OPERATIONS IN FRANCE

OCTOBER 1944

1141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

The month of October opened with the regiment engaged in combat with the Germans in the foothills of the VOSGES mountains approximately four (4) miles southwest of BRUYERES (245566, Sheet 35/18). The regimental command post was located in XAMONTAUPHT (195437, Sheet 35/18). The 1st and 2d Battalions occupied positions in the wooded area north and northeast of ST JEAN DU MARCHE (217500, Sheet 35/18) extending northwest to ESTRANGES (210530, Sheet 35/18). The 3d Battalion was still attached to the 112d Infantry Regiment in position south of XAMONTAUPHT.

The night of 30 September-1 October passed without enemy activity except for intermittent artillery fire. Patrols probed the enemy lines north of MALANKUFT (230515, Sheet 35/18) and reported that the Germans were cutting down trees across the road west of MALANKUFT. At 1005 hours on 1 October, the Regimental Commander, Colonel OLGER A. STEELE, O6159, of Cincinnati, Ohio, held a meeting at the regimental command post to discuss operational instructions with all unit commanders of the combat team. Plans were made for the 2d Battalion to advance to the east along the high ground paralleling the regimental boundary extending from HOUX (227495, Sheet 35/18) to HERZELMONT (260527, Sheet 35/18); the 1st Battalion was to eliminate enemy resistance on Hill 669 (230521, Sheet 35/18) if possible. If too much opposition was encountered, the 1st Battalion was to clear it on 2 October, and follow the 2d Battalion advance. An armored force of three tanks and a section of tank destroyers was to move from ST JEAN DU MARCHE and try to encircle HOUX. The artillery was to lay a barrage on the town and the tanks were to proceed into HOUX under fire. The remaining armored elements were to operate on the left flank of the regiment. Engineers were to remain in the vicinity of ST JEAN DU MARCHE ready to clear any mine fields that might be encountered. The 3d Battalion was cautioned not to attempt any frontal attacks—any enemy opposition was to be encircled. A special force composed of Company "B" and Company "G" was to protect the right (south) rear of the 1st Battalion. Inasmuch as the sector to be taken was heavily wooded, all units were warned to maintain close liaison to prevent any force from being cut off by enemy action. The attack was scheduled to begin at 1200 hours. The Commanding Officer of the 1141st Field Artillery Battalion advised that at least forty-eight (48) German guns were reported in the regimental area and requested reports of all enemy artillery falling within the sector as this information would assist in locating enemy gun positions.
At 1250 hours the 1st Battalion Commander, Lt Colonel WILLIAM A. BIRD, 0280648, of Barberton, Ohio, advised that his battalion would not be ready to move out until 1400 hours. In the meantime a Company "C" patrol had penetrated to the highest ground south of MALANRUPT and had found no enemy. Four riflemen and a squad of light machine guns were left on this position pending information as to what the 1st Battalion was going to do.

Company "C" left its position near LEFANIES at 1330 hours and moved southeast to attack Hill 669, supported by tanks and tank destroyers. A platoon of Infantry supported by tanks and tank destroyers also moved on PREY (222536, Sheet 35/18). Company "A" moved to the edge of the woods on Hill 558, 1500 yards west of Hill 669, to lay a base of fire on Hill 669 where Germans were reported to be entrenched. Both Company "B" and Company "C" advanced on Hill 669 from the southeast. Company "C" had proceeded but a short distance when it began receiving mortar fire but continued on toward PREY with the mission of attacking Hill 669 from the northwest. At 1605 hours Company "C" received fire from enemy 88 mm guns and suffered several casualties. One platoon of the company outposted positions (234508, Sheet 35/18) on the high ground while patrols went forward to probe enemy defenses. Meanwhile, Company "B" moved east of the COL D3 MALANRUPT.

At 1701 hours Company "C" had moved within 250 yards of the base of Hill 669. Company "A" began moving northeast from its position on Hill 558 while Company "B" moved from the south to converge with Company "C" on Hill 669. The town of PREY had been taken and was being held and outposted by one platoon of Infantry with two tanks and two tank destroyers. By 1800 hours Company "C" was receiving small arms, mortar and self-propelled gun fire while attempting to cross the open ground north of Hill 669 and was forced to hold its position while Company "A" continued to advance from the southwest.

Since it had previously been agreed that the 1st Battalion was not to become engaged in a large scale attack, the battalion commander requested the Regimental Commander to allow Company "C" to withdraw to PREY and stop the attack of Company "A" and Company "B". This plan was acceptable to the Regimental Commander.

The 2d Battalion consolidated its positions along the southern edge of the COL D3 MALANRUPT and sent patrols to points 500 yards north of HOUX. At 2116 hours the 2d Battalion reported that all enemy road blocks between ST JEAN DU MARCHE and HOUX had been cleared and patrols had penetrated as far as the first house in HOUX.
At 2120 hours the Regimental Commander advised all battalion and separate unit commanders that operations instructions from Division Headquarters had changed plans. Instead of proceeding with the attack in a column of battalions, which was unfeasible due to the present positions of the units, the 1st and 2d Battalions were to advance on the high ground in the vicinity of HERPELMONT. The 1st Battalion, from a position in the rear of the 2d Battalion, was to clear Hill 669, assemble and then follow behind the 2d Battalion. The 2d Battalion left (north) and Company "G" on the right (south) with Company "F" in support—at 0630 hours on 2 October. Company "A" was also to begin its attack on Hill 669 at 0630 hours, striking northeast. An armored group of three tanks and two tank destroyers was to assemble in the vicinity of ST JEAN DU MARCHE and be attached to the 2d Battalion in order to protect the regimental right (south) flank. The remaining armored units were to be under the command of the Commanding Officer, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, which was to be responsible for protecting the regimental left (north) flank and which was to be under regimental control. One anti-tank Company platoon was attached to the 2d Battalion with the remainder of the company under control of Armored Group "A" (636th TD Battalion). Cannon Company was to go into position near AU GOLIN (213505, Sheet 35/18) in general support of all units of the regiment. Artillery counter-battery preparations were to be fired on known enemy gun positions beginning at 0525 hours with a large concentration at 0625 hours lasting for five minutes. Units were notified that the enemy had guns to the southeast of the regimental sector so any fire received from that direction would definitely be enemy. Armored Group "A" was not to attack until ordered by the Regimental Commander whereas the other armored group, which had been designated as Armored Group "B", was to attack on order of the 2d Battalion Commander.

The night of 1-2 October passed with minor patrol activities and considerable harassing enemy artillery fires. At 0630 hours all units were in position and pushed off as scheduled. Numerous rounds of German 150 mm artillery fire fell on the hill mass northwest of ST JEAN DU MARCHE. The Regimental Commander, who was with Company "A", advised that no enemy contact had been made by either Company "A" or Company "B" up to 0745 hours. Company "G" had moved to a position east of MALANRUFT but no one had entered the town. The Regimental Commander ordered the 2d Battalion to occupy the town.

At 0906 hours Company "A" was on the southwest slope of Hill 669 while Company "B" was moving up the southeast slope. A prisoner stated that the hill had been held by a battalion of Germans which had departed during the night. Company "E" and Company "G" were ordered to press forward rapidly to a point 1000 yards southwest of
HERFELMONT and wait until the 1st Battalion could advance and form a line.

The regimental Commander reported that both Company "A" and Company "D" were on Hill 669 at 1021 hours. An estimated forty to fifty Germans were in front of Company "A" on the northeast slopes of the hill. Company "D" had established a road block on the HOUX-HERFELMONT road 1600 yards southwest of HERFELMONT. With a line extending from this road block, the 2d Battalion position covered an area 1200 yards to the northwest with Company "G" and Company "B" abreast.

At 1118 hours Company "G" encountered approximately fifty (50) enemy on Hill 688 (245516, Sheet 35/18) and took seven (7) prisoners. The Germans were driven off of the hill but it was necessary to fight for each foot of the ground. At 1200 hours on 2 October, Company "A" and "B" were still engaged with the enemy in an effort to drive them from Hill 669.

The Division Commander ordered the Regimental Commander at 1445 hours to have patrols from the 2d Battalion move to the high ground above HERFELMONT and BEAUMONT (251539, Sheet 35/18). The 1st Battalion was to be pulled back behind the 2d Battalion and the entire regiment was to be prepared to move south to help the 143d Infantry take Hill 808 in the vicinity of CHAMPDRAY (261488, Sheet 35/18) if the situation demanded it. Company "G" was ordered to advance northeast to get out of the area where it was receiving heavy enemy artillery fire. At 1450 hours the 2d Battalion was ordered to move forward and form a defense line on the ridge running between HERFELMONT and BEAUMONT. The 1st Battalion was instructed to take over the position of Company "G" and face to the southeast prepared to go to the assistance of the 143d Infantry.

At 1515 hours the Division G-4 advised that due to a shortage all types of ammunition were frozen with the exception of carbino. This presented a serious problem which directly affected all operations. However, the XV Corps had been added to the Seventh Army and its resupply was the reason for the shortage.

A Company "C" patrol progressed north to a point 1000 yards south of LAVAL (230555, Sheet 35/18) where it encountered enemy machine gun fire (228537, Sheet 35/18). An estimated company of Germans was located on the high ground (228446, Sheet 35/18) in that locality.

The 2d Battalion advised at 1712 hours that the Germans had put in a road block in front of Company "G" and whenever patrols attempted to approach it they were fired upon by self-propelled guns. However, Company "G" did get a patrol to the high ground above HERFELMONT by
1845 hours. The patrol did not enter the town, but observed no activity within it. Small arms fire was heard from BEAUMENIL upon which friendly armored units were advancing. The 1st Battalion relieved Company "F" and two Platoons of the company with one section of heavy machine guns moved back to ST JEAN DU MARCHE to protect the regimental left (south) flank.

At 2040 hours the Regimental Commander held a meeting with all battalion and separate unit commanders. He expressed his dissatisfaction with the support being given the infantry by armored units, stating that the armor was not furnishing one-tenth the support it should. The tank destroyers were to move forward, find targets and fire at them. Also, tanks were to be used more efficiently and not be afraid to fire their guns, firing on non-visible targets when necessary. The attack was to continue with the objective as the high ground south of HERPELMONT, which had been the objective of the 143d Infantry. An armored force designated as "Task Force Danzy" (TFD) composed of Company "A", 753d Tank Battalion, less three tanks; Company "C", 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, less one platoon; Reconsnaissance Company, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 141st Infantry Antitank Company, one platoon of Company "G" and at 0600 hours on 3 October Company "F", less one platoon, was to be added, had the mission of securing the regimental right flank and assisting the 2d Battalion in taking HERPELMONT. The 2d Battalion, less Company "F", was to secure the high ground west and north of HERPELMONT and protect the left (north) flank of the 1st Battalion in its attack to take Hill 676—BOIS DE CHAMONT (259518, Sheet 35/18). The 1st Battalion was to follow the 2d Battalion and protect its rear and right (south) flank until the high ground around HERPELMONT was taken. Then, the battalion was to take Hill 676 while the 2d Battalion, in turn, acted as protection. When both the high ground around HERPELMONT and Hill 676 were taken, both battalions were to attack HERPELMONT itself. The attack was to begin at 0700 hours on 3 October. Cannon Company was to be attached to the 131st Field Artillery Battalion in the vicinity of MALDOR (210511, Sheet 35/18). Armored units were to take the two hills southwest of FIMENIL (241544, Sheet 35/18) and then advance to the town itself, which Company "F" was to take. The 2d Battalion was also to assist armored elements in taking the town of BEAUMENIL.

The Company "G" road block on the NOUX-HERPELMONT road was knocked out by direct fire from a German self-propelled gun. During the night of 2-3 October, both Company "G" and Company "H" patrols ran into enemy opposition. Information secured from a prisoner indicated that 100 Germans occupied the high ground north and west of HERPELMONT which was the 2d Battalion objective.
At 0700 hours on 3 October, the 2d Battalion began its attack. By 0900 hours Company "G" was 700 yards west of the battalion objective with Company "F" on its left (north) flank. The 1st Battalion followed the 2d Battalion without encountering opposition. Armored elements could not move out of PREY due to the constant shelling from German 88 mm guns. By 1000 hours both Company "F" and Company "G" had encountered light opposition. Both Company "F" and the Company "G" platoon attached to Task Force Denzy were moving on BÉAUMÉNIL and were receiving small arms and mortar fire 500 yards west of the BOIS DE LACET. A strong enemy force appeared to be entrenched between the BOIS DE LACET and Hill 512 to the northwest protecting the road junction. Fire from enemy self-propelled guns continued to harass both infantry and armored units.

Company "G" had worked around to the west of the battalion objective by 1130 hours and had reached a point where the road to BÉAUMÉNIL entered the woods. Cub artillery planes had spotted four (4) enemy self-propelled guns in HÉRPELMONT and artillery was called upon to try and knock them out.

At 1205 hours the 1st Battalion reported approximately 200 Germans advancing up a draw between Company "B" and Company "C". Armored Group "F" in the vicinity of ST JEAN DU MARCHÉ was ordered to move by way of HOUX to the assistance of these units.

Forward armored elements were just southwest of the BOIS DE LACET in contact with Company "F" which was actively engaged with the enemy. The 2d Battalion captured seven Germans from an eight man enemy patrol out of the 3d Company, 1/3d Battalion. The prisoners stated that there had been 150 men in the company originally, but only 100 of these were left. Their unit had left GÉRARDMONT (3562, Sheet 35/18) for HÉRPELMONT the previous day. The patrol was attempting to return to HÉRPELMONT when it was intercepted.

At 1400 hours the regimental command post closed at XAMONTARUIN and moved to LE BOULAY (197512, Sheet 35/18). At 1440 hours the Division Commander visited the command post. He stated that he wanted the men to get as many hot meals as was possible. The 2d Battalion was to send patrols to its front and to the north in an effort to find out enemy dispositions. All battalions were to consolidate in a good position for the night.

At 1516 hours the Division Commander advised that Company "I" would attack from Hill 827 (234663, Sheet 35/18) toward the wooded area (240486, Sheet 35/18) which lay southeast of LAVELINE-HOUX (234490, Sheet 35/18), before darkness.
Company "B" had contacted Company "C" and elements of the 143d Infantry west of the HOUX-HERPELMONT road. Germans were still in the vicinity but their attack had been broken up and the situation was under control.

The Regimental Commander notified the Commanding Officer of Company "C", 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, at 1620 hours that the tanks and tank destroyers had never reached the Infantry of Company "F". He ordered both tanks and tank destroyers to move forward immediately and knock out the self-propelled gun which was holding up the advance of Company "F" and assist in clearing out the sixto seventy Germans in that area. Darkness fell before the Germans could be routed and Company "F" was ordered to hold its position, maintaining a line from PREY to the 2d Battalion. The Company "C" platoon attached to the armored group was brought back from PREY by jeeps and three-quarter ton trucks to its parent company with the 1st Battalion.

At 1921 hours the Division Commander advised that the PURDY Block Force, which was composed of Engineer and armored units blocking the roads around LEPANGES, was to be under control of the 143d Infantry.

The Regimental S-3 notified the 2d Battalion that it was to continue the attack at 0700 hours on 4 October. During the night active patrolling was to be maintained with adjacent units and at least one patrol to the front to feel out enemy defenses or other activity. Artillery harassing fires were to be placed across the entire front from 2200 hours on 3 October to 0700 hours on 4 October.

At 0700 hours on 4 October, both the 1st and 2d Battalions had moved out. Strong patrols were sent from the 1st Battalion to the BOIS DE CHAMPION (Hill 676) to ascertain the best approaches to the high ground. The PURDY Block Force reported that it was receiving heavy artillery fire from the east, but patrols had been sent toward BEAUMENIL and COTTENAY along the VOLCME River toward LAVAL in an effort to locate routes for armor and to establish observation posts.

At 0845 hours the Regimental Commander notified the Division Commander of the progress of the attack and requested that he talk to the armored forces regarding more aggressive firing. Colonel STEELE advised also, that the PURDY Block Force was to try and knock out the center of resistance between FIMENIL and BEAUMENIL with the support of the artillery. Cross-country movement was to be made by trails with as little observed movement as possible. Reserve armored elements were to move from DEYCHMONT (194528, Sheet 35/18) to LEPANGES.

The 1st Battalion was ordered at 0857 hours not to move out until the 2d Battalion had taken the high ground northwest of HERPELMONT. At 0914 hours the 2d Battalion advised that a Company "G" patrol had...
entered HERPELMONT and a Company "E" patrol had reached the edge of the woods (251530, Sheet 35/18) 1000 yards south of BEAUMENIL. The Regimental Commander ordered the 2d Battalion Commander, Lt Colonel JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD, 022656, of Fargo, North Dakota, to clear the woods and occupy positions north and northeast of the high ground. Company "C" was to protect the flank of the 1st Battalion when it crossed the open ground out by the HOUX-HERPELMONT road. By 1110 hours 2d Battalion patrols were combing the woods northeast of HERPELMONT and 1st Battalion patrols were investigating Hill 676. Armored forces were slowly working toward FIENIL.

The 1st Battalion was ordered to attack Hill 676 at 1400 hours. Artillery was to register on the area at 1330 hours. Patrols on the southwest slope of the hill reported no enemy contact. The 2d Battalion had taken the high ground above HERPELMONT and was prepared to support either the armored elements to the northwest or the 1st Battalion to the southeast. However, 2d Battalion patrols encountered strong enemy patrols on the edge of the woods near HERPELMONT and in the vicinity of ROND CHAMP (245529, Sheet 35/18). Two enemy platoons were observed digging in on the southeast edge of the BOIS DE LACET (242530, Sheet 35/18).

The PURDY Block Force was notified that a strong effort was to be made to take both FIENIL and BEAUMENIL before darkness. The tanks and tank destroyers were to close their turrets and move into an attack under fire of the artillery. The armored unit commander stated that his units were firing on a number of enemy positions and antitank guns but were continuing to advance.

At 1435 hours the 2d Battalion advised that Company "G" had received a counter-attack 200 yards west of HERPELMONT. Artillery had been called down on the Germans to break up the attack. The enemy effort was estimated to be in company strength and was on the left flank of Company "G". The Regimental Commander ordered the 1st Battalion to leave Company "G" in position in the event it was necessary to give the 2d Battalion assistance. By 1515 hours both Company "E" and Company "G" were fighting off enemy counter-attacks along an east-west line.

Company "A" and Company "G" crossed the HOUX-HERPELMONT road at 1535 hours. Encountering but slight opposition, Hill 676 was taken at 1720 hours. Meanwhile the 2d Battalion reported that it was meeting stiff resistance and was making little or no progress. The Germans held the east portion of the hill and Company "G" and Company "G" held the west portion. At 1850 hours the Division Commander ordered artillery placed on FIENIL, BEAUMENIL and the sector in front of the 2d Battalion. Company "G" established contact with Company "G" to
close the gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions while the 1st Battalion supporting armored units were ordered to proceed north to within one kilometer of HERPELMONT. By 2145 hours Company "F" had worked its way to the rear of Company "E" and Company "G" and was placed under the control of the 2d Battalion.

The 3d Battalion, which was still attached to the 142d Infantry, reported at 2158 hours that it was unable to secure supporting artillery fires from the 132d Field Artillery Battalion to stop the enemy artillery falling in its area. This information was passed on to the 36th Division Artillery Commanding General with the request that harassing fires be placed on LE THOL (260431, Sheet 35/18) and LE PETITE THOLY (269445, Sheet 35/18). The Artillery Commander stated that the 3d Battalion would receive supporting fires within fifteen to twenty minutes.

During the night of 4-5 October, the 2d Battalion was harassed by enemy artillery fire which resulted in slight casualties. At 0745 hours on 5 October, the 1st Battalion notified regiment that between forty and fifty Germans had infiltrated between Company "A" and Company "B". A wire party had contacted the enemy force.

The Division Commander visited the regimental command post at 0857 hours and the Regimental Commander requested that the PURDU Block Force be released from the control of the 141st Infantry and the boundary road justed. The Division Commander agreed to the release of the PURDU Block Force and made it the regimental flanking unit on the north.

One enemy tank and approximately forty foot troops entered a triangular clearing in front of Company "G" at 0730 hours. Artillery was placed on the area and it sounded as though the enemy had pulled back into HERPELMONT. One platoon of Company "E" sent to that position, however, was pinned down by machine gun fire at 1020 hours. Another platoon was sent to try and extricate the first platoon. The Germans also laid down artillery concentrations along the HOUX-READENNE road in the wooded sector.

At 1030 hours the 1st Battalion reported that Company "A" had sent patrols to the north, northwest and west and had contacted enemy forces in each direction. The 1st Battalion requested that support be furnished if at all possible. At 1050 hours the Commanding Officer of Company "A" reported a half a company of Germans digging in along the edge of the woods on Hill 676, 400 yards southwest of HERPELMONT. The Company "A" commander had sent two combat patrols to clear a communication and supply route. The patrols encountered approximately fifty of the enemy and engaged in fire fights. Several Germans were
killed, more were wounded and two prisoners taken. Tanks and tank destroyers were placed in position near the two road blocks established by the 1st Battalion southwest of HERTELMAIN. Both road blocks received considerable enemy artillery shelling.

The 2d Battalion Commander notified the Regimental S-3 at 1245 hours that he was taking the Company "F" platoon from its position 1000 yards northeast of MULHUPT and was replacing it with an Antitank platoon to block the road. The enemy had been probing the 2d Battalion left flank all morning and an attack was expected during the afternoon. One day's supply of mortar ammunition was to be expended firing on the area north of the Antitank platoon road block. The artillery had been ordered not to fire unobserved fire due to shortage of ammunition. With enemy patrols extremely active across the 2d Battalion front, harassing fires were needed.

The 3d Battalion was to be relieved from the 142d Infantry at 2200 hours and arrangements were made to bring the battalion to an assembly area near the regimental command post.

The Division Commander visited the regimental command post again at 1640 hours and stated that the regiment must establish a line on the forward slopes of the hill mass west of HERTELMAIN in order to gain a good defensive position.

An attempt was made to get the regimental Antitank Company back from the HARDY Block Force, but it was being used in key positions. The Regimental Commander requested additional men from Division to hold positions which did not involve actual combat for the 1st and 2d Battalions as all units were committed. Units from the 111th Engineer Battalion were obtained for this purpose.

Men carrying supplies to Company "A" and Company "B" encountered an enemy patrol on Hill 676 in the same vicinity as previous enemy patrols had been reported. It was believed this patrol was trying to cut communication wires.

Enemy artillery fire reached an unprecedented intensity throughout the regimental area. Casualties had been mounting steadily for four days and the battalions' fighting strength was being lowered appreciably. Arrangements were made by the Regimental S-2, Major ROSWELL K. DOUGHTY, 0280726, of LePuy, New York, to have members of the FFI (French Forces of the Interior) pass through the 1st Battalion's positions into enemy territory and report German gun positions by radio.

During the night of 5-6 October, the 3d Battalion was released
from the 142d Infantry and moved into an assembly position in the vicinity of LE BOULAY.

At 0612 hours on 6 October, the 2d Battalion Commander notified regimental headquarters that approximately 170 Germans were dug in along the 2d Battalion front. As soon as the PURDY Block Force on the battalion's left flank was able to advance, the Battalion Commander intended to use armored units to clear the Germans out of his area.

The 1st Battalion advised that Company "A" had received a small counter-attack at 0825 hours, but the Germans had been driven off with a good many casualties. One of the enemy was found to be tapping the wire line to the forward position of the company. Company "G" engaged an enemy force at 1030 hours but maintained control of the situation. Company "F" moved to the vicinity of ROHD CHAMP.

During the afternoon and early evening of 6 October, constant patrolling was maintained by the 1st and 2d Battalions. Each movement to the north or east brought enemy fire. It was evident that reinforcements were being brought into the regimental sector by the Germans.

At 2150 hours the Regimental Commander notified the 3d Battalion Commander that the regiment would attack again at daylight on 6 October with three battalions. The 3d Battalion was to be in the center and make the main effort with the objective of the high ground north and east of HERPELMONT. Operations instructions would be issued based upon battalion reconnaissance which was to begin at 1000 hours on 7 October. In the attack it was planned to have two companies abreast in each battalion with a great deal of supporting artillery fire and harassing fires from Company "D", 33d Chemical Battalion, which had been attached to the regiment. At 0802 hours on 7 October, Division Headquarters advised that Company "C", 3d Chemical Battalion, was also attached to the regiment.

On the morning of 7 October, the Regimental Commander attempted to clarify the situation of supporting tanks and tank destroyers. At that time only two tanks and two tank destroyers were physically with the regiment. The remainder had been with the PURDY Block Force and had stayed with that unit when it was detached from the regiment. At 0850 hours the Division G-3 stated that one platoon of tanks and one platoon of tank destroyers would be returned to the regiment.

At 1200 hours Colonel CARL E. LUNDQUIST, G16889, of Grand Rapids, Michigan, assumed command of the regiment.
The new Regimental Commander set the hour of attack on 8 October to 0400 hours and this information was given to the Assistant Division Commander and Division Artillery Commander at 1655 hours when they visited the command post.

The 1st Battalion displaced forward at 1430 hours and advance elements had reached a point 500 yards southwest of HERPELIGNY at 1700 hours. The Regimental Commander ordered the battalion to hold this point and use it as a line of departure for the attack in the morning. The 3d Battalion was to attack from this position at 0600 hours with the 1st Battalion holding the regimental right flank and furnishing one company for the attack if it became necessary. This information was passed on to the Division Commander at 1712 hours and he stated that units should be prepared for a counter-attack the following afternoon. When HERPELIGNY was taken, only one company was to remain in the town itself.

At 1750 hours the 2d Battalion reported that Company "F" and the battalion antitank platoon had advanced to the edge of the woods during the day. The artillery and chemical mortars had evidently knocked out some self-propelled enemy guns and horse-drawn artillery as a great deal of commotion was heard in the area when fire had been concentrated. Screaming could be heard and fast movement of troops and vehicles. At one point troops of the battalion wore in one house and enemy troops in another 100 yards away.

At 1820 hours a conference was held at the command post with the Division Commander, Assistant Division Commander, Division Artillery Commander and Regimental Commander. It was decided that the 3d Battalion would move from its assembly area near LE BOULAY at 0200 hours and attack at 0600 hours. Artillery preparatory rounds were to be on call. Only a thin line of Infantry was to hold the forward slopes of the wooded hills and a movable reserve force held in readiness for a counter-attack at all times. This reserve was to be held in the woods out of enemy observation.

The Regimental Commander notified the 2d Battalion that the regimental Antitank Company would be prepared to cover the left flank of the battalion by 0600 hours on 8 October. This relieved the battalion from protecting a flank that was protected only by the battalion antitank platoon.

At 0440 hours on 8 October, a forward command post was opened in the wooded sector southwest of Hill 676.

