospital maintain a blood bank which has saved many lives and will hasten the recovery of many Allied soldiers wounded in action. A great number of your organization have rendered their services as blood donors at this hospital.

On 15 November, orders were received from General Walker to move the combat team, less the 31st Field Artillery and Company "A", 111th Engineers, to an area in the vicinity of MUNARO to relieve the 15th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division. The relief of the 15th Infantry Regiment was to be effected on the night of 16-17 November.
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16 November dawned cold, grey and rainy. The men took down their pup-tents and rolled their packs in the end and rain, making a vain effort to keep their equipment clean and dry under the most adverse circumstances. The Regimental Command Post was closed at the PETRAVARINO area and moved to the HIGNANO area where it opened at 1200 hours. The new command post was situated on the second floor of an Italian farmhouse - a building in which the 193rd Infantry Regiment maintained their command post on the first floor end in which the 15th Infantry Regiment was still functioning on the second floor. The valley, which the command post overlooked, was limited in possible sites for headquarters command post interminable as it was extremely vulnerable to German artillery fire from end to end and afforded the enemy excellent observation from the H. CAMINO hill mass which dominated the valley on the south.

The battalion and support company troops left the PETRAVARINO area just at dusk and moved by motor truck to a point approximately five miles from the front line. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions went into bivouac positions in the rear as regimental reserve and the 1st Battalion marched from the detrucking point to a position on the southeast slope of H. LUNGO to relieve the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment, about two and one half (2½) miles northeast of the town of HIGNANO.

It had rained almost incessantly all day and it continued to rain throughout the night as the men of the 1st Battalion staggered up the road to H. LUNGO in mud over their shoes, slipping and sliding into pools of water. Upon leaving the road the troops stumbled over the wet and slippery rocks up the slopes of H. LUNGO. The Germans layed harassing artillery fire on H. LUNGO during the time the relief was being affected. As the shells dropped around them, the men would fall to the ground and seek whatever cover was available, becoming covered with mud from head to foot and soaking wet.

While the 1st Battalion was climbing the slopes of H. LUNGO, the 2nd Battalion was relieving the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Battalion was relieving the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment in the regimental reserve area several miles south of the regimental command post. The 15th Infantry Regiment was relieved at 0030 hours on 17 November.

The area having been officially taken over by the 191st Infantry, Lt. Colonel W. Trimble Brown, 05665, of Lebanon, Virginia, Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, completed plans for patrols and requested the regimental commander to furnish carrying parties to bring in a sufficient supply of food and ammunition to establish a dump for the battalion in the event it was attacked and supplies could not be brought in each day. Arrangements were made for the 2nd and 3rd Battalions to furnish fifty (50) men each to carry supplies on the night of 17-18 November and 18-19 November.

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The carrying parties assembled at the fortuitous point which the supply trucks could safely carry the supplies. From that point the men began the back-breaking task of hand-carrying ammunition, food and water up the rocky slopes of M. LOH. Slipping and sliding over muddy and rocky terrain, walking at times through pools of water knee deep, groaning in the dark and rain for footing over the unfamiliar ground and groaning for breath from the exertion of climbing, the men went on with their arduous task. The enemy laid concentrations of artillery shelling in the path of the carrying parties and the men were forced to drop their supplies and seek whatever cover they could find in rock crevices and shell holes. Private First Class Eugene G. Foster, 20105900, of Fort Isabel, Texas, a member of Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, and Private First Class Arthur V. Weiss, 38990832, of Nettie, Texas, a member of Company "E", were killed by this artillery fire. Private Frank S. Rine, 72262350, of Flushing, Long Island, New York, was seriously wounded and later died of his wounds in a rear line hospital as a result of this enemy shelling. Private First Class Norman J. Sisson, 36710491, of Conway, Missouri, Private Charles E. Anglin, 35712060, of Besford, Georgia, Private Heman Butten, 35760652, of Herat, Illinois, and Private Epps E. Shaw, 14146770, of Greenville, Georgia, all members of Headquarters Company 2nd Battalion, were seriously wounded and Corporal Manuel A. Rivera, 38092340, of El Paso, Texas, and Private First Class Maxie H. R. Gonzales, 38032610, of El Paso, Texas, both members of Company "E", were lightly wounded during the German artillery concentrations.

Despite the shelling, rain, mud, laborious hand-carrying and unfamiliar terrain, the 1st Battalion was supplied with sufficient food and ammunition on the two nights to establish an adequate supply dump.

On 16 November, Brigadier General W. H. Milby, Assistant Division Commander of the 36th Infantry Division, ordered Colonel Werner to relieve the 2nd Battalion of the 143rd Infantry Regiment on M. LOHNO with the 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry leaving their present area at 1730 hours, 19 November, also the 3rd Battalion would relieve the 1st Battalion on M. LOHNO, leaving their present position at 1730 hours, on 20 November. All Battalion commanders were informed of the change and plans were formulated for adequate guides and artillery support.

At 1902 hours 18 November, Lt. Colonel Brown advised Colonel Werner that the 1st Battalion was being attacked by a small German force, that the attackers were being met with mortar and small arms fire, and that artillery support had been called for from the regimental cannon company. At 1945 hours Colonel Brown advised that the attack had been repelled. The fire from the cannon company, commanded by Captain Everett C. Hamilton, O-310463, of El Paso, Texas, had been very accurate and effective in breaking up the attack.

Early on the morning of 19 November, the Germans laid several heavy concentrations of artillery fire on the regimental command post area, disrupting tele-
phone communications to the battalions, separate companies and division headquarters. The wire crews of Regimental Headquarters Company, the battalions and separate companies worked night and day to keep telephone communication open. The almost incessant enemy artillery fire broke the lines almost as quickly as they were repaired.

At approximately 0830 hours on 10 November, a Company A platoon led by 2nd Lt. Clarence M. Artymovitch, 0-125411, of Detroit, Michigan, cut off five German prisoners who evidently had been on a patrol mission and captured them. Interrogation revealed the prisoners to be from the 9th Company of the 15th Infantry Regiment which was located on H. LUNGO. The prisoners had recently been given instructions on security and it was difficult to elicit information from them.

At 1600 hours Allied planes bombed S. PIETRO for the first time since the regiment had occupied positions in the front lines. The weather had been cloudy for the great majority of the time and a great deal of rain had fallen. Two German planes strafed the positions of the 2nd Battalion on H. LUNGO.

At 1730 hours the 2nd Battalion commanded by Lt. Col. Aline W. Hyatt, Jr., 0-361355 of Oswego, New York, left their reserve position because they relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 133rd Infantry Regiment on H. ROTONDO. The relief was effected at 0730 hours on 20 November.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions were now situated on hills across from each other through which Highway No. 6 wound through the narrow valley separating the two hills. At the southeast tip of H. LUNGO the highway made a U-shape contour to the west closely following the base of H. LUNGO. The Germans occupied the greater portion of H. LUNGO - the 1st Battalion occupying only the southeast tip. Since both H. LUNGO and H. ROTONDO overlooked the broad valley in which the towns of S. PIETRO, S. VITTO and CASSINO are located and which hills and towns were important links in the German winter line, both the 1st and 2nd Battalions were subjected to almost constant artillery, mortar, machine gun and small arms fire - the troops on H. LUNGO receiving the brunt of the enemy fire. H. ROTONDO afforded better cover and concealment than H. LUNGO due to its wooded terrain. H. LUNGO was devoid of vegetation in many places and the troops had great difficulty in securing adequate cover. The H. CASSINO hill east to the west and southwest overlooked both H. LUNGO and H. ROTONDO and the regimental command post area located two miles southeast of CASSINO. Since the greater portion of H. CASSINO was occupied by the Germans, they were afforded excellent observation of all movements within the regimental area. Consequently, strict discipline had to be exercised on vehicular traffic during the hours of daylight. Vehicles larger than jeeps were not permitted to pass the road junction on Highway No. 6 and the road leading east to BRUSIANO during daylight hours.
only jeeps on urgent missions were allowed to traverse the road. Those units that could receive hot food from kettles in the field train bivouac near FRESENZANO were allowed to bring it up to their positions in jeeps with trailers.

The observation post maintained by the Regimental Headquarters Company Intelligence & Reconnaissance Platoon on M. CSELKA and the 2nd Battalion observation post on M. GOMONDI, having an excellent view to the north and northeast, afforded the regimental staff officers with valuable information on enemy movements on M. LUNGO, M. CAMINO, in S. PESTRO and J. VITtons, enemy artillery positions observed by gun flashes, German flares activity and vehicular traffic on Highway No. 6. This information coupled with that from the front line companies kept the regimental commander fully appraised of enemy activity in the regimental sector.

Allied artillery against German positions was maintained day and night. Although the Germans seemed to expect an early storm of artillery during the first few days on our own artillery batteries, additional units of heavy and medium artillery brought into the rear area soon brought the balance of artillery firepower in favor of our forces. The entire front was a constant maelstrom of fire. The ground rocked from the force of exploding shells and the noise reverberated from mountain to mountain.

The almost constant rain was a severe strain on the men in the front lines. Forced to remain in their trenches during the hours of daylight, the holes would often fill up with water. Since movement was constrained due to enemy observation, the men would have to wait until dark to fill out their positions with their steel helmets. Clothing, blankets, and equipment became wet and soggy with mud. After several days in the line the first cases of trench foot, familiar to World War I, appeared. Troops were urged and ordered to remove their shoes and wring out their wet socks as often as possible and to massage their feet to stimulate the flow of blood.

At 1750 on 20 November, the 3rd Battalion commanded by Major Robert E. Mahaffey, Jr., O-304193, of Brookwood, Texas, left the regimental reserve bivouac area to relieve the 1st Battalion on M. LUNGO. The relief was affected by 0345 hours on 21 November, and the 1st Battalion went into position as regimental reserve to secure a few days of much needed rest. Just prior to leaving their bivouac area to relieve the 1st Battalion, long range enemy artillery shells landed in the Company "A" area wounding thirteen (13) men.

The Medical Aid Stations of the 1st Battalion commanded by Captain Joel S. Cunningham, O-344543, of Camden, New Jersey, the 2nd Battalion commanded by Captain Ralph S. Phelan, O-570415, of Waurika, Oklahoma, and the 3rd Battalion com-
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Wounded by 1st Lt. Harry Hooahen, O-502157, of Miami Beach, Florida, worked tirelessly evacuating the wounded and dead from the hills. Wounded could not be evacuated during the hours of daylight due to the enemy's company positions. Litter bearers would leave the battalion aid stations just as dusk to climb up to unit positions from which it was necessary to evacuate the wounded. The task of hand-carrying the wounded from the hills was exhausting. Despite every effort to ease the pain of the wounded, litter bearers would slip and fall, jolting their patients. The bearers would arrive at the aid stations dripping with perspiration—their faces white and drawn with fatigue. There was no rest for them during the hours of darkness as German artillery was exacting its toll in dead and wounded day and night. Every effort was made to provide the wounded with hot drinks and cigarettes as they arrived at the aid stations. After administering emergency medical attention, the aid station personnel loaded the wounded into ambulances which moved to the 111th Medical Clearing Station in the rear area over Highway No. 6 which was constantly being subjected to enemy artillery fire.

At 1550 hours on 21 November, an artillery concentration fell on the Regimental Headquarters Company and Regimental Medical Aid Station positions. Major Joseph B. Coopwood, O-260126, of Lockhart, Texas, the Regimental Surgeon, was killed; Captain Seymour Pollen, O-16004, of Scranton, Pennsylvania, the Regimental Dentist, and Technical Sergeant Donald E. Dickson, 3350357, of Lockhart, Texas, were wounded, when a shell exploded outside of the aid tent in which they were working. Privates John E. Diehl, 33155574, of Quakertown, Pennsylvania, a number of Company "A" was killed, and Private Henry J. Jobert, 33501745, of Kingston, Massachusetts, a number of Company "D", was so severely wounded that he died in the hospital the next day as a result of his enemy shelling. Both Private Diehl and Private Jobert were on special duty with the Regimental Headquarters Company special military police platoon.

During the artillery concentration, Technician Grade V Hensman J. Ehlinger, 30022990, of Devine, Texas, was on duty at the regimental switchboard. The first shell landed so close to the switchboard that a soldier standing next to Technician Grade V Ehlinger was wounded. During this concentration and two other concentrations that followed, Technician Ehlinger was thrown to the ground from his position at the switchboard by the explosion of the exploding shells. Ehlinger remained on duty keeping the regimental command posted on what was occurring and handling such incoming and outgoing calls as came through, although the majority of the lines had been broken by the shelling.

At 1500 hours on 21 November, a small force of approximately twenty (20) Germans attempted to attack the left flank of the 3rd Battalion, having previously fired smoke shells in front of Company "A" to cover their approach. Artillery fire was called for from the German Company and with the addition of mortar and small arm fire the attack was promptly broken up.

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During the night of 21-22 November, the Anti-Tank Company Mine Platoon, led by 1st Lt. Harry R. Cross, 0-124409, of Dymond, Pennsylvania, laid mine field just east of Highway No. 6 and approximately one-half mile south of M. LUHIO, covering the most probable approach of enemy tanks. The mine field was laid under very hazardous conditions with enemy artillery shells falling around the platoon.

A 3rd Battalion patrol encountered an enemy pillbox on the southeast slope of M. LUHIO and also located some German mortar and machine gun positions. The patrol was forced to retreat before superior enemy fire power, but at daybreak museum artillery fire could be observed. Shells were placed on the museum gun and mortar positions effectively. The pillbox, however, was so situated that artillery fire could not reach it and the pillbox remained a constant source of trouble.

Fifty (50) Coleman stoves for heating food and drinks in the front lines were issued to the battalions by the Regimenal Supply Officer, Captain Claude T. Morgan, 0-299996, of Fort Worth, Texas. Also, canned solidified foods were obtained for issue to individuals who could not afford to have their positions so that they, too, might have hot food and drinks. The morale of the fighting men was improved immeasurably upon receipt of the heating facilities.

The problem of evicting Italian civilians from front line areas was solved by the regimental headquarters commander, Maj. Harold S. Ball, 0-477980, of San Antonio, Texas, nightly occupied civilians took to the rear areas. The Italian civilians were taken to the 36th Infantry Division Prisoner of War camp for interrogation because of their suspicious activities and attempts to get through the American lines to the north.

On 21 November, the Germans subjected the front line battalions and regimental command post to unusually heavy artillery concentrations. Allied artillery countered with counter-battery fire. The northern portion of M. LUHIO and the town of S. PISTRO were hit by the objects of air missions but due to heavy weather only a few planes dropped bombs on S. PISTRO.

It was noticeable during the day that the Germans had either reinforced their troops in the M. LUHIO - M. ROTONDO area, or were becoming careless about cover and concealment. Observation posts reported numerous incidents of enemy troops moving about and reinflating traffic on the roads. From the passage of this information to artillery fire direction centers brought heavy concentrations of Allied artillery on the enemy.

During the daylight hours on 25 November, repeated attempts were made to knock out the German pillbox on M. LUHIO with artillery fire. Due to its pos-
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tion, however, the artillery could not reach it. A patrol mission from the 3rd Battalion was formulated to go out that night and take the pillbox with small arms and rifle grenades, assisted by artillery concentrations in the general area of the pillbox. Before the patrol could reach the pillbox, however, they were engaged in a fire fight with the Germans and were forced to withdraw. Private First Class Frank J. Capparell, 3522200, of Corunna, New York; Private Earl W. Mitchell, 3503614, of St. Paul, Ohio; Private Elmo A. Cooper, 3468379, of Philadelphia, Mississippi; and Private George W. Kelso, 37371264, of Glencoe, Missouri, all members of Company "C", who participated in the patrol, were missing after the action. Observers and daylight patrols attempted to locate the men or their bodies the next day but were unsuccessful.

A German patrol attempted to enter the position of Company "C" commanded by Captain Charles H. Lentzel, 0-029093, of San Antonio, Texas, during the night. The enemy patrol threw hand grenades and fired machine pistols but it was quickly driven off.

The Germans used their new weapon a great deal (or "screaming-Meslies" as the men preferred to call them because of the eerie sound made by the shells as they fall). The troops on both the LUISO and the ROTISO were subjected to numerous concentrations of shells from these rocket-type guns. The sound of six (6) screaming shells falling simultaneously from a rocket launcher produced a chilling effect on the soldier in the area where the shells exploded.

On the night of 26-27 November the 1st Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion on the LUISO. During the relief of the battalions from their various positions, prearranged artillery concentrations were planned with the 121st Field Artillery Battalion in the event of an attack by the Germans while the relief was being effected. A screening force from the unit was relieved always remained in position until the relieving force had completely taken over. The screening force, in turn, was then relieved. Reliefs in the line were made one (1) platoon at a time in each company positions.

2nd Lt. Robert A. Buhman, 0-450958, of Paxton, Iowa, was a member of Company "F", Private First Class Andrew Neuman, 35082589, of Pahalta, Texas; Private Henry H. sunset, 35376660, of Greenburg, Pennsylvania; Private Raymond L. Huling, 31707371, of Bridgeport, Alabama; Private John L. Hawkins, 35368775, of Olive Branch, Mississippi; and Private Oscar D. Shoemaker, 35393518, of Birovra, Missouri, all members of Company "G", penetrated the German reserve position on patrol on the night of 26 November. Approaching a house behind the Germans, the patrol heard soldiers coming out and the sound of volleys. Lt. Buhman led the men up a narrow trail with banks on each side. Hearing the sounds of men approaching, the patrol crept close to the side of the bank affording the most concealment. What appeared to be three (3) German officers wearing trenchcoats came into view on...
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the top of the bank. It was decided to try and take the German prisoner. Lt. Mudgeham crept up and hit one of the Germans on the head with the butt of his pistol. Almost simultaneously Lt. Mudgeham was knocked out by one of the other two Germans. The unlimbed men of the patrol opened up fire with submachine guns and either killed or wounded all these officers. The sound of the gun fire brought two other German running from the house. As they came into sight on the opposite side of the bank, they dropped at 4:30 a.m. By that time Lt. Mudgeham had recovered enough to decide that the patrol must retreat since sounds of many voices and running feet could be heard from the direction of the house occupied by the Germans. The patrol split and made a hurried exit. Neither Pvt. Hawkins nor Pvt. Scottswan returned to the 2nd Battalion command post from the patrol and it was believed that they had been captured. From a prisoner of war captured several days later it was learned that one of the Germans wounded by the patrol was the Commanding Officer of the 12th Company of the 15th Infantry Grenadier Regiment.

At 1445 hours on 27 November, a 2nd Battalion patrol observed a number of German digging mortar positions who had four (4) American prisoners carrying a fifth wounded man with them. Despite the fact that the Germans had American prisoners, it was unnecessary to place artillery fire in the area to displace the mortars.

Artillery continued to play the dominant factor between both American and German forces. Vigorous patrolling was made both day and night and the patrols constantly drew enemy fire through their aggressive attempts to determine the strength and positions of the enemy.

After concentrations of 15cm shells had been placed in the general vicinity of the pillbox on the front of the 1st Battalion, a patrol was sent out that crept up to within ten feet of the pillbox. They found that the Germans had abandoned the pillbox and had withdrawn to the northeast slope of Mt. LUNGO. The patrol could hear sounds of German voices and men digging positions on the mountain.

On several occasions Company "A", 111th Engineer Battalion, was called upon to blast positions in the rock on both Mt. LUNGO and Mt. ROTONDO for gun emplacements and shelter for the troops during periods of prolonged enemy shelling. Also, road work had to be performed due to the constant rain which turned roads and trails into bogs of mud. While completing a turn-around for vehicles for the 2nd Battalion on Mt. ROTONDO, the engineers were forced to work under direct machine gun fire.

Allied planes bombed the area north and northwest of Mt. CAHINO, Mt. LUNGO and Mt. ROTONDO during the day on 27 November, when breaks in the clouds afforded them observation. Sounds of bombing were heard from the direction of CASINO after dark. The weather permitted only limited air activity but when the weather per-
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mired, their activities improved the morale of the men in the front lines who were forced to remain in their foxholes day and night under the merciless German artillery shelling.

2nd Lt. Ralph J. McMorrow, 0-1311220, of Minneapolis, Minnesota, Sergeant Herman Dowell, 330-00100, of Houston, Texas, Private First Class Martin W. Dieter, 3263240, of Brooklyn, New York, and Private Leon P. Bulanks, 3432424, of Lakewville, North Carolina, all members of Company "F", penetrated the German position on patrol. Upon meeting a sentry they challenged him in German but the sentry immediately fired on them, which also drew fire from a German observation post. The patrol returned the fire and either killed or wounded two of the enemy. The patrol began to return to our lines when they came to an open field with three rows of brush ten (10) feet apart running perpendicular to highway No. 6. A German sentry behind one of the clumps of brush opened fire on the patrol and the fire was returned. Lt. McMorrow had been slightly wounded in the first exchange of fire, tripped over a wire setting off a booby trap. The entire field seemed to be covered with booby traps as constant explosions occurred as the patrol endeavored to get away from the area. Lt. McMorrow was wounded again and Private Bulanks was wounded by the exploding booby traps. Both Lt. McMorrow and Private Bulanks were able to return to the 2nd Battalion command post through the assistance of Sergeant Dowell and Private First Class Dieter.

At 0005 hours 29 November, General Palmer ordered Colonel Ferber to have two rifle companies ready to furnish the 142nd Infantry as carrying parties for the night of 29-30 November. Arrangements were made to send Company "F" and company "E" from the 3rd Battalion after dark. The companies moved fully equipped with the exception of their heavy weapons as it was believed they would be used by the 142nd Infantry for at least two nights and possibly longer.

On the night of 29 November, a 1st Battalion patrol again went up to the pillbox on Mt. Lungo in front of their position and found no one there. Another patrol discovered a group of Germans laying mines. One of the mines exploded while the Germans were placing them in position.

On the night of 30 November, the 1st Battalion received an attack on three sides from a force of approximately one hundred (100) Germans. The main effort of the attack was directed on the right side of the battalion's position. The attack was successfully repelled, mainly by mortar and small arms fire and completely broken up by artillery fire. The attack was believed to have been for reconnaissance in force or to cover reinforcements entering the line on Mt. Lungo.
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Casualties of the 13th Infantry Regiment for the month of November, 1943, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>ENLISTED MEn</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KILLED IN ACTION</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIED OF WOUNDS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOUNDED IN ACTION</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INJURED IN ACTION</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSING IN ACTION</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enemy casualties, captured and destroyed material for the month of November, 1943, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KNOWN</th>
<th>ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners of war</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks (unknown type)</td>
<td>9 (destroyed)</td>
<td>9 (destroyed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half-track vehicle</td>
<td>1 (destroyed)</td>
<td>1 (destroyed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 mm Anti-tank gun</td>
<td>3 (destroyed)</td>
<td>3 (destroyed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine guns</td>
<td>2 (destroyed)</td>
<td>2 (destroyed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88 mm Mortar</td>
<td>1 (destroyed)</td>
<td>1 (destroyed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: No estimate is given as to enemy casualties caused by the combat team artillery fire. Information from prisoners of war indicates casualties to be in great numbers from artillery fire.

END

Report of operations written by:

Robert D. Bangerle, 16062808
Master Sergeant, Service Co., 13th Infantry Regiment.

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SECRET
HEADQUARTERS 11TH INFANTRY REGIMENT, NIFLS
APO 330, U. S. ARMY

11 January 1944

SUBJECT: Transmittal of regimental history and conclusions of operations

TO: Commanding general, 34th Infantry Division, APO 330, U. S. Army

1. Enclosed is the regimental history of the 11th Infantry Regiment covering operations in Italy during the month of December 1943.

2. Conclusions based on operations during this period are as follows:

a. Supply in mountain operations.
   (1) Supply for troops engaged in mountain warfare was found inadequate.
   (2) To improve such supply it is suggested that supply battalions be activated and trained for the servicing of troops engaged in mountain fighting, such battalions to be available for attachment to combat troops as required.
   (a) The above organization could comprise a headquarters and headquarters detachment, four (4) companies of eight (8) platoons, each platoon consisting of two (2) squads of fifteen (15) men with a sergeant squad leader and a corporal assistant squad leader. Our experience indicates that one officer is needed for each thirty (30) men in actual carrying.
   (b) This unit should be trained and equipped similarly as for special mountain troops.
   (3) The above would avoid the drain on combat organizations and make more infantrymen available for actual combat operations.

b. Training.
   (1) Additional training with close support artillery is needed.
   In the recent operation troops did not follow successive concentrations closely enough.
   (2) Troops must be trained to fire at likely locations for enemy whether or not they see anyone to fire at.
   (3) More time must be spent in developing physical and mental stamina in all ranks.
   (4) Drills such as calisthenics, battle drill and gun drills are of the greatest value in gaining and keeping control, in securing proper tactical performance and developing efficiency.
   (5) The average soldier does not understand the proper use of combat. He frequently exposes himself needlessly by skylining, etc.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION REMOVED
2. b. (6) American troops will rarely "crawl on their bellies" unless forced to. Many needless casualties resulted and many patrol missions failed because of this deficiency.
(i) Absolute obedience to orders must be demanded and enforced by commanders of all echelons.
(ii) More and better training is needed in night operations of all sorts.
(iii) Greater emphasis must be placed on training of patrols in both day and night operations.
(iv) Better understanding is required in all echelons of the principles of all around defense.
(v) Overall leadership discipline must be improved.

e. Hygiene, sanitation and health
(1) Control of foot hygiene must be exercised and followed through by commanding officers of all echelons. It is believed that by enforced foot massage and changing socks twice a day, coupled with the use of vaseline as a skin lubricant, trench foot casualties could be avoided or reduced at least by fifty percent (50%).
(2) Sanitation and overall hygiene are even more important in combat than in bivouac. Suitable latrines must be provided and meticulously maintained. Rubbish must be disposed of so as not to afford infection to enemy observation.
(3) All ranks should be required to shave at least every other day in combat. Clean shaven men feel better and perform better.
(4) Hands, face, and feet must be kept clean as insurance against infection.

d. General
(1) Officers and NCO's must never fail to see that men under their command are fed. Men must be made to do what is needed.
(2) More appreciation is needed in all ranks of the time-space factor in mountain operations. In mountainous country distance must be measured in time.
(3) Evacuation of trivial cases by medical personnel must be stopped.
(4) Relief of front line units every ten to fifteen (10-15) days for three (3) or more days would be desirable to permit rest, bathing, rest, supplies, physical examination and consumption of "M" rations.
(5) Extra issues of powdered soup and coffee would permit unit operation of "permanently "cook tents" and "coffee pots" with halting results in morale.
(6) Insufficient attention is devoted by combat units to prompt evacuation of wounded.
(7) Combat units normally have no personal available for evacuation of the dead, particularly in mountainous terrain. Additional grave registration personnel are believed to be required.
2. *Clothing and individual equipment.*

(1) *Clothing.*
(a) Many wool socks are needed for wear in cold, wet, weather, particularly in the mountains.
(b) The combat suit should be issued to all infantry personnel.
(c) The currently issued combat boot is too stiff and uncomfortable for use in the field in rough terrain. The service shoe is superior for everyday use. A rubber-bottomed, felt-topped boot is suggested for use in winter weather, overalls being too heavy and too clumsy for marching.
(d) The wool-knit glove with a longer palm is excellent; the wool-knit glove without the leather palm is entirely unsatisfactory.
(e) The currently issued rubberized raincoat is unsatisfactory due to “swelling.” A poncho of water-repellent cotton fabric with integral hood is suggested.

(2) *Individual equipment.*
(a) Present entrenching tools are inadequate. A combination pick and shovel to be carried by each infantryman is needed.
(b) Present more equipment is unsatisfactory. Knife, fork and spoon combination and a plastic canteen cup are needed.
(c) Weapons now carried should be armed with carbines or pistols.
(d) With strap suspenders, similar to the suspenders, medical, are needed for M19 ammunition carrier.
(e) A light, easily carried sleeping bag such as that issued to special service troops would be of immeasurable value in reducing illness and disease.

f. *Organizational equipment.*

(1) A small electric torch, similar to that used by the field artillery is needed in weapons platoons and companies for night firing. Blackout flashlights are not satisfactory.
(2) W-130 wire is too easily broken. A strong, light field wire is needed.
(3) A sound-deadening cover is needed for heavy machine gun water jackets.
(4) A small leather spare parts kit should be issued and strapped on machine gun tripods.
(5) Each infantry battalion should have switchboard equipment provided with not less than twenty-four (24) drops.
(6) Each infantry regimental headquarters requires switchboard equipment providing not less than sixty (60) drops.
(7) Each infantry regiment requires two and one-half (2½) buses additional transportation for signal equipment transportation. A 1½-ton, 6 x 6 truck, with 1 ton trailer is suggested.
2. a. (8) Each infantry regiment should establish a forward signal dump, maintaining a supply level including twenty (20) fags of 9.110 wire, two (2) days supply of batteries for each radio as well as miscellaneous supplies and accessories.

(9) The radio SCR-521 should be modified to permit the entire set to be carried on the chest of the operator. As presently designed, the set is frequently used as a walking stick in the mountains with resulting damage.

(10) Waterproof covers should be provided for all radio equipment. Each type of radio is very susceptible to operation due to dampness.

(11) The SCR-524 radio cannot normally be relied upon. It is suggested that the SCR-521 be issued in lieu.

(12) Each battalion requires eighteen (18) additional sound powered telephones for infantry companies as needed.

(13) As a prime mover and hoistiner mount the half track has proven unsatisfactory. It bogged down easily in soft ground and requires much frequent maintenance and repairing that "dead line" rates are abnormally high.

(14) Each infantry regiment requires twenty-two (22) additional SCR-5A telephones.

(15) Each infantry battalion requires thirteen (13) additional SCR-5A telephones.

b. Organization.

(1) Eight (8) ammunition carriers are required for 81mm mortar squad. Four (4) ammunition carriers are required for each 60mm mortar squad.

(2) Each infantry battalion requires ten (10) liason with an additional four (4) liason per lettered company for the proper maintenance of communications; six (6) switchboard operators are needed since two switching controls are usually needed.

(3) Each infantry regiment requires sixteen (16) additional liasons and four (4) additional switchboard operators.

(4) Four (4) additional messengers and four (4) additional code clerks are needed in regimental headquarters to operate forward message centers.

(5) Current T/O for Anti-Tank company provides sufficient personnel for operation of two platoons of anti-tank guns only. One officer and thirty-five (35) men in addition would be required for proper operation of the third platoon.

h. The above conclusions represent combat observations made within this regiment as well as experiences of other personnel with whom ideas have been exchanged.

AARON W. HAYES, JR.
Lt. Col., 1st Infantry
COMMANDING
On 2 December, Captain George S. Atlantic, O-424607, of Jan Antonio, Texas, Commanding Officer of Anti-Tank Company, began a reconnaissance for new gun positions in the area of a bridge-head by Allied Forces into the KUHAIW Valley. At that time, Captain Atlantic, as leader of the Anti-Tank Company, planned all, and, as a member of the KUHAIW Valley, he led his platoon in November between Highway No. 6, the southern tip of the KUHAIW and S. MARSHALL in order that armored units might pass through that section.

Captain Leverett C. Hasleton, O-444603, of El Paso, Texas, Commanding Officer of Cannon Company, received initial instructions from Colonel Warner for the support of the 123d Infantry Regiment in its attack against the Germans on the KUHAIW, S. MARSHALL hill mass lying southwest of M. IAHE.

The KUHAIW - M. IAHEE hill mass with its lofty snow-peaked heights afforded the Germans excellent observation of the greater portion of the 56th Division sector. This hill mass completely dominated M. IAHEE and M. IAHEE and overlooked the continental command post situated approximately two and one-half miles southwest of M. IAHEE. Allied artillery units regularly placed white phosphorous shells on its peaks and suspected enemy observation points. This very accurate and effective artillery fire caused by the Germans, however, indicated that the hill mass was occupied by a master of enemy artillery forward observers.

Active patrols were maintained by the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The junction of Highway No. 6 and the road leading into a. KUHAIW, known as "W 69", was a point of activity for the Germans. In that each night patrols from positions on M. IAHEE endeavor to reach the road junction.

Beginning just at dusk or 2 December, and continuing for hours thereafter, the Germans poured concentration after concentration of shells into the KUHAIW - M. IAHEE hill mass. The rumble and roar of the guns echoed from mountain to mountain and the noise of exploding shells reverberated until the ground trembled.

The 3rd Battalion, less Company "F" and Company "H", which were attached to the 142d Infantry as part of a force, relieved the 2nd Battalion on A. KUHAIW under cover of darkness on the night of 2-3 December, Company "F" and Company "H" of the 2nd Battalion replaced in position with the 3rd Battalion on the KUHAIW. The relief was effected without incident.

The outpost line of the 1st Battalion on M. IAHEE was attacked by a German force of unknown strength at 0430 hours on 5 December, in the Company "G" nec-
OPERATIONS IN ITALY, DECEMBER, 1944

of

HILL 9506

The 1st of December found the 1st Battalion, commanded by Lt. Colonel J. Tribley Brown, O-16666, of Locust, Virginia, on the southeast slope of H. 9506; the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Colonel Aaron H. Syatt, Jr., O-261375, of Ossining, New York, was on H. 9506; and the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Major Robert E. McHaffey, O-328103, of Breckenridge, Texas, was in regimental reserve approximately five miles north of H. 9506 along Highway No. 6.

The positions of the 1st and 2nd Battalions were constantly subjected to artillery and mortar shelling both day and night. The bald slopes of H. 9506 afforded little cover or concealment for the troops of the 1st Battalion. Engineers had previously been called upon to blast emplacements into the rock to afford the men better cover and to provide adequate gun positions. Only the southeast tip of H. 9506 was occupied by the 1st Battalion. The remainder of the mountain was in the possession of the Germans. Each night patrols from the 1st Battalion and from the Germans would go out and endeavor to penetrate the front lines of each side in an effort to locate positions and determine the enemy's strength.

Decayed H. 9506, although smaller in size than H. 9510, exceeded it in height. This mountain lay directly east of H. 9506. Highway No. 6 - the main arterial road leading to the north - passed between H. 9506 and H. 9510 making a horse-shoe curve into the base of H. 9510 as it passed between the two mountains.

The weather and terrain were formidable obstacles to the enemy. The cold, grey, dismal November days were extending into December. The almost daily rains continued, making the earth a mass of thick mud - the rocks slippery and treacherous to climb. Flights of Deles filled with water. The wet and cold pervaded everything on the battle front.

On 1 December, observation posts noted increased enemy activity along the front lines. Small groups of Germans could be seen working, digging, and walking around. It was apparent that the enemy had either brought in reinforcements or was becoming more bold in regard to cover and concealment.

Colonel Richard J. Werner, O-216665, of San Antonio, Texas, the regimental commander, worked with the regimental staff officers on a plan to take H. 9506 in its entirety in the event Division Headquarters issued an order for its seizure.

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tor. The wire line to the outpost went out and when it was checked by communications personnel, they found Sergeant Carl A. Houseman, 3263756, of Winchester, Kentucky, killed; and First Class O. Cantu, 36052755, of Brownsville, Texas, Private First Class Ralph D. Delgado, 36055373, of Ewing, Texas, Private First Class Charles R. Chamber, 36066732, of Zebulon, Kentucky, Private Charles L. Miller, 330561653, of Clarksburg, Pennsylvania, and Private Bronislav (10P) Jank, 338066653, of Buffalo, New York, missing from the outpost. It was believed that the missing soldiers had been taken prisoners by the Germans.

At dawn on 3 December, the 15th Infantry, the Special Service Force which was composed of American and Italian troops, and the British launched an attack against German positions in the MAGNICE hill mass. With the aid of Allied artillery, initial objectives were taken and the units participating drove on to further objectives.

Activity during the day on 3 December, in the regimental sector was confined to patrols which were limited in their scope. The Germans were mainly preoccupied with the attack on MAGNICE. A German patrol attempted to penetrate the position of Company "G" on H. 467.00 but after brief exchanges of machine pistol and rifle fire, the patrol withdrew.

At 0350 hours on 4 December, a concentration of enemy shells landed near the 3rd Battalion ammunition dump on the lower slopes of H. 467.00 and set it afire. Little damage was done and the fire was extinguished at 0435 hours.

A message was received from Division Headquarters at 1200 hours on 4 December, to the effect that it was anticipated the regiment would be relieved on the night of 5-6 December by the 1st Italian Motorized Brigade. A bivouac area between the 36th Division and 49th Division was reconnoitered for possible use by the regiment.

Active patrols were maintained and all units were alerted for a possible German counterattack against forces on MAGNICE which had successfully driven the enemy from the greater proportion of the hill mass.

Staff officers of the 1st Italian Motorized Brigade visited the Regimental Command Post to initiate preparations for relief of the regiment. Accompanied by II Corps Interpreters, the Italians were shown positions occupied by the regiment from operational maps and visited an observation post on M. OSKIMA which afforded fair observation of both M. UMBIO and H. RICCHIO.

The Company "G" outpost line was hit by a German patrol at 0500 hours on 5 December. Company "G" opened fire and the Germans retaliated with machine pistol and rifle grenade fire. The enemy force was unable to penetrate into
the Company "A" position and quickly withdrew.

On the morning of 3 December, battalion staff officers of the 1st and 3rd Battalions reported to the regimental command post to receive instructions regarding relief of their battalions by the 1st Italian Motorized Brigade. Until the relief was accomplished, both battalions were instructed to maintain very active patrols to their front and flanks.

Three German Heinkel 111A's patroled down the valley at 1227 hours strafing the road in front of the regimental command post. A few minutes later, six French-Dutch planes attacked an artillery observation planes to the front of the 1st Battalion area. The artillery planes, flying low and barely skimming the treetops, successfully avoided the German planes which had become targets for anti-aircraft units. One German plane was observed to be on fire - blazing from the cockpit.

Patrols returned to the 1st and 3rd Battalions, after making daylight reconnaissances of enemy territory, with information regarding machine gun, mortar, and artillery emplacements and troop concentration points. This information was passed on to artillery observers in order that they might direct fire on targets of known activity.

Italian civilians reported a tunnel at the southwest end of Hill 280 in which at least 200 Germans were reported to be living. This report was verified by a 1st Battalion patrol. Other patrols endeavoring to penetrate into that vicinity after dark stated the Germans were firing wildly and blindly and there were sounds of increased dingling in.

Advance units of the 1st Italian Motorized Brigade arrived at the Regimental Command Post at approximately 1700 hours preparatory to taking over regimental positions on Hill 280.

On the morning of 5 December, the first Italian troops to enter combat as Allies with American troops moved into the regimental sector to effect relief of the 1st Battalion on Hill 280. The 1st Motorized Group, 67th Infantry Regiment, 11th Field Artillery Regiment and Bersaglieri Battalion comprised the Italian units to enter combat. The Italian headquarters was set up in the same building as the regimental command post occupied. The influx of so much additional personnel required moving part of the regimental headquarters personnel to a rear command post which was selected near the field train bivouac area in FRESNANCE.

An attack plan had been formulated for the Italians to take Hill 280 on
the morning of 7 December, but Division Headquarters advised that the attack had been postponed until the morning of 9 December. The relief of the 1st Battalion, however, would be made on the night of 6-7 December as scheduled.

Division Headquarters ordered the balance of the 3rd Battalion attached to the 142nd Infantry - Company "A" and Company "K" had been with the 142nd Infantry since 29 November, acting as a reserve unit. The 3rd Battalion moved tactically, leaving their positions on Hill 10700 just at dusk in order to clear the road for the Italians relieving the 1st Battalion later in the night. The 3rd Battalion moved down the road leading southwest out of MIGNANO to a position east of S. CARINO where they assembled to perform their duties of hand-carrying supplies over the steep, slippery and treacherous trails of the S. CARINO - S. MAGGIORE hills area to the 142nd Infantry Regiment engaged in attacking the Germans.

Captain Admiral H. McDonald, O-407216, of St. Mary's, Texas, Commanding Officer of Company "F", was killed on the night of 5 December, by enemy shell fire when his company was climbing the steep trails carrying supplies.

The 3rd Battalion performed its duties for the 142nd Infantry Regiment so well that they earned an official commendation from Lt. Colonel G. E. Lynch, Commanding Officer of the 142nd Infantry Regiment. The 3rd Battalion remained with the 142nd Infantry until 9 December.

The 2nd Battalion, less Company "K" and a portion of Company "H" which remained in the bivouac area as a battalion reserve, moved up and took over the positions of the 3rd Battalion on Hill 10700. The relief was effected without incident and was completed at 2200 hours.

Gloves had been sent to the blown out bridge on Highway No. 6 just north of MIGNANO at 1845 hours to meet the Italian units coming in this line to relieve the 1st Battalion. Highway No. 6 was so congested with vehicles, especially Italian trucks that became stuck in the mud and did not have sufficient power to pull themselves out, that the relief was greatly delayed.

Only part of Company "A" had been relieved at 0425 hours on 7 December. Company "A" and Company "B" were still in position at that time.

Meanwhile, Colonel Werner, the Regimental Plans and Operations Officer, Major John L. Willmann, O-355157, of Houston, Texas; the Regimental Intelligence Officer, Captain Howard R. Doughty, O-280726, of Malbone, Massachusetts, and the enlisted men of Regimental Headquarters were striving to overcome the difficulties of co-ordinating both Italian and American units so that they would work smoothly together. The operators on the Regimental Headquarters
switchboards struggled courageously with the flow of Italian conversations received over the telephone wires until II Corps established a switchboard with interpreters in conjunction with the regimental wire net.

After being relieved, the 1st Battalion moved south down Highway No. 6 to a bivouac area near FIESOLE where on the morning of 7 December, they enjoyed their first bath in many weeks and received clean underclothing and socks.

During the afternoon of 7 December, enemy planes were active. Seven German planes strafed the valley and roost in front of the regimental command post and eight Messerschmitts strafed positions around S. PIETRO and M. ROTCHIO. Four Messerschmitts attacked an artillery observation plane between M. ROTCHIO and S. PIETRO but the artillery plane was able to escape to Allied lines.

The 1st Italian Motorized Group was scheduled to launch an attack against German positions on H. LUOGO on the morning of 8 December. At 0230 hours Colonel Werner checked with the Italian commander to determine whether or not additional artillery or other assistance was needed but the offer was declined with thanks. At 0330 hours the Italians launched their attack, climbing up the southeast slopes of H. LUOGO in an effort to take Hill 393 - the highest peak on H. LUOGO. The Italians were met with machine gun, mortar and small arms fire from the enemy on both H. LUOGO and M. VAGHIO E which lay to the west across a small valley. The Italian suffered heavy casualties but they courageously reorganized their depleted units and made another drive against Hill 393 but were again repulsed. Hill 233 on the southern tip of the mountain was taken and held. All of the 5th Division and II Corps artillery was at the disposal of the Italians and concentration after concentration was fired on enemy positions whenever it was called for. The 2nd Battalion sent out a patrol to contact the Italian leading Bersaglieri Battalion company which had advanced halfway along the west base of H. LUOGO.

Company "E" with a section of heavy machine guns from Company "H" was ordered from the 2nd Battalion reserve position into the front line, filling a gap between the 2nd Battalion's position on M. ROTCHIO and the Italians on H. LUOGO.

The 1st Battalion was detached from the regiment by Division order and attached to the 153rd Infantry. The 1st Battalion moved by motor truck to positions in the vicinity of VENAFRO as Division reserve unit.

A platoon of tanks from the 753rd Tank Battalion was scheduled to move to the vicinity of M. ROTCHIO on the night of 7 December, but they were unable to get through. The first tank hit a land mine and blocked the route for the other tanks. Engineers worked the entire day to clear another route so that the tanks
might move up on the night of 8-9 December.

General Walker informed Colonel Warner at 1930 hours that either the 3rd or
1st Battalions would be returned to regimental control on 9 December dependent
upon the tactical situation.

On the morning of 9 December, General Walker notified Colonel Warner that
the 3rd Battalion would be released to regimental control. Arrangements were
made to send the 3rd Battalion to the bivouac area vacated by the 1st Battalion
near RHEINZANO so that the men could also take a hot bath and obtain clean
clothing. The proposed plan was that as soon as one rifle company and the heavy
weapons company had taken their baths, they would be prepared to return to the
front with a portion of the 3rd Battalion Headquarters Company.

During the afternoon of 9 December, Allied planes were very active over
the regimental front line. Twelve A-36 planes bombed and strafed German posi-
tions behind FIERNO and eighteen Spitfires and A-36 planes bombed gun posi-
tions on the highway to CAVALINO.

The tank platoon, which had failed to accomplish its move on the previous
night, finally moved through the minefield blocking its path and took up position
east of Company "E", where its commanding officer indicated they would re-
main for the night. The tanks fired no missions and took concealed positions.

At 1800 hours General Walker ordered Colonel Warner to leave one platoon
of Company "E", on the northwest slope of Mt. RICORDO and send the balance of
the company to the position occupied by one platoon of Company "E" along the rail-
road track south of Mt. BANCA as protection against a possible counter-attack
by the Germans against the Italians and also to serve as security for artillery
units in that area.

Company "E" put out security patrols for the protection of Engineers who
were working on the tank passage east of Mt. RICORDO.

On the morning of 10 December, Division Headquarters advised Colonel
Warner that Fifth Army had directed that a reinforced company be placed in a
defensive position in the area occupied by the Italians south of Mt. LUNGO as
protection against an enemy counter-attack or break-through.

Before Company "E", which had covered the greater part of the night from
Mt. CAVALINO to RHEINZANO, had time to bathe and rest, it was necessary to load
the company into trucks, with a section of heavy machine guns from Company "H"
and bring them to the front. The company detrained near RICORDO under cover
of a thick haze and took positions along side of Company "E" at the southern
end of Mt. LUNGO. Then the remainder of the 3rd Battalion had completed
their bathing, they were also moved forward and occupied positions as regi-
mental reserve just southeast of RICORDO.
The Italians were happy to report that during the night of 9-10 December, American artillery had shelled Hill 743 on H. 1060 and had hit what apparently was an ammunition dump, on a terrific explosion resulted.

Lt. Lt. James H. Humphries, 0-412691, of Jacksonville, Florida, Commanding Officer of Company "E", reported on 10 December, that a considerable number of German anti-tank mines were found in his company's positions. There was no regular pattern for the mines and quite a few of them were removed.

The night of 10-11 December was very quiet. There were sounds of occasional rifle fire on H. 1060 and near A. FIEN, but very little German artillery shelling occurred. Patrols were limited to the distance which they could move by Division order and went out only about 500 yards beyond their front line positions. Engineers worked on the tank passage east of H. ROT030 and on the 2nd Battalion supply road.

German planes were again active on 11 December. Eight of them engaged in aerial combat with four Spitfires over the front lines. One German plane was observed to be on fire as the fight drifted out of sight of the observers. Five Messerschmitts flew over H. ROT030 but their strafing mission was unsuccessful. Later four Messerschmitts strafed positions on the high ground north of H. ROT030.

Colonel Werner instructed Major Hellmey to send another unit from the 3rd Battalion to relieve Company "E" which was still serving as security guard at the south end of H. LEMO. Company "C" occupied the positions vacated by Company "E". One platoon of Company "G", upon being relieved from their former sector, was attached to Company "G" to act as security for the Engineers who were rushing to complete the tank passage east of H. ROT030.

Division Headquarters ordered Colonel Werner to send a full company from the 2nd Battalion to the streamline north of H. ROT030 under cover of darkness to serve as security for a tank destroyer company coming through the tank passage and taking up positions behind the streamline. Company "G" was directed to occupy the position along the streamline.

The 2nd Battalion reported that the tank passage on which the Engineers had worked so long was again impassable and if the passage were to be used in future operations, work would have to begin on it again at once. This information was passed on to Division Headquarters.

During the night of 12-13 December, the 142nd Infantry occupied Hill 72 laying midway between H. TRICHEL and H. LEMO and sent troops to Hill 741 on the northern tip of H. LEMO.
A German deserter, taken by Company "F", advised that the Germans had several companies of tanks north of H. RUGRIO and that German positions on the mountain were protected by machine gun emplacements, barbed wire, and minefields.

During the night of 13-14 December, observation posts reported large numbers of enemy trucks moving along Highway No. 6 two at a time toward the front. Artillery fire was laid along the road the entire night. A German patrol attempted to penetrate the position of Company "F", but was repelled by small arms fire.

Early on the morning of 14 December the Division attack order was received at the Regimental Command Post. The regimental order was issued by 1000 hours having been coordinated with the Division order. The attack on S. PIETRO was scheduled to be launched by the 2nd Battalion at 1200 hours on 15 December.

At 0930 hours on 14 December, eight Focke-Wulf planes, coming from the southeast out of the sun, bombed and strafed the regimental command post. Anti-personnel bombs were dropped on the regimental headquarters building and Colonel Werner and Lt. Roy H. Bass, C-47, 44-41193, of 100th Fighter Group, near Hollywood, were seriously wounded. One Italian officer was killed, another Italian officer was wounded and five Italian enlisted men were wounded as a result of this bombing.

Colonel Werner, although in a great deal of pain from multiple body wounds, requested the medical personnel to bandage his wounds and allow him to remain on duty in such as the regiment was to attack S. PIETRO on 15 December. However, his condition demanded immediate evacuation. Colonel Werner then directed that 2nd Battalion, 36th Infantry, be called for the rear command post at FASSIANO and that Division Headquarters be notified. After these orders had been carried out, Colonel Werner was evacuated.

Upon reaching the regimental command post, Colonel Price was advised by Brigadier General W. H. Wilbur, Assistant Division Commander of the 36th Infantry Division, that Lt. Colonel W. H. Wyatt, Jr., Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, would take over command of the regiment. Colonel Wyatt arrived at the command post at 1100 hours and assumed command. He immediately informed Major Milton J. Landry, 41-24370, of San Antonio, Texas, the Executive Officer of the 2nd Battalion, that command of the 2nd Battalion would be taken over by him.

German planes again appeared in the afternoon and bombed the position of the tank units which had moved northeast of H. RUGRIO.

Colonel Wyatt instructed Major Landry to move the 2nd Battalion to new
positions northeast of K. ACTUNO in preparation to attack J. FISTRO on 13 December. Company "F" and Company "H" occupied positions just south of the stream-line of K. ACTUNO. Company "E" held the reserve position south of these two rifle companies. The 3rd Battalion moved into the positions vacated by the 2nd Battalion on K. ACTUNO.

Colonel Wyatt moved the regimental command post under cover of darkness to a new location at the northern base of K. ACTUNO.

Division Headquarters advised Colonel Wyatt that friendly fighter plane coverage would be given to the regiment during the 2nd Battalion's attack on the 15th.

Despite the promise of fighter plane coverage, fourteen enemy planes bombèd and strafèd positions south of K. ACTUNO in the vicinity of the regimental command post at 0900 hours on 13 December. At 0915 hours an undetermined number of Japanese planes bombèd and strafèd the field train bivouac area in PREHEZANO. One bomb dropped ten feet from the buildings housing the 3rd Battalion and the Regimental Medical Detachment. The exploding bomb blasted off the roofs, tore off posters, smashed all windows and cracked the walls and ceilings. Approximately fifteen enemy planes bombèd and strafèd positions around Cannon Company at 0915 hours. A number of anti-personnel bombs failed to explode and the Division Engineers were called to remove them. Two of this latter group of planes were seen to fall but another was seen streaking smoke as it headed south over Allied lines from the anti-aircraft and machine gun fire directed at the planes by all units in that area.

The town of J. FISTRO, which was the objective of the 2nd Battalion attack, was situated on the southern slopes of K. JUNGSO at the extreme eastern end of the KAGIDAN Valley. The approaches to the town were made up of a series of terraces many of which were walled olive orchards. Intelligence information derived from a previous attack by another unit that had failed and from survivors of war indicated that the enemy's defense consisted primarily of automatic weapons disposed in depth and placed to cover each terrace on the approaches to the town. The entire area was also heavily protected by mortar and artillery emplacements. In many instances the Japanese could call down their artillery and mortar fire directly on their own positions due to the fact that their emplacements were so well dug in and protected from heavy shelling.

In accordance with prearranged plans with higher headquarters, J. FISTRO and its immediate vicinity was placed under intense artillery fire as well as machine gun fire directed from positions in a draw located between K. ACTUNO and O. OGRAVETO. At 1235 hours the 2nd Battalion began its attack to
The attack was coordinated with that of the 115th Infantry Regiment and a company of tanks from the 733rd Tank Battalion. The slopes of Hill 2090 to the north of J. TIKHITI were to be taken by the 115th Infantry while the tanks approached the town from the southeast. Company "F" and Company "G" were in the initial assault with Company "H" in reserve. It was planned that Company "F" and Company "G" would cross the line of departure abreast, move to the west and east, and hold defensive positions north of J. TIKHITI. In the event heavy resistance was encountered, Company "F" was to establish a base of fire from a position north of J. TIKHITI to cover the advance of Company "G". Company "F" was to be committed upon the successful completion of the movement of Company "H" and Company "G" with the mission of mopping up J. TIKHITI from the east and thereafter to organize a defensive position generally east of the town.

Company "G" crossed the line of departure at 1253 hours, moving west, and soon encountered heavy machine gun and mortar fire. The Germans, seeking to cause the initiating point of the attack, brought heavy artillery to bear on the line of departure from which Company "F" planned to cross. Company "F" then moved westward and crossed the line of departure at a more distant point than originally planned, moving south and west to the position of Company "G". Company "G", there, was to establish the base of fire for Company "F" while it advanced. Thus, Company "F" was to fulfill the mission originally intended for Company "G". However, Company "F" moved out to meet the same intense machine gun and mortar fire as had Company "G".

Due to the superior fire power and excellent defenses of the Germans, the attack could not be carried out as planned. Major Landry ordered both Company "F" and Company "G" to recognize in their present positions and to continue the attack on later orders.

During the initial phase of the 2nd Battalion attack, Captain Charles H. Runner, O-309577, of Oakland, Texas, Commanding Officer of Company "F", was killed by rifle fire while leading his company. Both Captain Charles H. Beacham, O-420097, of San Antonio, Texas, Commanding Officer of Company "G", and 1st Lt. Harold F. Hesse, O-1281090, of Hooker, Massachusetts, Executive Officer of Company "G", were wounded and evacuated from the battlefield.

The Germans maintained a verticle belt of machine gun, mortar and artillery fire from the terrain around J. TIKHITI on the right flank of the 2nd Battalion and from positions around the town of H. L. E. on the left flank of the battalion. Heavy casualties occurred in all ranks.

The attack was continued at 1750 hours by Company "F" and Company "G" had made some advances of reorganization despite their large number of casualties. Company "G" was ordered to hold its position and establish a base of
fire for Company "F" which was moving to the west. Company "E" was committed to the right and ordered to move up the terraced slopes to the southeast of FIERRO. With the assistance of artillery and mortar concentrations, Company "E" and Company "F" was able to advance a short distance. Again, however, they encountered intense enemy machine gun and mortar fire directed at the attacking companies in the initial assault. Heavy casualties again resulted in both officer and enlisted personnel.

At 0000 hours, Major Landry again ordered a reorganization of the remaining elements of the battalion and gave instructions that all personnel was to be ready to continue the attack under cover of darkness. At this time the strength of the companies on position was as follows: Company "E" - one (1) officer and fifty (50) enlisted men; Company "F" - three (3) officers and sixty-five (65) enlisted men; Company "G" - two (2) officers and thirty-four (34) enlisted men. No accurate figure could be obtained of Company "H" personnel as the heavy weapons company was divided into Platoons supporting the various rifle companies. It was known, however, that Company "H" losses were high.

Major Landry and Lt. Hite, O-395780, of Portmouth, Maine, made a personal reconnaissance at 2100 hours to the front of Company "E" and Company "F". After this reconnaissance, Major Landry ordered the attack resumed at 0100 hours on 16 December. When the attack began, Major Landry remained with Company "E" and Lt. Hite remained with Company "F". By this time all communications had been destroyed. Since no porting fires could be secured from the artillery, an attempt was made to storm enemy positions with grenades, bazookas and whatever fire power could be obtained from the Company "H" mortar squad still remaining with the rifle companies. Despite the well-planned enemy resistance, consisting for the most part of heavy machine guns situated in their fires would cross-fire each other and numerous anti-personnel mines planted throughout the area, the 2nd Battalion continued to push itself along overcoming enemy resistance until some portions of Company "E" and Company "F" were able to penetrate into FIERRO proper. During this attack the 2nd Battalion men besides neutralizing many enemy positions were able to destroy an ammunition dump.

Another reorganization was ordered by Major Landry at 0200 hours with instructions to be prepared to make a fourth attack before dawn. For this purpose Colonel Wahl attached Company "I" commanded by Captain James R. Erikson (then Lt. Hite, O-395780, of Rock Springs, Texas, consisting of five (5) officers and ninety-seven (97) enlisted men, to the 2nd Battalion. The strength of the 2nd Battalion at the end of the 3rd attack was as follows: Company "E" - one (1) officer and forty (40) enlisted men; Company "F" - three (3) officers and fifty (50) enlisted men; Company "G" - two (2) officers and thirty-four (34) enlisted men, ten of whom were attached to Company "E".

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The fourth attack was launched at 0600 hours on 16 December. Company "B" and Company "G" were again in the assault. Company "A" was held as reserve initially with orders to enter the gap in the southern face of the battalion's position. What little remained of Company "G" was ordered to protect the flank of the battalion's right flank of the line of departure. Company "E" the Company "F" managed to get within 200 yards of their objective before being halted by the deadly flack of German machine gun hulls and the anti-personnel mines planted all through the area. At daylight German snipers began to take a heavy toll of the remaining men in the battalion.

Radio communication was re-established at 0730 hours and Major Landry called for smoke shells to cover his exposed positions. Under cover of the smoke, the remnants of the battalion again reorganized and established a defensive position. At 0940 hours General Sway called the battalion to move back south of the line of departure. The message was received by Captain Lehman, 0-233694, of San Antonio, Texas with Company "F" and it was not until 1230 hours that a messenger was able to transmit the order to Major Landry. Due to the incessant enemy artillery, mortar, machine gun and sniper fire, the order for the retrograde movement was not able to be fulfilled until 1400 hours. At this time the battalion strength in the rifle companies was as follows: Company "B"—two officers and twenty-seven (27) enlisted men; Company "E"—two (2) officers and thirty-four (34) enlisted men; and Company "G"—two (2) officers and twenty-five (25) enlisted men. Small groups of men, who had been cut off by enemy fire during the fire attacks from their companies, drifted back across the battlefield during the day and night to augment the strength of the companies slightly. During the final phase of action, the 2nd Battalion Intelligence Officer, Lt. William G. Ogle, was killed.

As a result of the attack against 3. FISTRO the 2nd Battalion suffered casualties as follows: three (3) officers and thirty-two (32) enlisted men killed; seven (7) officers and one hundred and twenty-four (124) enlisted men wounded; and none missing.

In the success of four attacks against some of the best prepared and strongly-defended enemy positions encountered in the Italian campaign, the officers and enlisted men of the 2nd Battalion have demonstrated in their determination to seize and hold the objective for which they had received orders to take, up until the time the order was received for a retrograde movement, the men persevered in fiercely attacking German positions. Often it was necessary for the men to stand upon one another's shoulders to scale the terraces which were cleared by German machine gun fire. Advancing in the face of what appeared to be certain death, these men gathered from almost every state in the Union and molded into a composite and indomitable fighting force displayed the highest type of courage.
The tanks which were to have assisted in the attack were either knocked out by land mines or enemy artillery fire and never were a serious threat against German positions. The narrow passage and road available for their operations was extremely limited. Without terrain in which to maneuver, the tanks were easy prey for German gunners who had the advantage of superior observation. The 143rd Infantry, attacking from the north and driving east, was unable to attain its objectives due to the superb defense maintained by the Germans in its sector. Enemy planes operating during the afternoon of 15 December, further harassed the attacking troops.

The Regimental Commander, Lt. Colonel Wyatt, directed the operation from an observation post on U. S. HIGHWAY 6 which lay approximately two and one-half miles southeast of S. PIETRO.