At 0600 hours the attack began with all three battalions moving forward preceded by an artillery concentration lasting from 0550
hours to 0600 hours. The enemy laid down counter concentrations all along the front with artillery ranging up to 170 mm caliber. Company "I" encountered six enemy machine guns and 20 mm gun fire 400 yards from the line of departure. At 0700 hours it began to dig in positions with Company "H" on its left flank. The enemy machine guns kept firing from behind a rock wall. Company "G" maintained the line with the 3rd Battalion with Company "F" farther to the north and Company "E" on the extreme northern end of the Regimental line. No opposition was being encountered in the northern sector. Tanks were ordered forward to knock out the machine guns holding up the 3rd Battalion. At 0730 hours the tanks were in position 400 yards southwest of HERFELMONT and Company "K" was preparing to assault the town supported by Company "L". Both the 1st and 2nd Battalions continued to keep in contact with the 3rd Battalion. The tanks began firing on the enemy machine guns at 06:20 hours. Company "B" moved to the northern tip of the "405 CHAMONT" prepared to protect the 3d Battalion right flank from enemy attacks coming from JUSSAURT (270516, Sheet 35/18) or the wooded sector (270525, Sheet 35/18) east of HERFELMONT. The 3d Battalion advised the 1st Battalion Commander that HERFELMONT would be taken by one company of the 3d Battalion supported by tanks after which the 3d Battalion was to form a block for the advance of the 1st Battalion. The 3d Battalion continued to advance through the woods northwest of HERFELMONT and Company "G" began to edge out into the open ground north of the town. By 0855 hours both Company "G" and Company "I" were pinned down by the enemy machine gun fire. The chemical mortars were called upon to try and knock out these enemy gun emplacements. Company "B" began receiving 20 mm gunfire from the floor of the valley east of its position. At 0940 hours Company "L" advised that it had met an enemy tank on the edge of HERFELMONT and tank destroyers were engaging it at the present time. The Executive Officer of the 3d Battalion stated at 0950 hours that both Company "F" and "L" had received fire from two tanks, machine guns and 20 mm guns. The forward artillery observers had lost their radios and the companies became disorganized under this heavy enemy fire. The companies withdrew to the edge of the woods west of the town and reorganized for another attack which was to be preceded by an artillery preparation.

Company "E" and Company "F" met increased enemy resistance as they pressed towards the northern part of the wooded sector above HERFELMONT. At 1011 hours the 3d Battalion notified regiment that it was holding its position until the 2d Battalion could give it some assistance. Artillery gun planes reported a constant stream of enemy infantry moving west and south from LES POUILLES (298558, Sheet 35/18). Company "C" encountered heavy resistance in the BOTS CHAMONT and suffered numerous casualties. The company withdrew to the vicin-
nity of the forward regimental command post, after its fire fight ceased, to reconnoiter. At 1200 hours the Regimental S-2 requested Division to secure fighter-bomber support for the attack.

At 1200 hours the 3d Battalion Commander, Captain ROBERT L. DAVEY 01286017, of Ziegler, Illinois, notified the Regimental S-3 that a ten minute barrage at 1230 hours would precede another attack in which tanks would move out under the concentration and pass through the Infantry. Company "I" had moved to the northeast side of the HOUX-HERPELMONT road and thus had relieved much of the pressure on Company "H". However, whenever Company "I" attempted to move, an enemy tank fired directly on its position.

The 3d Battalion began its attack at 1250 hours supported by tanks and slowly moved forward into HERPELMONT. At 1355 hours the town was entered and forward elements kept pressing forward toward the road junction east of HERPELMONT. The Regimental S-3 ordered Company "C" and Company "A" of the 11th Engineer (C) Battalion to take this road junction. However, Company "K" actually reached the objective at 1515 hours.

Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion reported that Company "E" and Company "C" had been stopped by the Germans. Company "F" was still fighting to clear the woods and reported that the enemy seemed to be moving toward HEAUMENIL. Company "G" was then ordered to try and move around on the flank of the enemy force.

The 1st Battalion was advised that a ten minute artillery concentration was to be placed on the southeast corner (257514, Sheet 35/18) of the BOIS DE CHAMONT and upon its completion Company "G" and Company "A", 11th Engineer (C) Battalion were to move in and attempt to clear the woods.

The 3d Battalion was advised at 1555 hours that the enemy forces opposing Company "G" might try to get back into HERPELMONT and units were to be prepared for this. The 3d Battalion had Companies "I" and "L" in town with Company "K" to the east of it. Patrols were sent to the high ground southeast. The tanks and tank destroyers were ordered to be prepared to move southeast of HERPELMONT along the valley.

The 2d Battalion notified regiment that the woods northwest of HERPELMONT should be cleared by nightfall. Company "E" was advancing while Company "F" was still engaged in a fire fight. One German position was found with abandoned artillery guns.

The Regimental Commander inquired at 1627 hours if Company "B" could be gotten ready to take the high ground due north of JUGGARUP.
The 1st Battalion Commander stated that it would not be possible, Wharsupen, he was ordered to have one company from the 1st Battalion relieve a company of the 3d Battalion which would attack to the high ground. The 1st Battalion was to clear the BOIS DE CHAMONT, and establish a road block on the east-west road running from HERPÉLON, and furnish support for the 3d Battalion attack. Company "B" was designated as the unit to relieve a company of the 3d Battalion, making little progress in their attack on the southwest portion of the BOIS DE CHAMONT.

At 1732 hours the 2d Battalion Commander advised that his companies were all mixed up in the woods. He had held a conference with his company commanders and hoped to work down to the edge of the woods by dark. Chemical mortars, tanks and tank destroyers fired into the woods and caused a large explosion of unknown origin. It became necessary to stop firing the mortars as the base plates bounced so that it was unsafe to fire. However, it became evident at 1822 hours that the battalion would not be able to clear the woods.

Company "K" received an enemy artillery concentration of approximately 200 rounds at 1830 hours and began organizing a defensive position along a line 400 yards east of HERPÉLON. At 1900 hours the Assistant Division Commander ordered the regiment to continue pushing during the night and to shift some strength to the left flank.

By 1913 hours the 3d Battalion had Company "K" on the high ground north of JUSARupt. Instructions were issued to find another supply route as the road through HERPÉLON was being shelled continuously. Company "B" was sent from the 1st Battalion at 1930 hours to relieve Company "K" and arrived on position at 2125 hours. Company "C" occupied positions on the edge of the woods northwest of JUSARupt, while Company "C" and the Engineers were still held up near the top of Hill 676 where they were receiving heavy artillery shelling.

During the night of 8-9 October, the Germans threw a great deal of artillery fire into the regimental sector. Movement was kept to a minimum and all units were dug in wherever terrain permitted.

The Regimental Commander ordered the 2d Battalion at 0700 hours on 9 October, to push aggressively and clear the woods to the west of its position during the afternoon. Armored forces were able to come through FIMENIL and BÉLUNIL but could not get through the wooded sector west of those towns.

The Division Commander stated at 0817 hours that he would like the regiment to take JUSARupt. The Regimental Commander pointed out
that although the high ground north and west of the town had been taken, the high ground to the southeast was still in enemy hands and an attack would leave the regiment with an open flank.

By 0914 hours the 2d Battalion reported that the woods northwest of HœRPELMONT had been cleared. Numerous S-mines were encountered in the area. Leaving Company "F" in the woods, the remainder of the 2d Battalion assembled to attack the BOIS DE LACET. The 3d Battalion continued to hold the area north and east of HœRPELMONT. Company "C" and Company "A" were to continue the attack to clear the BOIS DE CHAMONT while Company "B" completed clearing the woods north of JUSSARUPT.

At 1050 hours the Assistant Division Commander arrived at the command post. He stated that the 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, would take over the sector east of HœRPELMONT. The 3d Battalion was to be responsible for the sector from the 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, to the woods west of HœRPELMONT. The 2d Battalion was to be relieved for a rest. At 1135 hours the Regimental Commander notified the Assistant Division Commander that a patrol which had proceeded past the high ground southeast of BEAUMENIL had run into enemy tank fire coming from the reverse slope. Company "L" was ordered to occupy this sector.

The Assistant Division Commander ordered the regiment to set up outposts, defensive fires and hold objectives lightly. No troops were to be left in HœRPELMONT. The Division was expecting replacements shortly and the 143d Infantry was to receive first priority on them.

The 2d Battalion reported at 1155 hours that enemy tanks, troops and vehicles were moving from BEAUMENIL to Fimetier and thence to CHAMP LE DUC (246555, Sheet 35/18). It appeared as though the enemy was preparing to retreat from BEAUMENIL. At 1250 hours both Company "E" and Company "F" met strong opposition on the edge of the woods and received small arms and 20 mm gun fire. Company "B" was also engaged in a fire fight north of JUSSARUPT but continued to advance. Two enemy tanks moved south from BEAUMENIL toward Company "F" at 1300 hours. Company "I" patrols reported Mark VI tanks near the wooded sector southeast of BEAUMENIL. Company "C" advanced to the edge of the woods west of JUSSARUPT.

At 1422 hours the Regimental S-3 notified the 3d Battalion that Company "I" would relieve Company "J" and Company "B" would take over the Company "L" sector. The battalion was to protect the left flank of the regiment on a line extending from the BOIS DE LACET to BEAUMENIL.

Two tanks in front of the 2d Battalion kept firing into Company "J" and Company "F" positions at 1644 hours. The Battalion Commander
stated that the companies would probably have to be pulled back. At
1700 hours the Regimental Commander ordered both companies to move
into an assembly area and be prepared to attack the BOIS DE LACET in
the morning. Company "I" was to take over the position vacated by
these two units. The 2d Battalion Commander advised that if patrols
reported no enemy in the woods, units would move in during the night.
If Germans were met, however, the attack would begin at 0800 hours.
Patrols were unable to get into the BOIS DE LACET due to heavy fog.
It was decided to maintain listening posts throughout the night to
prevent patrols from becoming lost.

On the morning of 10 October, Company "E" was relieved and moved
to LEPANGES. The 2d Battalion moved out in its attack and Company "C"
was within the BOIS DE LACET by 0910 hours without meeting enemy re-
sistance although numerous mines were found in the sector. Company
"F", advancing up the west side of the woods encountered heavy small
arms fire. Company "G" began receiving heavy concentrations of artill-
ery. Advancing units ran into an increasing quantity of S-mines and
booby traps. One hundred fifty-four rounds of enemy artillery fell
within the Company "G" area in one hour. When friendly counter-
battery began, the German guns stopped firing, but when the friendly
counter-battery ceased, the enemy guns began firing again. Sixty-one
prisoners had been taken by the 2d Battalion up to 1230 hours. Priso-
ners reported an enemy battalion in position between the northeast
worn of the BOIS DE LACET and FIMENIL.

At 1345 hours the Regimental Commander informed the Division
Commander that the regiment was engaged in mopping up enemy opposition
in the BOIS DE LACET. It was requested that the 143d Infantry move
closer to the regiment so that the 300 yard gap between the 143d In-
fantry and the Engineers in the BOIS DE CHAMONT would be closed.
Heavy enemy artillery continued to fall throughout the regimental
sector, mainly from the LA CHAPELLE (296544, Sheet 35/18) area. It
was planned to pull the 2d Battalion out of the line during the day,
but it was doubtful if more than one company of the 1st Battalion
could be relieved.

The 2d Battalion advised that it was being held up by heavily
mined areas in the BOIS DE LACET. Company "G" was endeavoring to
flank an enemy road block at the north end of the woods.

The Assistant Division Commander visited the command post at 1420
hours and stated that the 2d Battalion was to be pulled back during
the night if at all possible with Company "K" taking over the sector.
Also, the 1st Battalion was to be relieved if the tactical situation
permitted.
By 1520 hours the 2d Battalion had been able to eliminate the enemy road block at the north end of the BOIS DE LACET and Company K began to move up to outflank the woods. Company "K" was in position at 1715 hours and the 2d Battalion closed into a bivouac area in LEFAGES at 1915 hours.

On the morning of 11 October, the order was issued by regiment for units to clear the woods and roads of mines wherever possible. This was a large task as the Germans had laid innumerable mines and booby traps throughout the area. The Engineers on the regimental right flank were withdrawn from their position for this work and the 1st Battalion was held responsible for maintaining contact with the 143d Infantry.

Enemy forces infiltrated back onto Hill 512 (229540, Sheet 35/18) and fired upon Engineers clearing mines from the area. Company "K" and the Engineers were ordered to drive the Germans from the hill again. A road block was to be established between Hill 512 and the BOIS DE LACET. The 3d Battalion continued to suffer casualties from enemy artillery which was believed firing from the vicinity of LA CHAPELLE. Patrols from the 3d Battalion were sent to FIMENIL and BEAUMENIL at 1948 hours. The patrol sent to BEAUMENIL penetrated to the fringe of houses on the edge of town and went through them, finding no enemy. The patrol did not enter into the main sector of the town. The patrol to FIMENIL reached a point 400 yards from the woods toward the town and encountered twelve Germans. A fire fight resulted and the patrol withdrew.

The 3d Battalion reported at 1025 hours on 12 October that it had tried to work troops from the BOIS DE LACET over to Hill 512 but was stopped by small arms fire. Patrols were endeavoring to work into the woods on Hill 512 from the north. At 1122 hours four enemy planes flew over the regimental sector strafing. The 2d Battalion bivouac area in LEFANGES received enemy shelling during the afternoon and the Battalion Commander was ordered to keep movement to a minimum within his sector.

The Regimental Commander ordered patrols sent to JUSSARUFT, FIMENIL and BEAUMENIL from the 1st and 3d Battalions. At 1555 hours Division ordered two strong combat patrols sent out to capture prisoners, but the Regimental Commander stated previous instructions would apply except that the patrols were to try to capture a few Germans. The 1st Battalion sent a patrol to JUSSARUFT at 1725 hours which penetrated to the southeast edge of town, heard Germans within houses but did not capture any. Another patrol was sent out which returned at 0205 hours on 13 October, reporting that the enemy had sent up flares which prevented them from getting close to the village. The patrol
from the 3d Battalion went to the edge of BEAUMENIL and talked to French civilians who stated there were no Germans within the town except two who were wounded. There were a great many mines within the town planted by the Germans.

At 0730 hours Company "K", supported by Engineers, attacked Hill 512 and successfully cleared its wooded areas. Sixteen prisoners were taken. A request was made for additional Engineers to clear the BOIS DE LACET of mines as the woods were needed for forthcoming operations. The 3d Battalion reported continued harassing enemy artillery in its area.

The 1st Battalion reported at 1018 hours that a six man patrol left for JUSSARUPT at daylight and reached a point just south of the town's limits when it was fired upon. Two members of the patrol were killed, two wounded, one was missing and only one was unharmed. Returning members stated there were many Germans within the town.

The 3d Battalion advised at 1140 hours that it had a patrol in BEAUMENIL. The Regimental Commander ordered the patrol to remain within the town and to work additional men from Company "I" into the town in an effort to hold it. The Regimental G-3 advised the 3d Battalion that Company "C" would relieve Company "I" during the night or as soon as Company "C" was relieved by elements of the 145th Infantry.

At 2135 hours the Regimental Commander notified the Division G-3 that only one patrol was being sent out during the night as it was desired that the enemy not be alerted. Company "I" was occupying houses in BEAUMENIL and tanks were moving from HEREFLENT to BEAUMENIL. The Engineers were clearing box mines from the roads and removing mines and booby traps from the BOIS DE LACET.

Company "C" completed the relief of Company "I" at 2215 hours despite heavy enemy artillery fire within the area. The night of 13-14 October passed without incident except for the usual heavy enemy shelling.

The Regimental Commander informed the 2d Battalion Commander at 0820 hours on 14 October that the regiment would attack at 0800 hours on 15 October, and it was vitally important that the 2d Battalion clear the high ground (225445, Sheet 35/18) north of FREY at an early hour as the advance of the 145th Infantry depended on it. The 3d Battalion Commander was notified at 0925 hours that his left boundary in the attack would be west of the road block between the BOIS DE LACET and Hill 512 and run north to the east end of LAVAL. The battalion was not to enter LAVAL as the stream formed the termination of the boundary.
A meeting was held at the regimental command post at 1320 hours and the Regimental Commander discussed the operations instructions with the battalion and attached unit commanders. The regiment was to attack at 0800 hours on 15 October in conjunction with a coordinated attack of both the 45th and 36th Infantry Divisions. The regiment had limited objectives compared to other units in the attack. The 1st Battalion was to hold its present position and upon regimental order north of JUSSARUP, establish a road block in the vicinity of AURONTEZ (286925, Sheet 35/18) and maintain contact with the 162d Infantry on the regimental right flank. The 2d Battalion, with one platoon of tanks attached, was to take the high ground north of FRENAY and south of LAVAL, mop up all enemy resistance and maintain contact with the 3d Battalion on the right (east). The 3d Battalion, with two platoons of tanks attached, was to attack with two companies and seize and hold the high ground west of FIENEL and the ground just southeast of the town with the main effort being made on the left. The main regimental effort was to be made in the 2d Battalion sector. Battalions were to use the utmost secrecy in their patrolling.

The 3d Battalion reported at 1820 hours that the town of FIENEL was clear. One platoon was in the town and two more platoons were moving in. By 2025 hours two platoons of Company "I" were in FIENEL.

Ten patrols from the battalions operated on the night of 14-15 October. All patrols moved into enemy territory aggressively and returned with a great deal of valuable information. Only 1st Battalion patrols encountered enemy opposition.

The attack on the morning of 15 October, began on schedule. The 3d Battalion had taken one of its objectives the previous night and quickly occupied the wooded sector west of FIENEL. The 2d Battalion cleared the high ground south of LAVAL by 1215 hours and moved north and west to the VOLGHEM River. Company "K" outposted the river bed and was ordered to be prepared to take over the 2d Battalion sector as it was contemplated that the 2d Battalion would be relieved. Company "G" was sent to the 1st Battalion to relieve Company "A".

At 1532 hours the Assistant Division Commander changed the regimental boundary to include the canal running through LAVAL. The 2d Battalion Commander sent one platoon of Infantry supported by a section of machine guns to the new boundary, but the Commanding Officer of the 163d Infantry stated that it would not be necessary for this force to cross the river as long as it covered the factory area with its fire power. Company "F" was then relieved by Company "K".

The 3d Battalion reported at 1644 hours that many Germans were
moving up the main road from LAVAL to BRUYERES (245566, Sheet 35/13) on bicycles. The chemical mortars were shifted from their position on the northern portion of the regimental sector to the southern portion in support of the 1st Battalion. The Regimental Commander ordered Company "A" to launch an attack at dawn on 16 October and establish a roadblock. The 2d Battalion was then to relieve the 1st Battalion while the 3d Battalion outposted the northeast flank of the regiment. Company "C", which had originally moved south to relieve Company "A", was charged with maintaining contact with the 1/2d Infantry. Company "E" engaged in a fire fight with a ten man enemy patrol at 2030 hours which lasted for approximately one hour before it was driven off.

At 2300 hours the Commanding Officer of the 143d Infantry advised that his regiment was going to infiltrate into CHAMP LE DUC during the night. Both Company "K" and Company "L" of the 141st Infantry were to be relieved as soon as possible.

The usual heavy concentrations of enemy artillery fell in the regimental area throughout the night of 15-16 October.

At 0615 hours on 16 October, Company "A" and Company "B" moved forward to establish a roadblock. Both units received enemy small arms and mortar fire but continued to press forward until they were pinned down by increased enemy fire. At 1112 hours the 1st Battalion advised its supporting tanks were in HERPELMONT and Company "A" was being drawn back into the town. An attempt was going to be made at 1500 hours to cut the road junction (274526, Sheet 35/13) north of JUSSARUPT. However, because of heavy enemy artillery shelling, the attack was delayed. It was planned for Company "A", supported by two tanks, Company "B" with one tank and two platoons of Company "C" to move along the road southeast towards JUSSARUPT and then cut back northeast towards the road junction objective. The battalion began its attack at 1640 hours and encountered stiff resistance from enemy small arms, mortar and artillery fire. It was forced to withdraw to its original position. The 2d Battalion was then ordered to relieve the 1st Battalion and continue the attack on the morning of 17 October. It was not until 0800 hours on 17 October that the relief was effected because the troops had been scattered by artillery and communications had been disrupted.

At 1250 hours the 2d Battalion reported small arms and machine gun fire from enemy positions along the fringe of woods on top of the hill. Mortar and 88 mm gun fire was coming from the direction of LAVALINE DEVANT BRUYERES. It was believed that the enemy had infiltrated within the battalion sector and was making an attack. The Regimental Commander immediately alerted Company "K" and Company "L" for movement to the battalion area. However, at 1451 hours the 2d
Battalion reported the situation had quieted down and plans were made to move forward slowly.

The Regimental S-3 notified the 1st Battalion, which had moved to DEVLIN, that after 0630 hours on 13 October, the battalion would be on a one hour alert status and would move to the vicinity of HERPEL-MONT if the tactical situation made it necessary.

The Assistant Division Commander notified the Regimental Commander at 1728 hours that the 2d and 3d Battalions would attack in the morning with two companies abreast in each battalion and two platoons in each company in the attack would be abreast. The Regimental Commander requested that the 142d Infantry make a feint on the right flank just before the two battalions attacked.

The Regimental Commander held a meeting at 2055 hours with battalion and separate unit commanders to discuss the attack in the morning. The 142d Infantry was to make a feint at 0600 hours with artillery preparations, small arms and machine gun fire in order to draw the enemy's attention. The regimental attack must be successful, he stated, as the objectives were of the utmost importance--the men must force their way through. At 0600 hours on 13 October, the regiment was to attack from a line bounded by the road running northeast from HERPEL-MONT toward the high ground north of JUSSARUP and clear the woods of the enemy and maintain contact with the 142d Infantry on the right. The 3d Battalion was to attack southeast from the line of departure and secure the first three regimental objectives which terminated on the high ground overlooking the road running north out of JUSSARUP. If the 3d Battalion attack failed, the 2d Battalion was to be prepared to attack and seize the first objective. If the 3d Battalion successfully took the first objective, the 2d Battalion was to attack and seize the road junction at VINOT (270520, Sheet 35/18), maintain contact with the 142d Infantry and relieve the 3d Battalion after it had secured its final objective.

At 0535 hours the 3d Battalion Commander, Major ALBERT R. BRUYÈRE III, O22644, of Montclair, New Jersey, who had assumed command of the 3d Battalion on 10 October, advised that his troops were in HERPEL-MONT and would be ready to begin the attack on time. The attack started on schedule and Company "L" moved forward to receive enemy mortar and small arms fire. The 2d Battalion reported mounting casualties from enemy artillery, small arms, and 20 mm gun fire coming from the vicinity of JUVELINE DEVANT BRUYÈRES. The 3d Battalion tanks accomplished their mission of blasting in houses northeast of HERPEL-MONT, but upon withdrawing to HERPEL-MONT enemy armor piercing shells fell in their vicinity. Company "L" pressed forward to the edge of the woods (264528, Sheet 35/18) and slowly began fighting its way south. Company
assembly area at 2300 hours while the 1st Battalion closed in at 0800 hours on 29 October.

At 0815 hours on 23 October, the Division Commander stated that he wanted a patrol of company or battalion strength to work down a trail through the FORET DOMANIALE DE CHAMP to the high ground (350570, Sheet 36/18) north of LA HOUSSIÈRE (345555, Sheet 36/18). French guides of the FFI were to be made available for the movement. The 1st Battalion was alerted to move out on foot immediately. The battalion, preceded by one company, was to go up the trail to specified points. If these points were clear of the enemy, the remainder of the battalion was to move behind the advance company. An Engineer reconnaissance party was to go with the leading elements to clear any obstacles. The 3d Battalion was alerted to stand by and the 2d Battalion was notified that it would move from XAMONTARUFT to a position around VERVEZELLE sometime during the night.

The 1st Battalion began moving at 1158 hours to a forward assembly area (284576, Sheet 35/18) on the edge of the FORET DE BELMONT. A forward regimental command post was established (280573, Sheet 35/18) close to the 1st Battalion assembly area.

With Company "A" leading, the 1st Battalion passed through the position of Company "K", 442d Infantry, (302587, Sheet 35/18). The 3d Battalion followed the route of the 1st Battalion and reached a position in the vicinity of the forward regimental command post at 1630 hours. Company "A" was on Hill 624 (320585, Sheet 35/18) at 1745 hours with the remainder of the battalion 1000 yards west. The 1st Battalion Commander requested at 1800 hours that the 3d Battalion move closer to his position in case support was needed. The 3d Battalion was ordered to move to the top of the hill in the morning as mortar fire was falling in the area at that time.

At 1817 the 1st Battalion Executive Officer, Major CLAUDE D. ROSCOE, 0367264, of Brownwood, Texas, reported that Company "A" was engaged in a fire fight with an enemy patrol.

The Division G-3 notified regiment at 1925 hours that the 2d Battalion was released to the regiment. Information was also given that BIFFONTAINE had been cleared by the 442d Infantry.

The Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion to follow the 1st Battalion route to a point 1700 yards north of BIFFONTAINE (309574, Sheet 35/18) at 0600 hours and then cut north to establish a road block (318601, Sheet 35/18) 700 yards southeast of GREBEFOSSÈ (315608, Sheet 35/18) and then move southeast along the route of the 1st Battalion.
"K" became disorganized due to enemy artillery fire, but began to rally up on the right of Company "L" at 0815 hours. A great deal of enemy mortar and artillery fire continued to fall on the 2d and 3d Battalions and casualties mounted. By 1129 hours Company "K" was on the right flank of the first objective with Company "L" following behind. Company "G" sent out a strong patrol just north of VIMONT to prevent the Germans from infiltrating into its position from JUSSARUPT. Company "F" had such heavy casualties that its remaining members joined Company "E".

By 1252 hours Companies "K" and "L" were on their first objective and pressed on towards the second objective. By 1350 hours Company "L" had reached the second objective and moved forward in conjunction with Company "E" and Company "F". The Regimental Commander decided to hold this force on the second objective during the night and continue the attack at 1000 hours on 19 October.

The attack began again at 1000 hours on 19 October, and moved rapidly. Only a small amount of enemy artillery was encountered. By 1140 hours the 2d Battalion believed it had cleared the last opposition from the hill but Company "E" ran into resistance at 1156 hours and received heavy enemy artillery fire. The 3d Battalion reported considerable activity across its front but stated it was progressing favorably. By 1330 hours both battalions had reached their objectives and were digging in defensive positions. The 2d Battalion was designated to hold the hill and the 3d Battalion was alerted for possible relief during the night. At 1610 hours the Division G-2 advised that the 142d Infantry would take over the 141st Infantry's entire sector and the 2d Battalion would be attached to that organization.

During the night of 19-20 October, the 3d Battalion was relieved and moved to LEPAURES. The Division Commander ordered two tanks to be placed in the vicinity of the high ground north of JUSSARUPT to fire across the valley on the road from AUMONTZEB (287525, Sheet 35/18) to GRANGES SUR VOLQUE (295498, Sheet 35/18) and render the road unusable for the enemy. Enemy planes operated over the Division area during the night.

The regiment, with the exception of the 2d Battalion and its regular supporting attachments, remained in bivouac on 21 October. The 2d Battalion was relieved from attachment to the 142d Infantry on 22 October and moved into a bivouac area in the vicinity of XAMONTAURUPPT.

At 1325 hours on 22 October, the 1st and 3d Battalions were alerted to move by truck during the night. The Regimental Commander selected an assembly area (255580, Sheet 35/18) southeast of VERVEZELLE (252587, Sheet 35/18). The 3d Battalion closed into its...
At 2140 hours the Regimental Commander informed the Commander of the 2d and 3d Battalions that the regimental mission of securing the high ground north of LA ROUSSIÈRE would continue at 0700 hours on 24 October. The 1st Battalion was to attack from its present position and knock out the road block to its immediate front and push on to the objective.

The 1st Battalion reported at 0830 hours on 24 October that Company "B" had moved forward at 0700 hours and had advanced but a few hundred yards when they were engaged in a fire fight with members of the FFI. This matter was reported to Division Headquarters which sent two FFI members to join the 1st Battalion. Division stated that there were probably French forces fighting on the side of the Germans and the 1st Battalion had probably mistaken them for FFI men. Units were alerted to be on the lookout for enemy dressed in civilian clothes in all towns.

Company "I" reached the 3d Battalion's initial objective 700 yards southeast of GREHEFOSSE at 1005 hours and received small arms and machine gun fire from the woods due north across a narrow valley from the objective.

The Division Commander arrived at the regimental command post at 1030 hours. He stated that the regiment need not worry about its northeast flank as the 3d Infantry Division was to cut the valley and roads to the north which would relieve the tension on the north and east flank.

By 1050 hours Company "B" and Company "C" were 1000 yards west of DEVANT LE FEYS (335952, Sheet 35/18). The 1st Battalion command post and Company "A" were located 600 yards northwest of DEVANT LE FEYS. The Regimental Commander ordered the Regimental S-3 to send light tanks to the 1st and 3d Battalions immediately as it was believed the 1st Battalion was in contact with the enemy in the BOIS DE SIFONTAINE near Hill 665 (333578, Sheet 35/18). Company "K" cleared the area southeast of GREHEFOSSE while Company "I" moved down to the trail junction (316599, Sheet 35/18) 1000 yards southeast of GREHEFOSSE. Enemy artillery fire began falling in the vicinity of the 1st Battalion command post. At 1230 hours the 2d Battalion was alerted for immediate movement as the 442d Infantry was to be relieved from the regimental sector. Four tanks moved into position along the ridge east of HELMONT SUR BUTTANT (280589, Sheet 35/18) and the Regimental Commander requested the Division Commander to release additional tanks to the regiment from the FELBER Armored Force in the vicinity of HELMONT SUR BUTTANT.

At 1446 hours the Division Commander notified regiment to have
the troops stop their attack at 1700 hours and dig in. At 1615 hours the Regimental Commander notified the Division Commander that the 2d Battalion would probably be out of communications for approximately two hours. Both the 1st and 3d Battalions were receiving counterattacks. The attack on the 1st Battalion came from the vicinity of RAVAN LE FEYS. The Germans moved from the lowland up a trail to the northeast and made contact with Company "A" and the battalion headquarters. Company "B" and "C", approaching Hill 645 (341577), Shotwell, moved forward to engage the enemy, reinforced by the battalion Antitank platoon. Company "K" also received a counter-attack near the trail junction southeast of GRENIER and Company "I" was sent as reinforcements. Both battalions were out of communication with regiment at 1615 hours. No contact had been made with the 3d Division.

At 1630 hours the Division Chief of Staff arrived at the regimental command post with instructions from the Division Commander to get the troops well dug in and start forward early on the morning of 25 October. Artillery was to be adjusted for air bursts within the woods. He stated that regiment was not to worry about getting tanks stuck in the woods—they were to be used whenever and wherever possible.

At 1735 hours the Regimental S-3 reported that the Germans had overrun the 1st Battalion command post, but the personnel had fought their way back west. The Regimental Executive Officer reported to Division G-3 that the 1st and 3d Battalions were digging in. The 2d Battalion was moving into an assembly area in the woods 1000 yards northeast of BIFFONTAINE. Enemy artillery continued to fall within the regimental sector, coming from the south. The trails within the woods were badly in need of repair and the Division Commander authorized the use of all the Engineers the regiment desired.

The night of 24-25 October passed with intermittent enemy artillery fire. Counter-battery fires of the 131st Field Artillery had been effective in keeping down much of the German Artillery. At 0045 hours on 25 October, the Division G-3 advised that a bombing mission was scheduled for 0900 hours along the road and edge of the woods south and east of the regiment objective. Control of the bombing was to be made by radio based upon information furnished by the Regimental S-2 as to the disposition of troops at 0830 hours on 25 October.

The 2d Battalion reported at 0648 hours that it was receiving heavy shelling from the north within its sector and requested counter-battery by friendly artillery units. The battalion continued to push down the trail to the 1st Battalion to open a supply route. At 0730
hours supplies could not be gotten any further than 1200 yards from units of the 1st Battalion in the BOIS DE HIFFONTAINE. The 3d Battalion was sending out a strong combat patrol to the point where Company "K" had received its counter-attack on the previous day. It was clear, the remainder of the battalion was to move into position there.

The Regimental Commander was advised by the Division G-3 at 0825 hours that the bombing would be in the vicinity of VANEMONT (364560, Sheet 36/18) with the center of impact northeast of the town. IVOUX (311539, Sheet 35/18) was also to be bombed, but not the area northeast of this position.

At 0830 hours the Regimental S-2 notified the Division G-2 that the Germans had cut the supply line to the 1st Battalion and had machine guns set up. It was believed the enemy had an observation post along the trail as a great deal of artillery was falling in the sector. Company "E" could hear small arms fire to the southeast and believed it was Company "A" engaged with the enemy.

The Division Chief of Staff arrived at the regimental command post at 0927 hours to check the situation of the 1st Battalion. The Regimental Commander informed him that every time a vehicle moved up the trail, even though they could not be seen, the Germans placed artillery concentrations on the trail. It was believed the enemy had a radio party in the woods that watched every movement. The Regimental Commander further stated that four light and four medium tanks were in forward positions within the woods. The Division Chief of Staff stated that the Division Commander wanted the remaining seven tanks attached to the regiment to move forward as soon as possible. Observation posts were to be put on the edge of the woods at the regimental objective—the entire edge of the woods was to be manned. Upon taking the regimental objective, reconnaissance was to be made into IA HOUSSEIRE and VANEMONT with a road block established, if possible, at one or the other of the towns.

A forward regimental command post was established 1200 yards north of HIFFONTAINE at 1300 hours.

The Regimental S-3 advised that two platoons of Company "A", Company "E" and Company "G" were together in the woods one mile north of IA HOUSSEIRE. Company "E" and one platoon of Company "A" were 2200 yards northwest of the 1st Battalion units and were engaged with enemy forces that kept infiltrating into their positions. The 2d Battalion radiated to the 1st Battalion that it was endeavoring to get supplies through to it but small groups of aggressive Germans were holding up the advance.
The 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, was attached to the regiment at 1450 hours. At 1525 hours the Regimental Commander ordered the command of this unit to pass through Company "I" and form a holding battalion and protect the regimental left flank. Troops were to pass through the regimental forward command post by 0630 hours on 26 October.

At 1600 hours the 3d Battalion Commander stated that contact had been made with the 2d Battalion and Company "K" was ready to attack. The Regimental S-3 advised the 3d Battalion that the 2d Battalion was also ready to attack and he could commit his units. Both units began their advance and immediately ran into strong opposition. Company "C" Sheet 35/18 East of Devant Le Feys.

The Regimental Commander informed the 3d Battalion Commander that he was planning to send supplies to the 1st Battalion on tanks. If this plan did not work, Company "L" was to transport ammunition and water to the isolated units. Each man was to carry two bandoliers of ammunition and a full canteen of water. After the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, passed through Company "I" and secured the high ground to the east, Company "I" and supporting tanks were to follow Company "K". At 1826 hours the 2d Battalion was ordered to keep pushing forward during the night in order to divert the enemy's attention in an effort to make contact with the 1st Battalion with tanks. The remaining platoon of Company "A" was ordered to send out a strong patrol to knock out the enemy road block so that the tanks could get through.

At 2330 hours the Regimental Commander reported no general change on the status of the 1st Battalion. The Company "A" platoon had not been able to work through or around the road block because of heavy automatic weapons fire and innumerable anti-personnel mines and the tanks also failed to break through due to lack of coordination. Companies "E", "F" and "G" were on the high ground east of Devant Le Feys with Companies "I", "K" and "L" on the high ground south of Grebefosse. Companies "B", "F" and "K" were in contact with the enemy. Company "K" was to maneuver to the east with two platoons and determine the enemy flank and clear the trail running southeast from Grebefosse to Hill 633 (331539, Sheet 35/18). The regiment with the 2d Battalion 442d Infantry attached, was to attack at 0730 hours on 26 October toward the east. The 2d Battalion was to push east to Hill 665 along the trail taken by the 1st Battalion. When the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, passed through the 3d Battalion, the 3d Battalion was to attack southeast to Hill 633. If contact was made with the 1st Battalion by the 2d Battalion, the 1st Battalion was to press on to the heights just north of La Housière while the 2d Battalion protected
the regimental right flank along the edge of the woods from Hill 601 to DEVANT LE PEYS. The 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, was responsible for the regimental left flank while the 3d Battalion was to be responsible for security from the vicinity (36758, Sheet 36/18) of Hill 612 to its objective (36356/7, Sheet 36/18) on the high ground north of VENOMONT.

The 2d Battalion reported at 0750 hours on 26 October, that its units were moving forward. The 3d Battalion also advised that it had begun its attack while the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, was getting into position. At 0923 hours the Division Commander arrived at the forward regimental command post and was apprised of the situation. The Regimental Commander informed him that the 1st Battalion had been cut off for thirty-six hours and the only means of communication was through one artillery radio with an artillery forward observer. The last message received from the 1st Battalion had been at 0835 hours wherein it acknowledged receipt of instructions to try and knock out the enemy road block to its northwest.

The commander of the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, reported at 1005 hours that he was encountering resistance 500 yards east of LANGEPOSSE (321500, Sheet 35/18) and was having a hard time getting across the trail.

At 1030 hours the VI Corps Commander, 36th Division Commander and 36th Division Chief of Staff arrived at the regimental forward command post to discuss the situation of the 1st Battalion. The VI Corps Commander stated that the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, should drive straight east while tanks were sent up the trail to fire direct fire at the enemy road blocks while Infantry went around both sides of the road blocks. The Division Commander ordered the 143d Infantry Commander to get an artillery forward observer in position to observe the valley southeast of the 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry, as there should be plenty of targets of opportunity there. The Division Commander stated that he might have the 143d Infantry attack across the valley to the east to surround the Germans cutting off the 1st Battalion.

At 1045 hours the 2d Battalion advised that it was encountering S-mines but was contemplating a plan to send its supporting tanks forward.

The Division Commander inquired from the Commanding Officer, 131st Field Artillery, as to when the last message had been received from the 1st Battalion by radio, as instructions might be issued to have the 1st Battalion attack west if they had enough ammunition. At 1047 hours the Division Commander ordered the Regimental Commander to have the 1st Battalion at attack to the rear (west) immediately.
He stated that the situation had been stalemated for thirty-six hours and four battalions were under regimental control with nothing being done. He ordered an attack to surround the enemy and stated that they were on the enemy's flank and the Regimental Commander replied that artillery shelling too close and too many casualties were suffered because of the tree bursts.

The 2d Battalion was ordered to send Company "F" into the patch of woods 1,000 yards east of BIFFONTAINE, Company "E" had advanced but 150 yards and Company "G" was being slowed down. The 3d Battalion advised at 1055 hours that Company "K" was receiving a counter-attack along its left flank coming from the high ridge across the valley (324.91, Sheet 35/18). The battalion commander judged that Company "K" would be able to repel the attack but was going to commit Company "L". The Regimental Commander ordered supporting tanks to be brought forward to assist Company "K". The 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, was having to fight its way forward every inch of the way.

At 1108 hours the Division Commander ordered that artillery be fired on enemy in front of the 2d Battalion. Artillery was to be fired over the target first and then adjust the range by sound. The 2d Battalion was cautioned to be careful of firing in the vicinity of Company "K" just to the northeast of Company "F". The two tanks supporting Company "I" pulled out and had to be ordered back by the Regimental Commander.

At 1135 hours the Regimental Commander sent a message to the 1st Battalion through the 113 Field Artillery radio to return to their starting point immediately; that Germans were occupying positions south of Hill 613 and Company "K" was in contact with the enemy in this vicinity; artillery was being fired on this point; and that the 113 Field Artillery was to be kept informed of the 1st Battalion position.

The Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, advised the Regimental Commander at 1153 hours that his Company "G" upon passing through Company "I", met entrenched enemy extending northeast to Hill 617 (324.91, Sheet 35/18). Company "G" passed Company "I" on the flank and used Company "I" as a base of fire to advance. The Regimental Commander ordered Company "G" to probe around the enemy's flank and estimate the situation.

The Division G-4 wanted to arrange for dropping supplies by plane to the 1st Battalion, stating that it would take a minimum of twelve hours to get planes over the battalion area. The Regimental Commander stated that the planes should be ready and loaded with supplies so that
if they were needed, it would be a matter of minutes to get them started.

A division liaison officer arrived at the command post at 1212 hours with orders from the Division Commander for the 1st Battalion to attack back (west); the Division Commander did not believe that the 1st Battalion understood that from the Regimental Commander's message. Also, the 2d and 3d Battalions were to get started in their attack, while the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, had the mission of moving southeast toward Hill 633. The liaison officer also reported that the Division Artillery Commanding General was planning to adjust artillery on the enemy road block. The Regimental Commander stated that no artillery was to be fired in that area without clearance from the 1st Battalion forward observer as troops were in the vicinity of the road block. At 1242 hours the Regimental Commander called the Division Commander and notified him of the disposition of all units. The Division Commander stated that the battalions must be organized and push ahead.

At 1300 hours the Regimental Commander ordered Company "I" to move between Company "K" and Company "L" to fill an existing 200 yard gap. Company "I" was still engaged in a fire fight with the enemy and was furnishing a base of fire for the advance of the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry. One friendly tank had been knocked out by the enemy and the others had moved back. The Regimental Commander stated that he would send additional light tanks forward.

A message was received from the 1st Battalion at 1312 hours that it had contacted enemy forces at three different points. Twenty-eight men of the 1st Battalion were wounded or injured and it was requesting friendly artillery fire on enemy positions in BOIS DE BIFFONTAINE southeast of DEVANT LE FEYS. The Regimental Commander sent another message to the 1st Battalion at 1340 hours to move the troops west and contact Company "K" 1000 yards north of DEVANT LE FEYS.

At 1345 hours the Regimental Commander notified the 2d and 3d Battalion Commanders that they would attack again at 1600 hours with the 3d Battalion making the main effort. The 2d Battalion was to make a holding attack and be prepared to break through a point 1000 yards northeast of DEVANT LE FEYS which the 3d Battalion was to clear up to. The 3d Battalion was to use whatever tanks were left available. Engineers were to follow the Infantry to clear the roads of blocks and mines. A ten minute artillery preparation starting at 1550 hours was arranged with the 131st Field Artillery Battalion.

The 1st Battalion radioed at 1422 hours requesting permission to remain in its position until the next day as it would be impossible to reach the vicinity of Hill 665--the prearranged point--at daylight due to casualties. A second message followed stating that the 1st Battal-
lion must know the outcome of the combat patrol which it had sent out as the patrol was half of its strength. The Regimental Commander radioed that the attack was going to proceed at 1600 hours and the 1st Battalion was to continue its attempt to fight its way back.

The 1st Battalion Commander, who had been cut off from his force when his command post was overrun, was placed in charge of supporting tanks which were to make the main attack down the trail toward the isolated units.

At 1530 hours the Regimental Commander ordered the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, to move to the vicinity of the trail junction south of LANGEPOSSE and stay there until ordered differently.

The Division G-4 was asked at 1600 hours if arrangements had been completed for dropping supplies to the 1st Battalion. The G-4 stated that at least twelve hour notice must be made, giving a specific time and place to drop supplies before the material could be packed. The nature of the supplies desired also must be made. Upon consultation with the Regimental Commander, the Regimental Executive Officer informed the G-4 that two days supply of "K" rations and water, medical supplies, one case of 45 caliber ammunition, one case of carbine ammunition, two cases of machine gun ammunition, four cases of caliber 30 M-1 rifle ammunition, and four BA 70, six BA 39 and two BA 40 batteries were to be dropped. The drop was to be made at the coordinate 349573, Sheet 36/18, Gertrude, in the vicinity of Hill 651, upon call after 0800 hours on 27 October.

The artillery preparation of fifteen rounds per gun fired by two battalions of artillery was made at 1550 hours on schedule and the attack jumped off on time. Company "G" met opposition on its left flank (318530, Sheet 35/18). Company "F" ran into a platoon of enemy 500 yards east of BIFFONTAINES with at least three machine guns. The company platoons deployed and used rifle grenades and automatic weapons on the Germans. Company "F" had run into enemy automatic weapons fire and one platoon was out of contact with the company. At 1720 hours the 1st Battalion radioed that it had been stopped by strong enemy forces dug in near Hill 665. Upon attempting to flank the enemy position, an extensive mine field covered by machine guns was encountered. Consequently, the 1st Battalion withdrew to its original line of departure.

The Division G-3 advised the Regimental S-3 at 1759 hours that the VI Corps Commander wanted the regiment to tie in with the 7th Infantry of the 3d Division on the left (north) by extending the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, to secure the left flank. This was not to be done by just patrolling.
The Regimental Commander radioed the 1st Battalion at 1800 hours that food, water and ammunition would be dropped on the morning of 27 October, after 0800 hours in a clearing in the woods (344574, Sheet 36/18). Panels, smoke or something white were to be displayed as recognition. The 1st Battalion replied at 1840 hours that medical supplies were needed as seven new casualties had occurred. It also stated that ammunition was needed before another attack could be made and inquired as to the disposition of the combat patrol which it had sent to contact the 3d Battalion. No information had reached regiment of any contact by the 1st Battalion patrol with other regimental units.

At 1905 hours the Division commander inquired of the Regimental Commander if he had contact with the 1st Battalion and was informed contact was made periodically by radio. The Division Commander stated that he believed it was a good idea to bring the 1st Battalion out across the open ground to the west to BIPPONTEAINE. The Regimental Commander advised that this plan had been discussed but it was not believed good due to the wounded litter cases. The Division Commander then stated that he did not order the wounded left but the 1st Battalion must be gotten out during the night.

The Division 8-3 advised at 1912 hours that an air drop of supplies for the 1st Battalion would take place at 0800 hours if weather conditions permitted. If the weather interfered, the drop would take place at the first opportune time. All antiaircraft units and other units had been notified. Planes probably would be a fighter-bomber.

The 2d Battalion Commander notified the Regimental 8-2 that enemy along his front were well dug in with numerous machine pistols in position along the line. The enemy personnel observed seemed to be well trained troops, some of whom might be snipers since they were camouflage uniforms with hoods fitting over helmets to break the outline. Positions of 120 mm mortars, self-propelled guns and a battery of artillery were reported. A patrol reported unusually heavy traffic on the road northeast of BIPPONTEAINE. Hill 624 had S-mines around the German positions. The Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, estimated at least 100 Germans dug in on his right (373605, Sheet 35/18) with machine guns firing at his troops. Company "G", 442d Infantry, had received a small counterattack during the afternoon which had been repulsed.

At 1955 hours the 2d Battalion Commander reported that every platoon leader and non-commissioned officer of Company "E" had become casualties. One hundred Germans with twelve machine guns were estimated to be in front of Company "F". The left flank of the battalion was exposed. The Regimental Commander stated that the Regimental Headquarters Company Intelligence & Reconnaissance (36R) Platoon would be sent to fill the gap.
The 1st Battalion radioed at 2010 hours that a small clearing around its position would be marked with a row of white and, if possible, some yellow smoke at 0745 hours. Rations, ammunition, cigarettes, and medical supplies were requested to be dropped in such a manner that the enemy would not be aware of the position and predica-
ment of the isolated forces. The battalion also inquired as to whether or not anything had been heard from its patrol. The Regimental Com-
mander replied that nothing had been heard from the patrol but suppli-
ies would be sent and smoke was to be sent up when the plane appeared.

At 2145 hours the Division Commander advised that the remaining elements of the 442d Infantry would pass through the 111st Infantry on 27 October in an effort to gain contact with the 1st Battalion.
The Regimental Commander advised him of a plan to concentrate on the enemy northeast of BIFFONTEAINS; with artillery, mortars, rocket laun-
chers and rifle grenades as it was believed this ground was the key to a goodly portion of the ridge. The 1st Battalion air drop was sched-
uled for 1100 hours. The Division Commander approved this plan.
At 2240 hours the Division Commander was advised that the 3d Battalion had but one medium tank left—two having been knocked out. Two compa-

The Assistant Division Commander notified the Regimental Commen-
der at 2350 hours that Company "F" would be relieved by one company of the 442d Infantry which would attack and take the nose of ground to its front southwest of DEVANT LE PAYS. The 131st and 332d Field Artillery battalions were to be in direct support. Officer guides from Companies "I", "K", "L", "O" and "O" were to report to the regi-
mental command post of the 442d Infantry at 0300 hours on 27 October to act as guides. The 1st Battalion Commander was to remain forward and take over command of the 1st Battalion whenever it is rescued or contacted. The 442d Infantry was to attack at 1000 hours on 27 October, with the 111st Infantry furnishing a base of fire while the 442d Infantry tries to go out and around the flanks of the dug in enemy.

The Regimental Commander suggested to the Division Commander at 0850 hours that the 111st Infantry stay in its present position to protect the 442d Infantry in its attack. The 2d and 3d Battalions were ordered to be prepared to resume the attack with the 442d Infan-
try if it becomes necessary.

The 1st Battalion radioed at 0915 hours that five men from its combat patrol had returned with one prisoner. The remaining members of the patrol had been captured in an enemy ambush. An enemy patrol supported by machine guns attempted to penetrate the 1st Battalion position from the south but was repulsed.
The 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry, was scheduled to attack through Companies "F" and "G" to the east while the regimental 3d Battalion attempted to outflank enemy positions and attack from the north. The 141st Infantry was to act as a holding force and furnish a base of fire for the 442d Infantry.

The attack of the 3d Battalion, 141st Infantry, and 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry, was delayed due to friendly artillery falling short and landing in the vicinity of both battalion command posts. At 0530 hours the attack was able to begin.

At 1145 hours Division was asked for information on the dropping of supplies to the 1st Battalion. The Division G-3 stated that planes had circled the area for some time but due to heavy ground fog they could not make the drop. The planes returned to their base and will start again as soon as visibility permits. This information was radioed to the 1st Battalion.

All rifle companies of the 3d Battalion were engaged with the enemy. Company "K" reported seeing the 442d Infantry advancing on the right (south) but the 3d Battalion of the 442d Infantry was not up with Companies "K" and "L" at 1200 hours.

At 1200 hours the Division Commander notified regiment that base projectile shells loaded with medical supplies would be fired from 105 mm and 155 mm guns at 1700 hours to the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion was notified of this plan by radio. The Division G-4 advised at 1500 hours that from twelve to fourteen P-47 aircraft were standing by to drop supplies if the weather cleared. Also, 100 rounds of artillery shells had been filled with medical supplies and were to be fired over the 1st Battalion area in the same manner as propaganda leaflets. Shells were to contain sufficient explosives to crack them open.

Company "K" received an enemy counter-attack at 1520 hours, supported by a tank and was forced to withdraw several hundred yards to higher ground. Company "I" and Company "L" were sent to the vicinity of Company "K" as added strength to repel the attack. Four enemy tanks were in front of Company "K", 442d Infantry, of which one was knocked out in addition to an armored half-track. The 3d Battalion was ordered to place unobserved fire on the tanks attacking Company "K". Company "I" was receiving artillery fire at 1615 hours coming from the east and southeast. At 1642 hours the Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion Commander to send a strong combat patrol to the nose of the hill to determine the location of enemy forces. In the meantime the 3d Battalion was to protect the left flank of the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry.
The 2d Battalion companies were engaged in a fire fight at 1745 hours. The road between Companies "F" and "G" was cut by heavy enfilade small arms fire. The Division Commander advised at 1750 hours that the regiment would be attached to the 442d Infantry Regiment temporarily.

At 1800 hours the Executive Officer of the 1st Battalion was placed in charge of the battalion by order of the Regimental Commander.

The Division Commander notified the Regimental Commander at 1826 hours that he wanted active patrolling during the night and an attack at 0630 hours on 28 October.

The 1st Battalion radios at 1826 hours that it could no longer adjust artillery for supplies but would continue in the morning. It inquired if aircraft would be used in the morning and requested the disposition of friendly troops. The message ended with the words, "morale high".

The Regimental S-3 replied to the 1st Battalion message that aircraft would be used the next day and friendly forces were approximate 1000 yards to the northwest. He asked what the condition of the man was, if the troops had secured water and how many litter cases were in hand. The 1st Battalion replied at 2015 hours that the men were weak; halazone tablets for purifying water were needed; nine medical litter cases were on hand; four men had been killed and 53 men were missing from the combat patrol sent out to contact friendly forces to the west.

Company "F" reported enemy rocket fire coming from LE COURS Mountain south of BIFFONTAINE during the night of 27-28 October.

At 0751 hours on 28 October, the 2d Battalion Commander reported that the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry, was bypassing enemy resistance and was moving to the left (north) of the 1st Battalion trail. The Regimental Commander ordered the 2d Battalion to clean up this resistance and keep moving. The 2d Battalion Commander wanted to know what reserve existed in the event of an enemy counter-attack and was told that regiment would try to send a reserve in such an event. The 3d Battalion was also ordered to keep moving and maintain close contact with the 100th Battalion if at all possible. The Commanding Officer of the 442d Infantry requested that the 3d Battalion attack the hill in front of Company "K" at 0900 hours in conjunction with an attack by the 442d Infantry. This was arranged with the 3d Battalion.

At 0855 hours the 2d Battalion Commander advised that he was taking over command of Company "G" and moving out for the attack. An officer from the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, was taking charge of the regimental Company "F" and Company "F", 442d Infantry, for the attack.
The 131st Field Artillery advised at 0911 hours that the 1st Battalion had radioed that it had a marker twenty-five feet long on the forward slope of the hill facing west for the air supply mission. This information was passed on to the Division G-3 who stated that the planes were in the air at the present time and would stay up until the ground could be seen sufficiently well to effect a drop. At 1005 hours the 1st Battalion radioed that the planes had dropped supplies near the right place. This information was passed on to Division with the request that the airfield be notified immediately. The Division G-3 advised at 1040 hours that the first two planes had dropped supplies. Two planes at a time with a sub artillery plane were to be sent when there was an open spot in the clouds and drop supplies until ten planes had fulfilled the mission. The 1st Battalion radioed at 1045 hours that it could see the bundles but could not get to them as they were too far away from the crest of the hill for safety factors. It was requested that subsequent planes drop supplies closer to the crest of the hill. This information was given to Division and subsequently to the airfield. The 1st Battalion finally stated that it could not reach any of the supplies. By this time, however, bad weather had grounded the planes. At 1210 hours the 1st Battalion radioed, "Weather is clear now. Please do something." The Division G-2 advised that planes were in the air at the present time carrying food, supplies, and batteries.

The Regimental S-3 requested an air mission against LE COURS MONT, bombing the northwest and southeast slopes and strobing the valley from IVUX to CORIEUX.

Two battalions of the 442d Infantry and the 2d and 3d Battalions, 111st Infantry, were to attack again at 1445 hours after a brief respite to reorganize.

Fog closed in again and a message was sent to the 1st Battalion as to whether or not they had received supplies as the last drop had been made by RADAR and the airplanes wanted to know the result. Visibility during the drop had been very bad. The 1st Battalion replied that it still had not received the supplies and requested the planes to fly lower. Division advised at 1550 hours that two planes were still trying to locate the 1st Battalion.

At 1620 hours the Division Commander notified the Division Chief of Staff at the regimental command post that the 3d Battalion was to crawl and run forward as that was the only way to get the enemy to move back. The Battalion and company commanders were to get up front and drive the companies forward.

At 1640 hours the 1st Battalion radioed that the last plane drop had been successful and requested that they keep coming. They also
reported that the shells loaded with supplies being fired to them had been successful. Division was immediately notified of the results.

The Division Commander advised at 1650 hours that the Division Chief of Staff, Colonel CHARLES H. OWENS, 06957, of Tacoma, Washington, had been designated as Commander of the 141st Infantry Regiment.

At 1740 hours the 2d Battalion advised that Company "G" and the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry, were moving forward with Company "G" in contact with the enemy.

The 1st Battalion radioed at 1820 hours, "Aircraft and artillery did wonderful job. Every man thanks every Sunray (Commanding Officer from the bottom of heart."

At 1835 hours the 1st Battalion radioed that it needed bandages, sulfadiazine, and adhesive tape for additional casualties. One man had just died. At 1900 hours the 1st Battalion requested that artillery not be fired until morning. The Division Commander was advised of this request.

By 2015 hours the 3d Battalion was approximately 1200 yards northwest of the 1st Battalion and in contact with the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry.