On the morning of 16 December, the 143rd Infantry and the Italians launched an attack against the Germans on H. WINKO. The German fire was directed from the northeast slope of H. WINKO on the previous day and had proved very costly in casualties for the 2nd Battalion.

The medical men attached to the 2nd Battalion performed heroically under the most adverse circumstances. Captain Ralph S. Stojek, OKLAHOMA, the 2nd Battalion surgeon, worked unceasingly day and night directing the evacuation of the large number of casualties. It was necessary during the height of the battle to call for assistance in evacuating wounded from the battlefield. A platoon of riflemen from Company E left its position to act as litter bearers in response to this request for help. The medical aid men and litter bearers operated as closely behind the forward units that they were constantly harassed by sniper fire from the Germans who seemingly failed to recognize the Red Cross worn by all of the men. A platoon of riflemen from the 3rd Battalion was sent to the 2nd Battalion aid station on 16 December to drive off the snipers who were harassing the aid men in their duties of evacuating the wounded.

In order to evacuate the more seriously wounded from positions in front of S. PIETRO, the valley and hills to the north of the town were smoke with white phosphorous shells. Under this cover litter bearers worked night and day bringing out litter cases.

If Corps advised that the 143rd Infantry and the Italians had taken all of H. WINKO by 1745 hours on 16 December, and that all had been sent out as far as H. 59. The 3rd Battalion furnished a security patrol for Corps Engineers working on Highway 6 in the vicinity of the U-band. Future operations depended on the use of the road and the engineers were working favorably to break out road blocks and repair and fill in ordnance caused by shelling and German demol-
tions. The 143rd Infantry north and east of 3. PISTRO continued to be engaged by the enemy during the night of 16-17 December.

The 1st Battalion which had not been in the line since 7 December, moved into positions on the mountain northeast of 3. FIELE on the night of 16-17 December along the left flank of the 143rd Infantry.

The 2nd Battalion sent strong patrols to the vicinity of 3. PISTRO throughout the day of 17 December. The patrols received fire from enemy positions southwest of the town and from a pillbox from the northwest. A later patrol penetrated to the point where the battalion had been stopped on the previous day and found machine gunemplacements unoccupied. The patrol, then, moved on into town.

The Commanding Officer of the 615th Tank Destroyer Battalion reported that he had seen one of our patrols enter 3. PISTRO unopposed, but when he attempted to enter with one of his patrols, mortar fire was received from enemy positions on the terraces north of the town.

Meanwhile, a patrol from Company "I", led by 2nd Lt. Thomas A. Lewis, O-1592195, of St. Paul, Minnesota, had occupied 3. FIELE from the east awaiting the arrival of Company "H" which was to occupy positions west of the town. This patrol entered 3. FIELE and found no evidence of the enemy. Two wounded men of Company "H" were found in the town and they reported there had been no activity in 3. PISTRO during the entire day.

Under cover of darkness the 3rd Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion.

The 3rd Battalion sent out patrols to contact the 143rd Infantry on the right flank but was unable to contact any units of this organization.

On the morning of 18 December at 0935 hours, the 36th Division G-3 ordered Lt. Colonel Wyatt to send a patrol out towards G. MORELLO to locate and clean up minor German resistance. A battalion was to move forward with its right boundary as 3. PISTRO and 3. VITORE inclusive, with the left boundary along Highway No. 6. The battalion was to occupy the southeast ridge of G. MORELLO and organize it for defense. G-3 stated that it was anticipated nothing but light resistance would be met. The 143rd Infantry further to the north would similarly advance and the 142nd Infantry on the left should do likewise.

Lt. Colonel Wyatt instructed Major Mefford to be prepared to execute the movement of his battalion in accordance with division orders. Captain Hamill, Commanding Officer of Cannon Company, and Captain Guthrie, Commanding Officer of Anti-Tank Company, received orders for the forward displacement of their positions and for a reconnaissance of no man's land in order to be able to move upon receipt of later circular orders. A platoon from the 2nd Battalion was ordered to report to Major Mefford at the 3rd Battalion for instructions to patrol out as far as Hill G. MORELLO northwest of 3. VITORE.
At 1645 hours, G-3 advised that the movement of the 3rd Battalion to C. MORENO would not be initiated until early on the morning of 19 December. The patrol to C. CINCINNO could be recalled, but C. MORENO was to be occupied and held. Major Mckeeff informed Colonel Whitt that the patrol sent out to C. MORENO had been on their objective but had encountered enemy opposition from what appeared to be a large German patrol. The patrol was instructed to remain on C. MORENO unless it was hit by a strong German attack. In that event, it was to withdraw.

On the morning of 19 December at 0750 hours, G-3 informed Major Hillman, regimental G-3, that the 3rd Battalion was to move in column well dispersed against artillery fire, to the left rear of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 123rd Infantry. This move was to begin at 0830 hours. Major Mckeeff was informed to prepare his battalion for the movement to new positions.

At 0915 hours, seven German Messerschmitt planes bombed S. FISTERO and strafed the road running east from it.

The 3rd Battalion moved almost to their assigned objective when they hit what appeared to be an organized German defensive position. Company "K" endeavored to make an envelopment from the right but was repulsed. Two prisoners were captured that stated there were ten companies on C. MORENO and at last twenty machine guns placed in defensive positions. The 3rd Battalion was ordered to dig in on point of their furthest advance and establish an all around defense.

The 2nd Battalion was ordered to be prepared to attack on the 3rd Battalion's right flank if the Germans endeavored to counter-attack. Patrols were also to be sent out from the 2nd Battalion to contact the 3rd Battalion of the 123rd Infantry on its right, the regimental 3rd Battalion to the front, and the Italian units to the left. The 2nd Battalion also moved to a new position southeast of C. MORENO approximately 1000 yards from the hill and in the rear of the 3rd Battalion.

The German maintained a constant rain of artillery fire on the 3rd Battalion's positions and as it was proving too costly in casualties to remain, Colonel Whitt ordered Major Mckeeff to displace to the rear. At 0710 hours the 3rd Battalion had closed into its new position which was approximately 700 yards southeast of the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion continued to make a reconnaissance of a route that could be travelled along the southwest slopes of Monte Sasso.

The 1st Battalion was returned to regimental control after having been attached to the 123rd Infantry and was given the mission of driving the Germans from the height northeast of S. VITTORE. One reinforced company was to garrison Hill 730 and protect the supply route through Hill 730 to the area north of S. VITTORE.
A platoon of anti-tank guns was placed west of S. FIERRO in the vicinity of the 2nd battalion to be prepared for action by daylight.

On the morning of 20 December, patrols from both the 2nd and 3rd battalions went out to reconnoiter a route for the 3rd battalion to travel in order to accomplish its mission of attacking S. VITTORE from the northeast. The patrols reported that they encountered German automatic weapons fire on every terrace and on every level and that it was impossible to get through the trail leading up to M. SAMUGURO. The 1st battalion was ordered to clear out enemy resistance in the hills northwest of S. FIERRO so that routes might be reconnoitered for the 3rd battalion. The 1st battalion also made arrangements to have guides meet the 3rd battalion on the mountain and show the units the available trails that could be traveled. Patrols were sent out from the 3rd battalion with instructions to count their paces and identify points so that the battalion would know exactly where it was going during the night. Code names were given to prominent points along the route to be referred to in messages.

The regimental command post was moved from its location on the southern slope of M. ROTONDO to a new area one-thousand miles east of S. FIERRO, arriving at the new location at 1330 hours.

At 1730 hours, Lt. Colonel Wray, Major Killman, Captain Poughett and a group of enlisted personnel from Regimental Headquarters left the command post to accompany the 3rd battalion in its move up the M. SAMUGURO trail.

The field train bivouac moved from FERRENNANO to a new area approximately two and one-half miles southeast of VIANDO. The move was made in a down-pour of rain which turned the roads into quagmires of mud. The slow movement of the field train bivouac occasioned a delay in supplying rations to the battalions and the 3rd battalion was delayed approximately one hour until rations could be gotten to the men.

At 2115 hours the 3rd battalion began its climb up the M. SAMUGURO trail. The 1st battalion guided the 3rd battalion at the junction of the trail and the church in S. FIERRO. The rate of march was very slow as the trail was steep and cratered in many places by shell holes. The almost incessant rain had made the path extremely slippery.

Shortly after midnight on 21 December, the Germans began laying artillery and machine gun concentrations on the advancing 3rd battalion column. During these concentrations, the column would break and disperse among the rocks affording the only available cover.

Lt. Colonel Wray and Major McHaffey passed the head of the column and went forward to contact the rear elements of Company "B" which had advanced in its mission to clear the trail of enemy forces to Hill 730.
The 3rd battalion of the 13th Infantry, further to the north, had met such heavy opposition in their advance that they were forced to withdraw to their starting position.

A carrying party of 130 enlisted men, out of a group of 200 replacements sent to the regiment on 20 November, lost contact with their guides loading them up to the 1st battalion positions and returned to the bottom of the mountain.

The 3rd battalion reached a point approximately 150 yards from Hill 730 at 0220 hours. Hill 730 was still held by the enemy and Company "E" was engaged in a fire fight to drive them off. The trail route was covered by enemy machine guns and the 3rd battalion found it impossible to continue their march without suffering the heaviest of casualties.

Brigadier General H. W. Willard, Assistant Division Commander of the 56th Infantry Division, issued an order at 0325 hours for the 3rd battalion to withdraw to the point of departure. Communications had been disrupted by enemy artillery fire and it was not until 0510 hours that Colonel Wyatt received the withdrawal order. The 3rd battalion column was reformed and an orderly withdrawal began. Company "G" was left on the mountain in positions previously occupied by Company "E" and was attached to the 1st battalion.

Since the 3rd battalion could not reach the point of departure before daylight, enemy positions were marked to cover the battalion's movement. At 0615 hours the battalion reached the bottom of the mountain and dug in concealed positions.

Lt. Colonel Edwin W. Richardson, O-20390, of Medford, Maine, reported to the regimental command post at 1000 hours having been assigned to the regiment by division order. Colonel Richardson was assigned to command the 3rd battalion with Major McMahon becoming the battalion executive officer.

The 2nd battalion sent out patrols to both flanks and to Md 69 and the 3rd battalion.

Company "E", commanded by Captain Edgar R. Darmanin, O-354446, of Wharton, Texas, suffered such heavy casualties in attacking Hill 730 that the company was ordered to withdraw. The 1st battalion and Company "G" occupied positions on the peak east of Hill 730. A wounded prisoner who later died stated that his company, which had a strength of 30 men, was holding Hill 730 and that there were pillboxes on the hill and the trail was covered by machine guns.

The 3rd battalion sent patrols to their flanking units and established
contact. A patrol that went to C. MARILO reported no activity between the hill and S. VITTONE.

On the morning of 22 December, Company "H" was detached from the 1st Battalion and returned to the 3rd Battalion. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was attached to the regiment. Division headquarters ordered the relief of the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 11th Infantry by the regimental 3rd Battalion beginning at 1700 hours. The 37th Reconnaissance Troop was to move into the positions vacated by the 3rd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion remained in its positions as regimental reserve. Two platoons of Company "C", 753rd Tank Battalion and Company "D" and Company "E" of the 2nd Chemical Battalion were also attached to the regiment.

The 1st Battalion was again detached from the regiment and attached to the Special Service Force for their attack on the night of 23-24 December. The battalion was attached for operational purposes only.

The 3rd Battalion completed the relief of the 113rd Infantry battalions at 1159 hours on 23 December. The Anti-Tank Company, less one platoon in position near S. PIETRO, moved from the HILL AREA to the field train bivouac area.

Due to time and space factors involved, the Special Service Force attack was postponed twenty-four hours.

Division headquarters advised Lt. Colonel Knytt that the 2nd Battalion would be relieved by the 1st battalion of the 113rd Infantry on the night of 25-26 December with the 2nd Battalion occupying the bivouac area vacated by the relieving unit.

During the night of 26-27 December, German patrols slipped through positions on the left flank of the 36th Reconnaissance troop and laid mines around W 69. Instructions were issued to the 36th Reconnaissance Troop to thoroughly outpost their position to prevent a repetition of German patrols entering this area.

Just at dusk on 25 December, 3rd Battalion patrols moved out to knock out two known enemy machine gun positions. The patrols worked their way almost close enough to use their hand grenades when a third machine gun opened up on them and the patrols were forced to withdraw.

The attack of the Special Service Force which was scheduled to begin between 2300-2400 hours on 24 December, was delayed until 0200-0300 hours on 25 December, due to supply and maneuver problems. After slight resistance, the
Special Service Force took Hill 720 and Company "A" moved onto the hill and occupied it. Division Headquarters instructed Lt. Colonel Watt that after Hill 720 was taken and occupied by the 1st Battalion, the battalion was not to proceed any farther with the Special Service Force. Division Headquarters also advised that the 1st Battalion of the 113th Infantry would be attached to the regiment upon its relief of the 2nd Battalion.

S. VITTORE was heavily shelled by Allied artillery until 10:00 hours on 25 December. After the shelling ceased, one patrol from the 3rd Battalion and one patrol from the 5th Reconnaissance Troop went into the town. A combat patrol from Company "G" moved out to a position northeast of S. VITTORE with instructions to dig in and cut off any German retreat that might come through their position. The patrol reached its objective without meeting opposition and sent smaller patrols to contact the Special Service Force and to investigate S. VITTORE.

Meanwhile the 5th Reconnaissance Troop patrol, skirting the left tip of C. MORELLO, ran into intense machine gun fire and was caught between the crossfire of two guns. The patrol then opened up with artillery and mortar fire on the patrol from positions south and west of S. VITTORE. Another 5th Reconnaissance Troop patrol went to the rear of M. CHIARA west of S. VITTORE and encountered machine gun and light mortar fire. Entering S. VITTORE, this patrol was fired on by machine pistols from the patrol's reports it was concluded that S. VITTORE was lightly occupied but heavily outposted.

The 2nd Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion, 113th Infantry, just prior to midnight and moved back to a bivouac area near the regimental train bivouac in the vicinity of VEIVAFFIO.

The Company "G" combat patrol moved out approximately 200 yards beyond its position and encountered no enemy although the patrol was fired on from C. MORELLO by machine guns and two mortars.

The 3rd Battalion and 1st Battalion, 113th Infantry, maintained constant patrols in their sectors, going to and from the outskirts of S. VITTORE and into the town itself. On occasions they would receive no fire and then another patrol moving over the same ground would be fired upon.

Captain Wm. Young, C-3/113th, of San Antonio, Texas, the new Regimental Plans and Operations Officer, visited the 3rd Battalion, 5th Reconnaissance Troops and the 1st Battalion, 113th Infantry, command posts to make arrangements for the forward displacement of the regimental forces. It was planned for Company "G" to join the combat patrol from that company northeast of S.
Upon arrival of company "G" at that position, the remainder of the 3rd Battalion would displace forward to positions so that its right flank would be on company "F" and the left flank run along the road running northwest from C. MORELLO. At the same time the 36th Reconnaissance Troop would displace forward so that its right flank was on the southeast slope of C. MORELLO and extend down to Highway No. 6. This line was to be exploited day and night. A combat patrol from the 1st Battalion, 115th Infantry, was to send two patrols out - one to the vicinity of C. INTERELLO and the other to the south entrance to S. VITTONE. Barrage artillery was to be placed north and west of the town and the two companies of the 2nd Chemical Battalion were to place white phosphorous fire on S. VITTONE and its vicinity. One platoon of tanks from company "G", 753rd Tank Battalion, would take firing positions from their present location to assist the forward displacement, firing on exits and targets of opportunity in S. VITTONE. The 2nd Platoon of the tank company was to move into new positions under cover of darkness and on time support of the 3rd Battalion. The 15th Infantry regiment on the left flank of the regimental sector arranged to send out patrols to contact the 36th Reconnaissance Troop. Active patrols were to be maintained by all units and if their reports reflected that S. VITTONE was unoccupied, Company "F" was to be moved forward to occupy the town. This plan was later altered so that just one company from the 3rd Battalion would occupy the town in the event it was found to be unoccupied.

The combat patrol from the 1st Battalion, 115th Infantry, moved out and occupied C. MORELLO at 1515 hours, the occupation being made without resistance. At 1635 hours the balance of company "G" moved out to join its combat patrol northeast of S. VITTONE. At 1737 hours the 1st battalion completed the relief of the Special Service Force in the mountains north of S. VITTONE which placed the 504th Parachute Regiment on the 1st Battalion's right flank. At 1755 hours Division headquarters notified Captain Young that company "G" of the 112th Infantry was attached to the 1st Battalion. This company was on Hill 1205 and was of all strength. At 1900 hours Company "G" had closed into its position and company "F" prepared to move forward. The entire 3rd Battalion closed into its new positions at 2205 hours, with the displacement of the 36th Reconnaissance Troop the planned regimental advance was completed.

Division headquarters advised at 0037 hours on 27 December, that the regiment would be relieved on the night of 29 December, by the 15th Infantry Regiment of the 31st Infantry Division, and move to the vicinity of ALIFE. The 1st Battalion was to be relieved by the 112th Infantry, company "G" and company "F" of the 2nd Chemical Battalion were to be released from regimental control and attached to the 135th Infantry Regiment.

Upon receipt of the relief notice from Division, Lt. Colonel Wyatt ordered
the proposed operation against S. VITTORIO called off.

At 1015 hours on 27 December, nineteen enemy planes bombed and strafed S. PISTRO, S. VITTORIO and the valley between the two towns.

At 1400 hours staff officers of the 155th Infantry Regiment arrived at the regimental command post to coordinate relief of the regiment.

The 1st battalion, 155th Infantry, and the regimental 3rd battalion kept constant patrols going into and around S. VITTORIO. As soon as one patrol would return, another patrol went out.

At 2300 hours Division headquarters informed Captain Young that the Commanding General, II Corps, ballotted S. VITTORIO to be unoccupied because of the enemy bombing of the town in the morning and a strong patrol should be sent into the town to occupy it. Captain Young advised that arrangements had been made to outfit the town thoroughly with one reinforced company.

The combat patrol of the 1st battalion, 155th Infantry, southeast of S. VITTORIO and the 3rd battalion combat patrol northwest of the town withdrew to positions within their respective battalion sectors at 0600 hours.

The 35th reconnaissance troop engaged a German patrol at 2200 hours which attacked on its left flank with machine pistols and hand grenades. As the German broke away, their patrol was intercepted by a patrol from the 15th Infantry Regiment and a fire fight ensued in which three Germans were killed.

Constant patrols were maintained by the 1st battalion, 155th Infantry, and the 3rd battalion. A 3rd battalion patrol encountered artillery, machine gun, sniper and machine pistol fire from the west of S. VITTORIO.

Large groups of Italian civilians coming out of the hills created a problem to the front line units. All battalions were instructed to evacuate the refugees to the regimental command post area where guards escorted them further to the rear. These civilians advised that S. VITTORIO was full of boby traps; that LT. COL. CHAJA had pillboxes to the rear of it, machine gun emplacements to the east and between 500-1000 Germans in positions north of the hill supported by tanks.

During the afternoon of 28 December, the 2nd battalion moved from its billets area to the rest area near S. ANGELO DI ALISI, moving in convoy with the 155th Infantry Regiment.

At 2220 hours on 29 December, a German patrol attempted to push through
the left flank of the 36th Reconnaissance Troop by using machine pistols.

The relief of the 1st Battalion by the 3rd Battalion, 112th Infantry, was
affected at 0500 hours, and the 1st Battalion marched cross-country to the vic-
cinity of NIGANO and entrenched at that point to move to the bivouac area near
S. ANGELO D'ALIFE.

Patrols working in and around S. VITIOLE on the night of 28-29 December,
reported German vehicles moving in and out of the town. The 3rd Battalion and
112th Infantry, were alerted for the possible reinforcement of
1st Battalion, 113rd Infantry, near the enemy in the S. VITIOLÉ area. A 3rd Battalion patrol received automatic
weapons and sniper fire when they approached the town from the northeast at
approximately 1000 hours on 29 December.

Division headquarters made plans to coordinate all artillery in the sector
to fire on S. VITIOLÉ at 1100 hours. The artillery concentrations were to last
until 1500 hours and then shift beyond the town to the north and west and con-
continue for thirty minutes. Both the 3rd Battalion and 1st Battalion, 113rd In-
fantry, were prepared to send patrols into S. VITIOLÉ as soon as the artillery
"serenade" lifted. If patrols found the town to be unoccupied, one company
from the 1st Battalion, 113rd Infantry, was to move in and occupy it.

As soon as the artillery concentrations on S. VITIOLÉ lifted, the patrols
left their respective bivouac areas to enter the town. The 3rd Battalion
patrol reached the edge of town and was hit by machine gun and small arms fire
from houses immediately in front of S. ANGELO D'ALIFE. The patrol tried to work their way
around this opposition on three different occasions but was pinned down each
time. Company "B", 113rd Infantry, which was scheduled to follow the combat
patrol, was pinned down by fire from S. VITIOLÉ two platoons abreast and
drew heavy machine gun fire from the edge of the town. Machine pistol and
rifle fire were also directed at Company "B". A small amount of mortar fire
fell on the company's right flank but was not effective. Against this superior
fire power, Company "B" was forced to withdraw.

The relief elements of the 135th Infantry Regiment began effecting the
relief of the 3rd Battalion, 113rd Infantry, and the 36th Reconnaissance Troop shortly after dark on 29 December. By 0700 hours on 30
December, the regiment and its attached units were officially relieved and
moved by motor truck to S. ANGELO D'ALIFE for a well-earned rest.
Casualties of the 11th Infantry Regiment for the month of December, 1943, were as follows:

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<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KILLED IN ACTION</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIED OF WOUNDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOUNDED IN ACTION</td>
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<td>286</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38</td>
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Enemy casualties, captured and destroyed material for the month of December, 1943, are as follows:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Known</th>
<th>Additional</th>
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<td>Prisoners of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
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<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
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<td>81mm Mortars</td>
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<tr>
<td>90mm Mortars</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Trucks, unknown type</td>
<td>3 (destroyed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammunition Dumps</td>
<td>3 (destroyed)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Guns</td>
<td>2 (captured)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>4 (captured)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carbines</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sight, Telescopic</td>
<td>1 (captured)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

END

Report of Operations written by:

Robert D. Koleske, 16062508
Master Sergeant, Service Co.
11th Infantry Regiment
SECRET

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Regimental History and Conclusions of Operations

TO: Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, APO #36, U. S. Army

9 February 1944

1. Inclosed is the regimental history of the U.S. Infantry Regiment covering operations in Italy during the month of January, 1944.

2. From the result of the river crossing operation it would appear to be definitely established that success cannot be assured unless the following conditions are met:

   a. Accurate knowledge of enemy strength and dispositions must be had;

   b. Surprise in the actual crossing be essentially accomplished;

   c. Adequate crossing equipment be made available. Note: The improvised foot bridges made up of Bailey bridge walkways fastened to rubber reconnaissance boats were entirely unsatisfactory;

   d. All echelons be thoroughly trained in what each individual and unit is to do, preferably through numerous rehearsals;

   e. Enemy organized dispositions on the far shore must be such that early penetration in depth across the river is possible to permit establishment of a bridgehead to keep small arms fire from the river line and allow crossing of subsequent echelons on foot bridges;

   f. Location of mine fields on the near shore must be known and cleared;

   g. Crossing locations should provide such concealment near the river for the forward establishment of bridging equipment that long carries are avoided. Note: In this operation it was necessary for troops to carry all equipment across open terrain for distances of more than 700 yards;

   h. Crossings must be made on a broad front.

[Signatures]

AARON W. WYATT, JR.
Lt. Col., 36th Infantry
COMMANDING

DECLASSIFIED FOR EXECUTIVE ORDER 12256, SECTION 3.3, MMD235017
SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION IN ITALY, JANUARY, 1944

OF

31st INFANTRY REGIMENT, RIFLE

On January 1, 1944, the 31st Infantry Regiment was routing in bivouac near San Angelo D'Alife, Italy, following the Ardennes campaign of December. Relief of the Regiment had been effected in the early morning hours of December 30, and the Regiment had been moved by truck to the rest bivouac.

Lt. Col. Aaron W. Wyant (0-361309) of Onondaga, New York, was in command of the Regiment, with Lt. Col. Andrew F. Price (0-318509) of Fort Worth, Texas, as Executive Officer. The Battalion Commanders were Capt. Emanu N. Kowman (0-377287) of El Paso, Texas, for the 1st Battalion, Maj. Vinton L. Laird (0-362179) of San Antonio, Texas, for the 2nd Battalion, and Lt. Col. Edwin W. Richardson (0-208550) of Wester brook, Maine, for the 3rd Battalion.

An intensive training program was initiated during the period spent at San Angelo D'Alife. When the Regiment was withdrawn from the line, 109 officers and 2,517 enlisted men comprised the total strength of the Regiment present for duty. A total of 35 officers and 694 enlisted men were assigned to the Regiment at that time, reconstructing it to nearly normal strength. The rest bivouac afforded these men an opportunity to train with and be absorbed into the Regimental Units.

The afternoon of January 7 the Divisional G-3 notified the Regiment that it was alerted, to be prepared to move January 9. All units were notified, and ordered to have quartering parties consisting of one non-commissioned officer per company, and one officer per battalion at the Regimental Command Post ready to move out at 0530 hours the following morning. Capt. Ross Young (0-368457), of San Antonio, Texas, the Regimental G-3, left with this party the morning of the 8th of January, but reported in when he had returned that there was no suitable area for the Regiment within the limits outlined by Division Headquarters. Likewise, sufficient trucks to move the personnel had not been made available, and road conditions hadn't been graded.

The morning of January 9, Capt. Young went to II Corps Headquarters, to obtain an area assignment, and reported the result to G-3. Quartering parties were again arranged for, and moved out the morning of the 10th to reconnoiter the area. That afternoon, Lt. Col. Wyant, the Regimental Commanding Officer, and Capt. Young attended a meeting held at Division Headquarters with Maj. Gen. Fred L. Walker, the Division Commander. The meeting dealt with a contemplated future operation which included a river crossing and subsequent attack.
On January 11th, instructions were given to the Battalion Commanders for the movement of the Regimental Combat Team. The move was to take place the evening of January 12th.

The initial tactical disposition of the 191st Infantry Regiment in the month of January, 1944, consisted of the relief of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment of the 1st Armored Division, on Mt. Porchia, the night of January 12. The 2nd Battalion was to occupy the initial positions of the elements of the 6th Armored Infantry on Mt. Porchia, with the 1st and 3rd Battalions disposed to the rear in reserve. During the morning of January 12, Lt. Col. Wyatt held a meeting at the Regimental Command Post with all Unit Commanders. Giving orders concerning the imminent movements, following which the Commanding Officer moved to the new Regimental Command Post, which had been established about 1 1/2 miles northeast of Sibarac, arriving there at 10:45 hours.

Mt. Porchia is relatively small compared with the mountainous terrain typical of the central part of Italy. Its significance is derived from its isolated situation commanding the low ground lying between the Mt. Naggione-Cavino hill mass to the south and Mt. Trochilo to the northwest. Highway #6 runs across the lower northern slope of Mt. Porchia and the ridge line runs approximately a mile south from that vicinity, forming two humps at the extremities with a smaller middle through the center. There is little vegetation on the mountain, the surface being extremely rocky in most places.

The Regiment moved up during the first hours of dusk, January 12, to pre-designated blocking points along Highway #6, the historic Via Enea, and the main arterial supply route to the north. From there they moved by foot into position. The 2nd Battalion, under the command of Major Milton J. Landry, relieved the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment which were occupying defensive positions along the forward slope of Mt. Porchia.

The relieved units, responsible for the continuity of the defensive phase, provided guides to their positions, and maintained patrols and screening elements to the front and flanks during the operation. Precorded artillery harassing fire was laid down by the 51st Field Artillery Battalion of the 1st Armored Division Artillery. Normal radio activity was maintained to prevent any indication to the enemy of the action taking place. Areas were outposted immediately, and patrols sent out to the front and flanks. Light artillery fire was received intermittently, but otherwise the relief was effected without incident, and was completed at 2332 hours.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions closed into their positions at 2115 hours. Both Battalions were in reserve, and were disposed to the rear of Mt. Porchia and off to the left of Highway #6. The 1st Battalion occupied positions along the northeastern slope of Mt. Giacosa and the 3rd Battalion was along the
The 131st Field Artillery Battalion, previously in position, was attached to the Regiment as part of the Combat Team as the Regiment moved into position. The following day a company less one platoon of medium tanks from the 753rd Tank Battalion were attached to the Regiment for pending operations.

The morning of January 13th the Regiment was requested to outpost the area between Mt. Forchini and the British Unite on the left flank. Company 'F' was directed to outpost this area and maintain patrols to pre-designated contact points.

On the night of January 13-14 the 2nd Battalion engaged in strengthening its outpost line and sending out patrols. Patrols with the British on the left was attacked. Company 'F', after several attempts had been frustrated by enemy mortars and small arms fire, eventually succeeded in establishing its outposts lines in the early morning hours. The patrols which had been sent out toward the front encountered enemy elements generally to the left front of the battalion position, in the direction of Mt. Trocchio.

Lt. Col. Myatt attended a conference held at Division Headquarters at 1100 hours January 14, with the Commanding General, the Assistant Divisional Commander, 3-2, the assistant 3-2, and the Commanding Officer of the 753rd Tank Battalion. The meeting dealt with the attack on Mt. Trocchio which was to be launched the following morning. That afternoon the Commanding Officer of the Regiment held a meeting at 1100 hours with the Unit Commanders of the Regimental Combat Team to give the orders for the attack.

Mt. Trocchio lies about 3 miles north of Mt. Forchini, its long axis following a northeast-southeast direction. It towers well above Mt. Forchini and occupies a commanding position over the surrounding ground, guarding the Rapido River to the west beyond the mountain, and the southern and eastern approaches to Cassino, several miles north-west on Highway #6. The sides are extremely steep and rocky. In Plate is a medium sized hill south of the southern slope of the mountain. The surrounding area, including the low ground between Mt. Forchini and Mt. Trocchio consists of low rolling terrain.