The Division 6-4 was notified at 2030 hours that supplies for the 1st Battalion were to be resupplied with priority on medical supplies, batteries, food and ammunition. The artillery was to shoot medical supplies and D-ration chocolate bars.

The Regimental Commander informed the 3d Battalion Commander at 2150 hours that another attack would be made at 0730 hours on 29 October. The 2d Battalion was to make a deploying attack around the left flank on a very limited scale while the 3d Battalion moved to the northeast. Two companies were to attack abreast.

The 1st Battalion radioed at 2227 hours that it had received only rations—nothing else had been found as yet. Water was available. The battalion hoped to see additional aircraft on 29 October. The Regimental Commander radioed back that aircraft would try again as soon as possible after daylight.

The 2d and 3d Battalions began their attack on the morning of 29 October on schedule. The 3d Battalion met no opposition initially. At 0918 hours the Regimental Commander advised the Division Commander that the attack could not move down the trail as desired. Instead the attack had moved to the left flank to the high ridge and thence
east down the trail. Movement was cross-country and was consequent slow. Neither Company "I" nor "L" had contacted the enemy. The 3d Battalion, 442d Infantry, was on the 3d Battalion right flank, and contact was being made. The 3d Battalion was proceeding due east to the high ground on Hill 612 (348590, Sheet 36/18), and thence south towards the 1st Battalion.

At 1020 hours the Regimental Commander radioed the 1st Battalion that friendly units were progressing toward it satisfactorily and hoped to contact it soon. The battalion was instructed to bury the dead and mark well the area. Friendly aircraft were due at 1015 hours. At 1105 hours the 1st Battalion reported that the aircraft had done a good job of dropping supplies but it had not received any 610 radio batteries for its radio.

The 442d Infantry advised at 1125 hours that it had advanced 500 yards from its position of yesterday. Its Companies "D" and "F" were in contact with the enemy. The road to its Company "C" was subjected to enemy small arms fire at the present time.

The 3d Battalion also ran into enemy opposition, but Company "K" was detailed to clear it up and Companies "I" and "L" continued to push to the east.

The 1st Battalion radioed at 1210 hours that it had received sufficient supplies with the exception of radio batteries and halazone tablets for purifying water. Division was notified of these additional requirements.

The 2d Battalion notified the Regimental S-3 at 1235 hours that one of its supporting tanks had hit an Italian box-type mine and there were twenty or more S-mines in the area. Two enemy machine guns with ten dead Germans were found nearby. Units could not move forward until the road was swept and an urgent request was made for Engineers to be brought forward. At 1305 hours all three rifle companies of the 2d Battalion were engaged in fire fights with the enemy in the vicinity of DEVANT LE FERYS. Companies "I" and "L" also continued to meet enemy resistance.

At 1450 hours the Division Commander sent a message to the 1st Battalion to the effect that the 442d Infantry was pushing down the trail approximately 700 yards from the 1st Battalion. The Battalion was to start patrols out to contact this force along the trail. If the enemy attempted to interfere, they were to attack on the German rear flank. The 1st Battalion replied at 1515 hours that it had received 3000 rounds of M-1 rifle ammunition and 800 rounds of carbine ammunition. A patrol would necessitate a large force of men which was
impossible to spare due to German counter-attacks and patrols. As too many of the men had bad feet as a result of constant exposure to warrant such an operation.

The Division Commander informed the 2d Battalion Commander at 1445 hours that the 143d Infantry had been ordered to move east and take over the 2d Battalion area. The Battalion would move to the northeast and hold an area of approximately 1000 yard frontage (316584 to 327575 Sheet 35/18 as the right flank and 322589, Sheet 35/18 to 335593, Sheet 36/18, as the left flank) with one company. The remainder of the battalion was to be held in reserve in the event of a counter-attack. The Division Commander then informed the 3d Battalion Commander that it was satisfactory to send one company to clear LA CROISETTE (333586, Sheet 36/18) and keep the remainder of the battalion in its proximity. The regiment was to take the high ground east of LA CROISETTE and if necessary attack the high ground from east to west. The 442d Infantry had two battalions in the vicinity of LA CROISETTE in heavy fighting with the enemy. The 3d Battalion was instructed to contact the 442d Infantry and coordinate efforts in another attack.

At 1645 hours the 1st Battalion radioed that it had sent a contact patrol out along the trail, but it had run into mines near the designated contact point.

The Division Commander notified the Regimental Commander at 1745 hours that the 111st Infantry and the 442d Infantry would continue attacking on 30 October with the same plan used on 29 October. The troops were to maneuver around the road blocks and clear them out. The 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, had the mission of clearing their present area and protecting the rear and left Division flank. The 111st Infantry was to begin its attack at 0800 hours and the 442d Infantry was to start attacking at 0900 hours on 30 October.

The Regimental Commander instructed the 3d Battalion Commander to break contact with the 442d Infantry in the morning and go east along the trail from LA CROISETTE to the vicinity of Hill 612 (345584, Sheet 36/18) and then move southeast along the trail toward the 1st Battalion.

The 1st Battalion radioed at 2047 hours that it had supplies for three days but no halazone tablets. Three prisoners stated that the Germans were going into position two kilometers northeast of the battalion's position. The enemy had artillery, mortar, four machine guns, and eight machine pistols, but was low on ammunition. A request for socks and foot powder was made. The Division G-4 stated that 700 pairs of socks and 100 cans of foot powder would be dropped on 30 October.
At 0815 hours on 30 October, the Division G-3 radiated to the 1st Battalion to be prepared to attack back along the trail and come on the air again at 0900 hours for further instructions. If the battalion had new radio batteries, it was to check in every fifteen minutes after 0900 hours. The 1st Battalion inquired as to whether a strong patrol of the main force of the battalion was to be used. It also inquired as to what to do with its disabled men and stated that German patrols were harassing its position. The Regimental G-3 advised them to remain in position and await further orders.

At 0932 hours the 2d Battalion was advised that it would go into an assembly area south of Crevecoeur as soon as the 113d Infantry took over its area. However, the battalion was to be prepared to continue the attack with the 3d Battalion on short notice. Both the 3d Battalion and the 442d Infantry reported no resistance as they began their attacks.

The Division Commander was notified of the situation of the 1st Battalion and was advised that if the 1st Battalion was to advance, it meant splitting their force and if a strong German patrol was encountered, it might result in their being wiped out completely. The Division Commander stated that the 1st Battalion was to leave a detachment of its weapons platoon to protect the casualties and be prepared to attack back along its original route on the northeast side of the road so as to contact the 3d Battalion, 442d Infantry. It was to attack toward Hill 645 (342578, Sheet 36/18) from the east. The 1st Battalion was to remain in position until it was given the time and direction for the attack.

The 1st Battalion requested at 1022 hours that the Air Corps not be sent over during the day as the dropping of supplies was giving away its position.

At 1047 hours the enemy began smoking the entire valley to the east and south of Ripfontaine. Artillery units rushed to register in defensive fires. The 1st Battalion called for a fire mission from the 131st Field Artillery at 1114 hours which indicated the smoking of the valley was a cover for the Germans to attack the 1st Battalion.

At 1120 hours the 1st Battalion radiated that it was not trying to bog off from orders issued, but its situation was worse. It had twenty-two litter cases, eleven trench foot cases, ten walking wounded and needed transportation. Efficiency was low. Enemy patrols were active on its flank and front with automatic weapons. Mines covered the route over which it was ordered to proceed and Engineers were required to clear the mines.
The 3d Battalion reported at 1125 hours that its forward elements were receiving tank fire, but no other opposition. It continued to advance eastward.

At 1135 hours the Division Commander ordered the 1st Battalion to send a patrol northwest as units were coming through to relieve it as fast as possible. The 442d Infantry was one and one-quarter miles away.

The 131st Field Artillery had fired two missions for the 1st Battalion by 1240 hours, one of which dispersed a force of thirty attacking Germans.

Company "G", 442d Infantry, was stopped by a German counterattack at 1345 hours and its Company "F" was also engaged with the enemy. The 442d Infantry was worried about its right flank. The 2d Battalion Commander was ordered to reconnoiter the area in the vicinity of LA CROISSETTE for a protecting line.

The 1st and 3d Battalions, 442d Infantry, and the regimental 3d Battalion continued to advance through the BOIS DE ROUSSIERE. As the 143d Infantry relieved the units of the 2d Battalion, the battalion was placed in the vicinity of LA CROISSETTE. The 1st Battalion asked at 1535 hours what the situation was. They were informed that the attack was progressing satisfactorily.

At 1555 hours the 442d Infantry advised that it had cleared Hill 660 (J42578, Sheet 36/18) and was moving southeast.

The long awaited message from the 1st Battalion was received at 1600 hours when it read, "Patrol from 442d here. Tell them we love them." All units were immediately notified of contact with the lost battalion and the 1st Battalion Commander went forward to take charge of their movement to a bivouac area and evacuation of the wounded. By 1625 hours the 442d Infantry reported it was in contact with the 1st Battalion in force. The 1st Battalion was instructed to get its wounded and sick men out quickly as it was quite probable that a counter-attack might occur.

The 3d Battalion reported that it was on the high ground 500 yards north of the 1st Battalion position at 1645 hours and was continuing to move southeast. At 1707 hours the Division Commander arrived at the command post and stated that the 1st Battalion wounded should be gotten out during the night and the remainder of the battalion moved in the morning.

The relief of the 2d Battalion was completed by the 143d Infantry
at 1740 hours and the rifle companies moved to the vicinity of LA CROISSETTE. Company "E" covered a frontage of 800 yards which included three trails. The 3d Battalion was instructed to send a patrol back to LA CROISSETTE from its position over the trail it had traversed to check any enemy infiltration.

The Division Commander ordered the Regimental Commander at 1800 hours to hold his positions for the night. The 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, was attached to the regiment. Patrols were to be sent out on 31 October, in an effort to locate enemy positions. The battalions were to make a report during the night of any known enemy positions to their front or in the rear. The 1st Battalion wounded were to be taken to BRUYERES as quickly as possible to be checked over.

The Regimental Commander and the Commanding Officer, 442d Infantry, made arrangements to continue clearing the FORET DOMANIALE DE CHAMP of the enemy.

Before the 1st Battalion wounded could be evacuated, darkness fell and, with a delay in clearing mines from the road, arrangements were made to complete the evacuation in the morning.

The Division G-4 advised at 2230 hours that no further allocation of 81 mm mortar ammunition would be made to the 141st Infantry for an indefinite period. All expenditures of this type of ammunition would be restricted to emergency requirements.

The Regimental Commander informed the Division Commander at 0612 hours that the night had passed quietly except for light artillery fire. The 1st Battalion was being evacuated over the route of the 3d Battalion, 442d Infantry. Other units of the 442d Infantry were sending patrols and laying wire to the 7th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, on the regiment's north flank. The Division Commander stated the regiment would hold its present position until the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, could relieve the 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry. When this was accomplished the 2d Battalion was to move into an assembly area.

The 3d Battalion encountered enemy opposition in the BOIS DE LA HOUSSETERRE (340533, Sheet 36/18) at 0845 hours and prepared to clear it up. The 442d Infantry prepared to move to the high ground south of the former 1st Battalion position but was worried about its northern flank. The Regimental S-3 assured the 442d Infantry that the 3d Battalion was attacking this high ground and would protect the 442d Infantry flank.

The 3d Battalion continued to advance with Companies "I" and "L" in contact with the enemy. Tank support was requested for this force.
Company "K", moving down the trail to establish a road block, ran into enemy opposition. Company "E" also encountered enemy in the vicinity of one of the road block positions and deployed to clear them out.

At 1320 hours the Division G-3 ordered the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry to send patrols toward the road the 7th Infantry Regiment was working on, which lay 1000 yards north of the regimental sector. The 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, was to put in road blocks on all trails leading from the 7th Infantry road to the southwest along the Division boundary until the 7th Infantry passed by them. Then, the road blocks could be pulled out.

At 1350 hours the Regimental Commander advised the Assistant Division Commander that Company "E" had encountered enemy opposition. If the regiment attacked, it would have only a platoon on Hill 617. Due to the lateness of preparing for an attack, it would be preferable to wait until 1 November. The 442d Infantry was sending a ten man patrol with a forward artillery observer to put artillery fire on the enemy. Only one and one-half companies were capable of making an attack and that force committed leaves the left flank protected only by one platoon and two road blocks.

All three rifle companies of the 3d Battalion were engaged with the enemy in the northern part of the BOIS DE La HOUSSIERE. Four tanks were sent to the support of the battalion in addition to Engineers.

At 1712 hours Company "E", 442d Infantry, made contact with the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, and established telephone communication with that unit.

The Regimental Commander advised the Division Commander at 1750 hours that the Germans were between Company "E" and the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry. Plans were being formulated to clear them from this area on the morning of 1 November.

The 3d Battalion planned to place mortar fire on enemy positions for two hours and then attack. If the enemy remained in position, the mortar fires would be repeated. The 2d Battalion also planned to fire mortars throughout the night. The 3d Battalion was instructed to use rifle grenades against enemy positions as much as possible due to the shortage of mortar ammunition. After the 3d Battalion began its attack, it received considerable enemy artillery fire.

The 1st Battalion closed into a bivouac area in the vicinity of LEPANGES for rest and training of replacements.

The Division G-3 advised regiment that an enemy saboteur was ex-
peated to try and make his way through the lines during the night or the following morning. A complete description of the man was given and instructions were issued that if he should be apprehended, he was to be evacuated immediately.

The month of October closed on a gruelling campaign. The 1st Battalion had become renowned as the "Lost Battalion" of World War II. The efforts of the remaining regimental units and those of the 442d Infantry Regiment in fighting through the dense woods of the FORET DOMANIALE DE CHAMP to rescue the 1st Battalion were truly heroic. Many casualties occurred and all regimental units fought on with greatly depleted fighting strength. The weather was for the most part cold with a great deal of rain. Ground fog hampered all attack operations. Notwithstanding all terrain and weather difficulties, the regiment had inflicted serious losses on enemy forces and contributed to driving the Germans back to the RHINE River.
Fighting strength on the line of the three battalions in April and enlisted men during the month of October 1944 is as follows:

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Six hundred twenty-three enlisted men and thirty-three (33) officer replacements were received during the month of October (431 enlisted men on 15 October, 152 enlisted men and 33 officers on 26 October, and 40 enlisted men on 29 October). Fourteen (14) enlisted men were commissioned 2d Lieutenants from the ranks of the regiment during the month. Of the enlisted men replacements sixty-one (61) per cent were riflemen, twelve (12) per cent light and heavy machine gunners, nine (9) per cent automatic riflemen with the remainder divided between mortar gunners, antitank gunners, field linemen, pioneers, medical
technicians and ammunition bearers. (Of the riflemen nine (9) per cent were heavy machine gunners substituted for riflemen.)

All replacements were received in excellent physical condition, well equipped and fairly well trained in basic arms. The system devised by the regimental commander by which replacements joined their companies during "rest" periods proved sound, since it gave new men a chance to become familiar with their officers and non-commissioned officers.

The practice of substituting machine gunners for riflemen proved unsound and resulted in a number of AWOL's. Such men, when returned to duty, stated they were unsure of themselves and they had not had sufficient training as riflemen.

Casualties among replacements, as usual, averaged approximately ten (10) per cent higher than among the experienced troops.

Age of replacements averaged 23 with the majority between 20 and 30. Replacements over 30 (with a few over 35) continued to be received—those men are practically useless in the Infantry.

German prisoners of war taken by the regiment during the month of October 1944 are listed by days as follows:

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One hundred and ten (110) Germans were known to be killed during the month of October. The number of additional killed and wounded cannot be estimated. However, reports from prisoners taken indicated that the number was very high with the great majority of casualties caused by artillery fire.
Enemy war material captured and destroyed during the month of October 1944, was tabulated as follows:

- Self-propelled guns.............. 5
- 88mm Guns.......................... 3
- 75mm Guns (horse-drawn)......... 5
- Tank, Mark IV...................... 5
- Half-track, armored............. 1
- Machine Guns....................... 2
- Ammunition Dump................... 1

The above figures include only known captured and destroyed enemy materiel. No estimate can be accurately made of additional enemy materiel destroyed or disabled.

END

Report of Operations written by:

Robert D. Dierke
M/SGT ROBERT D. DETERLE, 16062508
Service Company, 141st Infantry
Regimental Sergeant Major

---5---
HEADQUARTERS 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO #36, U.S. ARMY

OPERATIONS IN FRANCE

NOVEMBER 1944

ANNEX #6

111ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

IN THREE PARTS

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Index .................................................. 1
Conclusions on Operations ....................... 2
Regimental History................................. 4 - 13
Casualty Report ..................................... 34 - 45
Officers Roster..................................... 46 - 47
Awards and Decorations Roster .................. 48 - 49

DECLASSED

DOC DM 53283, Sept. 27, 1968
INCl by LCI, date 11-1-63
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HEADQUARTERS 141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
APO #36, U. S. ARMY

24 December 1944

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Regimental History for November 1944 and Conclusions of Operations

TO: Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, APO #36, U. S. Army

1. Inclosed is the history of the 141st Infantry Regiment covering operations in France during November 1944.

2. The following conclusions, based upon operations during November, are made:

   a. Flak wagons have been used to good advantage in firing on ground targets when not engaged in anti-aircraft missions. In heavily wooded areas, they were attached to battalions and added a great weight of fire at crucial moments in attacks on dug in positions and in interdicting routes of approach to positions.

   b. In several instances the Germans were found to have buried two hundred pound aerial bombs with time devices to crater roads or destroy large buildings. One such mine contained seven (7) two hundred pound bombs and was six feet (6') deep and covered by four feet (4') of rock. Civilian information was accurate and timely in most instances to allow engineers the opportunity to disarm such demolitions.

   c. On several occasions where our advance had been swift but suddenly slowed down by strong resistance, hostile artillery positions were fairly accurately located, even in rough mountainous terrain, by azimuth directions or sound. Counter battery fires at such times were successful to a marked degree in subduing hostile fires.

   d. On one occasion, two of our companies attacked a system of trenches and bunkers, located on commanding ground, at night. They succeeded in driving the enemy out but at daylight found that enemy machine guns, dug in for just such situations, placed enfilade fire on the main portion of the trenches and mortars were accurately registered on the position. The obvious lesson is the old one—by-pass the hostile positions and dig in on the further side.
2. 6. Failure to contact adjacent units in order to determine locations for outguards in an isolated region where shelter was very limited caused an erroneous posting of outguards. This disposition permitted a strong German Combat Patrol to infiltrate in the areas not covered by the outpost. A tank destroyer unit placed its vehicles close to the house where troops had sought shelter and several tanks congregated there as well. A strong hostile patrol closed in at night with bazookas and succeeded in knocking out several vehicles as well as setting fire to the house. Proper contact with adjacent units and correct outposting, despite the very cold conditions, would have saved most or all of this loss.

CHARLES H. OWENS
Colonel, 111st Infantry
COMMANDING

6 IncIs:
#1 - Narrative (6)
#2 - Casualty Report (6)
#3 - Officer Roster (6)
#4 - Awards & Decorations Roster (6)
#5 - "Regimental Journal (1"
#6 - "Maps (1"

* To accompany original to Army Historical Section, Washington, D. C.
OPERATIONS IN FRANCE

NOVEMBER 1944

141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

The month of November began with the regiment still fighting in the FORET DOMANIALE DE CHAMP against extremely stubborn German resistance. The regimental command post was located in two echelons—the forward echelon at GREBESFOSSE (314608, Sheet 35/17) and the rear echelon at MACHIEFORT (287595, Sheet 35/18). The 1st Battalion, after having been released from its isolation north of LA ROUSSIERE (316554, Sheet 36/18) was bivouacked in DEYCLON (194528, Sheet 35/18) while both the 2d and 3d Battalions were engaged with the enemy in the dense woods of the FORET DOMANIALE DE CHAMP. Both the regimental Cannon Company and Antitank Company were supporting operations from BELMONT-SUR-BUTTANT (285058, Sheet 35/18) while the supply echelons of Service Company were located in BRUYERES (245567, Sheet 35/18).

The night of 30 October-1 November passed with comparative quiet. No enemy contact was reported and only intermittent harassing enemy artillery fire was reported in the regimental area. The 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, which was attached to the regiment, reported no contact with the 7th Infantry or the 3d Division on the regiment's northern flank and patrols were sent out to attempt to make a contact. Company "F" was directing mortar fire on enemy positions in front of the Regimental Intelligence & Reconnaissance (I&R) Platoon. The Germans were to be attacked in this position. If the attack did not succeed, the I&R Platoon was to be used as a block to starve the Germans out while the 3d Battalion went on to attack the ridge line to the east. The Division Commander advised the Regimental Commander, Colonel CHARLES H. OWENS, 06957, of Tacoma, Washington, that a battalion of the 141st Infantry would relieve the regimental 2d Battalion. The 2d Battalion would then be put in a defensive position. The 1st Battalion was to be ready to go back into the line on 2 November.

At 0920 hours on 1 November, the 2d Battalion advised that a heavy mortar and artillery concentration had been placed on German positions on its front for ten minutes after which it and the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, began their attack. Company "E", 442d Infantry, advanced east without encountering opposition. Company "F", 141st Infantry, encountered opposition on its right flank and swung its left flank around to establish contact with Company "E", 442d Infantry, which was moving south along the high ground adjacent to the road cutting through the BOIS DE LA ROUSSIERE and due west of Hill 612 (314588, Sheet 36/18). By 1015 hours Company "F", which was southwest of Hill 612, was still engaged in cleaning up enemy machine gun and machine pistol fire. An enemy mine field was encountered between the position of Company "F" and Hill 612. By 1045 hours Company "E", 442d Infantry, had encoun-
entered enemy opposition. The Germans held positions between Company "J"
141st Infantry, and Company "R", 442d Infantry. The 3d Battalion, at-
tacking north of the 2d Battalion, had Company "L", six hundred yards
northwest of MARMOMOSSE (149608, Sheet 36/18) and Company "T" was in
the valley receiving mortar and small arms fire. By 1115 hours Com-
pany "F" had reached Hill 612 after Engineers had cleared a lane
through the mine field in front of the hill. Company "P", 442d Infan-
try, continued to push south in an effort to contact Company "R", 141st
Infantry, which had already crossed the draw to Hill 612. By 1219
hours both companies were reported to be engaged in a big fire fight.
Two tanks were ordered forward to eliminate enemy machine guns in front
of the companies' positions.

The Division Commander notified the Regimental Commander at 1235
hours that one battalion of the 142d Infantry would relieve the regi-
mental 2d Battalion on the morning of 2 November. The regimental 1st
Battalion, in turn, was to relieve a battalion of the 142d Infantry on
the Division southern sector. The company commanders of the 1st Batta-
lon were to reconnoiter the positions of the 2d Battalion, 142d Infan-
try, during the afternoon of 1 November, so that they would know what
positions to occupy.

The 3d Battalion reported that its units were making no progress.
The Germans had a strong point to its front which it was unable to
break. The Regimental Commander suggested that the troops be drawn
back and artillery placed on the German positions. The 3d Battalion
Commander, Major WALTER R. BRYER, III, 02264, of Montclair, New Jer-
ssey, stated that he believed the Germans would follow closely any with-
drawal of troops and nothing would be gained. The Regimental Commander
then stated that the IAR Platoon would move into its former position to
form a block. After darkness, the 3d Battalion companies would move
quietly—one man at a time. Tanks were to be in position to fire on
the slope of the hill and 60 mm mortars would fire all through the
night. At daybreak the battalion would move south down the trail to
the position of the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry, and return north
via a trail leading from that position. Thus, the enemy strong point
would be attacked from the rear. The Regimental Commander notified the
Division Commander of this plan at 1443 hours and also stated that the
tanks supporting the 3d Battalion had withdrawn because they thought
two German self-propelled guns were in the vicinity. The Division Com-
mander stated that the tanks must be brought back into position and
stay there.

Company "F" encountered enemy machine gun fire in its attempt to
gain its objective on Hill 612, but advanced doggedly forward until it
had reached the forward slope of the hill at 1530 hours. Ten dead Ger-
mans were found on the hill and prisoners were taken. A company of the

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442d Infantry was sent to relieve Company "F", which drew back to the vicinity of LA CROISETTE (332587, Sheet 36/18) as a reserve force in the event the 442d Infantry received a counter-attack.

During the night of 1-2 November, the K&R Platoon and Company "K" were relieved by the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry. The remainder of the 3d Battalion was relieved by Antitank Company and attached Engineers. The Regimental Commander had patrols from Antitank Company move east as reports had been received from prisoners that the Germans were retreating. However, Antitank Company reported at 0620 hours that its patrols had received automatic weapons and antitank grenade fire.

The 2d Battalion was relieved by the 3d Battalion, 442d Infantry, on the morning of 2 November, and moved to LEPANGES (208531, Sheet 35/18).

The 3d Battalion moved out on its attack at 0500 hours but made little progress. The Division Commander advised at 1017 hours that the 3d Battalion must be pushed; also that the road block of the 442d Infantry must be placed further south in the valley and all pockets of resistance cleared out around Hill 612. The Regimental Commander made plans for an attack at 1400 hours by the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, in the area just northwest of the BOUS DE LA HOUSSIERE.

The 3d Battalion re-grouped and began its attack again at 1200 hours but was stopped by three enemy machine guns, small arms, and artillery fire. At 1720 hours, the Regimental Commander notified the Division Commander that Company "F" was unable to get around the enemy's flank. The Regimental Commander stated that he was going to take command of the battalion in the morning for another attack. If this attack failed, he requested that the battalion be withdrawn from the line for a rest as it was seriously depleted in personnel and the men were extremely tired. Arrangements were made to use chemical mortars for a fifteen to twenty minute preparation before the attack.

The 2d Battalion, which had been ordered to relieve the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, reported at 2025 hours that two companies had been relieved but the third company would not be completely relieved until the morning of 3 November.

The 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, continued to probe the floor of the narrow valley along its front but reported that the ground was covered with impenetrable thickets. Also, its units were fired upon by heavy artillery and self-propelled guns and withdrew to the high ground to the west.

At 0635 hours on the morning of 3 November, the Regimental Commander - 6 -
der notified the 3d Battalion Commander that the attack would be delayed pending further instructions. At 0738 hours he advised that the 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, would take over the 3d Battalion sector. The IAR Platoon and Company "F" were to relieve the 442d Infantry Company "M" while Company "K" relieved Company "P", 442d Infantry. The 3d Battalion was to leave Company "L" in a deployed position supported by light machine guns until relieved by elements of the 442d Infantry. The remainder of the 3d Battalion moved to the vicinity of Regimental Headquarters. The 2d Battalion was notified that the 3d Battalion was moving over to its right flank. The 2d Battalion, 442d Infantry, reverted to control of the 442d Infantry.

Two German planes strafed positions in the vicinity of the rear regimental command post in MACHEPURI without causing casualties at 1535 hours.

At 1920 hours the Regimental Commander advised the Division Commander that all units of the 2d Battalion with the exception of Company "L" were in contact with the enemy. Patrols were to be sent from the battalion on 6 November to feel out enemy positions. The night of 3-4 November passed without special incident although the German's usual large volume of harassing artillery fire fell within the regimental sector. The Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion Commander to have Company "L" relieve Companies "I" and "K". Patrols were to be sent out along the road. If a road block was encountered, the patrols were to leave it alone. If a road block was not encountered, a block was to be put in. The Antitank Company was to be relieved by one platoon of Company "L".

A force known as "Stack Force" was organized from the 1st Battalions of the 141st, 142d, and 133d Infantry Regiments, to protect the southern Division sector. The Regimental Executive Officer, Lt. Colonel DONALD A. MacGRATH, 026031, of New York, New York, and the Regimental Intelligence Officer, Major ROY C. DOUTH C, 028072, of LeRoy, New York, formed the staff of this force under Brigadier General ROBERT I. STACK, 07585, of Schenectady, New York, the 36th Division Assistant Commander. The Stack Force opened its command post at 1500 hours on 3 November at ST JEAN DU MARCHE (216499, Sheet 35/18). Active patrolling was ordered on all fronts by all units during the night of 3-4 November. The 1st Battalion was ordered to send patrols into LE THOLY (260311, Sheet 35/18). The French, who were attacking east along the Division's southern boundary, were doing very well. On the morning of 4 November, Stack Force was to make a fake attack supported by fires from the 155th, 131st, and 132d Field Artillery Battalions. The artillery battalions were to actually support the French but their fires would make it appear an attack was being made from the Divisional sector. Company "A" was designated to make a feint toward CHAMPBlAY.
(259150, Sheet 35/18) at 0810 hours on 6 November, while artillery fired on the road network east and north of LE THOLY, Company "A" was to use small arms, mortar and machine gun fire to make it appear as though a major effort was being made. If the company was successful in securing a more advantageous position than it held, the new ground was to be held and occupied.

At 1325 hours on 6 November, the Division Commander visited the regimental command post and left instructions for the attack to be made on 5 November at 0800 hours. Company "G" was to assist the 142d Infantry by furnishing a base of fire. Also, the regiment was to take over three road blocks from the 142d Infantry with one company and a section of machine guns. At 0800 hours the regiment was to fire artillery, mortar, machine gun and small arms fire on known enemy positions and be prepared to attack on order.

At 1610 hours the Engineers advised that the Germans were infiltrating back into the regimental sector and mining paths that had been de-mined.

At 0745 hours on 5 November, the 142d Infantry advised that the attack would be late jumping off and requested that all fires be held until notification. At 0900 hours the 142d Infantry notified regiment that its attack had jumped off on time but did not pass the line of departure as early as expected. The 2d Battalion, 142d Infantry, was 500 yards east of MARMOSSSE (334605, Sheet 36/17), and the 3d Battalion, 142d Infantry, was closing in on Hill 699 (346517, Sheet 36/17). At 0945 hours Company "F", 142d Infantry, was moving through the position of Company "E", 141st Infantry; also, 142d Infantry troops were on Hill 699 but were receiving fire from the north and northeast. The 142d Infantry advised that its main preparation would begin at 1100 hours after which all supporting fires of the regiment were to begin. The Division G-3 advised that as soon as the 2d Battalion, 142d Infantry, had passed through the 3d Battalion, elements of the battalion would be pulled back.

At 1150 hours both the 2d and 3d Battalions jumped off in their attack in support of the 142d Infantry. The 2d Battalion fired one hundred rounds of mortar ammunition in support of the 142d Infantry and, in turn, received mortar fire within its position. The regimental Antitank Company was receiving rifle grenade fire within its position and the Regimental Commander directed that its 57 mm guns be fired to keep the Germans occupied.

Company "G" was not needed by the 142d Infantry and was withdrawn from the lines to bivouac in LESANGES. The 3d Battalion was held in place in the event of a German counter-attack. During the night of
5-6 November, the usual heavy concentrations of German artillery and mortar fire fell within the regimental area.

On the Stack Force front, civilians reported on the afternoon of 4 November, that REHAUPAL (253473, Sheet 35/18) was being evacuated by the Germans. Patrols were ordered to enter both REHAUPAL and CHAMPURA (270486, Sheet 35/18). The 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry, was ordered to send patrols into LE HOMY to contact the French and find out their locations. Patrols were to probe enemy positions throughout the night. Company "C" contacted French units and worked out mutual patrols with them.

At 1010 hours on 6 November, the Division Commander visited the command post and was informed that only Company "G" had been relieved. Whereupon, he contacted the Commanding Officer, 142d Infantry, and secured the release of Company "E" and all of Company "F" except for one platoon which was to remain on a road block. The Division Commander stated that the 2d Battalion should be prepared to re-enter the line on the night of 7 November, to relieve the 1st Battalion, 142d Infantry, in the Stack Force sector. The 2d Battalion units moved into a bivouac area in LEFANGES.

The Regimental Commander notified the 3d Battalion Commander at 1150 hours that his battalion would attack early as the longer it waited, the more difficult it would become to clear the enemy from the area. Patrols were sent out to observe enemy strong points.

In the Stack Force sector, Company "C" continued to make contact with the French. Both Company "A" and Company "B" were in physical contact with German forces to their front. At 2130 hours on 6 November, General STACK ordered the 1st Battalion to take the ridge line in front of its position. It was to take its time in doing so and use lots of supporting artillery. Company "C" reported that they believed French forces had moved to LA FORGE (247412, Sheet 35/18). Patrols from Companies "A", "B", and "C" all ran into enemy opposition on 6 November. Company "B" attempted to take the high ground to its front, but was repulsed when the forward artillery observer could not see the enemy positions. Tanks were requested to assist Company "B" on 7 November in its sector south of REHAUPAL. General STACK was advised that the 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry, would relieve the 1st Battalion, 142d Infantry, on the night of 7-8 November, and issued orders for the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry, Commander to work out a plan of attack for the 2d Battalion which might be used within the next three days.

At 0830 hours on 7 November, the Division C-3 notified the Regimental S-3, Major HERBERT E. EITT, O44138, of San Antonio, Texas, that control of the southern sector would revert to the Commanding Officer.
111st Infantry, on 8 November. The regimental Antitank Company and Company "L" were to be relieved at 1200 hours. Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion had begun another attack at 0800 hours in the BOIS DE LA HOUS-SIERE to clear the ridge west of Hill 612 and attained its objective without opposition. Upon cleaning up its sector, the 3d Battalion was relieved and moved to a bivouac area at LEPANGES.

The regimental staff and the Stack Force staff combined to take over the Division southern sector. The 2d Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion, 142d Infantry, by 1905 hours. The night of 7-8 November passed without incident. AUMONTZEE (287524, Sheet 35/18) was set on fire by the Germans and blazed throughout the night. On the afternoon of 8 November, the Company "F" platoon which had been attached to the 142d Infantry was relieved and joined the 3d Battalion in bivouac in LEPANGES. A platoon of Company "B" became engaged in a fire fight with a German patrol 500 yards south of REHAUPAL at 1915 hours but were driven off. Germans moved back into LE THOLY after the French moved out and the French sent no more patrols to contact the regiment.

At 0900 hours on 9 November, General STACK advised that the 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, was detached from Stack Force; also that Stack Force was dissolved and control of the southern sector was under the Commanding Officer, 111st Infantry.

An investigation was made as to the absence of French forces on the regimental right flank and it was disclosed that their units were not pulling out but were being relieved by other units. Active patrols were maintained by both the 1st and 2d Battalions during the night of 9-10 November. Little enemy activity was noted but the patrol areas were found to be heavily mined and booby-trapped. Company "C" contacted the 2d Spahis Regiment of the French Army at 0445 hours north of LA FOSSE. A Psychological Warfare Branch team from Division Headquarters was sent to the 2d Battalion to make a broadcast to Russian troops of the German army in the REHAUPAL area. The loud speaker was to be erected in time to coordinate with an attack of the 143d Infantry at 0715 hours on 11 November.

At 2030 hours the Regimental S-3 notified the 2d Battalion Commander that the 36th Reconnaissance Troop was attached to the 2d Battalion effective immediately. The 2d Battalion Commander requested that this unit report to the battalion at 0900 hours on 11 November to begin relieving Company "F" at 1300 hours.

During the night of 10-11 November, Company "B" was fired upon along its left flank by enemy small arms, machine gun and 60 mm mortar fire. The Germans also used flares in this area. Both the 1st and 2d Battalions continued their patrols throughout the night.

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The broadcast to the Russian soldiers could not be arranged in time for the 143d Infantry attack and broadcasts were made at 1015 hours and 1100 hours on 11 November. The Germans fired self-propelled guns at the vicinity of the loud speakers. No information had been received on the 143d Infantry attack although small arms fire could be heard east of Company "F".

The 36th Reconnaissance Troop relieved Company "F" and two squads of Company "G" on the afternoon of 11 November. Radio contact with the French, which was formerly handled by the 36th Reconnaissance Troop, was taken over by the regimental communication facilities. As on previous nights, the night of 11-12 November was devoted to active patrolling. French units on the regimental right flank used a different password each night from the one furnished by Division and it occasioned considerable trouble with contacting patrols.

At 1045 hours on 12 November, the Commanding Officer, 143d Infantry, notified regiment that he believed CHAMPORDAY was unoccupied by the Germans. 143d Infantry units on Hill 701 (2723.98, Sheet 35/18) had lost contact with the enemy. The 143d Infantry Commander requested that a patrol be sent into the town. The 2d Battalion was ordered to send a patrol there and if the town was found to be unoccupied, enough troops were to enter to garrison it. The 1st Battalion was also advised of an indicated enemy withdrawal and was ordered to send patrols to investigate.

The Regimental Commander held a meeting at 1355 hours with all battalion and unit commanders of the combat team to discuss an attack to be made at 0900 hours on 15 November. He stated that ample time was being given to make plans so that the attack could succeed. Artillery was to be used fully in addition to supporting chemical mortars. Tanks and tank destroyers would also be available for the attack. The 3d Battalion was to relieve the 1st Battalion on the night of 13 November. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was to take over the position of Company "F" while the Antitank Company took over the reconnaissance troop position. The 1st and 2d Battalions were to make the attack with the 3d Battalion in regimental reserve. The 1st Battalion was to pass through the 3d Battalion. In addition to the fires of the 131st Field Artillery Battalion, fires of two batteries of 155 mm howitzers, two batteries of eight inch (8") howitzers, and two batteries of anti-aircraft guns were to support the regiment.

The 36th Reconnaissance Troop reported at 0420 hours on 13 November that CHAMPORDAY was unoccupied by German forces and one of their squads was in the town. Houses to the east of the regimental sector were observed burning throughout the night.

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Patrols from Companies "E" and "G" ran into S-mines on the morning of 13 November, but encountered no enemy. Antitank Company relieved the 36th Reconnaissance Troop, whereupon the reconnaissance unit began pushing east from CHAMPFRAY. The 3d Battalion was notified that when it took over the 1st Battalion area it if could move forward and occupy any dominating terrain without much of a fire fight it was to do so.

By 1400 hours Company "A" had reached the 1st Battalion's initial objective on Hill 761 (253448, Sheet 35/18 7 & 8). The Regimental Commander ordered this hill protected with a force of sufficient size that it could not be pushed off. A patrol was to be sent to Hill 779 (258445, Sheet 35/18 7 & 8) to determine if any enemy troops were there. Company "E" was on Hill 827 (263468, Sheet 35/18 7 & 8) by 1630 hours. The 3d Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion by 1730 hours with Company "L" occupying Hill 761. Company "E" continued to press eastward and occupied Hill 873 (271469, Sheet 35/18 7 & 8) by 2100 hours. No enemy was found on the hill but the terrain was mined.

The Regimental S-3 informed the 3d Battalion at 2110 hours that operations instructions from Division called for the 141st Infantry to push east as far as possible on 14 November. The Engineers attached to the 3d Battalion were to be increased if possible in order to eliminate road blocks and de-mine the area.

At 0900 hours on 14 November, the 3d Battalion was ordered to move east. The battalion reported activity in front of Company "K" but did not know whether it was German or French. The Regimental S-3 notified the Commanding Officer of the 636th Reconnaissance Company that the 2d Battalion had reconnaissance units on its final objective line and was in the process of occupying it. The 636th Reconnaissance Company was ordered to reconnaiter the REHAUPAL road and proceed southeast until enemy contact was made—going as far as LIEZERY LE GRAND LIEZERY (208443, Sheet 35/18) if necessary. The 3d Battalion sent patrols along the road between TENDON (214474, Sheet 35/18) and LE THOLY. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop also sent patrols to the high ground south of LE THOLY. The 2d Battalion was ordered to send patrols from the road junction (285469, Sheet 35/18), which lay six hundred yards west of BERCHIGRANGES (291471, Sheet 35/18), to LIEZERY LE GRAND LIEZERY. However, the 2d Battalion reported that it would need a tank dozer and Engineers to clear the road as there were many mines along it.

Division G-3 advised that the town of LE THOLY lay in the French sector and regimental units were accordingly notified not to enter the town and to patrol only to the north of it.

By 1300 hours Company "L" was approaching Hill 779 with Company "I" following it. The 2d Battalion had occupied all of its objectives.
and was patrolling toward LIBZEY LE GRAND LIEZEY. The 636th Reconnais-
sance Company was moved back to FAUCOMPPIERRE (298496, Sheet 35/18) and
Antitank Company was ordered to move to CHAMPDRAY.

The road from CHAMPDRAY to JUSSARUFT could not be swept for mines
inasmuch as snow covered the highway up to depths of four feet. The 3d
Battalion continued to move forward while the 1st Battalion was ordered
to move to the vicinity of TENDON. A forward regimental command post
was opened in REHAUPAL at 1630 hours. By 2105 hours all regimental ob-
jectives had been taken except the high ground west of the road jun-
tion (280445, Sheet 35/18) which lay just to the south of LA RACINE
(281450, Sheet 35/18).

The Regimental S-3 notified the 3d Battalion Commander at 2055
hours that the 36th Reconnaissance Troop was attached to the 3d Battal-
ion. The reconnaissance unit and Company "I" were to take over the 2d
Battalion sector while the remainder of the battalion held its position
and maintained contact with the French on the south. Antitank Company
was to hold the regimental left flank with one company of the 1st Bat-
talion which two units were to take over the area of the 143d Infantry
1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion Commander was notified that one of
his companies and Antitank Company would occupy the area from GRANGES
SUR VOLOGNE (296498, Sheet 35/18) southwest to the vicinity of LE HAUTE
DU PRS (298469, Sheet 35/18). Arrangements for the relief were to be
made in HERPELMONT (260527, Sheet 35/18) in the morning and the relief
of the 143d Infantry units made by 1700 hours on 15 November.

The 36th Reconnaissance Troop reported that French civilians had
advised the Germans were moving their heavy artillery back and were
preparing to withdraw. The enemy were reported to have no water and
were eating raw food from the field. German patrols were camouflaged
with sheets because of the recent heavy snowfalls within the area.

On the morning of 15 November, reconnaissance patrols were sent
out to try and determine enemy positions. The 3d Battalion sent pat-
trols to the high ground (228439, Sheet 35/18) two thousand yards west
of LIBZEY LE GRAND LIEZEY. Company "I" relieved the 2d Battalion while
Company "L" pushed south on the REHAUPAL-LE THOLY road. The road was
swept for mines as far as the church in LE THOLY. The entire area be-
ing traversed by the regiment was found to be extensively mined and
progress was slowed considerably in some sectors. Several vehicles
were lost and casualties ensued as a result of the many mines.

During the afternoon of 15 November the 36th Reconnaissance Troop
moved into and through LE THOLY. The 2d Battalion was relieved by the
1st Battalion and moved into the vicinity of ST JEAN DU MARCHE and
HOUX (227496, Sheet 35/18) for a period of training for new replace-
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ments. The 1st Battalion reported that the 143d Infantry had not been on the high ground, on the main road, nor had they crossed the river. Tanks were placed in GRANGES SUR VOLOGNE and a road block established in the town. Tank destroyers covered the main approaches to the town. Contact patrols were maintained throughout the night of 15-16 November between all units.

At 1015 hours on 16 November, the 3d Battalion reported that both Company "L" and French units were receiving small arms fire from the vicinity of the high ground south of AU PRE CHAMP (276425 and 276425, Sheet 35/18). Also, a self-propelled gun was believed firing from the vicinity of LIEZEE LE GRAND LIEZEE. The 1st Battalion elements in the vicinity of GRANGES SUR VOLOGNE received intermittent artillery fire. The main difficulty, however, continued to be the numerous mines laid throughout the regimental area. The 3d Battalion and the French continued to receive enemy fire in their sectors. Enemy ski troops were observed for the first time. French troops fired on a Company "L" carrying party which wore white camouflage in the mistaken belief that the men were Germans. Division was notified of this action and requested that the French be notified of American camouflaged units.

The 1st Battalion was ordered to send two combat patrols to the high ground southeast of GRANGES SUR VOLOGNE at 0900 hours on 17 November. The Division Commander ordered artillery registered on the area that the 3d Battalion patrols had encountered resistance on the previous day. The 3d Battalion was also ordered to take the high ground around LIEZEE LE GRAND LIEZEE rather than the town itself. Antitank Company took five prisoners who reported that their unit had pulled back the previous night. The French stated that the Germans were pulling back to the east to a distance of eight kilometers. The FFI was sending patrols from GRANGES SUR VOLOGNE to GERARDMER (3642, Sheet 36/18). The 3d Battalion worked a patrol along the road south of LIEZEE LE GRAND LIEZEE toward the town itself. The 1st Battalion patrols encountered no enemy but ran into heavily mined terrain. Company "A" was ordered to move to the high ground southeast of GRANGES SUR VOLOGNE.

At 1628 hours the Regimental S-2 ordered the 3d Battalion to move a combat patrol to LIEZEE LE GRAND LIEZEE immediately and establish a contact patrol to meet the French at the road junction (301425, Sheet 35/18) which lay just east of LE BITIARD (295425, Sheet 35/18). Engineers worked hard to open up roads and trails but their task was gigantic in scope and only the most important approaches could be worked on. At 1915 hours the 3d Battalion reported a combat patrol in LIEZEE LE GRAND LIEZEE without making enemy contact. The 3d Battalion Commander was notified that plans for 18 November included assembling one company in the vicinity of LIEZEE while another reinforced company continued
east to the road junction (340442, Sheet 36/18) which lay one mile west of GERARDMER. The battalion right flank was to be covered by patrols.

On the morning of 18 November, Company "I" moved into LIEZEV and thence east while Company "L" followed it into town. The Battalion Aid Platoon was busy clearing mines and booby traps from the town which were numerous in number. Contact was maintained with the French who also continued to advance. The FFI advised that the Germans were retreating to the northeast of GERARDMER. The 1st Battalion was ordered to continue its advance east by sending reconnaissance patrols to its front and moving its companies behind them. Both Companies "I" and "L" continued to make good time through the heavily mined woods northwest of GERARDMER. By 1330 hours both companies had patrols overlooking the town and LAKE GERARDMER. The city of GERARDMER had received the "scorched earth" policy of the Germans and only a few buildings remained intact—the greater portion of the city being rubble and scorched walls which were mined and booby-trapped. A few Germans could be observed within the city and small arms fire could be heard.

Company "C", working southeast along the GRANGES SUR VOLCINE-GERARDMER road, reported three Germans and a self-propelled gun seven hundred yards west of L'ETANG D'ONON. Artillery was placed on this area. Movement down the road itself was slow due to the numerous mines. More mines had been encountered during the month's operations than any time in the regiment's combat in ITALY or FRANCE. The Regimental Commander ordered a contact patrol maintained between Company "C" and Company "L". Civilians coming west from GERARDMER reported the Germans had withdrawn from KICHEMEN (366439, Sheet 36/18) at 2100 hours on 17 November. Company "I" patrols reported an enemy road block eleven hundred yards long consisting of felled trees which were mined and booby trapped along the LIEZEV-GERARDMER road.

The 36th Reconnaissance Troop and the 636th Reconnaissance Company were to move to AUMONTZEV on 19 November and go into an assembly area. The 1st and 3d Battalions continued to move eastward on the morning of 19 November. French units on the right (south) flank also continued to make good progress. Divisional units on the regiment's left (north) flank were sending patrols to the GEREPAL-GERARDMER road.

The Assistant Division Commander arrived at the regimental command post at 1100 hours on 19 November, and advised that the 142d Infantry was being squeezed out of their position and the 141st Infantry would take over. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was to patrol the southern regimental sector with four companies taking over the 142d Infantry area. If the 103d Division to the north could secure its objective the eventual Division line would be from BAN DE LAVELINE (303608, Sheet 36/17) to Fraize (455543, Sheet 36/18) and thence south to the French
The regiment was to maintain contact with the 143d Infantry and the French. The Regimental Commander advised the Assistant Division Commander that the entire regimental area and especially the roads were heavily mined and at times it was slow work to clear them and continue to advance east. At 1135 hours the regimental command post moved from REHAUPAL to GRANGES SUR VOLOGNE.

At 1430 hours the Regimental Commander notified the Regimental S-3 that the 3d Battalion would leave one company in its position as occupied on the morning of 20 November. This one company would send strong patrols up the north-south road, clearing the road of mines to the enemy boundary. The remainder of the 3d Battalion would assemble in GRANGES SUR VOLOGNE and take over the billets of the 2d Battalion. The 1st Battalion was to relieve the 142d Infantry and the 36th Reconnaissance Troop would take over the 1st Battalion area.

The 3d Battalion reported a good deal of movement in GERARDMER but believed it was French as no sounds of gun fire could be heard. Company "C" had worked its outpost to the north end of KICHOMPRE by 1610 hours and established a road block. The company was ordered to assemble in that area and be prepared to move as soon as relieved by Company "L".

The Regimental S-3 notified the 1st Battalion at 1912 hours that the entire battalion would not be committed on 20 November. The Regimental I&R Platoon would precede the battalion on the motor move. The battalion would detruck at BERCOUTE (379520, Sheet 36/18) and assemble in GEREPEAL (395404, Sheet 36/18).

The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was advised that it would hold a line running generally from LA BASSE DE MARTIMPRE (390475, Sheet 36/18) to the road junction at the east end of GERARDMER (370425, Sheet 36/18). Two or three strong points were to be set up along this line and the route patrolled between the points.

The Division Commander stated at 2150 hours that the 143d Infantry had been receiving fire from enemy anti-aircraft guns and the 1st Battalion was not to pass GEREPEAL (365528, Sheet 36/18) in convoy.

The 1st Battalion detrucked and moved to its assembly area in the vicinity of GEREPEAL. At 1057 hours on 20 November, the battalion reported that all units had closed into the assembly area. Company "B" occupied GEREPEAL and sent patrols to the east. The Regimental Commander ordered a patrol sent from the 1st Battalion to contact the 143d Infantry in the vicinity of LES GRANGES (420520, Sheet 36/18) along the regimental boundary line. This was agreed to be the 143d Infantry Commander who requested that contact patrols also meet on the outskirts of
CLEFECY (436527, Sheet 36/18) at 2100, 0100 and 0300 hours. The regimental command post moved from GRANGES SUR VOLONNE and opened at GERSEL at 1455 hours.

The Division Commander ordered the Regimental Commander at 1510 hours to send a combat patrol to PLAINFAING (446528, Sheet 36/18) and a reconnaissance patrol to FRAIZE (455542, Sheet 36/18) during the night. On 21 November, a patrol was to be sent to LE GRAND VAULT (446443, Sheet 36/18) to establish a road block. The Division Commander stated that the axis of advance for the regiment was to shift to LAVELINE (604607, Sheet 37/18).

The 1st Battalion was ordered to send the patrols to PLAINFAING and FRAIZE. The PLAINFAING patrol was to take wire with it and establish communications. At 1725 hours the 1st Battalion advised that Company "A" was going to the high ground and proceeded down the east slope toward CLEFECY, going into position on the slope of the hill mass. A 1134 Infantry patrol ran into opposition in CLEFECY from a German patrol and a fire fight occurred. However, the French civilians reported there were no Germans within the town but the enemy had dug in emplacements on the high ground around FRAIZE and PLAINFAING.

Company "I" moved into GRANGES SUR VOLONNE by 2250 hours and the 2d Battalion was notified to move to the same town on 21 November. A Company "A" platoon worked to within four hundred yards of the road running south out of CLEFECY and reported the area was covered with mines. Information received from prisoners indicated there were approximately one hundred and fifty Germans in the area who had been placed there to harass the advancing units. The patrol to PLAINFAING got into a minefield and could not get out until daylight.

An overlay captured from a German prisoner by the 1st Battalion on the morning of 21 November indicated that the Germans had a strong road block just west of FRAIZE which was strongly fortified and well camouflaged. Seventy meters past CLEFECY was a barbed wire and mined line running from the high ground east of CLEFECY to the northwest and thence east to FRAIZE. Three hundred Germans were defending this line.

At 0942 hours on 21 November, the Division Commander ordered the 3d Battalion moved closer to the forward line. The Regimental Commander issued instructions to bring the battalion to a detracking point in GERSEL at 1030 hours. The 1st Battalion, which had begun to advance east at 0830 hours, reported at 1025 hours that Companies "A" and "B" were having a great deal of trouble in trying to cross the MEUSE RIVER because of the extensive mine fields. By 1109 hours one platoon of Company "A" had crossed the river and was in CLEFECY. However units
were receiving heavy enemy mortar fire from the high ground due east of the town. The MEURTHE River at CLEFUY was approximately twenty feet wide, but it was very deep and the current was swift. The 1st Battalion requested that priority be given to erecting a bridge at CLEFUY that would carry jeeps so that supplies could be brought across to the attacking troops. The Regimental Commander notified the Regimental C-3 at 1157 hours that Company "A" was across the river and was sending a patrol to the high ground and the edge of the woods northeast of CLEFUY. Company "B" was in CLEFUY and was receiving enemy mortar fire. The 3d Battalion was to go in on the right of the 1st Battalion and move down the ridge on a north-south line toward FRAIZE. If FRAIZE was found not to be occupied, the 3d Battalion was to move in and send patrols east of the town.

By 1215 hours Company "K" had reached CLEFUY and Company "L" was moving up to the town. The Division G-3 advised that Germans were entering FRAIZE from the southeast and desired clearance for the 143d Infantry to fire artillery on the town. This clearance was given. Company "A" was receiving machine gun and small arms fire from the high ground around the small village of SOUCHE (447525, Sheet 36/18) at 1335 hours.

Since the site for the bridge at CLEFUY was receiving mortar and artillery fire, the Division Commander stated at 1544 hours to try and use the ANOULL (414543, Sheet 36/18)-CLEFUY road. Also, he advised that the 2d Battalion must move forward during the night and be ready to go into the line on the regimental left flank in the morning.

Company "B" moved downstream and put two platoons across the river, its other platoon having previously crossed at CLEFUY. Company "B" was ordered to hold its bridgehead and protect the 3d Battalion as it crossed. However, an enemy self-propelled gun kept firing from the southwest (424546) in the vicinity of LA SCHE at the crossing site. The 1st Battalion reported at 1859 hours that it had one platoon on its objective (440535, Sheet 36/18) on the high ground northeast of CLEFUY and other units were following.

Difficulty was experienced in securing bridging material from VI Corps by the Engineers and it was planned to sweep the ANOULL-CLEFUY road for mines so supplies could be carried down this road. The 2d Battalion was ordered to assemble on the high ground west of CLEFUY by 0830 hours on 22 November. The 3d Battalion reported at 0230 hours on 22 November that both Companies "K" and "L" were across the MEURTHE River and were digging in. Company "A" reported that it had established a good defensive position in an area in which the Germans had placed much barbed wire and dug trenches. Heavy artillery and mortar fire kept falling in the 1st Battalion area throughout the night.
German patrol of approximately platoon strength attempted to infiltrate through Company "A" but was chased off with a small fire fight. Engineers advised at 0615 hours that the ANOUIL-CLEFCY road was clear and a tredway bridge was being brought up to place across the river. However, at 0615 hours, the Engineers stated that the road was under enemy fire and did not believe it advisable to bring the bridge forward. Whereupon, the Regimental Commander stated that the bridge would not be erected. The road from ANOUIL to CRAIG was to be swept for mines as soon as CRAIG was cleared of the enemy, the 2d Battalion was to move the road from CRAIG to LA CROIX AUX MINES (A-90579, Sheet 36/18). The 2d Battalion was ordered to send patrols from ANOUIL toward CRAIG and proceed until they met small arms fire.