The objective of the attack, to be executed in conjunction with the 135th Infantry Regiment of the 34th Division on the right, was to seize Mt. Trocchio and the area to the south and west including La Vista and the high ground.
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beyond the Rapido River. The Regimental objective was to take the southern tip of Mt. Trochito, La Plata, and the high ground to the south and east, and to outflank the Rapido. Air support to include heavy bombing of enemy installations and supply routes around Mt. Trochito and in the vicinity of San Angelo in Tarvisio had been requested for the afternoon. The Regimental plan of attack called for the 2nd and 3rd Battalions to attack abreast, the 2nd on the right and the 3rd on the left. The 1st Battalion was to move into a reserve position along the southern slopes of Mt. Forchia. The assault echelons were to infiltrate into position in the low ground between Mt. Forchia and Mt. Trochito during the first hour of darkness on January 14, and launch the attack at 0030 hours January 15.

During the afternoon of the 14th, the Regimental Command Post was moved forward to a point on the southeastern slopes of Mt. Forchia, about 1/2 mile southwest of San Vittore del Tasso.

Available intelligence information concerning enemy dispositions indicated that the Regimental objective was defended by the 134th German Infantry Regiment, occupying positions running generally south from Highway No 6 along the southeastern slopes of Mt. Trochito, across the railroad bed, and past La Plata to the vicinity of Cenara. Additional information indicated that the enemy units were under normal strength, with elements of the Hermann Goering Division as reserves. Inferences were that the enemy would defend along his line as long as feasible, and then retreat to the Rapido River line to defend against a crossing.

Under cover of darkness on January 14, the 2nd Battalion and 3rd Battalion moved into position to launch the attack. The initial objective of the 2nd Battalion was to work its way to the stream line running through the low ground between Mt. Forchia and Mt. Trochito. This was accomplished during the first hour of darkness on the night of January 14. During this period the 3rd Battalion was also closing in and reached its initial position on the left of the 2nd Battalion at 0030 hours January 15. Combat patrols of platoon strength went out from both Battalions to an outpost line 500-600 yards in front of the main positions and dug in. Contact was maintained between Battalions with the 134th Infantry Regiment on the right, and the British Units on the left.

During the night of January 14, the remaining units of the Regimental Combat Team were likewise deployed forward. The 1st Battalion moved up to its reserve position just south of Mt. Forchia. The Anti-Tank Company platoon with 75mm guns moved into the same locality, with its mission to protect against an enemy attack from the direction of the valley south of Mt. Trochito, or from Highway No 6 on the north. Company 'A' of the 755th Tank Battalion moved up to a forward position on the forward slopes of Mt. Forchia, prepared to support
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The attack by firing on targets of opportunity. The 131st and 132nd Field Artillery Battalions, the latter attached for the pinning operation, were to execute fire missions on call. They were to lay down an initial barrage and continue, setting down targets as they came up. The attack was launched at 0800 hours, January 15th, and lifting at 0930 hours, January 15th, 2nd and 3rd Battalions abreast, with Companies "E" and "F" on the right and Companies "G" and "H" on the left. Patrolling had been carried out, with the remainder of the attacking echelons infiltrating through behind them, gradually increasing the density of the attacking party with the company strength. The enemy defenses were well constructed, and attempts to observe the enemy's position were made. The difficulty was countered by the use of smoke shells which partially concealed the movements of the unit.

Determined resistance was put up by the enemy, especially along the southern sector in the vicinity of Mt. Trochilo and north toward Casa Martina. The Regiment succeeded, however, in working through to its objectives. The 2nd Battalion attacked throughout the operation to fully coordinate its activities with the 135th Infantry Regiment which was attacking on the Regimental right flank. At 1030 hours, January 15th, the information was received that the 135th Regiment had taken Hill 121, further north on Mt. Trochilo, with little opposition, and had requested that the 2nd Battalion push forward with them. By 1230 hours the 135th Regiment had seized all their objectives on Mt. Trochilo, and the Battalions of the 131st Infantry Regiment were working through to theirs.

The forward movement, primarily by infiltration tactics, continued throughout the afternoon. At 1400 hours, January 15th, Lt. Col. Wyatt reported to Division Headquarters that everything was proceeding smoothly. By 1700 hours the forward patrols had advanced beyond their initial objectives, and by 0000 hours January 16th, the remainder of the units had infiltrated through to the final objectives. Forward patrols from both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions had gone forward to cross the Rapido River, with instructions to look for choke points, enemy defensive installations, and exposed terrain features. Patrol contact throughout the night was maintained with the 135th Infantry on the right flank, and with the British units on the left.

Following the successful operation culminating in the capture of Mt. Trochilo, the 131st Infantry Regiment was disposed occupying positions defending Mt. Trochilo, in line, and the high ground to the south and west toward Casa Martina. Generally the line paralleled the course of the
Rapido River, the most objective of the Regiment. The 1st Battalion moved into reserve position along the southern reverse slopes of Mt. Tronchito. The other units of the Regimental Combat Team, likewise being moved forward, were disposed within the area between Mt. Tronchito and Mt. Forchia.

In preparation for the contemplated crossing of the Rapido River, nightly patrols were organized to cross the River. The course of the Rapido River along the Regimental sector, to the west of Mt. Tronchito from Highway 76 on the north to San Angelo in Teodice at the south, follows a northeasterly-northwestern direction. The initial intelligence information secured by the patrols gave some indication of the difficulties to be encountered. The main feature of the Rapido is the width of its current that flowed approximately five miles an hour. As a result, a deep channel had been cut with nearly vertical banks from 5 to 10 feet high. The average width of the River was not over 15 yards, but its depth, dropping abruptly from the banks to from 10 to 12 feet in the center, presented an additional hazard. Patrols from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions during the early hours of January 16 crossed the River and brought back that information and the fact that the bridge in the vicinity of San Angelo in Teodice had been blown by the retreating enemy.

During the evening of January 16, Lt. Col. Wyatt attended a conference with the Divisional Commander, at 1100 hours, to discuss the next Regimental move. Company A of the 773rd Tank Battalion was relieved from attachment to the 116th Regimental Combat Team. Arrangements were made with Company A of the 111th Engineer Battalion for them to provide the necessary rubber collapsible boats to enable patrols to cross the Rapido River. The plans called for one engineer to accompany each boat, and to search for mines at the embarking and debarking points.

The patrols which crossed the Rapido River the night of January 16-17 were able to bring back information concerning the enemy defensive installations. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions each sent out two patrols to cross at predesignated points, using collapsible rubber boats.

Only one patrol from the 3rd Battalion was able to cross the River, because of the difficulty encountered in using the rubber boats in the swift current. It crossed in the vicinity just north of San Angelo in Teodice. The patrol reported that the tree along the River had been cut back to better the enemy observation and afford him a field of fire, and that there were many enemy automatic weapon installations along the western bank. A double line of barbed wire fence had been erected several hundred yards inland, running parallel with the River. The 2nd Battalion patrols were more successful, both patrols getting
across about a mile further north, in the vicinity of the large 'S' bend the Rapido forms. Both of these patrols reported a double apron of barbed wire fence had been strung along the western bank in that vicinity.

On the night of 16-17 January, patrols also maintained contact with the 1st Battalion of the 113th Infantry Regiment which moved in further south on the Regimental left flank.

During the darkness between January 16 and 17, troops from the 111th Engineer Battalion succeeded in opening the supply route as far as San Luis, a small village on the lower southern slopes of Mt. Trochilo. The road had been mined by the enemy. By noon of the 17th, Highway 6 was opened as far north as the southern base of Mt. Trochilo. At 1800 hours, Lt. Col. Wyatt attended a meeting with the Commanding General of the Division to discuss the contemplated river crossing.

Beyond continued patrol activity, tactical movements for the night of January 17-18 consisted of the 2nd Battalion's displacing forward on the low ground to the south and west of Mt. Trochilo. Company 'A' of the 2nd Chemical Battalion, which had been attached to the 3rd Regimental Combat Team, moved in to the rear and right of the 2nd Battalion. The Anti-Tank Company of the Regiment also displaced forward, moving into position to the rear of and between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Increasing artillery fire to tie in with the contemplated patrol activity for the night of January 17th had been arranged with the 31st Field Artillery Battalion.

The 3rd night patrols had gone out to cross the Rapido, the night of January 17-18, Division Headquarters had requested that the activity be concentrated on obtaining information of enemy strong points across the River, identification of enemy units, and possible routes of access along the approaches from the east.

The 3rd Battalion patrols, attempting to cross west of the Regimental southern sector, encountered a great deal of difficulty with the rubber boats and mine fields along the eastern banks of the River. Enemy artillery concentrations further penetrated their movements and only one patrol was able to get across the River.

The 2nd Battalion patrols, one from Company 'G' and one from Company 'I', had more success. The initial plan had been to work the patrols across, have them establish a strong point on the far bank by digging in, and then to build them up to platoon strength and send raiders out from that point further inland. The 1st Company patrol, under Lt. Gabriel L. Pavolini (0-295353), of El Paso, Texas, crossed and was able to advance nearly 800 yards west of the River.
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They then notified the platoon, remaining along the eastern bank of the river, to cross. As soon as the platoon had crossed, enemy machine guns further inland opened up on the patrol. The platoon tried to encircle so as to flank the guns and aid the patrol, but encountered heavy small arms and mortar fire. The patrol engaged in a running fire fight which lasted nearly twenty minutes. Several men, including Lt. Speretta, were wounded, but all our men were successfully evacuated. Lt. Barresi, although wounded in the shoulder, swam back across the river. Enemy casualties included four killed and eight wounded.

The collapsible rubber boats had again demonstrated that they were inadequate for the task of crossing the Rapido. The current was far too swift, and the boats capsized readily in the swirling water. In addition, small shell fragments easily punctured the rubber, rendering the boat useless. Five of the seven boats used by the 16th Company patrols the night of January 17 were lost.

The patrols reconnaissance disclosed that the enemy had formidable machine gun installations behind hedge lines running parallel with the river, and that the guns were so deployed as to cover each other. The reports also confirmed earlier information that strands of barbed wire had been strung in the area between the river and the main enemy positions further inland.

During the afternoon of January 16, engineers laid a smoke screen along Highway 65 from the vicinity of Mt. Forchin south to the road junction leading off to San Vittore, to obscure enemy observation of that area, and activities taking place along the road.

Company 'A' of the 11th Engineer Battalion was relieved from attachment to the 11th Regimental Combat Team January 16. During the night of January 18-19, several of the units within the Regimental Combat Team changed position. The Cannon Company moved into concealed positions in the vicinity of San Lucia and set up their 75mm and 105mm guns. The 1st Battalion deployed forward slightly from their former position. Company 'A' of the 2nd Chemical Battalion moved into the same locality as the Cannon Company.

On the afternoon of January 19th, the Regimental Command Post was moved to the southeast slope of Mt. Trocchio, about two miles northeast of San Angelo in Tuscany. That afternoon, the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Engineer Regiment was attached to the 11th Regimental Combat Team.

Further patrol activity was engaged in during the night of January 18-19 and January 19-20, in preparation for the approaching crossing of the Rapido River. Strong patrols from each of the Battalions were used, and the mission...
were similar to those of the previous nights. The tactical plans called for
the patrols to cross the Rapido in rubber boats, establishing strong points
on the far side, and then notify the patrol remaining on the coast bank and have
them work across, building the patrols up to platoon strength. The patrols
would then work out from that point. Both nights, severe difficulties were
encountered.

The primary difficulty was with crossing in the rubber boats, although
the patrols were also hampered greatly by the resistance the enemy offered
with strong machine gun, small arms and mortar fire. This increased the
difficulties of crossing, and made reconnaissance on the western side of
the river extremely difficult. Several of the patrols were able to make
their way across both nights, and were able to gather valuable information
needed in planning the river crossing. The night of January 15th, the
patrols were increased in strength, and a cone of artillery fire directed
at the enemy positions, simulating an attack, in order to force the enemy
to dislodge his gun strength and positions.

The attempt to cross the Rapido river was scheduled for the night of
January 20-21. The 36th Division Field Order covering the operation was
issued January 16th, defining the order for the 115th Regimental Combat
Team, directing that two battalions of the 115th Infantry Regiment attack
across the Rapido commencing at 2000 hours January 20th. The 93rd Infantry
Regiment was ordered to attack in conjunction with the 115th, sending two
Battalions across the river south of San Angelo and cooperating with the
115th in the capture of San Angelo the following day by attacking from the
south. The 36th Division on the Regimental right flank was to make a de-
monstration further north, but was not to cross the river. II Corps Artillery
was directed to fire preparatory fires to reduce enemy installations along
the western bank, preceding the 115th Combat Team Artillery Fire.

The Regimental Field Order was issued the 15th of January at 1400 hours.
The 1st and 3rd Battalions were directed to move into a final assembly area,
located within the hill flanks between the southern tip of Hill Truchiljo,
and La Plata to the south, during the hours of darkness on January 19-20, from
which point they would move forward to make the crossing. To aid in
the attack the 2nd Battalion, in Regimental Reserve, was ordered to make
a demonstration crossing in the vicinity of San Angelo, approximately one mile
south of the proposed crossing site.

The 1st Battalion objective consisted of the high ground due west of the
crossing site, 1000 to 1500 yards inland, while the 3rd Battalion, using the
same crossing points later went to move to the north about the same distance
inland, and take the high ground to the west behind San Angelo.
The crossings were to be attempted in the vicinity of the '3' bend of the Rapids River, situated about a mile west of the southern tip of Mt. Tocchio and approximately in front of the middle of the regimental sector. Companies 'A', 'C', and 'E', crossing first by means of rubber assault boats were to launch the attack at 2000 hours January 20. At 2100 hours the rifle companies from the 3rd battalion had the mission of holding next, by means of foot bridges to be installed north and south of the '3' bend. Heavy weapons elements and the Battalion Headquarters Company of both Battalions were to follow on the foot bridges.

The engineering equipment necessary for the operation was spotted by the 2nd Battalion of the 10th Engineer Regiment. In addition, they were directed to install an 8-ton Infantry support bridge by 2400 hours the night of the attack to enable the regimental and battalion Anti-Tank elements and vehicular traffic to cross. They also furnished guards to lead the men through the minefields to the crossing sites, and personnel to operate the boat crossings. The Common Company moved into firing positions in the La Pista hill defilade on January 20th, prepared to support the attack on the 21st by direct fire on targets of opportunity. Company 'A' of the 2nd Chemical Battalion was prepared to execute smoke missions on order. The 155th and 175th Field Artillery Battalions had been placed in support of the 151st Field Artillery Battalion, to execute the artillery barrage.

During the daylight hours of January 20th, the 1st and 3rd Battalions moved into the forward assembly area. Engineering equipment was brought forward, and placed in a boat dump near the final assembly area. At 0930 hours Captain Young, the Regimental S-3, checked arrangements with the Regimental Communications Officer for the laying of wire for the night operation. Lines from the forward regimental switch had to be put into each of the Battalion Command Posts, the final assembly area, and the proposed crossing sites at the river. During the morning 3-3 notified Captain Young that the rifle units would use red smoke rifle grenades to indicate spot targets and orange smoke hand grenades with time fuses, placed well ahead of our units, to indicate enemy lines of resistance. These signals would serve as artillery registering points.

An additional communication service was made available for the river operation in the form of carrier pigeons. Light were furnished to the Regiment by II Corps, the pigeons left being located at II Corps Headquarters. The 95th Division had communication services at the left to forward and hurry any incoming information immediately. The pigeons were to be used only in case of emergency.

The Regimental Main Line of Resistance runs generally north and south, from the forward slopes of Mt. Tocchio, north across the high ground west of La Pista to the lower ground opposite San Angelo in Tuscice. The stream line
of the area was not easily paraled with this line, the terrain rising gradually toward the east from the river to the forward slopes of the Rangha, and was the further south. The first assembly area in the hill defilade between Rangha and the river. The 1st and 3rd Battalions had to move through this open terrain to the 3rd bend crossing, about four thousand yard to the east and slightly north.

The ground on the west side of the river was generally flat and the terrain was characterized by open rolling fields interspersed with hedges. The view was in the direction of the river, a thin fringe of trees along the river bank which cut off the enemy's observation of the river approach. Enemy defenses were organized behind the hedges, lines running through the open ground, and close to the road running through this area near the river. The road north from San Angelo was approximately 1,500 yards from the river, and approaching within 200 yards in the vicinity of the 3rd bend. Barbed wire fences were strung across the fields between the road and the river. This was the nature of the terrain in the immediate combat area had to be attacked across and along the eastern flank.

An intense artillery barrage was laid down prior to the attack, by II Corps Artillery and the Artillery units attached to the Combat Team, lifting to deeper targets as the attack progressed. Over 31,000 rounds were fired into the enemy position, saturating the area with one round for every 5 square yards within the area concerned. At 0730 hours the next morning, the attack, American planes performed a bombing mission on the western side of the rapids north of San Angelo.

At 1000 hours, January 20, the assault elements of the 1st Battalion, Companies 'A', 'B', and 'C' had entered the narrow assembly area and were proceeding to the engineer boats to pick up their boats and guides. During the night, enemy shell fire had destroyed several of the boats within the area. But, at the last minute, the units of the 1st Battalion had been destroyed. The boats proceeded toward the assembly area at the river, led by the engineer guides. Captain Newman, the Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, left the boats at 1000 hours with a wire party to establish the 1st Battalion support command post at the river.

The initial difficulties of the operation were encountered in attempting to get the boats to the crossing sites. Company 'B' left the boat dock in a column of boats to 1005 hours, proceeding toward the river, and by 1030 hours both Company 'A' and Company 'C' had started on their way. While proceeding from the dock to the assembly area, the engineer guides with 'B' Company missed the proper turning point, leading to the 3rd bend, and led the company several hundred yards past the vicinity of the Battalion and Assembly Area. The column had to be turned, and a great deal of confusion resulted, during which no enemy artillery fire was laid into the
area. Several men, including Captain John L. Herrmann (O-259116) of Winona, Texas, were killed, and nine others were wounded, among them Lt. Martin T. Fulley (O-1502947) of Chicago, Illinois. In spite of his wounds, however, Lt. Fulley was largely instrumental in reconcentrating the Company and continuing it on its mission. Finally he collapsed and was evacuated. Several of the boats had been destroyed during the shell fire.

By 0930 hours, engineering officers had reported to Captain Lemmon that 'A' Company and 'C' Company had reached the river with their equipment. Later reports, however, indicated that 'A' Company had been led into a minefield and stranded, the engineer officers having lost their way because the white tape marking the cleared area had been lost or destroyed. Lt. Warren D. Wray (O-129259) of Vigo County, Indiana, was wounded while leading the Company to the river, and Lt. Charles J. Artyewich (O-1292411) of Detroit, Michigan, took over the Company. He attempted to contact the battalion commander. All his efforts failed, however, and Lt. Artyewich attached his Company to 3rd Battalion elements which had come up to await the installation of the footbridges.

The Company had failed to get their Company through the crossing sites. Following the earlier disorganization of the Company, two officers were sent to reconcentrate the men through the minefields to the river. They were unable to locate the men, however, and at 0650 hours, January 21, Captain Lemmon led the Company through to the vicinity of the 1st line. The men of the Company then attempted to locate the assault boats, but all their efforts were vain. The steep slopes and swift current made it impossible to get the boats into the river, and prevent them from capsizing. Shell fragments destroyed two of the rubber boats the Company had, and the men were then ordered to disperse in the area and await the footbridges.

Heavy enemy resistance was encountered throughout these operations, and the artillery and mortar concentrations directed at the crossing sites were the primary disorganizing and demoralizing factor. Working constantly under the well coordinated enemy fire, the units were unable to proceed as planned.

Incident reports from the 134th Infantry regiment received at the regimental General Staff indicated that it was also experiencing smaller difficulties in getting across each battalion. The Company had succeeded in crossing by boats, by 0715 hours, January 21, but all attempts to install footbridges had failed, and they were then attempting to improvise wooden bridges.
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Attempts to clear the crossing by means of the foot grid on the 3rd Battalion personnel were too dilatory to encounter great difficulty. Of the four bridges which were too - - installed, one was defective and never taken into the service. Another had been destroyed in a mine field en route to the river, and a third destroyed by the shelling of the crossing site by artillery fire. Hence only one available foot bridge was available at the crossing site, but it was tightly installed in spite of the difficulties and the enemy fire striking in the area. During this period, the 3rd Battalion 5-5 and Capt. Edwards Ford (O-133) were at the crossing and were instrumental in directing the installation. Initially Companies A' and B' were rushed over and were over shortly after 0900 hours, January 21.

Continued and effective enemy water and artillery fire continued to prevent the proceeding. Five casualties were suffered, both wounded and killed. After Companies A' and B' had crossed, the engineer personnel were forced to abandon the bridge and one of the concentration of incoming fire. Consequently to that time, only a few men from Company C' succeeded in getting over.

The 3rd Battalion elements had some role to carry their schedule through as far as the river, but none of the units was able to cross the river at the breach area. The 2nd Battalion were given priority not reached across first. Although the 2nd Battalion of the 12th Company in place to construct the supply line support bridge had been shelled completely. At 0900 hours, January 21, it being obvious that the support bridge couldn't be installed that night, all the armored and vehicular elements that had been scheduled to cross were notified to remain in their former positions.

At 0915 hours, January 21, 1st Lt. E. S. Allen, the Assistant Divisional Engineer, gave orders that the 2nd elements still on this side of the river be withdrawn to the area immediately rear of the river and that they continue and succeeded in getting, Company B, instructed to hold in their present positions and hold. This order was given to the 1st and 3rd Battalions forward elements, and the units to the vicinity of the crossing area withdrawn. Lt. Col. Edwin W. Richardson, the 3rd Battalion Commanding Officer, Col. David Ford, and the 3rd Battalion 5-5 were withdrawn at the bridge crossing, and had to be evacuated.

All contact with the 5th Corps was lost by the evening of January 21, and their whereabouts to the next day was not really determined. All attempts to establish communications with them were unsuccessful. The sound of a mine was very crisp heard during the morning and dry; however, indicated that the mines had substantially inland from the river toward the east.

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Information received from several mounded men was managed to work their way back during the daylight indicated that the units were on the west bank had suffered heavily. Constant shelling of their positions prevented any effective reconnaissance of the area or any further progress toward objectives. All communication was regularly broken up. Casualties included killed, wounded, and some captured and at 1200 hours January 21, the regimental 3-3 estimated that the regiment had suffered a 7% reduction in strength.

Lt. Col. Papp held a meeting at the regimental command post at 0900 hours, January 21, with the unit commanders of the regimental combat teams. Plans were made for the attempt to capture the objectives across the river. Originally the plan was to cross at noon with the 2nd and 3rd battalions as assault elements. Directly of the commanding general of the division, however, a 4-hour respite was called until 1300 hours, and the later delay was called until 1500 hours, January 21, due to failure of crossing equipment to arrive on time and mechanical difficulties.

The crossing was again attempted at 1300 hours, January 21, by the 2nd and 3rd battalions, with similar mission, equipment, and plans. The 3rd infantry regiment was again given to cross on the regimental left flank, south of San Angelo.

Similar difficulties, both mechanical and due to enemy fire, were encountered that had been experienced the night before. The assault boats were again proved totally inadequate for the task. Many capsized in the swift current, and others were rendered useless by enemy mortar and artillery fire. The engineer foot bridges were likewise unsatisfactory, though some of the personnel were able to cross them by means of improvised foot bridges. Many along the approaches to the crossing site created additional serious hazards.

In spite of the difficulties, nearly all the units were able to get across the Rapido the night of the 21st of January. By 0030 hours January 22, Company B, C, and D moved over and Company A followed immediately. The regimental commanding officer, Lt. Col. Papp, had left the regimental command post at 2000 hours, and went to the forward regimental command post to stay in close contact with the proceedings. The 3rd battalion, then under the command of Major Robert K. Calley (8441193) of Brockbridge, Texas, succeeded in crossing and maintaining a foot bridge across the Rapido south of the 1st bridge, and by 0330 hours January 22, 1st and Lt. Companies had crossed to the west bank. The company encountered great difficulty in turn with the rubber assault boats and a foot bridge they had secured from the engineering dump, and had been able to get only a few of their men across.
Seoul.

Company 'F' was the first delayed, though small elements succeeded in crossing just before dawn.

Elements of the 2nd and 3rd Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Companies, and Companies 'E', 'F', and 'G', were made immediately after the rifle companies, shortly after 0800 hours January 29. Heavy artillery and artillery fire had not been quite so intensive or concentrated as it had on the previous nights, but was becoming increasingly heavy by evening. By 0930 hours, Companies 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', and 'I', were elements of a column 'I' and 'F' and of both Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Companies were across.

All attempts to install a pontoon bridge were unsuccessful, and were abandoned at 0930 hours, January 30, and the engineers ordered to bring up and install a Bailey bridge instead. The project was carried forward, preparations to begin on the approach, and the equipment gathered in the vicinity of the 2nd Regiment soon as possible. Enemy fires, however, frustrated any effort to complete the installation. At 0930 hours Division Headquarters notified Lt. Col. Ayott that the enemy had been seen moving toward us in spite of enemy fire. This was complied with, but the attempts were ineffective.

Reports received from the 2nd Infantry Regiment throughout the night indicated that they had lost large numbers of men across by 0905 hours. They reported several instances of enemy fire, but at 1000 hours, that all their units were crossed and were receiving heavy mortar and artillery fire.

In order to ensure enemy observation of units across the river, arrangements had been made to place anti-aircraft guns on the ledges and on the ridge, before dawn on January 30. These were set up to the elements of the 1st Battalion which had already succeeded in crossing the night of January 29-30. Over 300 pots were placed and ignited before dawn, and additional ones set out during the day to maintain the smoke. The pots were placed well upwind, so as not to reveal any specific location of activity.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were then ordered forward toward their objective, beginning about 0930, early in the morning. At a point about 2000 yards north of the bridge, the area was able to penetrate the first organized lines of resistance, which included breaking through the wire fence extending from the river, beyond this distance, because of the curtain of enemy fire on the enemy company and the enemy were unable to cross and were forced to dig into position. The operations of the 2nd Battalion subjected the troops to all types of enemy fire, which continued over the area.

SECRET
At noontime, the regimental officer of the 2nd Battalion reviewed the regimental J-3 that the majority of the troops were located about 800-700 yards across the river, east of the German machine gun line. But the battalion headquarters were about one hundred yards closer to the river. The penetration of the German fire, and the considerable loss of troops, caused some delay in initiating the second day's operations. Throughout the day, the German fire was sustained, but without serious effect. By the late afternoon, the German fire was directed toward the north, causing the regiment to regroup and reorganize. At noontime, January 29, the regimental J-3 estimated that the reduction in strength was approximately 26%.

By 1700 hours, the regimental officers and executive officers of both the 2nd and 3rd battalions, together with all the enemy, were preparing to accept the German fire and the enemy's attempts to disrupt the division's progress. Telephone communication was totally interrupted, and the division was collapsing. At 1700 hours, the 706th Tank Battalion, under the command of Captain Ogden, was able to reach the vicinity of the previously held crossing sites. As a result, the German fire was directed toward the north, causing the division to regroup and reorganize. The tanks during this operation were notably successful, but failed to anticipate the results desired.

At approximately 1900 hours, January 29, the enemy began a series of attacks, both from the northwest and the northeast. The attack was successful, and the division was unable to hold the line. The division was forced to retreat, and the German fire was directed toward the south, causing the division to regroup and reorganize for a final push. The tanks during this operation were notably successful, but failed to anticipate the results desired.
These placed further reinforcements that about 1300 hours, January 22, the German 115th division had started attacking. This was a move by the German 115th division, which was out to the left. It was present on the front line and within the area of contact, while the 1st Panzer Division was advancing in the north. This continued until about 1400 hours, when a counterattack of major proportions was launched. The German 115th division, however, was well to the left of the front line and within the area of contact, while the 1st Panzer Division was advancing in the north. The counterattack was repulsed by the engineers in the early hours of the day. The German 115th division had then been forced to retreat back to further heavy fighting to establish a new line. This was, however, believed to be largely due to the initial attack, although German small arms fire was still in full swing. It was difficult to estimate the number losses, although they were suffered heavily.

The reserve elements suffered severe contact on the entire portion of the front for most of the day. To the right of the 115th division, the engineers had given orders for a crossfire attack to establish a bridgehead across the river. At 2310 hours, January 22, however, the engineers were directed to advance the bridgehead and the crossing force was withdrawn.

Surviving elements of the 2nd and 3rd battalions, supplemented by the men who had been killed, were able to hold across the river. By 0500 hours, January 23, however, the engineers were directed to advance the bridgehead and the crossing force was withdrawn.

The 3rd infantry regiment had encountered adverse circumstances in attempting to establish a bridgehead across the river. They had withdrawn earlier, their initial being reported back across the river during the afternoon.

The afternoon of January 23, about 1600 hours, Capt. Joseph Kroll, one of the unit leaders, was captured by the Germans. He was later released by the Germans after being captured by the French and later released by the Germans. He was later released by the Germans after being captured by the French and later released by the Germans. He was later released by the Germans after being captured by the French and later released by the Germans.
surrounding the translation, the note was interpreted as having been designed only as a route to secure the men from all artillery fire.

Ferrying patrols were organized on the night of January 22 to attempt to communicate with the western side of the heights in order to bring back any men who might have remained in their positions alive or wounded. These were unavailing because of the continued heavy control of the river bank and the approaches to the east. At 0400 hours January 23, it was estimated that the regiment had suffered a 35% reduction in strength, the estimated strength of the battalions at that time being as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Battalion</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximately accurate figures on the number of known casualties suffered during the river operations, compiled after more details were learned, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in action</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in action</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in action</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Casualties</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 56th Reinforcement Troop was attached to the 10th Infantry Regiment during the afternoon of January 22, primarily to execute patrol missions. During the night, they had several patrols across the river and had established four strong points along the front of the regimental southern sector. The 3rd Battalion, under Lt. Col. John W. E. White (O-145715), who had been recently assigned to the regiment, was in defensive position along the western slope of In Iuliu, with the 1st Battalion, then under Captain Harry K. Carson (O-142072) of San Antonio, Texas, on their left flank along the river bank to the south. The 1st Battalion, under Captain Lawson, was located in the rear of the 2nd Battalion, in regimental reserve.