The 1st Battalion reported at 0932 hours that the two forward Platoons of Company "G", which had been advancing toward Company "A", had been surrounded and were pinned down by heavy concentrations of enemy artillery and mortar fire. At 0932 hours Company "G" moved to a position on the right of the Company "B" platoon in a heavily wooded area. Wire entanglements were encountered in the midst of heavy undergrowth. The company penetrated right up to the German positions and called upon two German to surrender. However, the Germans ran for their positions and machine pistols began firing into the company. The Germans also opened up with six machine guns, automatic weapons and rifle grenades. The company moved into vacant trenches and the machine guns began firing in such a manner as to appear that the unit was trapped. The platoons infiltrated back into SOURDE by 1230 hours under heavy mortar and artillery fire. An estimated two hundred Germans were in front of the company.

The Regimental Commander decided to commit the 2d Battalion due east through CLEFCY at once and called upon Division for smoke pots to cover the area. The 3d Battalion continued its advance, however, against slight enemy small arms fire. At 1120 hours the 1st Battalion advised that Company "A" had been driven off the hill and was there in CLEFCY. The company had received a counter-attack from 0630 hours to 1115 hours. Two Platoons of Company "C" and one platoon of Company "B" were also engaged in the fire fight. Units ran out of ammunition and without communication to assure a rapid resumon were forced to withdraw into CLEFCY. Casualties were heavy and the Platoons of the company were quite scattered.

The 3d Battalion's advance ran into increasing German opposition due to the strong emplacements and superior terrain advantage of the enemy. Patrols were sent out to both the right and left flanks in an attempt to knock out enemy positions.

The Division Commander arrived at the regimental command post at
1738 hours and issued orders for the 2d Battalion to attack on the morning of 23 November. One company of the 2d Battalion was to relieve Company "G", 143d Infantry, under cover of darkness. This position would be used to launch an attack on FRAIZE at 1000 hours on 23 November. Smoke was to be used to fog the valley if wind and weather conditions permitted. Four medium tanks were to be available to support the attack.

The 1st Battalion was ordered to re-organize its units in the vicinity of DEVELINE (411531, Sheet 36/18). Also, the 3d Battalion, with the exception of Company "I" which remained on position, was ordered to assemble near DEVELINE in regimental reserve. Elements of Company "B" with the 3d Battalion were to rejoin the 1st Battalion. One platoon of Company "A" remained east of the MEURTHE River in CLEFCY.

Division ordered the Reconnaissance Company, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, released from the regiment at 2130 hours, although the Regimental Commander advised that the release of this unit would mean that it would take additional riflemen to fill their vacated positions.

Company "G" relieved Company "C", 143d Infantry, at 0400 hours on 23 November, and Company "F" relieved two platoons of Company "B", 143d Infantry. Mist and fog covered the valley floor at dawn, but the 2d Battalion advised it was ready to proceed with its attack. The Division Commander ordered both the 1st and 3d Battalions to follow closely behind the advance of the 2d Battalion when the attack was launched. The Regimental Commander ordered the platoon of Company "A" to make a feint attack to determine if the Germans had withdrawn from positions east of CLEFCY. The platoon reported that no enemy activity had been observed in the vicinity of the town during the morning. However, as soon as its feint began, enemy fire immediately fell on the platoon and continued every time any effort was made to move from its position.

The 2d Battalion began its attack on time and began moving on LE MAZEVILLE (445549, Sheet 36/18). No enemy fire was received by 1028 hours and many French civilians could be seen moving around in the town. Company "G" sent patrols into both LE MAZEVILLE and BELREPATIE (437547, Sheet 36/18). Mortar fire began falling on the battalion at 1140 hours from the vicinity of CLAIREGOUTTE (445542, Sheet 36/18) and artillery was placed on this area. The regimental command post moved from GERBEVAL to DEVELINE at 1018 hours.

At 1420 hours the Regimental Commander reported the 2d Battalion was moving forward despite concentrated mine fields. The 3d Battalion, less Company "I", was ordered to assemble east of AINQUIL and be prepared to move up the valley toward FRAIZE. The Antitank Company was
instructed to move its command post to LES GRANGES with two squads at
BOSLDRIPE (430517, Sheet 36/18) and one squad overlooking CLEFOY where
anti-aircraft half-tracks were emplaced. The remainder of Antitank
Company was to move to the northwest of CLEFOY. The Company "A" pla-
toon in this sector was ordered to return to the 1st Battalion.

By 1530 hours Company "F" had advanced to a point (450553, Sheet
36/18) one thousand yards north of FRAIZE with Company "E" immediately
behind it and Company "G" was on the outskirts of LES AULNES (444546,
Sheet 36/18). The 2d Battalion objective had been changed from FRAIZE
to BON REPOS (459549, Sheet 36/18), Company "F" progressed to MANDRAY
(461550, Sheet 36/18) by 1713 hours with Company "E" following. Enemy
mortars firing from the vicinity of FRAIZE had caused several casual-
ties. Contact with the enemy was made all along the battalion front.
Civilians reported approximately two hundred Germans in the area. The
2d Battalion advised that the smoke screen had been effective through-
out the day and requested its re-use on 24 November. The battalion
was ordered by the Regimental Commander to push as far as possible,
maintaining contact with the 1/3d Infantry on the left (north).

The Division Commander arrived at the command post at 1740 hours
and stated that the regiment would be responsible for blocking the
FRAIZE-PLAINFAING and FRAIZE-SCARUFT (472544, Sheet 36/18) roads,
blocking the town of FRAIZE. Units were not to enter the town until
Engineers had cleared it of mines and booby-traps. STRASBOURG had
fallen and the main objective was to get into the RHINE Valley. A cap-
tured German document stated that their troops were to withdraw. The
regiment was to be responsible for any pockets of the enemy left behind
and maintain contact with the French on the south. The 2d Battalion
was to catch what Germans might remain in FRAIZE—these undoubtedly
would be trying to escape via the road to PLAINFAING. The 2d Battalion
was notified to send a patrol in an effort to find a crossing of the
MEURTHE River tributary between FRAIZE and PLAINFAING in order that a
force might block the road. At daylight a detachment was to be sent
into PLAINFAING. If the town was unoccupied, troops were to move in
and establish a road block at the cross roads within the town.

A Company "F" patrol reported at 0300 hours on 24 November that
the stream extending from BON REPOS to the MEURTHE River was unfor-
durable and it had not located any bridges. Enemy vehicles were observed mov-
ing north and east from FRAIZE.

The 2d Battalion Commander reported at 0545 hours on 24 November
that Companies "E" and "F" were engaged in a fire fight with enemy
machine guns firing from houses in the vicinity of LES SECHES TOURNEES
(465553, Sheet 36/18).
At 0840 hours on 24 November, the Assistant Division Commander stated that he had the regimental attack plan and wanted to know why the 1st Battalion was placed north of the 2d Battalion. The regimental Commander advised that the plan was for the 2d Battalion to attack south while the 1st Battalion attacked east. Whereupon, the Assistant Division Commander advised that the Division Commander had stated that the primary job of the regiment was to cleared AREND, FRAIZE and the hill mass from which Company "A" had been driven. Patrols were to be sent to the high ground south of FRAIZE. Road blocks to be taken over from the 143d Infantry were of secondary importance—the primary function was to take PLAINFAING and clear the FRAIZE valley. At 0900 hours the Division Chief of Staff advised that he believed the Division Commander wanted the road cut at PLAINFAING first and then clear the valley. Also, the 3d Battalion was to be kept in reserve.

By 1030 hours the 2d Battalion had worked to the edge of the woods just north of BON MOFO and patrols were sent to Hill 629 (466548, Sheet 36/18) and Hill 576 (470546, Sheet 36/18). Both Companies "E" and "F" continued to advance toward FRAIZE from the northeast while Companies "A" and "B" did likewise on the 2d Battalion left flank. By 1200 hours Company "F" had a patrol of platoon strength within the town and by 1355 hours a Company "E" platoon had worked to the edge of SCARUFT (472543, Sheet 36/18) and then occupied it despite being fired on from the high ground east of the town.

Both Companies "E" and "G" occupied FRAIZE despite some opposition from enemy on the ridge southeast of the city and from self-propelled gun fire coming from PLAINFAING. Company "A" was ordered to put in a road block on the edge of the BOIS DE ROUGES TERRES (477557, Sheet 36/18) and send a patrol to the road junction (470549, Sheet 36/18) in the LE NOIR BOIS. Companies "B" and "G" remained in reserve.

The Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion at 1645 hours to send a combat patrol from one company to the ridge position northeast of CIEUXY from which Company "A" had been driven. The remainder of the company was to proceed to CIEUXY and relieve the Antitank Company. If the patrol encountered no opposition on the ridge, the entire company would probably be sent to that point.

At 1800 hours the Division Chief of Staff ordered a patrol of one officer and twenty men sent to the COL DU BONHOMME (513518, Sheet 36/18) to observe the valley and town of LE BONHOMME (538528, Sheet 36/18) and determine if the Germans were using the town and roads running into it. Any Germans encountered on route were to be by-passed. If possible, the patrol was to penetrate into LE BONHOMME itself, but it must reach the COL DU BONHOMME. A combat patrol from Company "B" was ordered to accomplish this mission.
Information received from prisoners indicated the Germans were to withdraw from FRAIZE to PLAINFAING to AUVERNELLES (474523, Sheet 36/18) and when forced out of there withdraw to LE BONHOMME.

The Company "B" combat patrol returned to the 1st Battalion at 0300 hours. It reported that it had encountered enemy opposition first one thousand yards east of BON REPUS where a machine gun covered an enemy road block (479549, Sheet 36/18). Three men were lost at this point. The petrol out south and thence east toward the woods. It was again fired on from machine guns located on the edge of the woods (485545 and 485537, Sheet 36/18) and by riflemen from positions between the machine guns. Five men were lost at this point. The Germans sent flares into the air. Information from civilians indicated the Germans had occupied houses along the edge of the woods and had taken up defensive positions. The road to the edge of the woods was not mined but woods, themselves, were both mined and booby-trapped. French civilians were being forced to dig trenches for the Germans in the vicinity of LE BONHOMME. The Regimental Commander ordered the 1st Battalion to send another patrol out at daybreak with the same missions, but the patrol was to keep away from the main road and try to get through by back roads.

The Division G-3 advised at 0845 hours on 25 November that the Assistant Division Commander wanted a road block placed at the trail junction (493554, Sheet 36/18) southeast of LE CHIPAL (486560, Sheet 36/18). Also, the regimental command post was to be moved from ANOUIL to LE CHIPAL.

Company "L" occupied the hill mass northeast of CLECY and sent patrols toward the high ground south of FRAIZE. No enemy contact had been made at 0900 hours. By 0930 hours the Company "L" patrol was receiving artillery fire but had been no Germans.

The 36th Reconnaissance Troop, which was patrolling the road between ANOUIL and GERARDMER reported all quiet in its sector.

The 1st Battalion advised at 1028 hours that it was encountering heavy opposition 1000 yards east of BON REPUS and was using Company "C" and some tanks from the 2d Battalion to knock it out.

The Regimental Commander stated that if plans proceeded satisfactorily during the day, the 2d Battalion would move to LA CROIX AUX MINES during the night while the 1st Battalion remained in position as a blocking force.

A message was received from the Assistant Division Commander at 1533 hours that LE CHIPAL was receiving machine gun and 20 mm gun fire.
from the edge of the woods 700 yards south of the town. He stated that
this would not have occurred if the road block had been established at
the road junction in the LE NOIR BOIS as previously planned. A batta-
illion was to be used to put the road block in if it was necessary as a
battalion of the 143d Infantry was having to be utilized in the area
and the Division Commander wanted it elsewhere. Companies "A" and "C"
with light tanks and tank destroyers established the road block by
1415 hours.

Company "B" continued to receive machine gun and small arms fire
in its positions around SCARUFT and the 2d Battalion Commander ques-
tioned that the hill to the south be smoken to cut off enemy observation.
Company "L" had two platoons on the high ground overlooking PLAINFAING
at 1350 hours. French civilians could be seen in the town. The bridge
on the road to FRAIZE was destroyed although the town itself was intact.

At a meeting with all unit commanders at 1830 hours, the Regimen-
tal Commander advised that the regimental mission was one of blocking,
patrolling and clearing the enemy left in the sector. The regimental
command post moved from ANDVULD to LE CHIPAL at 2032 hours.

The 3d Battalion was advised that Division operations instructions
had changed the 141st Infantry plans. The 3d Battalion was to be respon-
sible for the hill mass south of FRAIZE and remain in regimental
reserve. Two companies were to hold the hill mass if desired by the
Battalion Commander. When the objective line was reached, which exten-
ded south of PLAINFAING to the vicinity of LES GRIMES (449510, Sheet
36/18) one company could move to an assembly area between MANDRAY
(450580, Sheet 36/18) and LA CROIX AUX MINES.

The 1st Battalion was notified that Company "A" would relieve the
1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, and Company "C" would relieve the 2d Bat-
talion, 143d Infantry, at 0800 hours on 26 November. Company "B" was
to be taken off of the road blocks it was holding and be placed in a
reserve position.

The 2d Battalion was to attack at 1030 hours on 26 November and
reach an objective line extending from the vicinity of LES GRIMES
(448919, Sheet 36/18) northeast to the road south of Hill 995 (515556,
Sheet 36/18). After the objective line was seized, it was to be se-
cured with not more than one reinforced company and patrols sent to the
southeast to maintain contact with and determine the strength of the
enemy.

At 2350 hours Division ordered the 36th Reconnaissance Troop to
send two patrols before 0900 hours on 26 November to Hill 988 (445485,
Sheet 36/18) and Hill 997 (453499, Sheet 36/18) to determine enemy
strength and dispositions.
At 2355 hours the 1st Battalion was ordered to extend its objective line to that originally set forth for the 2d Battalion in accordance with latest instructions from Division. The 1st Battalion Commander advised that Company "C" would have to be moved entirely across the 2d Battalion area during the night. The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, which Company "C" was to relieve, was engaged with an estimated one hundred Germans. This would make it extremely difficult to attack on so large a front with only two companies available.

Company "L" sent patrols into both FRAIZE and PLAINFAING during the night and reported no enemy in either town. By 0900 hours on 26 November Company "I" was four hundred yards southeast of SUEHS and Company "L" occupied Hill 757 (455420, Sheet 36/18) overlooking PLAINFAING. Company "A" had relieved the 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, at 0500 hours and Company "C" had relieved the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, at 0800 hours. Company "B" was in a reserve position in ST JEAN (489568, Sheet 36/18).

The Division Commander arrived at the command post at 0932 hours and stated that as soon as the regimental objective line was taken, the best reserve sector would be in the LA CROIX AUX MINES area. The main objective was to be LE BONHOMME cross roads.

The 1st and 2d Battalions began their attack at 1030 hours. The 2d Battalion encountered only slight opposition from mortar fire and one light machine gun and was within three hundred yards of its objective at 1105 hours. The 1st Battalion encountered a road block of approximately thirty trees that held up its tanks and tank destroyers. Engineers were called upon to clear the road block. No opposition had been encountered by the battalion. By 1305 hours Company "I" had elements in houses in LES GRIMBELS and was receiving small arms fire from just south of the town.

At 1252 hours the Assistant Division Commander ordered two patrols from the 3d Battalion to make a reconnaissance and contact the French if it was necessary to go all the way to GERARDMER.

The Antitank Company was attached to the 2d Battalion and the Battalion Commander was instructed to use it in an effort to relieve one of his companies.

Company "C" was on its objective at 1620 hours and was in contact with the 3d Battalion, 143d Infantry. Company "A" also reached its objective without encountering enemy opposition. Companies "I" and "L" remained on the line and Company "K" moved into a reserve position. The 2d Battalion was engaged with the enemy in the wooded high ground northeast of AUVERSLES. Company "I" was receiving fire from both
flanks. The enemy was reported to be digging in all along the battalion front. Company "F" made contact with Company "I" at PLEINFAING. Germans continued to occupy positions on the high ground southeast of PLEINFAING. Company "I" attempted to penetrate into BOIS DE STENGI-GOUTTE south of LES CHIMES but was pushed out. The enemy had dug in emplacements protected by barbed wire, machine guns and small arms fire. Artillery was placed on this area. The 2d Battalion dug in for the night. Antitank Company was sent to FRAYEZ to relieve Company "F".

The Assistant Division Commander advised at 0822 hours on 27 November that men were not to be risked unnecessarily but patrolling must be done. If and when the regimental sector was cleared, French forces would be able to move forward. The 3d Battalion was to be placed in a reserve position.

All battalions continued their attacks at 0730 hours on 27 November. Company "G" encountered rifle fire. Company "E" made enemy contact at 0815 hours and Company "F" sent patrols toward BARANCON (48552C Sheet 36/18). Company "I" was ordered to hold its position and had one section of heavy machine guns, one section of 81 mm mortars and three 50 caliber machine guns attached to it. The entire reinforced company was then attached to the 2d Battalion with the remainder of the 3d Battalion moving into an assembly area. By 1120 hours the 2d Battalion reported three enemy tanks were operating against Company "F" and one tank against Company "G". One platoon of Company "F" had worked to the east of BARANCON while the remainder of the company occupied AUVERNES.

Another patrol from the 3d Battalion was sent down the CLEFCEY-GERARDMER road with instructions to proceed until it hit resistance.

A report was received from the 131st Field Artillery at 1632 hours that Company "I" was receiving a counter-attack. However, it proved to be a German attempt to infiltrate men into houses around LES CHIMES, and the company engaged in a fire fight to repulse them. French reported a German headquarters in the vicinity of LES MINE (48507, Sheet 36/18) and mortar and artillery fire was placed on the area.

The 2d Battalion Commander advised at 1715 hours that Company "G" was faced with an enemy road block defended by Infantry, machine guns and 20 mm guns with two mortars in position behind Hill 951 (491530, Sheet 36/18). Enemy anti-aircraft half-tracks fired upon patrols attempting to flank the German positions. Enemy tanks had withdrawn from the road block and it was believed they were in LE BONHOMME firing on the 1st Battalion.

The 1st Battalion S-3 notified the Regimental S-3 at 1746 hours
that Company "A" had moved into a clearing and received direct fire from a self-propelled gun and mortars. The company had to pull back and was reorganizing, but was going to proceed on to its objective during the night. Company "B" was in reserve in the vicinity of LES VIEUX GAZONS (513510, Sheet 36/18). Company "C" had reached its objective line and had cut the road running from COL DU BONHOMME to LES BAGANELLES (538549, Sheet 36/18).

The 2d Battalion Commander informed the Regimental Commander at 2130 hours that he was sending two patrols out before daylight to work in behind the enemy road block holding up his advance. The road block was to be attacked in the morning using tanks and tank destroyers. A tank dozer was needed to clear the road block as it was approximately five hundred yards long.

At 0624 hours on 28 November, the lst Battalion notified regiment that the enemy had infiltrated into the position of Company "A" and was firing on men located in houses south of LES VIEUX GAZONS. A Company "B" platoon was trying to work around the enemy while Company "C" held its position. Both Companies "A" and "B" were receiving machine gun, rifle and mortar fire from Hill 1128 (515535, Sheet 36/18).

Division ordered the 36th Reconnaissance Troop to send two patrols into the FOREST DE LA HAUTE MEURTHE from the west in the vicinity of LA SOIE (520585, Sheet 36/18) and work southeast toward LE GRAND VALTIN (445543, Sheet 36/18). If no enemy was observed in the town, it was to be entered.

The 3d Battalion was alerted to reinforce the lst Battalion. The company commanders proceeded to the lst Battalion command post to be oriented on the situation. Company "A" was completely disorganized and Company "B" was in a position where it could not move without drawing heavy enemy fire. Two tank destroyers and one tank had been knocked out by German antitank rockets.

The Company "E" patrol of platoon strength, which had been sent out to reconnoiter behind the enemy road block in the 2d Battalion area, returned at 0955 hours. It reported that it had to go through heavy machine gun and rifle fire and one of its members had been killed. Both Companies "E" and "G" were sending platoons to the southeast to work behind the road block while an attempt was to be made to bring tanks forward. Company "I", on the southern sector of the 2d Battalion, reported that a great deal of German activity was being noted on Hill 833 (465611, Sheet 36/18). At 1148 hours the 2d Battalion reported that thirty rounds of tank fire had been placed on the enemy road block and Company "G" was working around to outflank it. The company became engaged in a fire fight and knocked out one machine gun and took two prisoners.
The Assistant Division Commander advised the Regimental Commander that the mission of the 111th Infantry in order of importance was to keep the FRAIZE valley clear for a Division supply route, keep the enemy completely occupied, advance whenever possible and secure ground and, finally, to take the high ground overlooking LE BONHOMME.

By 1323 hours Company "G" was almost on its objective. Prisoners taken by the 2d Battalion stated that the tank fire they had received during the morning had considerably lowered their morale. The company had one squad captured near the road block, while two other squads were engaged in a heavy fire fight.

Company "B" had cleared the 1st Battalion situation by 1430 hours and had taken fifteen prisoners. The Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion to take over the 1st Battalion positions and Company "G" was attached to the 3d Battalion. Remaining elements of the 1st Battalion assembled in the vicinity of LA CROIX AUX MINES. Company "I" was to be relieved by Antitank Company during the night.

The Regimental S-3 notified the 3d Battalion at 1552 hours that the 3d Battalion was to protect the right flank of the regiment and tie in with Company "E" on its left. On 29 November, one company was to move down the ridge to the southwest and clear any enemy resistance. Once the main road was cut, it was believed enemy resistance would cease.

The 2d Battalion advised at 1715 hours that Germans had infiltrated onto the hill north of IES CRIMELS and it was not believed that Antitank Company could hold the position of Company "I". The Regimental Commander therefore ordered Company "I" to remain on position. Company "I" reported much activity on their front with enemy half-track vehicles moving around in HABEVAUPT (463498, Sheet 36/18). Antitank Company advised that it was receiving small arms fire from houses west of the BOIS DE BRAMONT (479519 and 479515, Sheet 36/18). A Company "K" patrol that attempted to reach Company "E" ran into enemy opposition six hundred yards from the main Company "K" position and failed to make contact with Company "E".

The 3d Battalion was advised at 0110 hours on 29 November that it would attack at 1000 hours. At 0804 hours on 29 November, the 2d Battalion Commander advised that he intended to attack after the 3d Battalion attack had begun. Two companies supported by three medium tanks were to make the attack.

Four reports had been received that approximately two hundred Germans were in HAUSE BARANCON (490517, Sheet 36/18) but Company "F" reported there were only about sixty enemy there. Tanks and tank
destroyers put direct fire on the town at 0900 hours.

Company "L" moved out at 1000 hours and passed through Company "K". Encountering no opposition it reached its objective at 1100 hours in the BOIS DU RAIN DES GENETS (504125, Sheet 36/18). Company "E" patrols advanced into territory held by the enemy the previous day and found positions vacated. The high ground in this sector was immediately occupied by Companies "F" and "G" and contact made with Company "L".

The 2d Battalion was ordered to send patrols to the high ground (500500, Sheet 36/18) southeast of HAUTE BARANCON to determine if any hostile positions existed in this sector.

The Division Chief of Staff advised the Regimental S-3 at 1230 hours that the 3d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was to be relieved by 0800 hours on 30 November. The regimental boundary was extended eastward to run from a point (558550, Sheet 36/18) approximately two miles south of ECHERY (575592, Sheet 36/18) to LAPOUTROIE (579505, Sheet 36/18).

Company "C" was relieved by a platoon of Company "K" by 1430 hours and moved to LA CROIX AUX MINES. Company "G" continued to meet enemy opposition but was driving the Germans back toward the position of Company "L". A patrol of the 143d Infantry entered LE BONHOMME and reported that the town had been evacuated by the enemy.

Ambition Company relieved Company "I" on the hill mass south of FRAIZE by 2300 hours. Company "H" was then designated as the unit to relieve part of the 3d Battalion, 143d Infantry. Company "G" received intermittent mortar fire throughout the night of 29-30 November.

On the morning of 30 November, the 2d Battalion Commander regrouped his units, Company "E" sent patrols to Hill 951 (483511, Sheet 36/18) and RUDLIN (483470, Sheet 36/18). Company "G" established a road block at the COL DU BONHOMME (513519, Sheet 36/18) without opposition although patrols to the north continued to be subjected to intermittent mortar fire.

All units of the 143d Infantry 3d Battalion were relieved by the regimental 3d Battalion by 1230 hours. A contact point (562255, Sheet 36/18) was established just south of STE MARIE (566555, Sheet 36/18) where patrols of Company "B", 143d Infantry, and patrols of the 3d Battalion had already met. A Company "L" patrol was sent to LE ROND GAZON (522534, Sheet 36/18) and was then to proceed southeast to LE BONHOMME.

The Company "G" platoon that was attempting to put in a road block encountered increasing resistance from four enemy machine guns, a light
French-type tank and riflemen. Prisoners reported two Luftwaffe Companies had been brought into the sector during the previous night. A bazooka team from the 2d and 3d Battalions was sent out to try and hit the tank as it was located too close to the troops to use artillery. German snipers continued to be active across the 2d and 3d Battalion fronts and artillery and mortar fire fell throughout the afternoon. The enemy tank pulled out after artillery fire was finally laid on it and headed toward the COL DU BONHOMME. Several other German vehicles also moved in that direction.

The 36th Reconnaissance Troop reported at 2115 hours that it was receiving machine gun fire from the vicinity of the road junction (423465, Sheet 36/18) in the BAN SUR MEURTHE slightly to the southeast of MON PRES DE STRAUFSCHE (420467, Sheet 36/18). Another enemy machine gun was firing from houses in LE BOUYEREAU (430485, Sheet 36/18) while enemy mortar and artillery fire was coming from behind Hill 928 (445486, Sheet 36/18). Heavy caliber enemy artillery fire also fell in ANOULD.

Thus, the month of November closed with the regiment holding and attacking across a front of eighteen and one-half (18-1/2) air miles and across a front of many more ground miles due to the circuitous trails and roads in the highest reaches of the VOSGES mountains. It was apparent that the enemy was fighting a delaying action but they accomplished it with their usual tenacity and skill. It was noted, however, that the quality of the prisoners taken, as to training and equipment, was inferior. The area through which the regiment had operated during the month was mined and booby-trapped to a marked degree. The German "scorched earth" policy in the CORRHOX and ANOULD valleys was devastating and ruthless. There was a marked increase in casualties from mines and small arms fire due to the necessity of penetrating through the dense woods of the VOSGES forests, in which the enemy had previously had time to prepare excellent defenses. The German retreat was in no sense a rout but was evidently a planned withdrawal. However, they were afforded no rest and the constant pressure and numerous attacks across the long regimental front gave them the impression of a much larger force opposing them than actually existed.
Fighting strength on the line of the three battalions in officer and enlisted men during the month of November 1944 is as follows:

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Five hundred and forty-one (541) enlisted men and fourteen (14) officer replacements were received during the month of November. Of the enlisted men replacements ninety-four per cent (94%) were riflemen, three and three-tenths per cent (3.3%) were machine gunners, and three-tenths per cent (1.3%) were medical technicians, one and one-tenth per cent (1.1%) were squad leaders and three-tenths per cent (0.3%) were mortar gunners.

Replacements received in November were not as well equipped as those received during previous months. Few or none were equipped with shoes--the rubberized shoe so essential to infantrymen in inclement winter weather. All replacements were trained in the fundamentals.
of their basic weapons. The established system of allowing replacements to join their units during "rest" periods was continued. Casualties among replacements remained approximately ten per cent (10%) higher than among experienced troops. Upon being committed to active combat the great majority performed under fire very creditably.