Heavy smoke to screen activities in the vicinity of the 'H' bend in the River was laid down during the daylight of January 23, by company 'A' of the 2nd Chemical battalion. If any Artillery units had requested that the area be allowed to clear to increase their observation, after checking with
General Eisenhower, however, the meeting was continued to facilitate the return of any of our men still across the river and try to get back.

Elements of the 5th Division, including the 1st Battalion, were directed to demonstrate strongly toward the river during the night of January 23-24, to simulate a crossing in that sector. The demonstration was to divert attention from the 34th Division, on the northern right flank, which was to attempt to capture units on the north. The time set for the demonstration was 2100 hours, January 23. In the early evening, the division commander sent patrols toward the 34th Division sector to determine the strength and disposition of the enemy. The element of the 1st Battalion that comprised the crew of the 2nd Chemical Battalion was being attached to the 34th Division, effective at once, and that they were to move into the 34th Division sector as soon as possible.

Further attempts to resolve any men remaining across the river were made as soon as darkness permitted. The night of January 23-24, orders were given to the 2nd Battalion at 1445 hours that they would send two patrols out with that mission. Lt. Phillip W. Orton (O-190564), of Peoria, Illinois, from 2nd Company organized one of the patrols on the left. They then notified the fields and small town ships on the opposite bank as they were about to cross, and as much as they had to. Before the time of the scheduled demonstration at 2100 hours, they did not attempt the crossing. At 2300 hours they again met out on the right bank, but with no greater success. Machine gun and mortar fire from the closely guarded northern bank prevented any crossing.

The following morning, January 24, a patrol from the 1st Battalion were again sent out under Lt. Urken. In addition to searching out any wounded remaining alive, the patrol was to seek out and locate any enemy strong points. Using the rubber boats, the patrol was able to cross this time with little opposition. Following this success, plans were immediately made to exploit the possibility of establishing a bridgehead. A bridgehead was the western bank. Foot bridges were spotted by the Engineers, and Company B1 alerted to be ready to cross.

The initial success that the patrol had encountered, however, was short-lived. They had been able to persuade several hundred yards beyond the river, and had located many bloody and several men still alive. Their activities drew increasingly heavy fire from enemy strong points farther inland, and they were forced to withdraw. Artillery fire on enemy positions and smoke screening activities ordered to aid the patrol in withdrawing. Further attempts to install foot bridges were postponed until after darkness. The patrol returned to the 1st Battalion Command Post at 1500 hours, January 24.
SECRET

The 54th Division was ordered to stage a demonstration of a River crossing the night of January 24-25. The activities of the 54th Division for the night of January 23-24 had been cancelled on the night before, and set for the following night. Three separate demonstrations were staged, between 2130-2230 hours, January 24, and 0330-0430 hours and 0530-0630 hours, January 25, in an attempt to contain the enemy in his present position until dawn. Tanks from the 49th Tank Battalion participated in the demonstration, moving toward the river at the previously used bridge sites at the '69' bend, and firing across into enemy positions.

Owing to the necessity of conducting activities between the demonstration periods, on the night of January 24-25, and increasing enemy artillery fire, plans to install dock bridges across the river were abandoned. At 0115 hours the Commanding General ordered the engineer equipment to be dispersed. Infantry activity for that night was confined to maintaining lateral contact, and in establishing major points of resistance forward from the battalion positions. A patrol from the 56th Reconnaissance Troop operating along the river bank in front of the 2nd Battalion positions reported at 0530 hours, January 25, that it had located and knocked out a German machine gun along the river bank.

Defensive arrangements were strengthened during the night of January 24-25, in anticipation of a possible enemy counterattack. Because of the activities of the 49th Division to the north, artillery fires were arranged for defensive tactics, strong points of resistance established, and patrol activity organized in that light. During the night, enemy planes twice passed over the regimental forward line positions, dropping flash bombs and probably photographing installations.

All attempts to rescue any wounded men across the river had been thwarted by the complete enemy control of the western bank and the approaches from the east. The morning of January 25, a final attempt was made by sending Medical Aid men under the red cross flag to the river. Litter teams from the 1st and 2nd Battalions were sent along as covering parties. At 0715 hours, all artillery units were ordered not to fire into the area concerned. Across the river, men and tanks from the vicinity of the '69' bend south to San Angelo, all firing ceased at 1015 hours.

At 1015 hours, January 25, the party landed for the river, under full observation by the enemy positions. They proceeded to the river, crossed in rubber boats, and joined the men on the western bank unopposed. Two German men came down to meet them at 1200 hours, and a short while later, three of the enemy aid men and two of their officers came forward. The Germans requested a cessation of hostilities now, the front from north of the 70
head south to San Angelo to enable both sides to evacuate their casualties. A
truce until 1500 hours was arranged but was extended to 1700 hours. Divi-
sion Headquarters, and all artillery units concerned, were notified.

Both sides worked feverishly to evacuate as many casualties as possible
in the time available. Approximately 50 of our men and an estimated 50 German
worked side by side within the area. By 1700 hours, the boundaries of the truce,
\[\sqrt{3}\] wounded and about 50 dead had been brought back across the river. Hostilities
were resumed at that time.

The Germans who crossed into the area throughout the truce maintained a
primarily attitude and were rather mixed, we feel in any way possible, al-
though they refused to allow them to go beyond the barbed wire area about
about 500 yards inland. They appeared well-disciplined and, judging from
their uniforms, medals and equipment, were veterans of many campaigns,
some for four in the determined counterattack. The Regimental Observation
Post reported that throughout the truce its own strongpoints were constantly
well-guarded. The information our men were able to gather regarding the
enemy defenses corresponded pretty closely with that received from patrol activities
and prisoners of war.

In their conversation with us, the Germans couldn't seem to understand why
our bridgehead had continued to hold out so desperately. Several of them
stated that the Americans who had crossed the river had fought with great deter-
mination and courage.

Lt. Col. Spratt held a meeting at the Regimental Command Post at 1500 hours
January 30th with the Unit Commanders of the Regimental Combat Team and
Regimental Staff, to discuss and arrange a realignment of the Regimental defen-
sive disposition, taking into consideration the recent operations and recent
attainments to end detachments from the Regimental Combat Team.

The necessary movements were to be accomplished during the hours of darkness
of January 22-23, and preliminary orders were issued at that time to facilitate
unit preparation. The final order was issued at 1500 hours January 30th, covering
the disposition of the Regiment together with the units of the Combat Team
which had been attached the 1st Battalion of the 142nd Infantry Regiment, Troop
\[\sqrt{1}\] the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, and a platoon of Company \[\sqrt{1}\] of the
2nd Engineer Weapons Battalion. Company \[\sqrt{1}\] of the 66th Tank Battalion and
the 2nd Battalion of the 10th Engineer Regiment had been detached from the
Combat Team.

The main lines of resistance consisted of organized strong points in front
of the Battalion sector. Generally, the line ran parallel with the north-south
Apexo River stream line, from Highway 76 to the northern tip to a point opposite
San Angelo to the south.
SECRET

The 2nd Battalion of the 70th Infantry Regiment occupied the southern sector, defending the lower ground south of the town of San Angelo, extending north from the upper ground of the hills. On their right the central sector was defended by the 1st Battalion, 310th Regiment, covering the line south to include the high ground immediately east of the southern slopes of Mt. Trecchio. The northern sector, held by the 1st Battalion of the 310th Regiment, was toward the northeastern, extending along the lower eastern slope of Mt. Trecchio. 7th Infantry, 56 at a point about two miles northeast of San Angelo.

The southern 2/3 of this line ran along the east bank of the Rapido River, the northern third varying, struck the east side from the river line. The area between this line and the river was subjected at night immediately adjacent to the river, and strongly protected, the Aussieta withdrawing back to the line 10-10 resistance before dark.

The 1st Battalion of the 310th Infantry was posted in sequential reserve in the north of the northeastern tip of Mt. Trecchio, to the rear of the 1st Battalion position. The 3rd Reconnaissance Troop was stationed in the 2nd Battalion sector, and had the mission of detecting and patrolling that sector at night. The Company and Anti-Tank Battalion continued in their former disposition. The 2nd Platoon of Company "A" of the 2nd Chemical Weapons Battalion was directed to position where they could be used to support the Regimental sector by smoke defensive fires. They moved in the area to the north of Mt. Trecchio, to the rear of the 1st Battalion area.

Troop "A" of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron had been definitely located by the night of January 25th, but were directed to locate their guns to cover the river line, and the rear to the north, and also have patrols cut between the Aussieta and the main line of resistance.

Defensive installations were further strengthened on January 26th by erecting concertina wire entanglements around the Battalion strongholds. There were 15 of these wire points within the Regimental sector. Engineer personnel from Company "A" of the 11th Engineer Battalion, four men to a Battalion, helped install them the night of January 26th. The plan was also to include a wire fence to be strung between the river and the line of resistance during the night of January 26th and 27th. Line clearance was required for this work and arranged the mode for each engineer crew, working those nights, to drive along ahead of them through the mine fields.

At 1400 hours, January 26th, reconnaissance reports indicated increased vehicular traffic and probably an enemy motor pool near Ficulenta, north of Cassino. Division Headquarters arranged for II Corps artillery and an air mission to destroy the target.
SECRET

Colonel Richard J. Turner, (USMC), of San Antonio, Texas, the former Commanding Officer of the Regiment, returned to duty from hospitalization shortly after noon January 26th, and resumed command of the Regiment. Lt. Col. Jeffett was transferred to the 19th Infantry Regiment.

G-3 notified the Regiment at 1400 hours that it was to stage two demonstrations to indicate River crossing the night of the 26th, at 2400 hours, and 0200 hours January 27th. Mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire were to be used in conjunction with artillery work, beginning each line with slowappy fire, and increasing to a crescendo toward the end of the demonstration. A reinforced squad from each battalion was to approach the previously used crossing sites at the river, actively firing small arms fire across the river.

At 1900 hours, the original plans were changed, and the time finally set for 0030 hours, January 27th.

Patrol activity for the night of January 26-27 was confined to combat patrolling along the Eastern side of the River, and the establishment of outposts up to the River line. The scheduled demonstrations prevented the accomplishment of the previously planned reconnaissance missions across the River.

The 2nd Battalion of the 5th Armored Infantry Regiment of the 1st Armored Division replaced the 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment in attachment to the 19th Regimental Combat Team as of 1800 hours, January 26th. The actual relieved into position was accomplished under the first hours of darkness that night, and all elements were in place by 0300 hours January 27th. They were directed to maintain the continuity of the defensive plan and perform the same missions as the Ist Battalion of the 19th Regiment located along the right flank of the regimental sector. Group 'A' of the 5th Reconnaissance Squadron moved into position along the regimental southern flank in the low ground south of La Hoya behind the 2nd Battalion.

At 0430 hours January 27th, 2-2 advised the Regiment that the Commanding General of the Division had ordered contact to be made with the enemy by drawing small arms fire across the river. Troops were to approach the River prepared to cross, and to continue until the enemy demonstrated his presence. The purpose was to be prepared for any withdrawal of the enemy night order. Three reconnaissance groups were, approximately 1500 yards south of the 1st bend in the River, were given.

At 0530 hours, Col. Turner and Capt. Young left the regimental command post to observe the Battalion position. They returned at 1030 hours. At 1105 hours the detail from the 11th Engineers which had been clearing the mine fields and wiring the wire between the Battalion strong points and the River reported the area cleared except for five Anti-tank mines on the southern sector in front of the 26th Reconnaissance Platoon, which were to be cleared of mines that night.
SECRET

During the afternoon of January 27th, two gun batteries under a determined attack to destroy a bridge on Blau river, near the road out to the northwestern sector. Several direct hits were scored on the bridge itself, but the bridge remained intact. Further enemy artillery activity in the area was limited to the Regimental Cannon Company's two N-7 mounted guns. Trots firing in their area were believed to have been the counterbattery fire which did the damage.

The Regimental G-3 officer, in his stage demonstrations the next of January 27-28, one at 2000 hours, and one at 0200 hours January 29th. At 1905 hours, 0-3 had notified the regiment that the planes and execution would be identical with those of the previous night. The constant threatening of the enemy positions along the direct sector were designed primarily to prevent the friendly units further north on the regimental right flank to close in toward the enemy's main mountain defenses north of Cusco. Further activity was again limited with the demonstrations scheduled, and continued to move patrols behind the positions along the river and back to the rear in the distance.

At 0050 hours, January 29th, Colonel Warner and Captain Young visited the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment Infantry Division, which was defending the northern sector of the regimental front line. Two companies of the battalion were at the forward slopes of the northern outposts, one was on the river above the northern end, and one was organized for defense directly across the river. Arrangements were made with the engineers to furnish an installation entrenchments around the battalion strong points during that night.

At 1905 hours, 0-3 notified the Regimental G-3 that there were no scheduled activities for the regiment the night of the 29th. G-3 had formerly requested reconnaissance studies for patrol work across the river, to cover the bridge to the river, crossing sites, and the strength and positions of enemy installations. Two patrols from Troop A of the 5th Reconnaissance Squadron, equipped to cross the river, attempted to fulfill these missions, but both patrols were forced to return to contact positions in the middle of the river because of heavy fire. They drew on the river as they approached the river.

0-3 notified Colonel Warner at a meeting of Division headquarters at 1100 hours January 29th, to attend on the regimental G-3 to attend. During the afternoon, three 150 planes flew overhead. Many, barely above tree level, photographing every installation to the north. Patrols across the river for the night of the 29th were again threatened by the enemy control the enemy held along the western bank.

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C. J.  - departure of the 17th Air from the Division Engineers, at 0900 hours, January 16.  The nearest line of defense of the newly occupied defensive positions.  The initial phase of the attempt to destroy a vital railroad through the newly occupied line of defense in order to cut off the enemy's supply line, which runs north from the external line of defense in this sector.  The railhead at the railroad line of defense positions is at the northern end of the sector.  Three thousand yards of wire were stretched in each direction, and a careful detail from the enemy was called to help install it.

Fifty-four officers and men were assigned to the 17th Air at the 25th of January to perform the various duties in the sector.  The officers and enlisted men were also transferred from the 1st Marine Division during the 26th and 27th of January.

At 1700 hours, January 16, Major General A. C. Fuller, to Colonel D. L. Brown, that the Division had been ordered to prepare to clear the Rapid River on the 17th of the month.  Col. Brown was ordered to carry out previously arranged division plans.  Details of a prospective Division Order to cover the proposed operation was issued to the Battalion Commanders of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions of the 17th Air at the divisional headquarters at 1700 hours, January 16.  The plan contemplated crossing the Rapid River in the vicinity of San Angelo, capturing the town with the 3rd Battalion.

Three companies from the 17th Air, 2 from the 3rd Battalion, and 1 from the 4th Battalion of the 17th Air were prepared to cross the Rapid River the night of January 19.  The night of January 19, the 17th Air crossed the Rapid River the night of January 19.  The 17th Air crossed the Rapids River at 0300 hours, January 20.  The 17th Air crossed the Rapid River at the San Angelo.  The 17th Air reported several times.

At 1500 hours, January 20, the 17th Air, Colonel D. L. Brown, was ordered to a hospital.  His order was issued at 1500 hours, and he was unable to continue in command of the regiment.  After Brown, the regimental executive officer assumed command of the regiment following Col. Brown's evacuation.

The regimental headquarters are now at the proposed river crossing area, located at the north end of San Angelo, with the 1st Battalion as the assault element, the 2nd Battalion in the north, and the 3rd Battalion in the south.  These elements were then to attack and capture the town.
Company 'L' continued to be the scouting unit group. The 2nd Battalion was assigned to cross the river and occupy the high ground south of San Angelo.

Covering attacks from the 39th Reconnaissance Troop and Troop 'K' of the 3rd Reconnaissance Squadron, we moved to the crossing sites. The 1st Battalion of the 99th Infantry Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment were to move strongly to the rear of their sectors, and remain in regimental sectors. As soon as a Bailey bridge could be installed, Anti-Tank, Tank, and vehicle elements were to be crossed.

Preparations for the crossing were made during the day of January 31st. Mortar teams from the 50th Reconnaissance Troop and the 3rd Battalion moved into firing positions from which they could cover the assault. At 1200 hours, General Huggins, the Commanding General of the 36th Division Artillery, visited the Regimental General Staff to see final arrangements on firing data. 巧y, artillery from the 3rd Infantry Regiment were furnished to the 36th Regimental Artillery to carry the engineer boats and foot bridges to the forward assembly area the night of January 31st. Communications to the forward positions installed, and mine clearance to the crossing sites arranged.

At 1220 hours, January 31st, the Commanding General of the Division called Lt. Col. Price, the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, and told him that there would be an attack until the 99th Division on our right flank had had some success in the night attack. From the north he also stated that he didn't know just when the regiment would be officially notified that there would be an attack for the night of the 1st. At 1315 hours, II Corps 0-5 notified Lt. Col. Price that the attack would not be made that night.

Following the cancellation of the attack for the night of January 31st, reconnaissance patrols were organized. Scout teams were assigned as on the previous night. In general, to find more detailed information on enemy installations along the Western bank of the river. One patrol from the 3rd Battalion succeeded in crossing north of San Angelo. Heavy fire prevented any reconnaissance, however, and the patrol returned to avoid any ambush. During the night, the carrying parties from the 3rd Infantry once did in setting the foot bridges and rubber rafts to the forward assembly area in readiness for the proposed operation.
SECRET

Compiling of the 3rd Infantry Regiment for the month of January,
1944, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>ENLISTED MEN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KILLED IN ACTION</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BORN OF WOUNDS</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOUNDED IN ACTION</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>314</td>
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<tr>
<td>KILLED IN ACTION</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>1007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Report of operations written by:

Charles W. Schawitz, Jr.
2nd Lt., Regimental Headquarters
3rd Infantry Regiment

- 27 -
UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS 141st INFANTRY REGIMENT, RIFLE
APO 932, U. S. ARMY

5 March 1944.

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Regimental History and Conclusions from Operations.

TO: The Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, APO 932, U. S. Army.

1. Enclosed is the regimental history of the 141st Infantry Regiment, covering operations in Italy during the month of February 1944.

2. From experience during February operations, costly in continuous terrain, the following conclusions are derived:

   a. The supply problem is the most vital and serious problem necessary to solve for successful operations. The following are the difficulties most usually encountered:

      (1) Shortage of pack mules and the inherent disadvantages of using pack trains in restricted amounts of supply deliveries and slowness of delivery.

      (2) Men-back transportation even more unsatisfactory than mule-back.

      (3) Trails interdicted and shelled with or without observation, day or night, resulting in men and mules killed, supplies lost, and resulting failures to accomplish deliveries at times required.

      (4) The excessive time required to procure any emergency needs of supplies.

      (5) The necessity of following confined and restricted trails that show up prominently on aerial photos, permitting effective interdiction even when they cannot be observed.

      (6) Extreme difficulty in evacuation of wounded and dead, requiring excessive time, and excessive use of manpower over and above that provided for evacuation purposes.

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Suggested remedies for these difficulties are as follows:

(1) Mule trains, when available, require that trained mule skinner be made available and the mokers should be counted in order to increase the rate of march of the train.

(2) Replacements should not be utilized as mule skinner nor as mok-keepers if this can be prevented in any manner.

(3) A variable solution of all the above problems of supply can be suggested, based upon extremely successful experiments and tests that were conducted for various agencies of the War Department in Washington and at Fort Bragg by the present Regional Commander, Lt. Col. John G. L. Adene. This would involve the assignment of one or more light planes of the Cub observation type, but preferably the slightly larger and more acceptable types that are available, as integral parts of the Infantry Battalion supply set-up. These would become aerial food carts, aerial ammunition carts and aerial evacuation ambulances, making short hops of 10 or 15 minutes duration each end supply dumps, in which they fly low, avoiding observation and leaving no trail which will appear on aerial photos or which can be interdicted. Deliveries would be almost immediate and could be made by dropping supplies or by actual landings. In the present operation actual landings could have been made on open areas that were available even on the steeply sloping mountain sides and tops. In the exceptional cases when no landings could be made the salvage resulting from dropage at speeds of approximately 55 miles per hour into prepared nets or blankets, would be negligible for the majority of types of supplies. Even if landings could not be made the expenditure saved by the transportation of supplies would simplify the evacuation problem. Delivery could be made of emergency supplies within 15 minutes, more or less, of receipt of request. The above suggested uses have been with proven in extensive supply tests, have been proven in active operations by the Russian Army and in supply operations in the Far Eastern jungles. These light planes should be infantry-controlled and flown, just as are the supply jeeps and trucks. Suitable pilots are now available in all Infantry Regiments. Two extremely experienced officers

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Pilots as well as enlisted pilots were available in the 141st Infantry during this operation and the entire supply and evacuation of the regiment while on Hill 706 could have been handled by the use of three such light planes, even of the Cub observation type, which is not considered the best type available to employ in case this solution is given consideration or test.

b. Experience gained from use of fast driven motor vehicles of all types on supply routes along interdicted roads and across exposed valleys, under enemy observation, indicates that there is much less loss of personnel and transport involved than was the case in the slow moving columns of men and mules, even when the roads were interdicted spasmodically and at times without observation.

c. Infantry must evolve better mine-clearance or mine avoidance techniques and practices for use by them in emergencies when they must, without the aid of engineers, penetrate mine fields or extract themselves with a minimum of losses from mine fields blundered into during battle operations. As a result of investigations and discussions with battle experienced officers it is believed that a suitable solution of this problem can be referred to higher authority by the undersigned. (See attached appx.)

d. When men have been required to remain in fighting holes for long periods of time, or have been employed on a purely defensive mission for long periods of time, vigorous measures must be taken to eliminate a "defensive complex" or a "fox hole attitude or mind". This attitude usually takes the form of hesitating to initiate fire action against the enemy or hesitation in promptly returning all enemy fire, due to a fear of provoking further enemy fires, including particularly artillery and mortar fires. This attitude must be replaced by one of returning quick, savage, and overwhelming fire every time the enemy fires or moves. Men can be encouraged in such an aggressive attitude, replacing a purely defensive attitude, by employing all possible weapons in every conceivable manner possible, including all innovations that will harass, confuse, startle or, destroy the enemy. Methods employed successfully to accomplish these ends are suggested as follows: Employing rifle grenades at excessive ranges for harassing, firing 60mm mortar shells during the night and covering 50mm mortar fire by fire of heavier mortars to prevent detection by the enemy; immediately reporting the calcium or smoke or flashes of enemy weapons, by all front line units in order to deliver accurate artillery and mortar fire on every conceivable type or enemy activity at joint targets rather than upon areas; immediately firing of single rounds or salvos by our own artillery to fall immediately in front of or any or our front lines that are receiving enemy shell fire, in order to confuse enemy observers into
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lifting their fire in the belief that it is falling short; constant listening
posts, ambush patrols, sniper posts and combat patrols, probing and punching
at the enemy in order to make his life miserable or terrify him. Use of
such tactics during the February operations definitely established our superi-
ority in aggressiveness over several different enemy units and definitely
resulted in increased enemy activity against us due to their hesitation in
starting something that we would finish. In other words the enemy acquired
the state of mind that we found necessary to eliminate within our own units.

0. The need for greater use of engineering and pioneer units
to constantly improve front line positions, including not only weapons en-
placements but even fighting holes for specific purposes such as sniping or
observation. Dynamite, T.N.T., aerial mines, and similar explosive aids are
not used sufficiently in our attempts to place fighting holes into extremely
rocky soil. Battalions and Regiments should have their own personnel trained
to deploy such explosives to the greatest advantage in organizing a defensive
line even when such organization is merely a short interlude prior to resuming
the attack within a day or so.

f. Operations during this month included such frequent and heavy
shelling of our units by the enemy that it became evident that all possible
means must be employed for the definite location of all possible types of
enemy weapons with such a degree of accuracy that the counter battery fire
upon enemy artillery, nebelerwehr, machine guns, mortars or even concentrated
small arms fire, becomes point targets rather than area targets for both our
artillery and our mortars.

One method that aided materially in this was to make it SOP for
all units and installations, either front line or reserve, to report the direc-
tion of sounds, flashes, observed enemy activity of any nature, or the
direction of flight of any enemy fire, BY AZIMUTH to the Battalion Headquarters.
These this was immediately plotted on a map and in a short time inevitably
resulted in enemy targets and areas of enemy activities being definitely loc-
ated by azimuth intersection methods. Most excellent results were then ob-
tained in destroying nebelerwehr, enemy batteries and enemy ammunition or
supply points.

A very important additional need is for the artillery observation
planes to be equipped with instruments for night flying as this will contribute
materially to reducing enemy interdiction and harassing fires upon our front
line units due to the ease with which artillery and similar weapons can be
located from light planes either by sound, sight, or flash at night.

g. Our outstanding need at the present in air-ground cooperation is
that it should become an habitual practice for ground commanders of units not
larger than a regiment to be afforded air assistance, together with direct
contact from the regiment to the supporting air unit, which will immediately
employ light attack bombers to immediately bomb out enemy batteries that
fire upon the front line infantry units either in offensive or defensive opera-
tions. This would effectively employ these light attack bombers as counter-
battery artillery of the air against enemy batteries. This would normally
require only a few, even only one or two, of such light attack bombers being
available to each Infantry Regiment but it would be necessary that they be
immediately available upon call, flying from some adjacent field not more
than 10 or 15 minutes away. Such use would have prevented to a great extent
the destructive enemy artillery fires that saved the way for successful
German counter-attack against river crossing units and would have definitely
prevented such heavy concentrations of fire as were later encountered in the
mountains.

John C. Adams
Lt. Col., 141st Infantry
SUBJ. BING

Inc: 1 - Annex to Letter of Transmittal (septuple)
2 - Regimental History (septuple)
3 - Casualty List (septuple)
4 - Unit Journal (1 copy)
5 - Maps (1 set 1:50,000 and 1:25,000)
It is a well recognized fact that infantry is greatly slowed or is stopped cold when they encounter mine fields during an attack or blunder into them during approach marches. A certain amount of hysteria or panic immediately results when an infantry unit finds itself caught in a mine field and several successive casualties result from their attempts to extricate themselves or to penetrate through the mine field. The disorganization is more pronounced when relatively inexperienced replacements are present in the organization. Therefore a method of penetrating the mine field or extricating themselves thereafter should be devised which can be immediately employed by infantry units without any expectation of help from engineer or other mine-clearance units. The method devised should be such as will give the unit the greatest possible chance of getting out of the mine field with the least possible casualties. The teaching of the method evolved should particularly stress this fact to all new trainees, namely that their greatest chance of survival lies in employing the method presented rather than in taking a chance on accidently blundering through a mine-free path which the following infantrymen may or may not be able to follow. It must be emphasized that the first plan will probably result in no casualties or few casualties while a large number of casualties could be expected from disorganized and individual efforts to extricate themselves. Additionally the plan evolved should be such that it will afford the men who are penetrating the mine field all possible protection from shell fire that can be expected to cover such fields. The method should be such that it will get the unit through the mine field or out of it as quickly as possible. It should permit following units to readily follow the same path successfully used by a preceding unit in the attack and above all it should permit the men to work at once so that they will not be frozen in place, thus becoming a prey to panic thoughts and fears.

It is suggested that infantry units be taught the following procedure to be applied immediately upon finding themselves in a mine field: each man will immediately squat where he is without moving his feet. Each man will then begin probing with his bayonet or knife inserted at an approximately 45° angle into the ground at intervals of 2 or 3 inches, across a space approximately 15 inches wide directly in front of his feet. As soon as each man has probed a sufficient area he will kneel and continue the probing until he has an area cleared sufficiently for him to lie prone. If any hard substance or suspicious object that may be a mine, is encountered during any of this probing or during the following instructions the man will immediately avoid that particular point by probing around the mine seeking another path rather than risking any attempt to remove it. As
long as any individual infantryman is prone on the ground anywhere in the mine field, AND IS NOT PROPPING AND MOVING FORWARD, he will begin to scrape himself out a shallow "scallop" in the area that he has probed, utilizing helmet, entrenching tools or anything with which he can dig. These shallow scallopes then definitely mark safe areas in which there are no mines and it then becomes a matter of merely probing and connecting these in order to form a safe trail through or out of the field. Additionally these scallopes afford additional protection from small arms fire that may be sweeping the area. If men remain long enough in that area before being extricated they will have accomplished digging sufficiently to give themselves cover in a shallow scallop fox-hole to the depth of not more than a foot or foot and a half. Then the method of connecting these scallopes and proceeding to the attack, or getting out of the mine field should follow the following procedure. Men should be directed to probe with the bayonet in order to join their scallop to that of the nearest adjacent man. Since the unit normally moves in column formations this operation of itself would tend to produce a connected series of scallopes following a tortuous but safe trail through the mine field. In order to advance the head or thin "trace" that results, the following procedure should be employed. One man should be designated, preferably at the head of the column or at the head of what is to become a column, and it is to be his job to probe ahead along a given direction for a distance of not to exceed three yards. He has then done his share and will roll on his side to one edge of his probed area, permitting the man next to him in the following scallop to come forward across his probed area and himself contribute three more yards of probed safe ground, following at all times the line direction designated for the advance. Having probed his three yards he too rolls to the side and thus the platoon or other unit continues to advance behind the rotating leader's position of the column, along a trail that can be readily followed even at night because of the scallopes and because the probed ground can readily be located by feeling. Meanwhile all men who are not at the head of the column, taking their turn in probing, will engage themselves in digging the scallop wherever they find themselves. When the scallopes have reached a selected or prescribed depth or possibly not more than 12 inches or a foot and a half, according to conditions, the men will then engage themselves in joining their scallopes to the one next ahead of them by cutting out the intervening bumps along the ground that they have probed while joining themselves to the adjacent man. The final result of this procedure is to produce a snake-like, but safe trace through the mine-field, which has either become a series of scallopes and loosened, probed ground or an actual continuous, very shallow communication trench. This extremely shallow communication trench in actuality becomes the trace of a trail which the first unit or any succeeding unit can easily follow by crawling or walking, in accordance with the type of fire being employed or not employed by the enemy to cover the mine field. The adoption of such a procedure as outlined above does give some positive action
that can be immediately employed upon encountering a mine field and this is vastly more desirable than the total lack of any coordinated plan or effort, which has proven to be the usual situation at present. This method would particularly be of use to patrols or at night. It would not supersede but merely supplement other methods now used. It also should not apply when it is vitally necessary in attack to quickly force a mine field without regard to casualties.

JOHN C. L. ADAMS
Lt. Col., 141st Infantry
COMMANDING
The long axis of St. Trocchio extends for approximately 2½ miles along a northeast-southwest direction, with the southern tip flanked by La Pleta, a medium-sized hill. Between the northeast-southwest base line thus formed and the Rapido River streamed to the west, the rolling terrain lowers gradually to the river. The 111th Infantry Regiment, on February 1, 1944, was in defensive position along this ground, holding the land up to the river.

The Regimental Main Line of Resistance extended southeast, from Highway 36 at the northern tip of St. Trocchio, along the lower forward slopes of the mountain, then south across the western slopes of the La Pleta high ground to a point opposite San Angelo in Tuscio, a small town along the western banks of the Rapido. The 2nd Battalion of the 111th armored Infantry Regiment of the 1st Armored Division, attached to the 111th Regimental Combat Team, held the northern sector, along the slopes facing northwest. There the line curved to the south around the southwestern tip of St. Trocchio, the 1st Battalion of the 111th Regiment occupied the defense line, and the southern sector, along the line running south, west of La Pleta, to opposite San Angelo, was held by the 2nd Battalion of the 111th Infantry Regiment. The 3rd Battalion was in a reserve position to the rear of the 2nd Battalion, along the southern flank.

The Regimental Command Post was located in the vicinity of San Lucia, a small town along the southern reverse slopes of St. Trocchio. The Cannon and Anti-Tank Companies of the Regiment in position along the southern sector of the Regimental defensive situation, in the La Pleta hill defiles. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop, and Troop 'A' of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, were attached to the Regimental Combat Team primarily for patrol and outposting functions. Their Command Posts and activities were confined to the southern sector of the defense zone. On the Regimental flanks were the 113rd Infantry Regiment to the south, and the 34th Infantry Division on the right, across Highway 36 to the north.

The 111th Regimental Combat Team was prepared, on February 1st, 1944, under the Regimental Field Order 319, issued at 1300 hours, January 31, to cross the Rapido River on Division Order. Attempts during the latter stages of the January Campaign to cross, in the vicinity of the large 'S' bend the Rapido forms about a mile west of the southern tip of St. Trocchio, had proven unsuccessful. The mechanical difficulties of crossing, made extremely hazardous by the swiftness of the current, plus the concentrated fire power the enemy was able to muster against the crossing sites had frustrated all attempts to establish and hold a bridgehead on the western bank.
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The present plan contemplated crossing further south, in the vicinity of San Angelo, in Texcoco, with Companies 'I' and 'K' of the 3rd Battalion crossing as the assault echelon. The idea was to bracket the town by crossing Company 'K' about a half mile north, and Company 'I' a half mile south, thus enveloping the town from opposite directions simultaneously. Company 'L' had the mission of following up the initial assault as a mopping-up element.

The 2nd Battalion was to cross later, infiltrating through and occupying the higher ground to the west and north of San Angelo. Armored elements, including tanks from the 750th Tank Battalion, were prepared to cross as soon as a Bailey Bridge could be installed. Squads from the 36th Reconnaissance Troop and Troop "A" of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron had missions of protecting the crossing sites. The 1st Battalion of the 114th Infantry Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment were to demonstrate within their sectors, and compose the Regimental reserve. Mortar, artillery and chemical weapon fires from units of the 114th Regimental Combat Team were arranged and coordinated.

Battalion forward supply dumps were set up in defile between La Plata and the River. The final assembly area for the 2nd and 3rd Battalions was located within the same area, a little south of San Angelo, and the Regimental control point was established forward from the final assembly area, and about 200 yards east of the Rapido, opposite San Angelo.

Initial intelligence information, secured from prisoners of war and previous patrol activity, indicated the position of enemy strong points in the vicinity of San Angelo, the most likely crossing sites, and identification of some of the enemy units. This latter indicated that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Companies of the 128th Panzer Grenadier Regiment were defending the vicinity of San Angelo.

Two patrols from the 3rd Battalion, and one from Troop "A" of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron were sent across the River the night of January 31-February 1, with specific missions pointed at securing information for the proposed crossing. Predesignated crossing points, and the specific location of strong points to be investigated were given to the patrol. In addition, the patrol was to investigate and locate the hostile outpost line of resistance along the western bank of the River, natural and artificial barriers between the River and objectives, and the strength and disposition of enemy defensive installations.

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The patrol from Company 'A' succeeded in crossing south of San Angelo, and penetrating a short distance inland. Heavy fog prevented any effective reconnaissance, however, and the patrol, aided by enemy outposts, returned to avoid an easy ambush in the fog. The other two patrols drew machine gun and mortar fire as they approached the river, and were unable to cross. They succeeded in locating enemy machine gun and mortar emplacements, on the western bank. During the night of January 31-February 1, carrying parties furnished by the 113th Infantry Regiment brought foot bridges and engineering equipment to the assembly area, to be in readiness for the crossing. Enemy planes twice circled over the regimental forward line positions during the night, dropping parachute flares.

Major General Fred L. Waller, the Commanding General of the 36th Infantry Division, and the Divisional G-3 visited the Regimental Command Post at 0300 hours, February 1, to discuss the proposed operation. In a phone conversation later in the morning, the Commanding General informed Lt. Col. Price that the attack would not be initiated until every hope of success was apparent. The operation would be contingent on the success of the 34th Division, on the regimental right flank, which was attempting to cross the Rappido further north and capture Casino.

Mine clearance parties from Company 'A' of the 111th Engineers, attached to the 113th Regimental Combat Team, had been attempting, during the night of January 31-February 1 to clear paths from the final assembly area to the crossing sites at the river. A cleared lane had been opened to the southern point, but the party working the northern path had drawn fire from across the river, and didn't get through. At 0730 hours, February 1, the Engineers reported that lanes, twelve feet wide and marked with white tape, were open to both crossing sites, and that a second path to each site had been started. The road to the river, at the end of which the Bailey Bridge was to be installed, had not as yet been swept.

At 1500 hours, February 1, a meeting was held at the 3rd Battalion Command Post with Officers from the Regiment, Company 'A' of the 111th Engineer Battalion who were responsible for mine clearance, and Officers from the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Engineer Regiment who were spotting the collapsible rubber assault boats, foot bridges, and the Bailey Bridge to be installed during the crossing. The purpose of the meeting was to accomplish final and detailed coordination of all activities for the proposed attack.

Notification was received from the Divisional G-3, at 1810 hours, February 1, that the attack would not be initiated that night. All units concerned were notified, and reconnaissance patrols to cross the river with the same missions as on the previous night were ordered.

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Again on the night of February 1-2 only one patrol succeeded in gaining the western bank of the Rapido. This patrol, from 'I' Company, crossed south of San Angelo and penetrated 250-300 yards inland, where they contacted an enemy security patrol and were forced to return. The patrol reported that no defensive wire entanglements had been erected south of the town, and that the western banks along that sector were very steep and from 10-12 feet high. The close guard the enemy held along the western banks, and the River approaches from the east, prevented the patrol from Troop 'A' of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron from crossing north of the town. The Regimental outpost line of resistance was pushed up to the River line during the night and security patrols maintained from the Main Line of Resistance up to the River.

At 0900 hours, February 2, the Commanding Officers, G-3, and supply Officers from the 113rd and 111th Infantry Regiments met at the 111th Regimental Command Post to correlate all details for the crossing. The decision was made to have a carrying party of 160 men from the 113rd Infantry Regiment carry the foot bridges to the crossing sites. Four bridges were to be provided for each site, 2 to be installed initially, and 2 held in reserve. It was also decided that the 1st Battalion of the 113rd Infantry Regiment would attack and seize the knoll south of San Angelo, in conjunction with the 111th Regiment's assault on the town itself.

Lt. Col. Arron W. Wyatt, (O-264305) of Cohoes, New York, was reassigned to the 111th Infantry Regiment as Commanding Officer, the morning of February 2nd. Lt. Col. Price resumed his former duties as Executive Officer.

The engineers had been working throughout the night of February 1-2 and during the morning of February 2 in an attempt to complete the mine clearance required. By 1330 hours, February 2, they were near the River on the road leading to San Angelo. Twenty-one trolley mines, apparently newly laid with light brush scattered over them, were unearthed along the edge of the hill immediately across the River from San Angelo. They requested, and were furnished, a covering party of 8 men from the 3rd Battalion for security as they approached the River. Attempts to get through that afternoon drew too much enemy fire, and at 1700 hours the engineers reported that if attempts that night were again frustrated, it would be necessary to use a Scorpion the following day, which would require self-propelled artillery coverage.

G-3 notified the Regiment at 1600 hours, February 2, that the crossing would not be attempted that night. Patrols were again organized and given reconnaissance missions pointed at determining enemy strength and disposition. The 3rd Battalion patrol, from 'I' Company, was increased in strength to enable it to capture a listening post located along the western bank, south
of San Angelo. The men succeeded in gaining the western bank along the southern outskirts of San Angelo. They then worked their way north along the river, but failed to discover any listening posts along that sector. Loving houses from which they heard enemy voices.

General Walker, the Divisional Commander, notified Lt. Col. Wyatt at 2400 hours, February 2, that the contemplated tactical disposition for the Regiment had been changed. Detailed information concerning the move was not available at the time, but in general, it envisaged tank penetration by tanks of the 1st Tank Group across the Rapido River and through the open ground to the west between the northern end of Mt. Trocchio and Cassino. The 11th Infantry Regiment would function as the infantry unit to exploit and consolidate the armored thrust.

The 1st Battalion was to move into an assembly area behind Mt. Trocchio that night, prepared to jump off on a two hour alert, the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment extending their defenses south to cover the 1st Battalion sector. The 2nd Battalion, of the 11th Infantry Regiment, remained in their present defensive position, and the 3rd Battalion was directed to pull in their crossings installations from the vicinity east of San Angelo, both Battalions to be ready to move on Regimental order. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop were directed to extend their outpost line north to cover the sector to the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment.

Following the notification, the 1st Battalion was pulled back from the line and assembled south of Mt. Trocchio in the hill defiles east of the La Plata, closing in at 0615 hours, February 3rd. Their defensive sector was occupied by Company 111 of the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment.

Lt. Col. Wyatt sent the assistant S-3 of the Regiment to the Command Post of the 1st Tank Group, across Highway 40 from the northern tip of Mt. Trocchio, when the Regiment was notified of the proposed move, to get as many details as possible. He reported back the following morning, February 3, with the information that the operation was not imminent, and would not be initiated until the 34th Division had been successful in capturing Cassino from the north. Control of Mt. Cassino, the spearhead of the mountainous salient jutting south into the low land, and the town of Cassino along the southeastern base of the mountain, permitted the enemy too complete a control of the low ground south to Mt. Trocchio and the whole Rapido River line to risk an attack west across the intervening open terrain.

Further attempts to ascertain specific details concerning the Regimental move were made during the day of February 3rd. At 1015 hours Lt. Col. Price visited the Command Post of the 1st Tank Group for that purpose, but nothing was
definite at that time. Later in the morning the Regiment was informed that the Divisional Commander was going to hold a meeting with the Commanding Officer of the 1st Tank Group early that afternoon, at which time the employment of the 111th Infantry Regiment was going to be discussed. At 1045 hours, the Division O-3 had more specific information. The 111st Infantry Regimental Combat Team, including a detachment from the 111th Engineer Battalion and the 131st Field Artillery Battalion, was definitely attached to the 1st Tank Group. All the Battalions were to be in assembly area, prepared to move on two hours notice, before dawn, February 4th. Orders were to come from the 1st Tank Group. At 1200 hours, Lt. Col. Wyatt and Capt. Ross Young (O-346157) of San Antonio, Texas, the Regimental Plans and Operations Officer, left the Command Post for a conference to be held at 200 hours at the Command Post of the 1st Tank Group.

Further dislocation along the previous Regimental defense line paralleling the Rapido was caused by the detachment of the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment from the Regimental Combat Team the morning of February 3rd. The Battalion was detached as of 0645 hours, and cleared their previously occupied defense sector at 1310 hours. Troop 'A' of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron was directed to extend its outpost area north to Highway #6 to cover the gap. As of 0900 hours, February 3rd, Troop 'A' reverted to II Corps control, and was given the mission of outposting the entire Regimental area. In as much as the 111st Infantry Regiment, including the 36th Reconnaissance Troop, was scheduled to move.

During the early part of the afternoon, February 3rd, II Corps gave Troop 'C' of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron the mission of outposting the Regimental Front, from Highway #6 south to opposite San Angelo, and Troop 'A' was to be employed further south along the 113rd Infantry Regimental Sector. To avoid a dangerous weakening of the defense line. Lt. Col. Wyatt directed the 36th Reconnaissance Troop to remain in its outpost position until troop 'C' of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron was actually in position.

In as much as the men from Troop 'C' could not be in position before dusk, February 3rd, Company 'I' was alerted to outpost the northern sector until that time, but the units from Troop 'A' which had relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment when it moved out were held in position to retain the continuity of the defensive plan. At 1830 hours, O-3 notified the Regiment that the 36th Reconnaissance Troop would revert to Division control the following morning, February 4, at 0600 hours. They were directed to establish a strong point during the night along the northern part of the Regimental defensive sector, maintain patrol contact on the right flank with the 34th Division, and then assemble just prior to dawn behind Mt. Trochio, prepared to move with the 111st Regimental Combat Team, but under Division control.
Brigadier Parkinson and Major Cooke from the 6th New Zealand Infantry visited the Regimental Command Post at 1215 hours, February 3rd. Two enemy plane attacks occurred later that afternoon. At 1325 hours, 10 came in over the Command Post area from the west, but were driven off by heavy anti-aircraft fire, and headed north. At 1700 hours, 25 came in from the southwest and over the enemy lines dropping something believed to be supplies, and then headed back toward the northwest. A platoon of L Company of the 111th Engineer Battalion were attached to the 51st Regimental Combat Team on February 3rd, and reported into the Command Post at 2000 hours.

Reconnaissance patrols from the 3rd Battalion were sent to cross the Rapido the night of February 3-4 in the vicinity of San Angelo. One patrol from Company 'K' worked its way across to the far bank south of San Angelo and inland 250-300 yards. Enemy voices were heard in houses along the southern part of the town. The bright moonlight hampered the patrols activities and it returned without proceeding further. No enemy strong points or vehicular movement were discovered in the sector south of town.

At 1500 hours, February 4, Lt. Col. Wyatt held a meeting at the Regimental Command Post with the Regimental S-2 and S-3, the Commanding Officers and S-3s of each of the Battalions, and the Commanding Officers of the Regimental unlettered units and units attached to the Regimental combat team. Field Order 220 covering the proposed Regimental employment was discussed. The order had been issued at 1000 hours, February 4.

The initiation of the operation was contingent upon the capture of Cassino and the establishment of a bridgehead across the Rapido River toward the west, south of Cassino. The 36th Infantry Division, divided into Task Forces 'A' and 'B', with tank support, was to cross through the bridgehead and attack across the open ground to the west and south. Task Force 'A' consisted of the 51st Regimental Combat Team and the 1st Tank Group.

The initial objective of Task Force 'B' consisted of objective 'L', 'I', and 'J' along Phase Line 'A', which extended in a semicircle starting about a half mile south of Cassino and swinging west and north with Cassino as the hinge. Secondary objectives consisted in fanning out to the west and south across the open ground to the Aquino River to the west, capturing the town of Aquino to the west, and Fiumicino to the southwest, and trapping and destroying the enemy in the whole Liri River Valley. The 51st Infantry Regiment was also to assist the 36th Division in capturing the town of Fiumicino, further northwest along the western slopes of the Mt. Cassino salient.
The 3rd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment was to revert initially to the 753rd Tank Battalion, as a securing force for the II Corps Engineers who were to install a Bailey Bridge for armored crossing of the Rapido River. The Battalion then attacked and seized objectives '11' and '38', and '39' along Phase Line 'A' in conjunction with the 753rd Tank Battalion, both Battalions reverting to Regimental control on arrival at Phase Line 'A', and the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Infantry going into Regimental reserve on the arrival of the 1st and 2nd Battalions at Phase Line 'A'.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions closed in behind this initial penetration, and continued the attack to the south and west beyond Phase Line 'A' on Task Force 'B' order. The 753rd and 760th Tank Battalions were to attack in conjunction with the Infantry Battalions. The Cannon and Anti-Tank Companies remained on the eastern side of the River, prepared to cross and be employed on Regimental order.

The Regiment, in the meantime, remained in assembly areas southeast of Mt. Trocchio and east of La Pietà. At 1530 hours, February 4th, Brigadier Kittlitzbuhler, Lt. Col. Young and Major Bandall of the New Zealand Division visited the Regimental Command Post to reconnoiter the area and arrange the relief of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron elements defending the prior Regimental defense line. At 2145 hours, the 1st Battalion was alerted to move on an hours notice in the event of an enemy attack along any point of the Regimental sector.

Two patrols were again dispatched from the 3rd Battalion, the night of February 4-5, to cross the Rapido in the vicinity of San Angelo. The sector south of the town again proved vulnerable to patrol infiltration and one patrol crossed in that area. The bank further north was too closely guarded with automatic weapons upon emplacements to allow the patrol any activity, or permit the other patrol to cross north of the town.

During the preceding several days, New Zealand Units had been moving into the area south and east of Mt. Trocchio and east of La Pietà, in the vicinity of the Regimental Command Post and the Battalion assembly areas. This area, open to enemy observation from the high ground to the west, already was occupied by artillery units in nearly every defilade. The resulting confusion and road congestion together with the apparent disregard of comrades discipline typical of the British Units, drew a great deal of heavy incoming artillery into the area of the Regimental Command Post from February 4 to February 7. The over congested situation was likewise believed responsible for repeated enemy plane attacks. Twice during the afternoon of February 5, groups of enemy planes came over the area. One group dropped anti-personnel bombs along the northern part of Mt. Trocchio, and both groups apparently performed photographic missions.
New Zealand Units relieved the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron elements along the previous 3rd Infantry Division sector the night of February 5-6. The New Zealand phones were hooked into the Regimental Wire Network, and arrangements made to have the New Zealanders make patrol contact with the 3rd Division on their right flank and elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 91st Infantry Regiment which were still outposting the southern flank of the 3rd Infantry sector.

The New Zealanders were in the area by dusk, and the relief completed during the night. Guides from Troop 'D' of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron led the New Zealanders into position. No patrols were sent out the night of February 5-6 because of the bright moonlight.

At 1100 hours, February 6, Lt. Col. Pratt held a meeting at the Regimental Command Post with Captain Young, the Regimental S-3, and the Battalion Commanding Officers and S-3, to discuss the status and mission of the Regimental Combat Team. At that time, the operation remained contingent upon the capture of Cassino and the establishment of the bridgehead by the 34th Division. A 35th Division Directive, issued later on the 6th, confirmed the previously made plans. Task Forces 'A' and 'B' came under the control of the Commanding General of the 35th Division, who was in command of Combat Command 'B' which included both Task Forces.

In order to remove the Battalions from the congested area and resultant incoming artillery barrages laid into the assembly areas along the reverse slopes of Mt. Trocchio and east of La Pista, and to have the units in a better position to execute the proposed operation, new assembly areas were recommissioned during the day of February 6. The area chosen lay to the east of Highway 66, almost due east from the former positions, in the vicinity of Ch. Cicerolle, between San Vittore and Corvaro. Line clearance was needed, and arranged for with Company 'A' of the 111th Engineers. The Battalions moved into this area immediately after dusk, February 6, in the following order, the 1st, 2nd last, and all were closed in by 2300 hours. The Regimental Anti-Tank and Cannon Companies were notified at 1750 hours to make a reconnaissance of that area the following morning, February 7, and move in.

The Chief of Staff of the 35th Division, Colonel Vincent, with the Divisional G-1, visited the Regimental Command Post at 1105 hours, February 6. At 1200 hours Lt. Col. Pratt visited the Command Post of the 1st Tank Group to coordinate plans for the operation. The Regimental Command Post area was again subjected to periodic artillery shelling during the afternoon, and two enemy plane groups circled over the area, one group of 18 planes dropping bombs along Highway 66 east of Cassino.
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At 1300 hours, February 7, Lt. Col. Wyatt and Captain Young moved to the advance Regimental Command Post which was established at La Pasternelle, to the east of Highway #6 as it curves around the northern tip of Mt. Trocchio. At 1500 hours, the Regimental 3-2 and Communications Officer attended a meeting at the Command Post of Task Force 'B' concerning their functions in the operation. The Anti-Tank Company moved into the new area in the vicinity of Ch. Cicorella during the afternoon of February 7th. At 1900 hours, Captain Morgan, the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion requested and was given permission by Lt. Col. Wyatt to take the Company Commanders from the 3rd Battalion on a patrol reconnaissance to the vicinity of the proposed crossing site along the Rapido. They returned at 2100 hours.

The site of the Regimental Advance Command Post, in La Pasternelle, was under fairly clear observation by the enemy. Cassino lay straight ahead along Highway #6 across open ground, and observation positions atop Mt. Cassino afforded the enemy excellent vantage points over the low ground to the south including La Pasternelle. To minimize this risk, a back door jeep trail was prepared through defile to the town. The 11th Engineers constructed the trail and cleared it of mines. At 1730 hours, the rear Command Post was closed out, and the new opened at 1830 hours, February 7, in La Pasternelle, 2 1/4 miles southwest of Cassino.

All attempts of the 34th Division to capture Cassino had been unsuccessful. They had succeeded in capturing the northern end of the valley formed by the eastern rim of the low ground and the Mt. Caira-Cassino mountainous salient, and had gained a foothold along the eastern ridges and hills of the salient. The enemy, however, was firmly entrenched along the southern and western heights, and held Mt. Cassino, the southern tip. The historically famous Abbey of Montecassino, home of the Benedictine Monks, straddled the very tip of Mt. Cassino, commanding the eastern and southern approaches to Cassino, and dominating the entire area.

The Germans, in flagrant violation of International Law, had occupied the Abbey, using it for observation and defenses. Possession of this virtually inaccessible bastion by the enemy rendered any tactical movements through the low ground to the south extremely hazardous. It likewise greatly imperiled the success of an attempt to capture the town of Cassino situated at the base of the Mountain. This tactical situation was the primary obstacle to initiating the proposed employment of the Regiment and Task Forces 'A' and 'B' in a break thru to the west through the open ground south of Mt. Cassino.

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The only apparent means of circumventing this obstacle lay in capturing the Abbey itself or in rendering the position untenable for the enemy by demolishing the structure. The American forces had pursued the former course, hoping to avoid the necessity of destroying the ancient shrine, symbol of the sources of Christianity. Hence the tactical employment of the Regiment was again shifted to the north, this time into the foothold which had been established along the eastern and northern ridges of the Mt. Caira-Cassino mountainous structure.

At 2005 hours, February 8th, O-1 inquired how long it would take to get one of the Battalions on the road to move to the vicinity of Caira, which was situated about two miles north of Cassino along the eastern slopes of the mountainous salient. There had been three serious counterattacks by the enemy in the mountains north and west of Caira, and additional troops were to be moved in. Captain Young informed O-1 that it would take about two hours to put a Battalion on the road. At 2030 hours, Lt. Col. Nyatt was directed to have one Battalion on the road by 2230 hours, February 8. The Battalion was to be under Division control, and possibly attached to the 12th Infantry Regiment. The 2nd Battalion was alerted to move, and to take their warmest clothing and two blankets per man.

The trail to Caira was a tortuous and hazardous journey. The only means of access to the town and the foothold which had been established in the mountains involved working north along the eastern rim of the low land, from San Vittore through Cervaro and San Michele to Portella, then doubling back toward the southwest into the valley between the eastern rim of the low land and the Mount Caira-Cassino mountainous salient. The route then ran south along the eastern edge of the low land, nearly as far south as Cassino itself, cut west across the valley, then crossed the Rapido near the Italian barracks at Villa, and finally north along the eastern base of the mountains to Caira.

The roads leading north through Cervaro, San Michele and Portella were little more than trails, winding and twisting tortuously along the mountain side. The continuous rains of February 8-11 loosened the soft surface of the roads and rendered them almost impassable, some sections with nearly a foot of soft mud on the surface. The entire route, from the time it left Cervaro, was under clear observation from the Abbey of Monte Cassino and many points, particularly the crossroads in the valley, were subjected to consistent and accurate artillery barrages by the enemy. Here the route ran across the valley floor to the west, it came virtually under the noses of the Germans occupying the Abbey of Monte Cassino and the surrounding heights.
The 2nd Battalion, under Lt. Col. John G. L. Adams, covered the trail the night of February 8-9, closing into the area north of Cairo at 0530 hours, February 9th. Only a minimum of 20 vehicles were taken along because of the hazardous road conditions. Guides from the 113th Infantry Regiment met the Battalion in the vicinity of Cairo, and guided the men into an assembly area north of town. At 2230 hours, February 8, Lt. Col. Wyatt was notified that the previously planned operation was off and that the 2nd Battalion would have the mission of relieving the 1st Battalion of the 127th Infantry Regiment of the 34th Division during the night of February 9-10. The balance of the Regimental Combat Team would move to Cairo the night of February 9-10, in Division reserve. Quartering parties were to be sent to the vicinity of Cairo early the following morning, February 9th.

At 1200 hours, February 9th, Field Order 21 was issued, dealing with the move from the vicinity of Ch. Cisorello to position in the mountains in the vicinity of Cairo and Cassino. The 2nd Battalion, having moved into the vicinity of Cairo the previous night, February 8-9, relieved the 3rd Battalion of the 127th Infantry Regiment, the night of February 9-10, in defensive positions of Hill #706, along the southern end of the Mt. Castellone ridge. The 1st and 3rd Battalions closed into the vicinity of hill #213, along the eastern wall of the mountains between Cassino and Cairo, the night of February 9-10, and occupied hill #293 south and east of the Mt. Castellone ridge, in relief of the 135th and 168th Infantry Regiments of the 34th Division, the night of February 10-11. The tank and Anti-Tank Companies of the Regiment were directed to move back to the Regimental Service Train, in the vicinity of San Pietro. The 131st Field Artillery Battalion moved into the vicinity of Portella, prepared to support the 1st Battalion when it moved into position. Company 'C' of the 2nd Chemical Battalion was attached to the 111th Regimental Combat Team, and directed to move into the vicinity of Mt. Maiola, along the eastern wall of the mountainous salient, south of Cairo, on February 10th.

The positions which the troops of the 111th Infantry Regiment were to occupy were located in the midst of the Mount Cairo-Cassino mountainous structure. The lofty snow-capped peak of Mt. Cairo towers well above the other mountains, from the north at the base of the salient. Mount Cassino forms the southern tip. The main feature of the intervening terrain is Mt. Castellone, with its rocky ridge line extending south. The southern part of this ridge is denoted Hill #706, and it was along the southeastern slopes of that hill that the 2nd Battalion was to move into position the night of February 9-10. Mt. Maiola lies southeast of Mt. Castellone, and just north of Mt. Cassino.
The remaining features of the terrain stop the salient are less prominent, and consist of minor hills and draw, though the features themselves are all cut along rugged rims. Hill 593, onto which the 1st and 3rd Battalions were to move the night of February 10-11, is situated in the midst of the salient, and forms the southernmost hill which had been wrested from the enemy. The American positions atop the salient extended in the form of a semi-circle from the east. The ridgelines of the salient are extremely abrupt, making access to the positions along the top difficult and perilous.

The Regimental assistant S-3, the Company Commander of the Regimental Headquarters Company, and quartering parties from the 1st and 3rd Battalions moved to Caiera the morning of February 9th. Guides from the 135th Infantry Regiment were appointed to meet the 1st and 3rd Battalions when they reached the vicinity of Villa and Hill 593. The contact point was 135th Infantry Barracks at Villa, and the time set at 1800 hours, February 9th. The Regimental Command Post at La Pastornello was closed out at 1810 hours, February 9th, and opened in the town of Caiera at 1930 hours.

The relief of the 3rd Battalion of the 135th Infantry Regiment by the 2nd Battalion of the 11st Infantry Regiment, on Hill 593, was accomplished the night of February 9-10. Forward elements of the Battalion had worked their way up the mountains, through the draw between Mt. Castelano and Mt. Vallo, and reached the hill at 2010 hours, accompanied by guides from the relieved units. Ammunition was inventoried and transferred over, and an exchange of blankets arranged between the Battalions, to avoid the necessity of carrying the extra weight up and down the mountains. Porters from the 3rd Battalion of the 135th Regiment remained in position until those of the 2nd Battalion of the 11st Regiment were zeroed in for defensive fires. The relief was completed by 2300 hours, without incident. The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 11st Regiment closed in to their assembly area on Hill 215, south of Caiera, at 2005 hours, February 10th. At 2000 hours, February 9th, arrangements were made with the Caiera, to guide Lt. Col. Wyatt to the forward positions at 0700 hours, the following morning.

At 1300 hours, February 10th, Field Order 22 was issued, covering the proposed employment of the 1st and 3rd Battalions. The initial movement consisted in the occupation of positions on Hill 593, the night of February 10-11, in relief of elements of the 155th and 168th Regiments of the 4th Division. Hill 593, the knob immediately northeast from the Abbey on Mt. Cassino, forms the southern tip of a minor ridge running north and south, the northern part of which is called the "Snakes Head", because of its appearance on a contour map. The 1st Battalion was to move onto Hill 593, with the 3rd Battalion further north along the "Snakes Head".
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The attack, to be launched at 1100 hours, February 11, would be made in conjunction with the 4th Division. The 1st Battalion was to be the assault echelon, attacking south from Hill 553, to capture Hills 569 and 574. These latter lay directly south of Hill 574, Hill 553 being due west of the Abbey of Montcasino. The 3rd Battalion was to follow close behind, consolidating and holding Hill 594, and then pushing on to Hill 574. Elements of the 155th and 168th Infantry Regiments were to assault the Abbey itself, from positions east of Hill 574, and the 123rd Infantry Regiment had the mission of capturing the town of Cassino. The 131st and 132nd Field Artillery Battalions were in direct support of the attack, of the 112th Regiment, and the 155th Field Artillery Battalion was in general support. The artillery barrage on the enemy positions would commence at 1030 hours, February 11, and lift on order from the Commanding Officer of the 112th Infantry Regiment.