Morale of the troops suffered due to the protracted period of time they remained in active combat. The regiment had been engaged in one hundred and eight (108) days of continuous combat on 30 November. Every effort was made to give each battalion a few days out of the line whenever tactical situations permitted. A very limited number of enlisted men and officers (less than one half of one per cent) were sent to Paris on pass every fourth day beginning with 20 November. The Headquarters Section of the Medical Detachment operated a Regimental Rest Camp well behind the front lines where enlisted men and officers who did not require hospitalization were permitted to rest for a period of no more than four days and recover from battle fatigue and minor physical ailments. Extra efforts were made to provide all troops with a minimum of one hot meal per day. All commanders instituted an active campaign to instruct troops on the care of the feet to prevent trench foot inasmuch as the advent of colder weather and snow appreciably increased this type of non-battle casualty.

German prisoners of war taken by the regiment during the month of November 1944 are listed by days as follows:

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<td>30 November</td>
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TOTAL.....135

Thirty-four (34) known enemy dead were accounted for in the regimental area. Reports from prisoners indicated that all units opposing the regiment had suffered heavy casualties in both killed and
wounded. Russians, Poles and poorly trained second-rate German soldiers had been rushed into the front lines. The majority of the enemy casualties were caused by friendly artillery fire.

Enemy war material captured and destroyed during the month of November 1944 was tabulated as follows:

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Mines, Shu</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

The above figures include only known captured and destroyed enemy material. No estimate can accurately be made of additional material destroyed or disabled.

END

Report of Operations written by:

Robert D. Dietrich
M/Sgt ROBERT D. DIETRICH, 16062508
Service Company, 141st Infantry
Regimental Sergeant Major
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<table>
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<td>Officer roster</td>
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<td>Awards and Decorations roster</td>
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**Classification: CANCELLED**

By Authority of the Adjutant General

Downgrading Committee

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-1
HEADQUARTERS 141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
APO #36, U. S. ARMY

29 January 1945

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Regimental History and Conclusions of Operations

TO: The Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, APO #36,
U. S. Army

1. Inclosed is the history of the 141st Infantry Regiment covering operations in France during December 1944.

2. The following conclusions, based upon operations during December, are made:

a. On several occasions the results of carefully planned use of all supporting weapons available to a battalion have been outstanding. The battalion commander concerned has taken time to coordinate such fires on a time schedule in such a manner that not only is maximum fire power delivered onto enemy positions prior to attack, but by shifting the directions from which fires originate, hostile counter-battery is effectively overcome. For example, while normal direct support artillery lays down a preparation, tank destroyers will open fire from the left flank for three minutes, followed by tank or anti-aircraft ground mission fire from the right flank for two minutes. Meanwhile, machine guns firing in battery will deliver heavy volumes of fire from central positions for five minutes. Mortars enter the action on schedule and as the infantry advances, a crushing weight of all supporting arms lays down opposition until the infantry can close to the assault. In one instance fires were coordinated in this manner and as a climax two M-7's rolled up to within 200 yards of hostile emplacements and fired a full load of ammunition at point blank range. The Infantry successfully assaulted a very strong dug in position.

b. The use of armor in mass thorough difficult country broke the back of hostile opposition in a vital spot northwest of COLMAR. A French combat command, attacking with elements of this regiment, poured through a saddle in the hills overlooking KAYSERSBERG and deploying, rolled down the steep, irregular slopes into KENTSHEIM to take that strong point in a manner of minutes. Their vicious, coordinated thrusts there and on the following day into KAYSERSBERG and AMMERSCHWHR resulted in the taking of about 300 prisoners and so
SECRET

disorganized hostile forces that no further offensive action could be taken by the German command for forty-eight hours. Fifteen tanks were involved in this action, supported by three or four tank destroyers. In addition to the capture of the prisoners, a large quantity of supplies and ammunition were taken while two Mark V tanks, a self-propelled gun and four 20mm anti-aircraft guns were destroyed.

2. a. In the operations around COLMAR the German tactics were an interesting combination of feints, frontal attacks and double envelopments coupled with daring infiltration tactics designed first to gain time to assemble forces, secondly to mislead us as to the direction of their main effort, and thirdly to take advantage of our overextended, shallow dispositions in an attempted annihilation of the entire division.

From the moment of our approach to the ridge overlooking the KAYSERBERG--BENWIHR road, German reaction was violent. This was the position which they believed vital in the defense of COLMAR and for several days our forward elements were subjected to fanatical frontal attacks coordinated by attacks from smaller infiltrating units within our own positions. The attacks were made by units arriving directly from Germany to be thrown immediately into the assault and thus spoil any contemplated attack by us.

This was followed by small thrusts at our left flank where a salient into our line existed, for which the Germans fought tenaciously.

As soon as a sizeable force could be brought into our sector--again directly from Germany--a hasty large-scale attack developed which struck mainly at our exposed right flank, deep into the position. This was accompanied by a smaller blow into the salient on our left and a comparable attack against SELSTAT where another regiment was located. Dependent on a strong and mobile reserve the objective of this attack was to cut the division off and then annihilate it. The force employed amounted to about 2500 men but the lesson to be learned is that the German command, when faced with a desperate situation, will continue to accomplish its ends by desperate, daring plan put into effect with all the cunning and secrecy available to them, seeking the weakness in a defensive line which they then endeavor to exploit by a fanatical tenacity.

CHARLES H. OWENS
Colonel, 141st Infantry
COMMANDING

-3-

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6 Incls:

#1 - Narrative (sextuplet)
#2 - Casualty Report (sextuplet)
#3 - Officer Roster (sextuplet)
#4 - Awards & Decorations Roster (sextuplet)
#5 - Regimental Journal
#6 - Maps

*To accompany original to Historical Section, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.*
OPERATIONS IN FRANCE
DECEMBER 1944
141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

The month of December opened with the regiment holding and attacking across a front of eighteen and one-half (18 1/2) air miles and across a front of many more ground miles due to the circuitous trails and roads required to be traveled between positions. The 1st Battalion was in a reserve position in LA CROIX AUX MINES (490579, Sheet 36-18). The 2d and 3d Battalions were probing through the dense forests on the high ground west and northwest of LE BONHOMME (538528, Sheet 36-18). Company "C" was blocking the road network at the COL DE BONHOMME (512519, Sheet 36-18) which the Germans were also trying to block by cutting many trees across the roads to prevent penetration to the east. Company "E" occupied positions north of Company "G" and the 3d Battalion in turn, extended northeast to the vicinity of BOHRY (575592, Sheet 36-18). Company "F" occupied positions extending from Company "C" to HAUTE BARANCON (490517, Sheet 36-18) and west toward PLAINFAING where it connected with Antitank Company on the high ground above PLAINFAING (464528, Sheet 36-18). The 36th Reconnaissance Troop, which was attached to the regiment, held the southernmost flank and established contact with the French forces in the GERARDMER (3642, Sheet 36-18) sector.

The night of 30 November - 1 December passed with intermittent enemy artillery fire. Company "G" reported Germans falling trees across the road east of COL DU BONHOMME and artillery was placed on this area. Company "F", received self-propelled gun fire in the vicinity of PLAINFAING.

The 2d Battalion Commander advised at 0911 hours on 1 December that a great deal of enemy activity was heard around the COL DU BONHOMME during the night and it was difficult to determine whether the enemy was withdrawing or re-inforcing. However, Company "G" reported twenty-five Germans had infiltrated between two of its platoons and approximately thirty Germans trying to work their way around the company's flank. Also two light tanks and a column of Infantry were observed moving west toward the COL DU BONHOMME. Friendly artillery was placed on all enemy movements. The 3d Battalion was warned to watch its southern flank where it connected with the 2d Battalion. Company "E" which had been ordered off the hill the previous night was brought back into position and Company "L" was ordered to send a contact patrol to Company "E". Meanwhile, Company "C" engaged the German forces in front of its position and drove the enemy to the south.
At 1444 hours the Regimental Commander, Colonel CHARLES H. OWENS, 06957, of Tacoma, Washington, ordered the 3d Battalion to send a patrol into LE BONHOMME. If the town was unoccupied a platoon was to be sent in to occupy it.

Company "G" was still engaged in beating off German infiltrations at 1900 hours. Additional tanks could be heard moving toward the COL DU BONHOMME.

The regimental sector was extended to the east to include AUBURE (617555, Sheet 37/18) and the regiment was directed to be prepared to counter-attack any attempted enemy penetration of its line which now extended for twenty-one miles. The 1st Battalion sent Company "B" to SUR L'HATI (580588, Sheet 36/18) on the morning of 2 December with instructions to maintain contact with the 143d Infantry at AUBURE.

Company "K" occupied Hill 922 (543537, Sheet 36/18) during the night of 1-2 December and dug in a defensive position. Prisoners taken stated there were enemy troops in the FAURUPT (551540, Sheet 36/18) area. German fire was received from this town.

Contact was lost with the enemy on Hill 951 (469512, Sheet 36/18) and Hill 833 (469511, Sheet 36/18) southeast of PLAINEFAING. Patroits were sent to LE VALTIN (470446, Sheet 36/18) and TETE DES FAUX (542508, Sheet 36/18) in an effort to re-establish enemy contact.

Company "G" remained in contact with the Germans near the COL DU BONHOMME throughout the night and the morning of 2 December. A prisoner taken by the company stated that Engineers had come forward during the night to lay mines for a contemplated withdrawal. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was ordered to move east toward previously known enemy positions along the high ground south of CLEFTY (440527, Sheet 36/18) and PLAINEFAING. If the Germans had withdrawn the reconnaissance troop was to patrol the ridge east of the road running from CLEFTY to LE GRAND VALTIN (443444, Sheet 36/18).

The Division G-3 advised at 0938 hours that extensive patrolling was to be accomplished during the day so the Division Commander might give the regiment the mission of attacking Hill 1109 (569534, Sheet 36/18) and the hill mass to the south. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was to extend its patrolling so that additional troops might be released to shift to the east. French units on the south were to be kept advised of all movements.
Division was advised at 1115 hours that Company "G" was still engaged in small arms fire fights near COL DU BONHOMME and Company "B" had cleared SUR L'HATZ and was moving toward AUBURE. Company "G" was being relieved by Company "E" to clear out the resistance near COL DU BONHOMME. Company "F" sent patrols to the high ground and wooded crags south of AVIRNELES (474523, Sheet 36/18) and BARANCON (485520, Sheet 36/18).

At 1327 hours on 2 December, the Division C-3 stated that the Division Commander desired the troops to get east of the LE BONHOMME road. The 2d Battalion was to move during the night but not later than daylight on 3 December.

The 3d Battalion reported at 1443 hours that Company "K" had received a counter-attack on Hill 922 and had been driven back to a knoll due north of the hill itself.

The 2d Battalion reported no change in its dispositions at 1445 hours. Contact was still being made with the Germans around the COL DU BONHOMME.

The 1st Battalion was notified that it would move to the vicinity of Company "F" and be prepared to attack with two companies in the morning. Company "I" and Company "B" had established contact but were unable to push south because of darkness. The plan for the 2d Battalion to move to the road of LE BONHOMME was canceled and the battalion was ordered to alert Companies "F" and "G" for movement. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was ordered to take over the 2d Battalion sector. Antitank Company was ordered to disengage itself during the night and move by infiltration to BAN DE LEVEINES (504607, Sheet 36/17). Company "L" was to remain in position until it was relieved by the 36th Reconnaissance Troop when it would revert to the control of the 3d Battalion.

The regimental command post moved from LE CHIPAL to the vicinity (547563, Sheet 36/18) of WESTENLACH (542558, Sheet 36/18) at 1800 hours.

At 0130 hours on 3 December operations instructions were issued for an attack on the same day. The 1st Battalion was ordered to shift all of its forces east and begin an attack at 1000 hours from the high ground southeast of STE MARIE (566557, Sheet 36/18) and proceed southeast along the high ground paralleling the FRELAND (598523, Sheet 36/18) road, maintaining contact with the 3d Battalion on the right (east) and the 2d Battalion on the left (east). The 2d Battalion was to move by motor to a point (614585, Sheet 37/18) approximately two miles north of AUBURE and proceed south to seize
the area around Hill 924 -- MT LE KALVIN (618533, Sheet 37/18). The
objective was to take the battalion was to form a task force
consisting of one rifle company, a section of tank destroyers, a
section of tanks and a squad of engineers which was to move west
and seize the road and trail network (645532, Sheet 37/18) south-
west of AUBURE. Remaining elements of the 2d Battalion were to pro-
ceed southeast along the PERLAND--KAYSERSBERG (645490, Sheet 37/18)
road toward KAYSERSBERG. The 2d Battalion was also to maintain
contact with the 143d Infantry on the left (east) and the 1st
Battalion on the right (west). The 3rd Battalion was to disengage
Company "L" and assemble it in the vicinity of COL DES BAGINELLES
(538549, Sheet 36/18) prepared to assist in the attack. Company
"K" was to hold its position as a blocking force until relieved by
Antitank Company by 1200 hours on 3 December. The 3d Battalion was
to attack southeast from the high ground north of FAURUPF along the
high ground paralleling the LE BONHÔME--LAOUTROIS (579505, Sheet
36/18) road. The 3d Battalion was also to maintain contact with
the 1st Battalion on the left (east) and protect the right flank of
the regiment. A road block was to be established 600 yards (589498,
Sheet 36/18) southwest of HACHIMOTT (595501, Sheet 36/18). The
36th Reconnaissance Troop was to take over the two regimental
observation posts south and southeast of FAURE (555542, Sheet
36/18), protect the Division right flank and maintain contact with
the French on the south.

At 0916 hours on 3 December, the Regimental Commander notified
the 2d Battalion that it was not to be committed without orders
from regiment. Such orders depended upon how quickly AUBURE was
cleared. Also, the 3d Battalion was notified that FAURUPF was to be
cleared and not by-passed. The Division Commander advised at 0941
hours that the Germans were withdrawing from AUBURE at the present
time and the 2d Battalion was to be kept assembled and allowed to
rest for a dry.

At 1015 hours the 1st and 3d Battalions began their attack
with Company "B" and Company "I" leading, followed by Company "A"
and Company "L". By 1128 hours Company "I" was moving down the
forward slope of Hill 1228 (562543, Sheet 36/18) without encoun-
tering opposition. Small arms fire could be heard in the vicinity of
Company "B". Company "K" was entering FAURUPF.

The regimental command post moved from the vicinity of
WUSTENLOCH to ECHERY (575595, Sheet 36/18).

At 1200 hours the 1st Battalion reported that its leading ele-
ments were receiving enemy small arms and mortar fire 800 yards
south of STE MARIE. The 3d Battalion also began receiving mortar
fire but met no small arms fire. The 2d Battalion destroyed and moved south toward JAURM but encountered heavy mortar fire as it approached a blown bridge one mile north of the town.

By 1300 hours the 1st Battalion was receiving intense enemy machine gun, small arms and mortar fire. The 1st Battalion Commander ordered the battalion to assemble in the vicinity of the battalion command post because it was impossible to get supplies through the woods in sufficient quantities to press the attack. At 1338 hours the 3d Battalion commander advised that Company "I" was receiving small arms and mortar fire and requested permission from the regimental commander to withdraw the company due to the 1st Battalion withdrawal. However, at 1355 hours the 3d Battalion advised that Company "K" was clearing FAURUET and when the town was cleared, it would tie in with Company "I" and infantry Company "L" dug in 1000 yards northwest of Company "I" and remained in a reserve position.

The 143d Infantry had cleared AUBURE and the Division Commander ordered the 2d Battalion to occupy the town. At 1500 hours the 2d Battalion notified regiment that it was placing one company within the town, one company on the high ground on the right (west) and one platoon on the high ground on the left (east). Intermittent enemy artillery fire of a heavy caliber was falling on AUBURE.

The 3d Battalion was advised at 1613 hours that its first objective for the continuance of the attack on 4 December would be the road junction at CODONGOUTTE (595535, Sheet 36/18) with the second objective of proceeding south to the high ground at LAPOUTNIP. The 1st Battalion assembled in SUR L'HATS and was to remain in reserve the following day. The 2d Battalion was to continue with its previous mission and was to begin its attack at 0700 hours.

Company "K" cleared the enemy from the woods east of FAURUET, but found the area so heavily mined and booby-trapped that it withdrew to its original position.

The 2d Battalion attack was delayed until 0730 hours on 4 December due to road blocks and mines. Engineers were rushed to the battalion sector in order to get this attack moving. The 3d Battalion's attack began on schedule at 0730 hours and moved forward without encountering the enemy. The Regimental Commander, who was with the 3d Battalion, and the 3d Battalion Commander were wounded by mines at 1045 hours and the Company "H" commander was killed by a mine. Brigadier General ROBERT I. STACK, 07585, of Schenectady, New York, the 36th Infantry Division Assistant Commander, took over command of the regiment. By 1200 hours the 3d Battalion had advanced to within 1000 yards of CODONGOUTTE. Companies "F" and "G" also continued their advance, which was slow because of attempts by the
Germans to infiltrate across their flanks, Company "F" sent two
platoons to contact the 2d Battalion at CODONGOUTTE. Company "C"
continued to move due south and by 1425 hours was 1000 yards west of
FRELAND. Company "L" patrols entered RIBEAGOUTTE (578523, Sheet 36/18
by 1540 hours while Company "K" sent patrols east to contact Company
"F". Isolated groups of Germans could be seen running around in
woods as though they were lost. Several groups of Germans were also
by-passed during the advance through the thickly forested mountains.
One such enemy group ambushed the Executive Officer and S-3 of the
3d Battalion with their radio party. The Battalion S-3 and two of the
radio men were wounded but managed to escape as did the Battalion Ex-
ecutive Officer. Two members of the radio party, however, were
captured as was the radio and map indicating the battalion objective
points.

General STACK notified the 2d and 3d Battalions that they would
continue their attack on 5 December with the same objectives desig-
nated. The 2d Battalion was told that it had done a good job during
the day and would move south to an unimproved road (615509, Sheet
37/18) one mile west of ALSBECH (630505, Sheet 37/18) on the following
day. Roads in the 2d Battalion area were to be improved as rapidly as
possible so that armored units could follow and support it.

At 2040 hours the Regimental Commander sent the Regimental
Executive Officer, Lt. Colonel DONALD A. MACRAE, 0260431, of New
York City, New York, to take command of the 3d Battalion when the 3d
Battalion Executive Officer was wounded. The Regimental S-3, Major
HERBERT E. WAT , 040188, of San Antonio, Texas, assumed the addition-
al duties as Regimental Executive Officer.

At 0910 hours of 5 December, the regimental command post closed
at ECHERY and moved to AUBURE. 1500 rounds of the First French Army
with 400 mules were attached to the regiment until the French forces
could take over the sector.

Germans could be seen moving east down the KAYSERSBERG valley
on the morning of 5 December and the 2d Battalion directed artillery
fire on them. Division artillery was called to deliver harassing, 155mm
fire on this road for three hours as the enemy had been using the
highway for some time. A patrol from Company "F" entered FRELAND
while Company "Z" worked to within one and one-half kilometers of
the FRELAND-KAYSERSBERG road. By 1200 hours Company "C" had three
platoons in the wooded area directly north of the road. The 3d
Battalion continued to move southwest slowly and was on the high
ground west of FRELAND by noon time.

At 1320 hours the 3d Battalion contacted the 2d Battalion in
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FRELAND and Company "F" reported the town was cleared of the enemy. Company "L" received small arms fire 1000 yards northeast of LAPOUTROIS. The Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion to keep pushing and not slow up. The Germans were ordered to occupy FRELAND, as soon as they arrived in the sector.

The Regimental Commander notified the 1st Battalion at 1520 hours that it was to be attached to the 142 Infantry for the purpose of garrisoning SELESTAT (7962, Sheet 37/17). The Battalion was to assemble immediately and be prepared to move while a quartering party preceded it.

Company "F" encountered enemy opposition at 1740 hours while trying to push south out of FRELAND. Companies "K" and "L" were side by side on the high ground southwest of FRELAND with Company "I" between their position and the north end of the town. Company "I" was ordered to hold its position, prior to being committed, until Company "F" was able to clear up its opposition.

The Regimental Commander notified the 3d Battalion Commander at 1925 hours that the Battalion had done a good job during the day. He ordered a patrol sent to LAPOUTROIS and if that town was found to be unoccupied, troops were to move in. If Germans still held the town, artillery was to be placed on it and the Goums would be ordered to attack it. The Regimental Commander ordered a supply route opened from FRELAND to RACHMOTT; it was necessary to work on it all night in conjunction with the 2d Battalion.

At 2040 hours an alert notice was received from Division Headquarters to move the 2d and 3d Battalions and arrangements were made with the Division G-4 for transportation as all regimental transportation was hauling Goums and mules for French forces. The 2d Battalion was notified it would be relieved in place and was to arrange a stay in the assembling area. The Regimental S-1 was ordered to take a quartering party and arrange for quartering for the 3d Battalion and regimental command post in BERGEN (723562, Sheet 37/18), the 2d Battalion in ST HIPPOLYT (722594, Sheet 37/18) while Antitank Company was to be placed in either BERGEN or RADEN (716595, Sheet 37/18). The 1st Battalion was to remain in SELESTAT and wire communications were to be run to the town from BERGEN.

By 2230 hours Company "K" had worked a reinforced platoon into LAPOUTROIS without encountering any enemy. Company "L" also pushed a platoon into the town.

The Regimental S-3 notified the 2d and 3d Battalions at 0215 hours on 6 December that their relief by the French Goums would begin.

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at 0900 hours. The relief was to be speeded as much as possible without making a relief man per man. French officers were to be notified of positions and place their men as they so desired.

The 2d Battalion reported at 0855 hours that Company "F" was engaged with the enemy on a hill south of FRELAND and that the battalion ration party had received enemy fire while carrying supplies forward. Company "K" and a platoon of Company "L" in LAFOUTROIE received a counter-attack at approximately 1000 hours. The 3d Battalion was notified that this town would be held and forces would remain in position until the situation was cleared up. The 3d Battalion commander advised at 1057 hours that the Germans had come up a draw northeast of LAFOUTROIE behind a mortar barrage. The 3d Battalion forces pulled back from the town to the high ground to the north. A platoon of Company "K" was sent to cut off the draw through which the Germans were entering the town and Company "I" was sent to the assistance of Company "L".

By 1140 hours Company "I" was relieved with the exception of one platoon. The Goume proceeded through Company "F" and advanced south down the road under supporting fire from the Company's mortars. Up to 1200 hours no French troops had shown up to relieve Company "G".

The Division G-3 notified regiment at 1209 hours that new operation instructions had been issued and the 1st Battalion would revert to regimental control as soon as the regimental command post was established in SELSTAT. A reinforced battalion was to remain in SELSTAT and as soon as the 143d Infantry took GUEMAR (743544, Sheet 37/18) the regiment was to be responsible for that town north to SELSTAT. The Regimental Commander notified the Division Chief of Staff at 1210 hours that the relief of the 2d Battalion was progressing as planned. However, relief of the 3d Battalion was being held up by the German counter-attack near LAFOUTROIES. The Chief of Staff was advised that the regiment could not accept responsibility for the GUEMAR-SELSTAT area until the regiment was completely relieved, the only responsibility accepted being for the 1st Battalion in the vicinity of SELSTAT.

The Regimental Commander informed the Regimental S-3 at 1303 hours that Company "K" had been driven from the high ground around LAFOUTROIES and from the town itself. Two squads from Company "L" had been captured. The 3d Battalion commander was about to commit Company "I" to regain this lost ground, but the Regimental Commander ordered this stopped and the French to take over immediately. The 3d Battalion was ordered to leave its present sector as quickly as possible without additional casualties.

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All units of the regiment with the exception of Antitank Company, which was still awaiting relief by French forces, closed into their areas by 0100 hours on 7 December.

Both GUNMAR and BEBELHEIM (695510, Sheet 17/18) received counter-attacks during the night of 6-7 December and the 2d Battalion was alerted to move to HIBEAUVILLE (6955, Sheet 37/17). The 3d Battalion was notified that it would patrol from HULAWIR to the 1st Battalion's positions in SELSTAT and take over the 2d Battalion road block (754599, Sheet 37/18) one mile west of OESCHWILLER (736604, Sheet 37/17). The Division G-3 advised the Regimental Commander at 0900 hours on 7 December that the 2d Battalion would be attached to the 143d Infantry if it became necessary to use them to stop the German attack. If it was not necessary to commit them, it would not be attached.

The Antitank Company moved into HOSCHAT (723577, Sheet 37/18) on the morning of 7 December after being relieved by French forces during the previous night.

The 2d Battalion commander, Lt. Colonel JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD, 022656, of Fargo, North Dakota, notified regiment at 1122 hours that his battalion command post was at HULAWIR (684534, Sheet 37/18) and Company "C" was assembling there. The battalion was to be prepared to attack the high ground east of KAYSERSBERG. The situation in the sector was somewhat better although Germanartillery was fired on the vicinity of MISHWILLER (592502, Sheet 37/18). The Division G-3 advised at 1210 hours that the counter-attack had died down and no ground had been lost. At 1530 hours Division ordered the 3d Battalion moved to HULAWIR. 1 Battalion of the 143d Infantry was to be moved into the regimental area in case of a German attack. If the enemy attack materialized this battalion would be attached to the regiment. The 36th Reconnaissance Group was ordered to patrol the road between GUNMAR and SELSTAT. If it encountered any enemy force, it was to fight until a force could be brought up to assist it.

The 2d Battalion was ordered at 1630 hours by the 143d Infantry to attack a hill (645508, Sheet 37/18) 1000 yards north of KAYSERSBERG preparatory to making an attack on the town itself in the morning. No artillery or mortar preparations were to be made for the night attack. Both the 2d and 3d Battalions were advised to be on the alert from 0630-0730 hours on 8 December, for a possible enemy counter-attack.

By 2120 hours the 3d Battalion had closed into HULAWIR. The 2d Battalion reported that it had advanced further than it had expected without receiving fire, having advanced to a point (667493, Sheet
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87/18) 1300 yards north of KIENTHEIM (667485, Sheet 37/18), the 1st Battalion relieved Company "C" 142d Infantry, on the southern edge of SELERSTAT at 2030 hours. Enemy flares, mortars and netelwoofers were very active around the GUIMAR and OSTHEIM (723712, Sheet 37/18) areas. Company "B" contacted French forces north of SELERSTAT and reported the Germans cutting trees down across the roads in front of their position.

The 2d Battalion reported at 0730 hours on 8 December that it had occupied the hill north of KAYSERSBERG, formerly held by the 143d Infantry, without encountering opposition. Company "C", 143d Infantry, which was the battalion's left flank, was expecting another counterattack. The battalion command post had been established in RIQUEWIHR (675320, Sheet 37/18).

The Regimental Commander notified the Regimental S-3 at 0830 hours that the 3d Battalion would relieve elements of the 143d Infantry in OSTHEIM. The relief was to be made under control of the 143d Infantry, but after it was completed the 3d Battalion would revert to control of the 111st Infantry. The Division Commander advised at 0845 hours that the regimental line would extend from KIENTHEIM-SIGGOLSHEIM (677484, Sheet 37/18) -- OSTHEIM -- GUIMAR. The 1st Battalion was to be released to the regiment upon being relieved by elements of the 112d Infantry and move to the vicinity of ZELLENBERG (690522, Sheet 37/18). The 2d Battalion, however, would not be released to regimental control until the morning of 9 December. The 1st Battalion was notified that it would attack Hill 351 (681491, Sheet 37/18) northeast of SIGGOLSHEIM. The 131st Field Artillery was ordered to place fire on the hill throughout the night.

The Division Commander informed the Regimental Commander at 1752 hours that the 2d Battalion would remain under control of the 143d Infantry until 0700 hours for defensive purposes. The 143d Infantry was to attack in the morning. The regimental left (east) boundary was to extend to the towns of MITTELWIEHR (691501, Sheet 37/18) and BANNWIHR (695497, Sheet 17/18).