At 1130 hours, February 11, Lt. Col. Wyatt and Captain Young attended a meeting at the Regimental Command Post in Cairo, attended by General Wilbur, the 5th Division Assistant Divisional Commander, General Butler of the 4th Division, the Division G-1, G-2, and G-3, and the Commanding Officers of the 112nd and 113rd Infantry Regiments. The attack for the morning of February 11 was the subject of the conference, and final arrangements and coordination were reached. It was decided to have the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 112th Regiment occupy Hill 593 as a terrain feature in conjunction with elements of the 44th Division, rather than in relief of those elements as originally planned. The 3rd Battalion of the 112th Regiment was to be attached to the 113th Infantry Regiment for operational purposes only. The French 8th Moroccan Regiment was to attack enemy positions on Mt. Cairo the night of February 10-11, and the 113th Regiment was to relieve the 44th Regiment in positions along the Mt. Cassino Ridge the same night.

Lt. Col. Wyatt held a conference with the 1st and 3rd Battalion Commanding Officers on 6-30 at the Regimental Command Post at 1830 hours, February 10th, and gave them final coordination for the attack. The need for close coordination of efforts between the 1st and 3rd Battalions was stressed by Lt. Col. Wyatt. The Regimental Commander pointed out that the tactical situation offered the enemy excellent flanking fires against our troops as they moved out to the attack. Heavy machine gun fire would have to be employed, firing over the head and from the flanks of the attacking echelons. The critical supply problem was also discussed, and orders given that the men should carry all possible rations into positions with them.
One of the most critical elements of the entire operation was the supply problem of getting adequate ammunition, rations and other necessary items to the positions atop the mountains. A forward regimental supply dump was established near Portella, which was as far along the route to Cairo as it was feasible to use vehicular transport. From that point forward, down into the valley, across the valley floor, and up the mountains to position, supplies were moved by mule trains and, in the initial stages of the operation, a good proportion of the bulk had to be hand carried.

The first stages of the supply axis, - motor transport to Portella - was tied up the first several days by the nearly impassible road conditions caused by the continuous heavy rains. Many stretches along the road were at least one lane wide, and though the traffic had been routed one-way over the worst parts, when a single vehicle bogged down the entire column was held up. On many occasions during the nights of February 10-11 and February 11-12 vehicles slid off the road, or were bogged down in the deeper ruts and tied up the whole stream until clearance could be made. British units likewise had to use this route, and their bulky and less powerful vehicles, particularly the ambulances, were frequently stopped. The trip from Omoaro through to Portella, or clear through to Cairo could be covered in less than an hour under normal conditions. During the first days of the operation in the mountains it frequently required 4-5 hours.

The more serious aspects of the situation concerned relaying the supplies from Portella on. The night of February 10-11, the night the 1st and 3rd Battalions were moving up the mountain into position, the regiment was unable to get sufficient mules to handle the bulk of the supplies. Of the 150 mules promised, only 60 had arrived at the mule park near the forward regimental dump, and about half of these had been already walked for 30 miles, and were unfit for duty that night. Every attempt was made to secure more, and some were dispatched from the 42nd Infantry Regiment park. Finally, at 0300 hours, February 11th, a train of 55 mules had been organised, loaded and started on the road.

Any account of the campaign into the mountains above Cairo must necessarily reflect the difficulties and hardships of this supply route. The trails had to be navigated at night, because nearly the entire route, and particularly the part leading across the valley floor, was under clear enemy observation and subjected to constant and accurate enemy artillery fire. Dispersal of the mule trains was impossible because the single road was the only mine-laced lane, and the mules couldn't be dispatched singly because of the necessity of guides and maintaining contact along the trails leading up to the mountains.
The almost incomprehensible part of the task lay in scaling the mountain sides. The rains had loosened the thin covering of mud on the rocky trails making them extremely slippery, and along many stretches it was virtually impossible to gain footholds. The side walls of the Mt. Caira-Cassino mountainous structure are very abrupt, and offer few draws to make the climb easier. In many instances, ropes had to be tied from man to man to pull and guide the succeeding men up, or lead the mules over the worst part. The main supply route led across Hill # 213 from Villa, and up the draw between Mt. Castellone and Mt. Maiola. An alternate route, used to supply the 2nd Battalion on Hill # 706, led up through the town of Caira and up the draw between Mt. Caira and Mt. Castellone, and then south along the eastern side of the Mt. Castellone Ridge.

The nights of February 10-11 and 11-12, the two critical nights of the operation, many of the supplies had to be hand-carried because of the difficulties of getting and organizing mule trains, and because some parts of the trail were nearly inaccessible to mule transport. Several trucks had ventured across the valley to the west, to the base of the mountains, and some supplies had been taken that far. The enemy, through observation and by knowing the only available routes open to our supply was able to pour accurate mortar and artillery concentrations onto the trail. As a result, a great deal of disorganization was inevitable, many men were wounded, and the trail was littered with dead mules. Darkness, and unfamiliarity with the trails the first two nights further complicated the task.

Men to handle these mules and supplies were recruited largely from the Cannon and Anti-Tank Companies personnel, and later, from a group of 200 replacements received by the Regiment the 12th of February. In the initial stages, one trip up the mountain with supplies required from dusk until dawn, and was so arduous that a man could only be counted on to make the trip on alternate days, though in many instances the same men were required to, and did, work ceaselessly at the task. The difficulty of the whole task was augmented by the fact that the type of fighting which occurred atop the mountain required for the most part the heavier grenades and mortar ammunition in large quantities.

A platoon of engineers from Company A of the 111th Engineer Battalion checked into the Regimental Command Post in Caira at 2400 hours, February 10, for duty to work the trails. They were instructed to do what maintenance work they could on the trails, and to begin early the following morning, as soon as daylight permitted. The platoon reported in at 1100 hours, February 11, that they had accomplished what they could on the trail, and that it would possibly hold up for two-three days unless the mules choppd it up too badly. The platoon was directed to return and service the trail further forward, to
forward, to the vicinity of the Regimental forward Command Post. The artillery barrages had continually interrupted the engineers' efforts.

The 1st Battalion, under Captain Newman, and the 3rd Battalion under Captain Morgan, moved from their assembly area on Hill # 213 and into position in the vicinity of Hill # 593 the night of February 10 - 11, closing in at 2300 hours February 10, and 0300 hours February 11 respectively. They relieved elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 186th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 160th Infantry Regiment from the most forward positions only, the move not being a relief of those elements. The Regimental advance Command Post was moved from Cairns and established on the northeastern slope of the 'Snakes Head', a little more than a half mile northeast of Hill # 593, at 1700 hours, February 10.

Hill # 593 forms the southern tip of a small north-south ridge line in the midst of the Mount Caira-Cassino mountainous structure, and is the key terrain feature in the defenses from the south, or in an offense from the north directed to take Mount Cassino and the Abbey of Monte Cassino. The terrain atop the southern part of the mountainous salient consists of minor hills and draws. A deep draw extends to the east from south of Hill # 593, across the northern slopes of Mount Cassino.

The impression the Regiment had been given was to the effect that Hill # 593 was actually occupied by elements of the 34th Division, and that the 1st and 3rd Battalions would encounter no difficulty in occupying the Hill the night of February 10 - 11. Actually, the positions occupied were further north along the ridge, in the vicinity of the 'Snakes Head'. The enemy was firmly entrenched on Hill # 593 itself, and held secure emplacements behind a stone wall running across the top of the Hill which afforded them excellent defense positions.

The occupation of Hill # 593 the night of February 10 - 11 thus assumed the nature of an attack itself. Before the men reached the vicinity, they had already been required to work their way up the tortuous mountain trails, from Hill # 213 up through the draw to the west between Mt. Castellone and Mt. Haido, and south along the top of the mountainous structure to the 'Snakes Head'. From that point on, the men encountered heavy opposition from the enemy positions on Hill # 593, and mortar and automatic weapon fires from the surrounding hills to the south and west. Close contact was made with the enemy, to within 20 - 30 yards in many instances, as the men from the 1st Battalion attempted to work their way south from the 'Snakes Head' along the sides and top of the ridge to Hill # 593. Both sides used large numbers of hand grenades.
The attack, at 1100 hours, February 11, had to be launched from these precarious positions gained along the ridge south of the 'Snakes Head'. The units were well under strength, with between 15-50% reduction in combat strength previous to the present operation. Casualties suffered during the occupation of positions the night of February 10-11, and a further reduction in strength caused by the unusually large number of stragglers who had been unable to make the perilous ascent, further reduced the overall position strength just prior to the attack to nearly a 60% reduction in combat efficiency.

The 1st Battalion, with Company 'C' as the assault echelon, began the attack at H-hour, 1100 hours, February 11, coordinated with simultaneous attacks by the 152nd Infantry Regiment on the Regimental right flank to seize Hill # 569 which lay due west across a small draw from Hill # 593, and elements of the 135th and 168th Infantry Regiments of the 34th Division on the Regimental left flank which were attempting a frontal attack on the Abbey of Monte Cassino across the draw which ran east from Hill # 593. The objectives of the 1st Infantry Regiment consisted of Hill # 569, immediately south of Hill # 593, and Hill # 374, further south and due west from the Abbey. A fairly accurate concept of the relative height of these hills can be obtained from the hill numbers, inasmuch as the numbers are determined from the contour height of the hill.

The initial attempts of the 1st Battalion to advance south along the ridge to Hill # 593 and beyond to Hill # 569 encountered extremely heavy mortar and artillery concentrations laid into the area, and automatic fires from positions on Hills # 593, 168, and 517, and the Abbey to the south. The primary obstacle blocking the advance consisted of the flanking fire the enemy was able to bring against the shock troops, from their positions on Hill # 168 to the west, and the Regiment had no means available of countering or evading this fire. The units, in their reduced strength, were able to make only isolated and short gains against the firmly established defenses on Hill # 593. In many of the situations, these successes had to be gained by creeping and crawling along the barren and rocky surfaces of the ridge and dislodging the enemy from his positions with hand grenades.

At 1130 hours, Captain Newman, the Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, reported to Lt. Col. Wyatt that the Command Post of Company 'C' had been hit, the Company Commander wounded, and all communications with the Company knocked out. At 1200 hours, the 152nd Infantry Regiment reported that their leading company was likewise held up in its attempt to take Hill # 168. Captain Newman reported short gains at 1245 hours, but that heavy casualties were being suffered.
The fierce close-in struggle for positions on Hill #593 lasted throughout the afternoon of February 11. Hand Grenades, used offensively and defensively by both sides were frequently the only thing that could be employed because of the rocky nature of the terrain and the close contact maintained with the enemy. Over 1500 grenades were used by the 1st Battalion alone during the afternoon. At 1330 hours, Lt Col. Wyatt reported to General Walker that stiff resistance was still being encountered on Hill #593, and that Hill #468, to the west, would probably have to be taken, instead of just placed under fire as the 112nd Infantry Regiment was doing, before the Regiment could succeed in dislodging the enemy from Hill #593. At 1335 hours, the 112nd Infantry Regiment reported that one company was being slowly advanced south through the draw between Hills #593 and 468 in an attempt to flank the defensive positions.

The enemy launched two counterattacks during the afternoon of February 11, one of severe intensity at 1200 hours from the positions on Hill #593 and one at 1600 hours, of smaller proportions. While both these counterattacks were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy, the total effect was to neutralize the attempt of the 1st Battalion elements to advance, and the positions remained substantially the same throughout the afternoon. The 3rd Battalion, though not in the original assault echelon remained in close support of the 1st Battalion, and likewise suffered heavy casualties from being in the midst of the artillery and mortar impact areas.

By 1645 hours, the strength on position had been reduced to 10 Officers and 66 Enlisted Men in the 1st Battalion, and 12 Officers and 94 Enlisted Men in the 3rd Battalion. Lt Col. Wyatt at that time notified Captain Newman of the 1st Battalion to combine the elements of the 1st and 3rd Battalions into one unit, using Captain Morgan, the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion as Executive Officer. The men were to be ordered to dig in and hold their present positions, and a strong combat patrol was to be kept south along the ridge toward Hill #593, to keep in close touch with the enemy disposition. Defensive artillery and mortar fires were arranged. Supplies, with the exception of grenades and mortar ammunition, would probably be adequate because of the reduction in strength.

The large number of casualties suffered during the initial occupation and during the afternoon of the attack accentuated the difficult and hazardous problem of evacuation of the wounded from the mountains. Additional litter teams were recruited from the Anti-Tank and Cannon Company personnel, and, on the 12th of February, from a group of replacements assigned to the Regiment. To bring one wounded man down from the mountain positions, in a litter, frequently took a team from eight to nine hours. The Battalion Aid Stations had been set.

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up at the head of the draw between Mt. Castellone and Mt. Maiola, and the
Regimental Aid Station at the base of the mountains, near Wida, south of Caira.
Stragglers also occasioned difficulties during the operation. Many had fallen
out during the march into position the night of February 10-11. Because of
the critical shortage in on position strength, frequent attempts had been made to
organise these men from the vicinity of the town of Caira and the Aid Stations
and return them to their units.

Information received from prisoners of war captured the afternoon of
February 11th indicated that enemy units to the Regimental front along Hill
593 were from the 30th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. The prisoners stated that
the hills further east were defended by parachute troops and, to the northwest,
by mountain troops. Prisoners captured the following day, February 12, on
Hill 468 confirmed that information, and identified the parachute troops
as the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Companies of the 1st Parachute Regiment. The presence of
units of the 36th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and 5 Companies of the 200th
Panzer Grenadier Regiment was also indicated.

The Regimental Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Wyatt, and the Regimental
3-3 and 3-2 operated during the period of the attack and the subsequent days from
the Regimental advance Command Post located along the northeastern base of the
'Smoke's Head', atop the mountains. This position, although it offered the
Commanding Officer and the Staff Operations and Intelligence Officers close
contact with the attack, was within easy range of the enemy fires, and
was frequently subjected to artillery and mortar concentrations.

The positions along the ridge north of Hill 593 were held during the
night of February 11-12. At 1120 hours, February 12, Lt. Col. Wyatt reported to
Lt. Col. Price, at the Regimental Command Post in Caira, that no forward
movement was possible but that the men were holding the present positions
in close contact with the enemy, with the limited strength available. At
noon, February 12, the Regimental 3-3 estimated that the Regiment was operating
under a 75% reduction in combat efficiency. Lt. Col. Wyatt also reported that
there had been several localized counterattacks during the night, from the
vicinity of Hill 593, which had been repulsed, and that the enemy showed
no inclination to offensive activities this morning. Two patrols had been kept
forward of the Regimental positions the preceding night, along the ridge toward
Hill 593, to keep in close touch with the enemy disposition. The entire
area had been frequently subjected to heavy mortar and artillery fire.
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Lt. Col. Wyatt told Lt. Col. Price that there was urgent need of grenades and mortar ammunition, and woolen gloves and socks for the men on position. The continuous rains and cold winds atop the mountains seriously increased the difficult and hazardous conditions for the men on position. In as much as the 1st and 3rd Battalions had been united, the supply echelons of those Battalions were combined and handled as one unit. The 200 replacements which came to the Regiment on February 12th were used by the Regimental S-4 as male skimmers and as litter bearers for the Aid Stations.

At noon, February 12th, the Assistant Division Commander notified Lt. Col. Wyatt, that the 1st and 3rd Battalions had the mission of holding defensively in their present positions along the ridge between the 'Shakes Head' and Hill # 593.

The 2nd Battalion, which had remained operationally attached to the 1/3rd Infantry Regiment remained in their original defensive positions along the slopes of Hill # 706 throughout the period of the attack. At 1530 hours, February 12th, Lt. Col. John C. L. Adams, the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, reported to Lt. Col. Wyatt that the strength of the enemy along that sector was unknown, and that a strong counterattack against their positions might be hard to stop. To strengthen the position, the 1/3rd Regiment was sending elements of their 1st Battalion into that sector.

At 1800 hours, February 12th, Lt Col. Wyatt notified Lt. Col. Price that there was a possibility that the 1st and 3rd Battalions would be moved back to the vicinity of Hill # 706, near the 2nd Battalion positions, that night. The mile train was held up pending the decision, but finally dispatched to the same position when no word was received. The promised relief did not arrive, and the men held their former positions. A minor counterattack was launched from Hill # 593 about 0400 hours, February 13th, but the men experienced no difficulty in repulsing it. Throughout the night the engineers continued their maintenance work on the trails. The constant use by the miles and the surface destruction from the shellings required continuous work.

Lt. Col. Wyatt attended a meeting at the Divisional Forward Command Post in the vicinity of Castra shortly after noon, February 13th. He was notified that the 1st and 3rd Battalions would be relieved from their positions the night of February 13-14 by the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Sussex Brigade. The Battalions would then move north to Hill # 706, along the southern part of the Mt. Castellana ridge, to the same sector the 2nd Battalion had been occupying. That sector would then become the Regimental defense sector.
The Regimental Surgeon was directed to locate all the Battalion Aid Stations with the 2nd Battalion Aid Station, at the head of the draw between Mt. Castellone and Mt. Meola, and the Regimental 3-4 notified to group all the Battalion supply echelons to work to and from one dump. Guides were arranged to take the troops of the Royal Sussex Battalion into position, and from the 2nd Battalion to guide the 1st and 3rd Battalions to Hill # 706.

At 1045 hours, February 13th, the Regimental Command Post at Cairo received a direct hit from a 150 mm artillery shell. The shell ricocheted from the roof of the adjoining building and plowed into the sandbag protection across the door of the Command Post room, exploding on contact. Maj. Col. Wyatt was killed and Lt. Col. Price wounded. The entire enlisted personnel of the Regimental Plans and Operations section were wounded and had to be evacuated. Lt. Col. Price, before he was evacuated, notified Lt. Col. John H. Adams, Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, that he was in command of the Regiment. Lt. Col. Adams notified Captain Ross Young, the Regimental S-3, that he would assume the additional duties of Executive Officer.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions were relieved from positions along the ridge north of Hill # 593 the night of February 12-13, by the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Sussex Brigade. The relief was effected by man to man replacement in the defensive positions, and was completed at 0120 hours. Guides from the 2nd Battalion led the 1st and 3rd Battalions north to the vicinity of Hill # 705, the men closing in at 0600 hours. This sector, along the southeastern slopes of the Mt. Castellone ridge then became the Regimental defensive sector. At 0900 hours, February 14th, the former Regimental advanced Command Post was closed out and moved to the head of the draw between Mt. Castellone and Mt. Meola, near the Regimental defensive positions.

The Regimental forward Command Post and the 3rd Battalion Command Posts were then located in the same spot. The Regimental S-2 and S-3 returned to the Command Post at Cairo to continue operations.

A truce was requested by the enemy the morning of February 14th, to enable them to remove their dead and wounded from the positions along the mountain tops. A cessation of hostilities and artillery fires was granted to extend from 1030 hours to noon, and later extended to 1330 hours. The truce was arranged through the 112th Infantry Regiment, and the sector concerned was south of the Regimental positions on Hill # 705, and to the west from Hill # 593. Over 165 dead alone were removed from that sector by the enemy.
At 1510 hours, February 14, O-3 requested the release of Company 'C' of the 2nd Chemical Battalion from the Regimental Combat Team. The liaison officer from the Company had reported, earlier in the afternoon, that the Company had eight of their 4.2 mortars set up in the draw between Mt. Castellone and Mt. Malolla. Lt. Col. Adams reported that the Regiment was short on organic mortars, and it was decided that Company 'C' should remain attached to the Regimental Combat Team.

Combat patrols worked south from the defensive positions the night of February 14-15, across the draw south of Mt. Castellone to the vicinity of Hill 517, along the southern part of Mt. San Angelo which lies south of Mt. Castellone along the western wall of the mountaneous salient. Contact with the enemy was made as the patrol attempted to work to the top of the hill, and the patrol was unable to proceed any further. Between the hours of 0500 and 0600, February 15, enemy artillery was unusually active, shelling many points intensively, from the front line positions well back. The town of Cairn and the vicinity of the Regimental Command Post was subjected to particularly heavy concentrations, over 700 rounds falling in that area. Heavier caliber, 155mm and 170mm artillery, was used primarily.

Lt. Col. Adams returned to the Regimental Command Post in Cairn at 0900 hours, February 15, and the Regimental advanced Command Post was closed out. Later in the morning, beginning at 1030 hours, American planes began a series of bombings of the Abbey of Monte Cassino. The Germans had installed gun emplacements and observation posts within the Abbey itself, and the only alternative facing the Fifth Army lay in demolishing the structure. Leaflets advising the religious and civilian occupants of the famous Abbey of the proposed destruction had been propelled into the Abbey by artillery on the previous day. Flight after flight of heavy and medium bombers, over a hundred planes in all, came in from the south, spilled their bomb loads onto the Abbey and enemy emplacements along the slopes of Mount Cassino, and circled off to the west. The ancient structure crumbled into a heap of ruins under the heavy assault. Over 150 enemy were seen wildly trying to get away from the Abbey as the first planes dropped their loads. Artillery and small arms fire took a heavy toll of these men as they exposed themselves across the open terrain.

At 1400 hours, February 15, the Regiment was notified to have a quartering party at the Division Command Post at Cervaro at 0500 hours the following morning, February 16th. The Regimental 3-2 and 5 men from each Battalion moved out the morning of February 16th to reconnoiter a rest area for the Regiment in the vicinity of Pratella, back along the Volturno east of Highway #6. At 1500 hours, February 15, Lt. Col. Adams visited the Advance Division Command Post, in the vicinity of Cairn, to discuss the defensive situation with General Stack, the Assistant Division Commander. At 1830 hours the Regimental Command Post in Cairn was closed out and moved to a building about a half mile northwest of Cairn, along the slopes of Mt. Cairo.
Arrangements were made the afternoon of February 16th to make patrol contact with the British Units to the left of the Regimental positions. The contact point was a house in the vicinity north of Hill #593 which had formerly been used for the 1st and 3rd Battalion Command Posts. A patrol was sent to that point at 1730 hours, and contact made with the British at 2038 hours, and maintained at three hour intervals throughout the night. The following morning the Commanding Officer of the British Units, the 7th Brigade, requested that the arrangements be cancelled because the British troops were Indians and he was afraid they might shoot at the American troops. The British were notified of the location of our listening posts.

The Commanding General and Regimental Commanders of the 88th Division visited the vicinity of the Regimental Command Post and line positions on February 16th. Security and contact patrols operated from the Battalions the night of February 16-17. Toward morning, the British made an attempt to take Hill #593. Intense activity in that area, with a great number of enemy flares, was reported periodically by the Regimental listening posts and defense positions. The British succeeded in working men onto the Hill, but failed to hold any gains, and were pushed back along the ridge toward the 'Snakes Head.'

At 1730 hours, February 17, the 2nd Battalion reported that a security patrol, working forward from the Battalion position, had destroyed an enemy mortar emplacement and probably a machine gun, with hand grenades. The emplacement was located in the draw south of Mt. Castellone. The Regimental defensive positions had remained stationary from the time the 1st and 3rd Battalions had moved north to Hill #706. The defense line ran generally in the form of a circle, with the 2nd Battalion in a north-south line along the southern slopes of Hill #706 defending primarily toward the southwest and west, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions situated further down the slopes toward the southeast defending south and southwest.

The Regiment was alerted, the night of February 17-18, to be prepared against the possibility of a German counterattack. British Units were attempting wide scale attacks, with New Zealand troops attacking across the Rapido River toward Cassino, and Indian troops attacking south across Hill #593 to seize the Abbey and Mt. Cassino. The Regimental listening posts and defense positions reported intensive activity periodically throughout the night, in the vicinity of Hill #593. The offensive netted possession of Hill #593, but further penetrations toward the Abbey were repulsed, and the bridgehead across the Rapido, which the New Zealanders had extended into the outskirts of Cassino, was pushed back across the river the following day.
At 1300 hours, February 18, Lt. Col. Adams opened an advanced Regimental Command Post at the head of the draw between F. Castellanos and Lt. T'aiola in the same position with the 3 Battalion Command Post. Maj. Shack, the Assistant Division Commander visited the Command Post at 1330 hours, and made a tour of the Battalion positions with the Regimental Commander. At 1615 hours, the rear Regimental Command Post was moved back into the town of Caïra. The position outside the town had been located within the French sector, and a higher echelon French unit claimed the building for its own use. Security patrols again worked forward from the Battalion positions the night of February 18-19, and the Regiment remained on the alert to assist the British in holding Hill 393 in the event of an enemy attempt to reconquer that position.

Lt. Col. Charles J. Dembola (D-21833) of Poughkeepsie, New York, was assigned to the Regiment as Executive Officer, February 19th. At 1430 hours, February 19, Lt. Col. Adams ordered a patrol consisting of one Officer and several Enlisted men to be sent from Company F to contact the British Units in the vicinity of the "Snakes Head". The patrol reported in at 1500 hours that there were no troops on the "Snakes Head", but that the British held their positions further south along the ridge and on Hill 393. At 1610 hours, February 19, the Regimental Liaison Officer to the British Brigade reported in to the Command Post, confirming their hold on Hill 393, and giving the details of a realignment of their forces pointed to renewed offensive activities.

Throughout the night of February 19-20, contact patrols were maintained to the flanks of the Regimental positions on the British to the left, and the 32nd Infantry on the right. Security patrols were active at the front of the Battalions, and harassing mortar and artillery concentrations fired onto the enemy positions on Hills 396 and 397. Considerable machine gun and small arms fire was reported from the north, along the slopes of Lt. Caïra, throughout the night. The following morning 0300 reported that German patrols had attempted to break through the French lines in that sector, but had been stopped by the French.

During the night of February 20-21, reconnaissance patrols from the 2nd Battalion worked forward from the Company I T and Company K T positions, to investigate the enemy disposition. The patrols both returned in short after 0300 hours, February 21, and reported hearing digging-in activities south of the Battalion positions, in the vicinity of Hill 396. Both patrols went out again, one to work south through the draw between Hill 396 and "Snakes Head" and attempt to capture prisoners and the other to specifically locate the digging activities. The prisoner patrol drew fire and failed to capture any of the enemy, but remained in the draw as a listening post, and located an enemy mortar position. The other patrol likewise specifically located the enemy digging what was believed to be mortar positions, south of Hill 397. These areas were immediately placed under mortar fire.
The Germans counterattacked to the east, during the afternoon of February 21, from Hills #517 and #468, and north through the draw between Hills #468 and #593. The attempt was apparently aimed at recapturing Hill #593 and establishing a breakthrough between the British and 161st Regimental defense positions. Heavy mortar and artillery concentrations preceded the attack. The Company 'F' observation post observed three-four pieces of artillery firing from west of Hill #468, about 200 yards south of the Battalion position. Mortars from Company 'H' and Company 'M' laid approximately 80 rounds into the area, and reported hearing enemy machine gun firing following the barrage. Shortly afterwards, about 50 enemy were observed working their way north in the draw between Hills #593 and #468.

The enemy then fired red flares, following which smoke was laid onto positions on Hill #593, and a short time later a green flare was fired, at which signal the enemy fires ceased temporarily. Heavy machine gun and mortar fires from the 161st Infantry Regiment and the British Units on Hill #593 repulsed the attacks, and the enemy efforts ceased shortly after 1330 hours, although localized intermittent activity was noted throughout the afternoon.

A reconnaissance patrol from Company 'I', the night of February 21-22, reported an enemy machine gun emplacement along the northern slopes of Hill #468, and due south of the 3rd Battalion position. The patrol was unable to reach the position because of the heavy brush. Lt. Col. Adams, at 0345 hours directed that either the patrol should return with bazookas and rifle grenades, or that mortars should be fired into the area with the idea of keeping the enemy strong points terrorized. At 0035 hours, February 22, the Regimental Commander notified the 2nd Battalion 'S-3' to have a patrol work forward from both flanks of the Regimental position to within 200-300 yards of the enemy position, and to have them remain throughout the following day to observe and prevent any enemy mines laying or patrol activity. The men should remain concealed unless they could utilize their fire power profitably, and should take a radio along to relay their reports.

At 1110 hours, February 22, Lt. Col. Adams held a meeting with the Battalion and Company Commanders at the Regimental Command Post. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss means of improving the morale of the men, and changing their attitudes from defensive-mindedness to aggressiveness, to make them anxious to keep harassing fires on the enemy positions with every means available.

On February 22, the Regimental S-3 requested the Division S-3 for engineering personnel to blast machine gun emplacements to the front of the Regimental defensive positions. TNT explosive charges and fuses to make a 'bee-hive' blaster would be required for the work.
The engineers, from Company 'A' of the 11th Engineer Battalion, failed to get through the evening of February 22, but reported in the afternoon of February 23 with the engineering equipment and were led up to the 3rd Battalion positions that night. The work of blasting the emplacements, 12 each for the 3rd and 2nd Battalion positions, was completed the following day. The 4,2 chemical mortars from Company 'C' of the 2nd Chemical Battalion furnished covering fires for the engineer personnel while the preliminary work was being completed.

At 2025 hours, February 23, C-3 notified the Regiment that Company 'C' of the 2nd Chemical Battalion would be detached from the Regimental Combat Team as of 0600 hours, February 26th. Security and contact patrols were again active the night of February 23-24, but no unusual activity was reported from the German positions. On February 26th, the Regiment was notified that its relief would be effected within the next several days, by troops from the 8th Moroccan Regiment, but no specific details were available at that time.

Patrols during the night of February 21-25 engaged in successful activity to the south of the Regimental positions. A security patrol from Company 'F' captured two prisoners who were believed to be from a wire tapping patrol attempting to work their way behind the Regimental lines. Later interrogation substantiated this fact, and identified the prisoners as being from the 2nd Company of the 17th Parachute Regiment. Another 2nd Battalion patrol of one Officer and 3 Enlisted Men worked their way through the draw south of the Regimental positions and onto Hill # 517. They surprised and killed a sentry guarding the ruins atop that Hill, and began searching the body. Before they were able to finish, three enemy rushed them from behind the ruins and in the ensuing close-in fire fight, the patrol disposed of all three without losing a man. The activity apparently alerted German positions throughout the area because several machine gun emplacements opened up on the patrol and a great number of illuminating flares were fired over the area. The patrol was able to silence two of the machine gun emplacements with rifle grenades and kill another enemy before they were forced to withdraw. The men lost contact on the return trip, but all returned in safety. Enemy emplacements located by the patrol were then placed under heavy mortar fire.

The daylight forward patrols previously ordered by the Regimental Commander had been working forward from the Regimental positions each day, leaving early in the morning and reporting in shortly after dusk. Contact patrols with units on the Regimental flanks, and security patrols working in the area to the front of the defense positions were active each night.
Relief for the Regiment was accomplished the night of February 26-27, by the 2nd Battalion of the 31st Infantry Regiment of the 88th Division. At 0800 hours, February 26, the command responsibility of the sector was turned over to the the French, whose units had relieved the 142nd and 143rd Infantry Regiments.

The Regimental Commanding Officer, Colonel Champy, and reconnaissance parties from the 31st Infantry Regiment visited the Command Post and the defense positions during the afternoon, February 26th, and final details arranged for the relief. The relief was accomplished by units, and completed at 0800 hours, February 27, without incident. Company "R" of the 31st Infantry Regiment relieved the 1st Battalion of the 141st Regiment, Company "P" the 2nd Battalion, and Company "Q" the 3rd Battalion. The Regimental Command Post at CIRA was closed out at 0900 hours, February 27 and opened at 1245 hours at Fratella.

The relieved units, after clearing the mountains, moved by foot across the valley to the Regimental supply dump at Portella, and from there by truck to the rest bivouac area at Fratella. All units were closed into the area at 1500 hours, February 27th. On February 28, Lt. Col. Adams held a meeting with Lt. Col. Denholm and the Commanding Officers of the Battalions and the Regimental unlettered units to make arrangements for the rest period and entertainment for the men. The rest was badly needed, and well deserved after the arduous campaigns of February.
Casualties of the 141st Infantry Regiment for the month of February, 1944, were as follows:

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<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>KILLED IN ACTION</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIED OF WOUNDS</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOUNDED IN ACTION</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INJURED IN ACTION</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSING IN ACTION</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>640</td>
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</table>

Enemy casualties and destroyed material for the month of February, 1944, are as follows:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Known</th>
<th>Estimated</th>
<th>Additional</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners of War</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Guns</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortars</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm Anti-Tank Gun</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

END

Report of Operations Written by:

CHARES G. SCHNARTZ 0-2055769
2nd Lt., Regimental HQ
141st Infantry Regiment

OFFICIALS

CAPTAIN, 141st Infantry
ADJUTANT

SECRET
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 106, U.S. ARMY

OPERATIONS IN ITALY
MAY, 1944

ANNEX 6

115TH INFANTRY REGIMENT, R.I.N.Y.

DECLASSIFIED
DODD 5080.3, Sept. 27, 1963
TIMS 4, 2222, date 10-31-63

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS, 131st INFANTRY REGIMENT, RIFLE
APO # 36, U. S. ARMY

16 June 1944

Subject: Transmittal of Regimental History and Conclusions from Operations

To: Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, APO 36, U. S. Army

1. Forwarded herewith is the Report of Operations of the 131st Infantry Regiment, Rifle, for the month of May, 1944.

2. Three aspects of the operations engaged in during the month of May, 1944, require special comment.

a. The long period of static warfare during the past winter and spring created an attitude of defense which was slow to overcome before offensive operations could be conducted with speed and efficiency. Although all ranks were anxious to be moving forward, the greatest difficulty was experienced in increasing the tempo of all phases of supply, movement, and issuance of orders. Individuals and units were slow and deliberate when speed should have been the keynote. This attitude of defense accompanied with deliberate, detailed and complete orders gave way to an aggressive attitude accompanied by rapid changes, movements, and orders; however, the change was difficult.

b. Communications personnel accustomed to communicating radio communications had failed to maintain a high level of efficiency in radio communications. The operation engaged in prohibited continuous wire communications due to long lines and rapid movement. As a result units were frequently cut of communications, and central difficulties.

c. Close support of front line infantry units by anti-tank and tank destroyer units was an absolute essential. During past operations in this theatre the weapons of tank destroyer units were used principally as artillery and anti-tank companies were used for carrying parties. This past employment was the cause of great difficulty being experienced in getting these supporting weapons into positions from which they could engage enemy armor before it struck foot troops. Commanders of anti-mechanized weapons initially simply would not push their weapons far enough forward, either through a failure to understand the across country ability of their transportation or through a misconception of close support. Small local counter-attacks accompanied by a few tanks or armored personnel carriers are frequently made during a general withdrawal to aid in breaking contact. These attacks must be met and stopped by anti-tank weapons which can hit the enemy armor before it reaches the front line infantry.

4. Inclosures:

Incl # 1 - Report of Operations
Incl # 2 - Consolidated Casualty Report for March, April and May
Incl # 3 - Unit Journal, 131st Regimental Combat Team, May 1944
Incl # 4 - Maps, Italy, 1:50,000, Sheets 158 III, 158 I, 150 II
At 1130 hours, 24 May 1944, Col. Harmon (Sidney, Ohio) held a meeting with the Regimental Commanding Officer, the Regimental Communications Officer, and the Regimental Surgeon. The meeting was convened to discuss the recent changes in the leadership of the 3rd Field Artillery Battalion. Col. Harmon assigned the new Executive Officer, Lt. Col. James G. Bolling, to the 1st Battalion. The previous Executive Officer, Lt. Col. John A. Smith, was transferred to the 2nd Battalion. The newly appointed Executive Officer, Lt. Col. George W. Garrett, would serve in this capacity until the next change in leadership.

The 3rd Field Artillery Battalion was established on 24 May 1944, replacing the 3rd Field Artillery Battalion. The personnel and equipment were transferred from the 3rd Field Artillery Battalion to the new 3rd Field Artillery Battalion. The battalion was organized into three companies: A, B, and C. The battalion was under the command of Lt. Col. John A. Smith. The battalion was stationed at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The battalion was in the process of reorganization and training for deployment to Europe.

The 3rd Field Artillery Battalion was established as a result of the reorganization of the 3rd Field Artillery. The battalion was commanded by Lt. Col. John A. Smith. The battalion was organized into three companies: A, B, and C. The battalion was stationed at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The battalion was in the process of reorganization and training for deployment to Europe.
Command Post at 0240 hours 26 May 1944 and were assigned to operate with the Battalions. As of 0615 hours Company E of the 605th Tank Destroyer Battalion was to be immediately attached to the Regimental Command Post.

Colonel Herron directed the 1st Battalion to move his Battalion to the northern sector of the defensive position as soon as possible. Two platoons of the Regimental Antitank Company were placed in support of the 2nd Battalion and ordered into position along the northern and eastern flanks, and one platoon of the Combat Company placed in support within the central sector of the defensive zone, south of the 2nd Battalion. This Battalion moved out from the assembly area at 0615 hours, 26 May 1944, and had moved into position by 0900 hours. The 3rd Battalion, under Lt. Col. Edward W. Johnson, was directed by the Regimental Commander to occupy the southern sector of the defensive line and move into position shortly after noon. Company E, 605th Tank Destroyer Battalion, disposed directly in front, prepared for defense against mechanized enemy, which was unknown had entered the area, as part of the Regimental sector. The 1st Battalion remained in its original position in the Regimental assembly area, in Regimental reserve.

The position now held by the 115th Regimental Combat Team was primarily defensive in line to block any thrust the enemy might have made in that sector. The dispositions of the Regimental Antitank and Combat Companies and the battalions of the 605th Tank Destroyer Battalion were planned with an overall antitank force, in mind along the whole Regimental sector, to prevent the enemy from capturing the Dresser position and to destroy any enemy that might enter the Dresser position. The 115th Infantry Division was to occupy the Dresser position with the Regimental Command Post to occupy the Dresser position. At 1230 hours, the Combat Command post reported that they had established contact with the 113th Infantry Regiment along the left flank of the Regimental sector and had communicated with the 114th Infantry Regiment along the right flank. This decision was made after the 113th Infantry Regiment was to be attacked by the 113th Infantry Regiment along the right flank. This decision was made after the 113th Infantry Regiment was to be attacked by the 113th Infantry Regiment along the right flank.

During the afternoon of 26 May 1944, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 115th Infantry, sent two companies of troops to the front of their positions. The troops were completely surrounded, but they were not entirely casualties. At 1145 hours, the Regimental Command Post was established as a headquarters for the forward the Regimental Command Post, Colonel Herron, the 3rd Battalion, and a staff officer, visited the 3rd Battalion Command Post, and then the 2nd Battalion Command Post. Observation posts were established about a mile north of the 2nd Battalion area, in the sector of the 30th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division along the right flank of the Regimental position. At 1215 hours, 26 May 1944, the Regimental Command Post was established and opened at the coordinates 0134, about 1/2 mile southwest of Dresser. At 1215 hours Colonel Herron left the Regimental Command Post to visit the Regimental Observation Post and witness an attack to be made by the 113th Infantry Regiment along the right flank of the Regimental sector. He returned to the Command Post at 2100 hours.

Between 2100 hours 26 May 1944 and 0030 hours 27 May 1944, enemy air strikes in undetermined numbers were active over the Regimental area, dropping bombs and flares but causing no damage.
The 1st Battalion, 111th Infantry, was directed by the Regimental Commander to move from its assembly area into position north and east of the 2nd Battalion positions. The men had closed into position by 1230 hours. Company C affected the relief of 1 platoon of the 36th Reconnaissance Troop earlier in the morning about 1030 hours, 27 May 1944. A liaison officer from the 36th Reconnaissance Troop had reported to the Regimental Command Post at 0530 hours, contacted the 1st Battalion S-3 and the Commanding Officer of Company C and conducted them to the Command Post of the 36th Reconnaissance Troop to make final details for the relief. The 1st Battalion 24 reported to Major Young, acting Executive Officer, at 1130 hours that the relief had been completed and that the 1st Battalion was moving into position. The sector now occupied by Company C was located along the northern flank of the regimental sector, in the area between the 35th Infantry Division and the 3rd Infantry Division on the right flank.

At 1100 hours, 27 May 1944, General Barrett received orders from Major General Frank L. Walker, for the advance of the 111th Infantry. The Battalion Commander, Officers, Regimental Staff and Commanding Officers of the Battalion Headquarters Unit and Attachments were called to the Regimental Command Post to receive instructions and verbal orders. For the attachment of the 1st Battalion, the 1st Infantry and the 2nd Infantry were facing the left and right flank of the advance. The 1st Battalion, 111th Infantry, was moving towards the town of Vellasrt, with the 111th Infantry attached to the Regimental Combat Team for the operation were Company A (6th Platoon) of the 73rd Tank Battalion, Companies B and C of the 90th Tank Destroyer Battalion and Company A of the 111th Medical Battalion. The 111th Tank Destroyer Battalion's heavy tanks would be in direct support.

The advance was to be run generally in a northern direction, the Regimental objective consisting of cutting the railroad line and road which ran north from Vellasrt, the sector of the advance was left by the 111th Combat Engineer Battalion. Intelligence obtained from a patrol by the Regimental Regimental Intelligence and Interrogation of prisoners of war, indicated that strong forces were in this sector, but that defensive arrangements had not been established in the sector by the enemy in his general withdrawal. The Headquarters of the 71st Infantry and the 2nd Battalion advanced about two Battalions abreast; the 2nd Battalion toward the left flank. Companies B and C of the 90th Tank Destroyer Battalion would advance by echeloning forward by columns by fire teams, the company with each Battalion. Elements of the combat engineer and anti-tank companies would move forward with each Battalion. Companies A (6th Platoon) and D of the 73rd Tank Battalion moving forward with the left elements of the advance and maintaining contact with the 35th Infantry along the left flank. Colonel Young, directed the Battalion that no large engagements should be made, and that no attack against a well established defensive force should be made until so ordered by the Regimental Commander. The primary means of advance would be sending aggressive patrols to the front to cover a sector and then bringing the main elements up to that line and again extending forward with the patrols. The 3rd Battalion would be in reserve, moving north along the limiting line between the two Battalions in the line, prepared to defend the flanks against counterattacks. The terrain over which the advance was to move was consisted primarily of rolling grain fields, intermixed with well wooded draws and gullies.
with the capture of the city of Velletri as the objective. The advance was to begin at 1130 hours, 28 May 1944, with the 2nd Battalion on the left and the 3rd Battalion further northeast along the right flank. The 1st Battalion, from its positions east of Velletri would be in Regimental reserve. The 2nd Battalion was directed initially to swing their right flank around toward the north, in order to present a unified line with the 3rd Battalion for the attack. Each of the attacking Battalions would have one platoon of Cannon Company and one platoon of the Anti-Tank Company operating in its sector.

The objective of the attack was to capture Velletri in conjunction with the 133rd Infantry along the left flank which would attack the town from the north. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 113th Infantry, would attack from their positions between two to three miles southeast of the city. The 1st Battalion was given the mission of protecting the right flank of the 3rd Battalion as it advanced on the city. One Company of the attached 80th Tank Destroyer Battalion was to move with the 2nd Battalion and the remainder of the Battalion with the 3rd Battalion, 113th Infantry. A fifteen minute artillery barrage commencing at 1145 hours, 28 May 1944, would precede the attack, and thereafter the 113th Field Artillery Battalion would use direct support fires on targets of opportunity.

About 1200 hours, 28 May 1944, and prior to the time the attack was to move, part of the enemy forces in the vicinity of Velletri launched a counter-attack toward the southeast, striking directly within the 2nd Battalion, 113th Infantry, sector. Heavy concentrations of artillery were fired into the area preceding the counter-attack, and following closely under the barrage, about two companies of infantry, 4 tanks and several armored personnel carriers struck at the 2nd Battalion. The nature of the well wooded heavily wooded terrain enabled the enemy forces to mask their attack until they had advanced closer to the positions of the Regimental Units. Because of the terrain, plus the fact that the supporting Anti-Tank weapons had not moved sufficiently forward to enable the 2nd Battalion to utilize their fires to neutralize the mechanized units employed in the counter-attack, the enemy assault had to be repulsed almost entirely by the infantry units. This was accomplished without serious difficulty, but Companies E and G along the left flank of the Battalion were forced to withdraw several hundred yards to a stronger defensive line. Company F along the right flank of the 2nd Battalion positions bore the brunt of the armored thrust, the enemy tanks being able to make a quick dash through a covered road running northwest through the sector occupied by Company F and go in behind several isolated units of F Company. The attack was repulsed, however it caused a considerable amount of confusion and reorganization was not completed until just prior to darkness.

Colonel Harmon notified the Regimental Combat Team Units at 1430 hours 28 May 1944, that the attack would be postponed until the 2nd Battalion could complete its reorganization in preparation for advancing, and that the attack would then move out on Regimental order. Earlier in the afternoon, General Bliss, the Commanding General of the 56th Division artillery visited the Regimental Command Post to discuss artillery support with the Regimental Commander.
The advance began at 1530 hours 27 May 1944 and continued throughout the afternoon and evening. Little resistance was encountered in any part of the sector of advance, and the troops moved forward without interruption. Futarella were left to the front of the advancing lines, and the main elements then moved forward. Intermittent reports received at the Regimental Command Post indicated that beyond the artillery barrage, no resistance had been met. During the night of 27–28 May, a line roughly parallel to and about a mile from the railroad running east from Velitri was held and contested, with the advance moving at dawn.

At 0055 hours 27 May 1944, the Regimental Command Post was closed out and opened in a area of the coordinates OS 3098. About 0600 hours, the advance had reached the village of Velitri, and the 3rd Battalion was to maintain contact with the 1st Battalion. By 1200 hours, the 3rd Battalion shall operate within the village area, which was paroling the sector of the regimental right flank. The 1st Battalion operated to the right flank, and the Regimental Command Post was established on the right flank of the regimental sector, being observed by the 3rd Battalion. At 1600 hours, a contact was made, indicating that there were no further enemy forces in the area. The 3rd Battalion was then relieved by the 1st Battalion and sent to the rear.

By 1800 hours, the 3rd Battalion was deployed along the left flank with the 2nd Battalion. On 28 May, a counterattack against the Regimental Command Post was attempted. The Regimental Command Post again deployed for an additional night, opening at the coordinates OS 3098, about 1/2 mile from Velitri.

Company A, 56th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the Regimental Command Post at 1800 hours 27 May 1944. Company A, 56th Tank Destroyer Battalion moved out at 0200 hours 28 May 1944, and moved forward with the 1st Battalion and 3rd Battalion during the morning. A company of the 3rd Battalion had been attached to the 56th Tank Destroyer Company to serve as security during the night of 27–28 May, while the 56th Tank Destroyer Company relieved the forward defense against counterattacking forces.

During the morning of 28 May 1944, the advance toward the Regimental objectives continued. Small pockets of resistance were encountered, but these were eliminated without serious difficulty. By the afternoon, the 3rd Battalion, during the morning, captured all of the village of Velitri and pushed the 2nd Battalion forward during the afternoon and pushed further into the town. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry, had captured little resistance during the morning, and pushed further into the town. The 3rd Battalion advanced northeast about 22 miles from Velitri at the southeastern corner of the city.

At 1605 hours 28 May 1944, the Regimental Command Officer issued orders to the Battalion Commanders, Regimental Staff and Commanding Officers of the Unlettered and Attached Regimental Units for pushing the attack forward.
At 1500 hours, the Commanding General of the 36th Infantry Division directed the Regimental Commander to call the attack on Velletri off. The Regimental units should hold the gains they had made, and slowly push forward by making isolated gains and then consolidating the localised advances. Colonel Harmon then issued orders to each of the Battalions, directing them to keep patrols out in front of the main elements, and move up where the ground was clear.

Following the cancellation of the attack, Company B was assigned to the 2nd Battalion to reinforce its position. Company A of the 656th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the Regimental Combat Team as of 1530 hours, May 28, 1944, and Company A of the 83rd Chemical Battalion as of 1500 hours. To further strengthen the 2nd Battalion position, the attached tank destroyer units from the 655th and 656th Tank Destroyer Battalions, and the Regimental Anti-Tank units were directed to move further forward in order to gain greater effectiveness against mechanized counter-attacks by the enemy. At 2015 hours, May 29, 1944, the Regimental Command Post displaced forward and was established at the coordinates 031° 22', about 3 miles southeast of Velletri.

Another counter-attack was launched during the night of 28-29 May 1944 by the enemy forces defending Velletri. The main enemy effort was directed against the 3rd Infantry on the right flank of the 11th Infantry Division, and against the 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry, which was left to cover the area occupied by Company G. The force was repelled with great difficulty. Throughout the night security and reconnaissance patrols were effective in the front of the Battalion positions. Reports from these patrols indicated that the enemy held positions along a line 300-500 yards to the front of the Battalion positions. A patrol, dispatched from the 2nd Battalion by the Division of the 83rd Division, reported in 0230 hours that two tanks they had seen to investigate along the left flank of the Regimental sector were friendly tanks dug in for protection. At 0145 hours, May 29, 1944, C-3 notified the Regimental S-3 that the Commanding General wanted to be sure that the 4.2-inch mortars of the Attached 83rd Chemical Battalion were prepared to execute their missions on call. The readiness of the 83rd Chemical Battalion for such an assignment was verified.

The advance toward Velletri was resumed the morning of 29 May 1944. Each Battalion had been directed to avoid any major engagements and to advance as previously directed, by pushing patrols out to secure an area and then bringing the main elements forward. Small points of resistance should be eliminated throughout the morning, the advance was continued. The 3rd Battalion encountered light resistance from isolated strong points, but experienced no difficulty in forcing the enemy to abandon them. Initial intelligence information on enemy defensive installations obtained from photo interpretation, observation and interrogation of prisoners of war, indicated that defensive strong points were held to the front of the 2nd and 3rd Battalion positions, and that large mine fields had been placed in front of the left Battalion sector.

By noon, 29 May 1944, the Regimental line was about 2 miles from the town along the southern flank, with the 2nd Battalion on the left and the 3rd Battalion further northeast. The 1st Battalion further north and almost due east...
The Commanding General of the 35th Infantry Division directed Colonel Harmon, at 2300 hours 29 May 1944, that the present Regional lines should be held and outposted throughout the night and following morning, and that the Regional Commander was to report to the Division Command Post the next morning, the morning of 30 May 1944, at 0900 hours, for a conference concerning plans for the 11th Infantry. Several prisoners were brought to the Regional Command Post the night of 29-30 May 1944, making a total of over 30 prisoners, or was captured in the last several days. Under interrogation, the prisoners, almost without exception, talked freely and willingly, giving all the information they had at their disposal. Among the prisoners brought in had been several Russians who had been captured by the enemy in Russia and forced to work for the enemy in Italy.

At 1135 hours, 30 May 1944, Colonel Harmon held a conference with the Battalion Commanders, Regional Staff, and the Commanding Officers of the 35th Infantry (C) Battalion and the Regimental and attached units, to discuss the relief General Order had mentioned that morning. The 35th Infantry (C) Battalion had been ordered to relieve the 11th Infantry along the line then held south and east of Velletri, the relief to be completed by 1600 hours 30 May 1944. Two possibilities were open for the subsequent commitment of the 11th Infantry. One was that the 11th Infantry would be directed to exploit a break through to the northwest the 1st Armored Division was attempting. The other was that the 11th Infantry would move to an assembly area northeast of Velletri to await further assignment. On completion of the relief, Companies A and C of the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion would revert to control of the 35th Infantry (C) Battalion in defensive support.

The Commanding General had discussed several points during his conference. The subject which had caused some difficulty was the control of attached Tank Destroyer and Tank units. General Walker stated that these units were definitely under the command of the Regimental Commander. These supporting weapons
with forces, discussing the attack encounter encountered by the Milt Infantry, the General stated that enemy counterattacks were expected, and the troops had to be ready for a possible counterattack.

During the afternoon of 30 May 1944, the enemy counter-attack against the right flank of the Regimental sector, in the area occupied by Company G, was the subject of a briefing. The Company C Officer of Company G called for shifting of mortar fires and machine gun support to assist in repelling the enemy. The enemy unit, with their heavy guns, anti-tank guns, and other supporting weapons were unlikely to be significantly hindered. The attack was significant and the Company G officer instructed the 1st Platoon of Company G to immediately move to the right flank of the 1st Battalion sector to assist in repelling the enemy.

The relief of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, Milt Infantry, from their positions southeast of Wellotri was accomplished by Company A of the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Company B of the 30th Engineers on 31 May 1944. The 2nd Battalion then moved by foot north to a position along the road running northeast from Wellotri, establishing a position and establishing a road block at that point. The position was occupied at 0100 hours 31 May 1944. The 1st Battalion, Milt Infantry, was relieved by Company A of the 2nd Battalion of the 30th Engineers, which relieved the 1st Battalion at 0200 hours 31 May 1944.

The 1st Battalion remained in its position east of the town, and the 2nd Battalion, in its position west of the town, up to completion of the relief of the 1st Battalion, Milt Infantry, by Company A of the 2nd Battalion, 30th Engineers, on 31 May 1944. The 1st Battalion remained in its position west of the town, and the 2nd Battalion, in its position east of the town, up to completion of the relief of the 1st Battalion, Milt Infantry, by Company A of the 2nd Battalion, 30th Engineers, on 31 May 1944.

All three of the Battalions were now northeast of Wellotri, the 1st Battalion in the position it had previously occupied, the 2nd Battalion in the Regimental reserve area, and the 3rd Battalion blocking the main road running northeast from Wellotri to Willenstadt on Highway 46. The current plan now for the capture of Wellotri was to first take the high ground along the ridge to Monte Ardemmo north of the town, cover the supply routes from the town, and then attack the remaining positions. On the night of 30-31 May 1944, the 122nd Infantry moved north to Monte Ardemmo and then west along the ridge behind Wellotri.

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On the afternoon of 31 May 1944, the 11th Infantry was given the mission of capturing the town of Volledri. Operational instructions issued at 1600 hours, 31 May 1944, detailed the plans for taking the town. The 1st Battalion, from its positions east of the town, was to advance from the east while the 2nd Battalion from the Regimental reserve was to advance southwest toward Volledri. The 3rd Battalion was directed to remain in its present position until 1600 hours, 31 May 1944, while the 85th Infantry Division on the 11th Infantry right flank crossed its front to its push to the northwest, and then move east to the Regimental reserve from which the 2nd Battalion had occupied. Company A of the 696th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the Regimental Combat Team for the operation. The advance by the Battalion was to be accomplished by patrolling aggressively to the front and subsequently bringing the main elements abreast of the patrolled sector.

At 1600 hours, 31 May 1944, G-3 notified Major Young that plans for the attack on Volledri had been revised, and that the 11th Infantry would send one battalion to the east behind the town with the mission of cutting south beyond the town and severing the Volledri-Nemi highway running northwest from Volledri. The 2nd Battalion was given this mission, and the 3rd Battalion was given the mission originally given the 2nd Battalion, of advancing south on Volledri from the Regimental reserve area to the northeast.

The 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, encountered heavy resistance in its attempts to advance toward Volledri from the east during the afternoon of 31 May 1944. Mines fields had been laid through the sector, and strong points of resistance were organized by the enemy. The 1st Battalion units from clearing or flanking the mine fields. Beyond initial gains of 500-600 yards, no further progress could be made and the attack was delayed until engineers could clear lanes through the fields. And enemy counter-attack with tanks and infantry was repulsed without loss of ground. At 1600 hours, Major Young notified the 1st Battalion G-3 that a platoon of engineers was being sent to clear the mine field. Company K, which had been given the mission of holding the 3rd Battalion road block on the Volledri road to the southwest, would be released and attached to the 1st Battalion for reinforcement.

The 2nd Battalion encountered only light resistance in moving west beyond Volledri and then turning south to establish a block on the Volledri-Nemi highway running northwest from Volledri. At 1800 hours, Colonel Hamory notified the 2nd Battalion to continue southwest, after blocking movement from the northwest on its first objective, and establish a block on Highway 7, the Rome-Volledri road running past from Volledri. During the early part of the evening, 31 May 1944, the 3rd Battalion closed out of the Regimental reserve area and began advancing south toward Volledri.

Thus, at the end of May, 1944, the 11th Regimental Combat Team was poised for the capture of Volledri. The 2nd Battalion was northwest of the town, blocking the main route of supply and avenue of escape. The 1st Battalion was astride the principal road running east from the town, and the 3rd Battalion was in position north of the town prepared to advance at dawn, 1 June 1944.
During the month of May, 1944

The following are the numbers of officers and enlisted men killed and wounded, to the following extent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The following is an estimate of enemy personnel and ordinance casualties:

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<th>Known</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners of War</td>
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<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KILLED</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of the fast moving nature of the operations engaged in during the month of May, 1944, and the fact that numerous units worked together during combined operations, an approximate allocation of the substantial amount of enemy wounded and ordinance casualties for the month of May, 1944, cannot be made.

END

Report of Operations Written By:

Charles E. Schmitz

2nd Lt., Regimental Sg.
111st Infantry Regiment

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION
AIO #36, U.S. ARMY

OPERATIONS IN ITALY
JUNE, 1944

ANNEX #6

141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

PART I (5 Sections) OF THREE PARTS

Section I...Regimental History
Section II...Casualty Report
Section III...Company Histories.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.3, Sept 27, 1955

SECRET

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
APO 956, U.S. ARMY

13 July 1944

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Regimenal History and Conclusion of Operations

TO: The Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, APO 956, U.S. Army

1. Incorporated is the history of operations of the 141st Infantry Regiment for the month of June 1944.

2. The operations in June, after the fall of Vellitri, brought about a fast-moving pursuit which disclosed the need of:

a. Aggressive patrolling by reconnaissance units, operating well out in front of motorized columns. Experience in this operation from VELLITRI to ROCCASTRADA repeatedly showed a lack of aggression upon the part of the attached reconnaissance elements and an unwillingness to proceed sufficiently far forward to give timely warning of enemy positions. It is recommended that:

   (1) Reconnaissance elements' training stress cross-country movement to prevent being road bound.

   (2) Reconnaissance elements be assigned specific reconnaissance missions.

b. Making use of all types of vehicles to transport troops forward quickly so that the enemy, once forced into retreat, could not stop long enough to make a serious effort at delaying our advance. In several instances the use by our troops of tank destroyers, tanks and artillery prime-movers in getting to objectives brought about the collapse of enemy resistance in positions, naturally strong, but incompletely manned because of the speed with which they were taken under fire.

   (1) It is recommended that a division have additional transportation attached to carry troops due to the fact that use of organic transportation prevents supply installations keeping up with the main body of troops.

c. Dependence, to a great extent, upon radio communication. This was particularly necessary in the cross-country operations of special task forces covering extensive zones where good results were obtained by use of radio relays. The attachment of SCR-193 radio to the regiment by division and task force was of particular help and the suggestion is offered that such radios be made a part of the T/2 of each regiment because of their superior power and strong construction.

   (1) It is believed that there is a necessity for a great deal of additional training for all radio operators in the capabilities and maintenance of radios and observance of radio security measures.

-1-

S E C R E T
2. d. A re-emphasis on the will to attack by all arms. This attitude showed constant improvement as the situation progressed and success bred confidence.

(1) It is suggested that more emphasis be placed upon indoctrinating troops with the knowledge that pursuing units should not stop to dig in positions while being subjected to artillery fire until their objective is reached.

JOHN W. HARMONY
Colonel, 14th Infantry
COMBATING

1 Incl: History of Operations (sxtupps)
including regimental history, casualty report,
and company histories. Original copy includes
all of above plus regimental unit journal and
1/25,000 maps covering operations.