The regimental command post closed at BERGHEIM and moved to RIQUEWIHR at 1807 hours. The 3d Battalion completed the relief of the 112d Infantry elements in GUIMAR and OSTHEIM by 1630 hours. Relief at OSTHEIM was delayed by heavy concentrations of enemy artillery. The road between GUIMAR and OSTHEIM had not been swept for mines and several civilians were wounded and one vehicle blown up as a result.

Prisoners taken during the day indicated that the COIMAR sector was being reinforced with a great many troops. However, the Germans had suffered many casualties. One of their missions was to attack

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And hold the high ground north of KLINZHEIM and hold it until the first bullet and last man was expended but they were unable to accomplish the mission because of numerous casualties.

The 3d Battalion was worried about its left (east) flank as the road between OSTMANN and GUSMAR was still under enemy self-propelled gun and small arms fire. The Regimental Commander ordered Engineers to sweep the road between the two towns for mines, but if they encountered too much small arms fire, it would be necessary to stop.

During the night of 8-9 December, numerous heavy concentrations of enemy artillery and mortar fire fell throughout the regimental area.

The 2d Battalion reported an enemy counter-attack at 0630 hours. German artillery and self-propelled guns fired continuously across the entire front and over the communications routes. The 131st Field Artillery was using all defensive fires to support the battalion. At 0725 hours the 2d Battalion reported it was running short of 81 mm mortar ammunition and the Regimental S-4 rushed 300 rounds forward. The Division G-3 advised that the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was also receiving a counter-attack coming from BENEFORI in a due westerly direction from a small force. This attack was broken up as was the attack on the regimental 2d Battalion, which had been the enemy's main effort.

The 2d Battalion was officially released from the 143d Infantry and returned to regimental control at 0800 hours. The supply road between HUNAWIRH and RIEVENIRH, which the 2d Battalion was using, was getting impassable. However, the Engineers were unable to put men on it due to previous commitments. The 2d Battalion had moved out in its attack with Company "C" leading at 0800 hours but had advanced only 200 yards before meeting machine gun and small arms fire. Engineers attempting to clear mines were forced to stop by enemy artillery. Tanks and tank destroyers were unable to get into position to support the attack due to the heavy enemy artillery concentrations. Company "A" advanced to a point (680601, Sheet 37/18) 200 yards southeast of FERME BOUX (682500, Sheet 37/18) and stopped, while Company "B" proceeded to Hill 351 and drove the enemy from it despite heavy small arms fire. Company "F" moved to the vicinity of HUNAWIRH upon orders of the Regimental Commander. The 143d Infantry reported another counter-attack 100 yards south of Company "A". The 2d Battalion continued to have a hard fight in its attack. Company "G" received quite a few casualties while Company "F" was opposed by four machine guns and many riflemen. The Regimental S-3 ordered Company "F" to move to the left (east) to release a company of the 143d Infantry despite the statement of the 2d Battalion Commander

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that the company was holding all the territory it possibly could. Company "B" received an increasing amount of fire and its company commander was wounded. The company became disorganized and withdrew to the north slope of the hill. Company "B" stated that it had receive fire from friendly tanks and tank destroyers from the vicinity of ZELLENBERG. 143d Infantry forces in this area were ordered to stop all fire in the regimental 1st Battalion sector. The 3d Battalion continued to hold in the vicinity of GUMMAK with Company "I" and in the vicinity of OSTHEIM with Company "L" despite the ever increasing volume of enemy artillery.

The 2d Battalion was informed that it could use three batteries of artillery to assist it and the Division Artillery was placing heavy concentrations around the edges of KINTZHEIM. The 143d Infantry admitted that its tanks and tank destroyers had been firing on the 1st Battalion troops, but the situation was corrected and two companies were ordered to get back on Hill 351 before the Germans had a chance to return. The 2d Battalion was informed that the 1st Battalion would attack at 1500 hours with Company "A" on the right (west) and Company "C" on the left (east).

The 1st Battalion advised at 1325 hours that Company "A" had gone over Hill 351 and some elements of the company had gotten into SIGOLSHEIM. These elements were receiving heavy shelling and Germans were reported to have worked in behind them. The 1st Battalion commander, Lt. Col. WILLIAM A. BIRD, 0280568, of Barberton, Ohio, stated that he would not send Company "E" forward until 1500 hours unless it was determined Company "A" was really in trouble. Then Company "E" would clear the area and swing left (east) to take the objective of Company "A". The Regimental Commander approved this plan but stated that Company "B" must relieve elements of the 143d Infantry at a point (684498, Sheet 37/18) 1000 yards west of BERNHOF as quickly as possible. At 1458 hours Company "C" jumped off to try to contact Company "A". The company encountered two men from Company "A" who stated that their company was fighting in SIGOLSHEIM. Company "C" sent a patrol to investigate the status of Company "A". Supporting tanks had difficulty trying to get around Hill 355-MT DE SIGOLSHEIM (676498, Sheet 37/18). One tank got on the other side but was hit. The tank which reached the southern slope of the hill was endeavoring to cover by fire the other tanks which were maneuvering to get through the enemy's fire.

The 2d Battalion reported at 1616 hours that Company "B" had established contact with the 143d Infantry two hours before. Company "B" was still in close contact with the Germans and had been unable to knock out the enemy strong points in front of its position. Company "C" patrols, which tried to reach the main road, were driven back by
Heavy artillery concentrations.

The 1st Battalion commander received a message from Company "A" at 1530 hours stating that artillery and 81 mm mortar forward observers and machine guns were needed. Enemy tanks were active in the southern section of SIGOLSHEIM. Thirty Germans were known to be within SIGOLSHEIM and an estimated fifty to sixty more with the tanks. Company "A" reported its position (678.85; Sheet 37/18) on the north edge of SIGOLSHEIM. Company "A" had sent a two man patrol to contact Company "B" and the men had moved to the southern edge of BENNIWIR, encountering only German troops. The 1st Battalion commander stated that Company "B" had almost completed relief of the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry at 1715 hours. No word had been received from Company "C" which had last been seen going across Hill 351.

The 2d Battalion commander notified the Regimental Commander at 1735 hours that he believed at least 200-300 Germans lay dead on the hill in the battalion sector. The battalion area was mined and Company "F" had been meeting extremely heavy resistance all day. The Regimental Commander ordered the 2d Battalion to establish contact between Companies "A" and "C" and get Company "F" straightened out the following day. An attack on KIENTZHIRM was planned and defensive fires were to be laid out in the event the 2d Battalion made the attack.

At 1930 hours the 1st Battalion reported a platoon of Company "C" on Hill 351 with the company's other two platoons proceeding toward BENNIWIR. The Regimental Commander ordered the 1st Battalion to get in touch with Company "A" and get supplies to it. The remainder of SIGOLSHEIM was to be taken by the battalion on 10 December while the 2d Battalion attacked KIENTZHIRM.

Company "I" reported at 2115 hours that there was a great deal of enemy movement south of the road out of OSTHEIM toward ROSEMENZ (724.72; Sheet 37/18). Mortars and artillery fired on this route.

The 143d Infantry sent fifty caliber machine guns over to OSTHEIM to fire into BENNIWIR. The 3d Battalion Commander, however, refused to let them fire without the concurrence of the Regimental Commander as both Companies "A" and "C" would be in line with their fire on the west side of BENNIWIR; also the machine guns would draw increased enemy artillery on 3d Battalion troops.

The 1st Battalion ordered the two platoons of Company "C" located in BENNIWIR to pull back to a position on Hill 351 and gain contact with Company "A" in SIGOLSHEIM. The 143d Infantry was advised not to fire into BENNIWIR until both Company "C" platoons had withdrawn.
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At 0400 hours on 10 December, all regimental troops had been withdrawn from BENWTHR. Company "C" reported quite a few Germans within the town and had a fight with them, hitting two tanks—one with a bazooka and the other with two rifle grenades, killing seventeen of the enemy and capturing two.

During the night of 9-10 December Company "C" reported a great deal of vehicular and horse-drawn traffic in KINZHEIM. Enemy tanks kept firing from the town and it appeared that strong reinforcements were being brought into the town.

No contact had been made with Company "A" during the night. Patrols from Company "C" continued to search for it.

The Division Commander notified the Regimental S-3 at 1010 hours that new operations instructions were being issued. Company "I" would be relieved by the 1/62d Infantry and Company "I" by the 1/43d Infantry. The 111st Infantry sector was to extend from BENWTHR to the French road block on the right (west). The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was to be attached to the regiment and relief of units would be accomplished during the day. The 3d Battalion units which were relieved were to assemble in HUNAHTHR.

Both Companies "B" and "G" became engaged with enemy forces on the morning of 10 December. Company "B" received heavy shelling and small arms fire while Company "G" was cut off from communications by Germans infiltrating across its flank.

The Division Commander at 1110 hours ordered the 1st Battalion command post to move to FEIME BOUX (682503, Sheet 37/18). He also directed that a staff officer be sent to try to locate Company "A". The 1st Battalion Executive Officer reported at 1139 hours that the 2d Battalion had contacted a platoon of Company "A" at the southeast base of Hill 393. This platoon stated the other two platoons of their company were farther south engaged in a fire fight.

The 36th Reconnaissance Troop established its command post in URSFRUN (631597, Sheet 37/18). A six man group was established on Hill 557 (628521, Sheet 37/18), sixteen men on Hill 651 (639521, Sheet 37/18) and eight men on Hill 672 (653518, Sheet 37/18). These groups were to patrol between the hills and south to the French forces at ALSPACH (630505, Sheet 37/18).

Both the 1st and 2d Battalions were subjected to artillery fire of unusual intensity at approximately 1430 hours. Both battalions were alerted for any possible attacks made by the Germans. At 1510 hours an observation post reported a heavy fire fight on Hill 351.
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of which most of the fire was friendly intercrossed by German Automatic weapons fire. Company "C" became engaged with the enemy and Company "B" dispatched a patrol to try and locate Company "A". However, Company "B" became engaged in a fire fight west of Hill 351. The 2d Battalion used 4.2 mortars and small arms fire to clear up this area.

The Regimental Commander ordered the 1st Battalion at 1712 hours to send another patrol into SIGOLSHEIM in an effort to locate Company "A". Antitank Company was sent to protect the battalion left (east) flank. A coordinated attack was to be made in the morning with the 1st Battalion attacking SIGOLSHEIM, the 2d Battalion attacking KIENTZHEIM and the 143d Infantry attacking BENGWIHR.

Company "B" received a counter-attack at 1736 hours from Germans infiltrating into its position from the east and Company "B" was called upon to make an immediate attack to support Company "B". By 1810 hours Company "B" radioed that it was still holding out and enemy small arms fire was decreasing.

Company "F" sent a strong combat patrol to the nose of the hill overlooking KAYSERSBERG which captured seven Germans and killed five. However, the patrol was forced to withdraw.

By 1955 hours the Company "B" sector had quieted down. A fire fight was going on in front of Company "F" while many enemy vehicles were heard moving between KAYSERSBERG and KIENTZHEIM. The 1st Battalion was ordered to send a combat patrol with an officer as leader to SIGOLSHEIM to locate Company "A". The 1st Battalion commander advised at 2125 hours that a three man patrol had reached to within one hundred yards of the church in SIGOLSHEIM where it met a German patrol. The German patrol was allowed to pass and the 1st Battalion proceeded until it encountered a German soldier whom it disarmed. The captured German began yelling and enemy machine guns opened up on the patrol from both sides, forcing the patrol to withdraw. Many tracked vehicles could be heard moving from west to east within the town and sounds of digging could be heard.

The 2d Battalion notified the Regimental S-2, Major ROGUELL K. DOUGHTY, 0260726, of Lomay, New York, that civilians reported two German radios operating within the town of RIDGWIHR where the Regimental Command Post was located. Division was requested to send Counter- Intelligence Corps personnel to search the town on 11 December. The 3d Battalion was also alerted for a possible counter-attack in the morning on the regimental right (west) flank.

The night of 10-11 December was marked by heavy concentrations
of enemy artillery fire throughout the regimental area. An enemy patrol ran into the position of Company "G" and threw several hand grenades.

Beginning at 0650 hours the Germans opened up with artillery concentrations on all front line positions. Mortar fire was also received all along the front although no enemy counter-attack had been reported. Both the 1st and 2d Battalions began firing defensive fires at 0715 hours. At 0826 hours the 1st Battalion reported the enemy had infiltrated and was attacking Company "C". The 3d Battalion was alerted immediately to counter-attack the Germans. An observation post reported Germans working toward Company "G". At 0845 hours both Companies "F" and "G" were engaged in beating off a counter-attack. Company "K" was ordered to move behind the 2d Battalion and pass through Company "E" to hit the resistance encountered by Companies "B" and "C". Company "K" was to remain attached to the 2d Battalion until the 1st Battalion situation was cleared up. The 2d Battalion advised at 0909 hours that the situation around Company "C" had quieted down. Three or four enemy machine guns had been set up during the attack and two of them had been knocked out.

The Regimental Commander advised the Division Commander at 0913 hours that the regimental attack would have to be postponed until the enemy attack was broken up. The Regimental Commander planned to attack as soon as the Germans had been routed. For the attack Company "K" was to take over Hill 351 and the 2d Battalion take over Hill 392. By 1032 hours Company "C" had broken the German attack on its position. The enemy group in the saddle between Hill 351 and Hill 392 was ousted with six prisoners being taken and an unknown number of Germans killed.

The 1st Battalion was ordered at 1110 hours to attack toward SIGOLSHEIM at 1200 hours to relieve the pressure on Company "A". Attacking units were ordered to take rifle grenades, bazookas and antitank weapons with them.

Prisoners taken by Company "B" reported that they had been engaged in a fire fight with Americans in SIGOLSHEIM on the previous day, but the Americans had withdrawn. This was presumed to be Company "A" which had been out of contact with the regiment for two days. Since contact had not been established with the company and supplies had not reached it, it was believed the men had either been captured or killed.

The 1st Battalion jumped off in its attack at 1200 hours with Company "G", plus a platoon of Company "K" attached, leading. The enemy threw a heavy smoke screen over the entire valley extending from SIGOLSHEIM to Hill 351 to BENNUHR. The 1st Battalion met strong op-
position almost immediately. Both Companies "B" and "C" received heavy artillery, mortar, small arms and automatic weapons fire. Company "C" could not advance and was forced to just hold its ground. Company "B" was pulled out of position and Company "E" was sent to its assistance. However, the Company "B" area was subjected to heavy enemy fire of all types and Company "E" could not move in. The artillery was directed to fire defensive and counter-battery fires to assist the 1st Battalion in returning to its original positions.

The Division Chief of Staff was notified by the Regimental Commander at 1403 hours that the 1st Battalion would be pulled back and the 3d Battalion would replace it during the night. The Regimental Commander requested some effective counter-battery fire to reduce the large volume of enemy artillery that precluded any attack of being successful. The 1st Battalion was ordered to pull back to RIQUEWIHR under cover of darkness. Company "F" took over the position of Company "B" at 1525 hours. Antitank Company was attached to the 3d Battalion and continued to maintain contact with the 143d Infantry. The 3d Battalion completed the relief of the 1st Battalion as soon as darkness fell and the 1st Battalion closed into RIQUEWIHR at 1900 hours.

During the night of 11-12 December, patrols from the 2d and 3d Battalions reported extensive enemy movement around AMMERSCHMIDT, KIEPENHEIM and KAYSERSBERG. Numerous heavy artillery concentrations fell throughout the regimental area. The 143d Infantry reported heavy enemy traffic moving into COILAR--one vehicle per minute--from the south.

At 0730 hours on 12 December, enemy 20mm artillery and mortar fire began falling on Companies "E", "F" and "G". The 3d Battalion reported a small counter-attack which was repulsed. Company "F" reported enemy movement on its right flank and defensive fires were placed on this area. At 0829 hours the 143d Infantry commander advised that the Germans were counter-attacking in BERNEHEIM and there was enemy infiltration around BERNEHEIM (696710, Sheet 37/18). The Regimental Commander ordered the 36th Reconnaissance Troop at 0900 hours to send a combat patrol immediately to contact Company "F".

One of the Regimental I&R (Intelligence & Reconnaissance) Platoons observation posts reported at 0900 hours that Germans were moving on the regimental command post in RIQUEWIHR from the north and west. Company "F" stated the Germans were working around its right flank on Hill 621 (655504, Sheet 37/18). The I & R OP(observation post) reported forty Germans moving down a trail from the woods just northwest of RIQUEWIHR. Company "B", 83d Chemical Battalion, on the hill west of RIQUEWIHR, reported Germans within its position. All of its ammunition had been used up trying to stop the Germans and its troops
could no longer hold the enemy. The remnants of Company "A" and Com-
pa ny "B" reported Germans within RIQUEWIHR and more coming over the
hill into the town. All personnel of Regimental Headquarters, Head-
quar ters Company, and 1st Battalion units within RI U. S. I. were alert-
ed to drive off the Germans, with the 2d and 3d Battalions were in-
formed that the Regimental Command Post was being attacked. At 0947
hours the Division G-3 stated that the Division Commander was on his
way to the regimental command post and the 2d Battalion, 142d Infantry
had been alerted to assist the 141st Infantry if it became necessary.
At 1008 hours Company "B", 893 Chemical Battalion advised that its men
were all pinned down by enemy fire and were out of ammunition. One
section of its 4.2 mortars had been overrun and captured. The company
was ordered to evacuate its position if possible. Meanwhile the I & R
platoon OP directed three separate missions of artillery simultaneously
upon the advancing Germans so effectively that the attack lost its
momentum and was finally turned back after two hours of this artillery
combined with the counter-attack by Infantry. The Regimental
Commander notified the 1st Battalion that tanks were moving up from
the 3d Battalion to support it. The 2d Battalion reported at 1031
hours that Companies "F" and "G" were being subjected to heavy
artillery and Germans had gotten into its mortar positions. The
battalion requested Company "K" to spread out and protect the rear of
Companies "F" and "G". By 1042 the 2d Battalion counter-attack had
clashed a little. The 157th Field Artillery Battalion had secured
some direct hits on Germans coming up a sunken road from the west on
the battalion's flank. The 2d Battalion Commander, who was observing
from a tower within RIQUEWIHR, reported that the attack on the North-
west end of the town was pretty well in hand. Germans had cut the
supply road leading to Companies "E" and "G" but both companies were
holding their own. A prisoner stated that 1000 officer candidates of
the German Army were making the attack on RIQUEWIHR. The mortars of
Companies "M" and "N" and the remaining section of 4.2 mortars of
Company "B", 893 Chemical Battalion, were zeroed in on the west end
of RIQUEWIHR and the high ground to the west. The Germans continued
to press toward the town from the hills and the mortars and small arms
fire directed against them created heavy casualties. They kept coming
in such numbers, however, that some of them penetrated within the town
walls and street fighting began. The 3d Battalion was ordered to send
its reserve company (Company "L") to the south edge (67513, Sheet
37/18) of RIQUEWIHR. Tanks of Company "A", 753d Tank Battalion, were
reported moving from HUNAWIHR to RIQUEWIHR although they were having
to travel through enemy fire. Tank destroyers of Company "B" 656th
Tank Destroyer Battalion, moved to the south entrance of town and opened
up with their machine guns, inflicting additional heavy casualties on
the Germans.

By 1225 hours Company "B" was southwest of town, Company "A" was
south of town and Company "C" had restored the position of Company "B", 83d Chemical Battalion, just northwest of RIQUEWIHR. The 3d Battalion was advised not to fire past the wood line and only at Germans that could be seen. One tank coming from HUNAWIR was knocked out by a German bazooka. The 3d Battalion advised that Company "L" would have to fight its way to the south edge of RIQUEWIHR. The 143d Infantry began an attack southwest from HUNAWIR at 1200 hours and Company "C" to the northwest of RIQUEWIHR was advised to watch out for the 143d Infantry troops. The 2d Battalion Commander informed regiment at 1246 hours that he could see mortars falling seventy-five yards in front of Companies "A" and "B". A 2d Battalion machine gun was placed in the clock tower in RIQUEWIHR to support units with overhead fire. The situation to the south of RIQUEWIHR was unknown as the communications wire had been cut in twelve known places—although it was known that Company "L" was working west in this area. All artillery was stopped except on call of the 1st Battalion. By 1500 hours the 1st Battalion troops had worked to the edge of the woods. The 2d Battalion wanted all artillery in RIQUEWIHR to cease firing, but the Regimental Commander ordered it to continue to fire on the ridge west of town.

Company "F" was engaged in a fire fight at 1300 hours and called for defensive fires. Company "A" proceeded to clear the houses on the east side of RIQUEWIHR, following which it was to reorganize and clear the area. The remaining 4.2 mortars of Company "B", 83d Chemical Battalion, went back into position. By 1327 hours Company "L" had reached the south edge of town and dispersed to await orders. Company "F" reported Germans coming in on it in increasing numbers and Company "L"—supporting tanks were ordered to proceed to its assistance. The mission of Company "L" was changed and it was ordered to proceed south along the high ridge west of RIQUEWIHR to contact Company "F" while Companies "B" and "C" contained the enemy and swept along the lower ridge to contact Company "F" on the right (west). Company "C" was to occupy the high ground west of Company "F" and outflank it west. The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry was ordered by Division to proceed to Hill 672, then Hill 621 and contact Company "F".

As the attack against RIQUEWIHR dissipated and the enemy was rout-ed, the Germans began throwing heavy artillery into the town. The slopes up to the wooded sector northwest, west and southwest of town were dotted with the bodies of Germans killed in the attack. It was estimated that between 200–300 enemy dead lay throughout the regimental area.

The Division Commander sent a message at 1600 hours to hold Hill 351. The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was attached to the regiment. The Division order was to attack and clear the ridge north of KAYSERSBERG and establish a line along the edge of the woods.
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The 2d Battalion reported the Germans were on Hill 621. Two Platoons of Company "F" were separated from the Company's third platoon by an enemy force although the Germans had made no push against Company "E" and "G". By 1610 hours the first elements of Company "I" had established contact with rear elements of Company "F". The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was making slow progress due to the steep hills. However, it was not in contact with the enemy.

The Regimental Commander ordered the 36th Reconnaissance Troop to send a patrol to Hill 672 from which it had been pushed off the previous night. The troop was in position on Hill 671 due north of Hill 672.

The 2d Battalion 143 Infantry was notified at 1655 hours by the Regimental Commander that an attack order would be issued on 13 December, for an attack with two companies and Companies "F" and "I" of the regiment which was to reach the clearing just north of KAYSERSBERG.

Companies "F" and "I" linked together and coordinated their positions for the night. A great deal of the enemy force between Companies "F" and "G" had been eliminated, but supporting armor had pulled back and a gap was created between the two units. Company "G" was engaged with the Germans at 1927 hours. The 2d Battalion commander was ordered to recover the area in this gap and bring forward his supporting armor. The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was cautioned to bring antitank protection forward as a road in its area was capable of supporting enemy tanks.

By 1930 hours Companies "F" and "I" were 500 yards east of Hill 621 and in contact with the enemy, while trying to set up a defensive line. Antitank Company moved up on the ridge with Company "F". A small gap existed between Companies "F" and "G". The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry was also in contact with the Germans on a line extending from the woods (668.15, Sheet 37/18) 800 yards southwest of RIQUEWIHR to a point (658.25, Sheet 37/18) 1,400 yards west of RIQUEWIHR. Company "G" was dug in 400 yards south of the town with Company "F" outposting it. The remaining small force of Company "A" went into position due north of RIQUEWIHR.

The Regimental Commander held a conference with the Commanding Officers of the 1st and 2d Battalions and the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, at 2030 hours to issue instructions for the attack on 14 December. The attack was to begin for the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, at 0900 hours to regain Hill 672. A portion of the regimental 2d Battalion was to attack Hill 621 at the same time, but the remainder of the regimental 2d Battalion would wait until the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, came abreast of its position. Each battalion was to have a
reserve element. The 1st Battalion was to be in position on the regimental reserve line. The Regimental Commander stated each battalion had done a good job in repelling the enemy attack, as did Company "B" of the 83d Chemical Battalion.

Information from prisoners indicated there were at least 150 Germans dug in on the northeast slope of Hill 672. This information was given to both the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, and the 36th Reconnaissance Troop. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was ordered to hold Hill 671 at all costs.

During the night of 12-13 December, Company "G" had small arms fire on its right (west) flank and artillery and self-propelled gun fire fell throughout the regimental area in concentrations of varying intensity. Over 100 rounds of mortar fire were placed on the position of Company "I" around 0500 hours. The 2d Battalion reported at 0710 hours on 13 December that mortar and artillery fire was still falling at a steady rate in the battalion area and requested counter-battery fire.

The Regimental Commander informed the Division Commander at 0830 hours that Companies "I" and "F" were straightening their front line and extending to the right (west). The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, received fire from Hill 672 but was going to attack at 0900 hours. The Division Commander stated that the 1st Battalion should assemble in a reserve position as he did not want the 2d Battalion committed at once.

The Regimental Commander informed the 2d Battalion commander at 0844 hours that the Germans had moved in between his Company "F" and Company "E", 143d Infantry. A patrol was being sent from Company "G" with some tanks to move on this resistance. However, Company "E", 141st Infantry, was to move on this resistance immediately. The 2d Battalion S-2 notified regiment at 0847 hours that communication lines between Companies "E", "F" and "G" had been cut. The attack of the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was held up pending eliminating the German force between it and the 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry. Linemen, attempting to restore telephone communication between the 2d Battalion companies, reported they were fired upon by Germans upon returning to battalion headquarters.

The Division Commander attached a company of Engineers to the regiment which, in turn, were to be attached to the 36th Reconnaissance Troop. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was instructed to mine the road (645520, Sheet 37/18) between Hill 651 and Hill 672 as quickly as possible. If additional mining was necessary, the Engineers could accomplish it as soon as they arrived on position.
The 1st Battalion commander was notified by the Regimental Commander at 1021 hours that enemy pressure against Company "F" had been relieved and troops manning a road block (664530, Sheet 37/18) in the wooded sector west of RIQUEWIHR could be pulled back. However, an observation post and a few machine guns were to remain on the hill north of the road.

The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, advised at 1110 hours that it was advancing across its entire front. The right flank was on Hill 611 (654524, Sheet 37/18). The tanks with Company "C" were firing between Company "F" and the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry. No definite information had been received on the status of Company "F" as wire men had been unable to get through the enemy fire to reestablish communications. By 1442 hours, Company "E", 143d Infantry was receiving machine gun and small arms fire.

A civilian report was received that the Germans were going to fire on RIQUEWIHR from 1200 hours to 1500 hours. The 131st Field Artillery was instructed to place harassing fire on known enemy gun positions. All units within RIQUEWIHR were alerted for possible bombing.

The 1st Battalion notified regiment at 1220 hours that Company "C" was alright and it had established telephone communication with Company "F". Company "F" was not on Hill 621, but was on the southern slope of Hill 666. The Regimental Commander ordered Companies "I" and "F" at 1308 hours to start moving toward Hill 666 and thence to Hill 621. The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was on Hill 672 by this time although it was meeting stubborn resistance.

The Germans began shelling RIQUEWIHR at 1300 hours with artillery concentrations of unusual intensity. Except for brief respite the shelling continued for three hours.

The Division Commander inquired of the Regimental Commander at 1335 hours that if two companies of Engineers were attached to the regiment, could the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, be relieved and the regimental 3d Battalion be shifted over to the right (west). The Division Commander stated that he was trying to establish a two battalion front for each regiment and set each unit into its own area. The regimental left (east) boundary would be the saddle between Hills 351 and 393.

By 1442 hours the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, reported it believed enemy resistance was breaking a little. Company "G", 143d Infantry, was moving southeast from Hill 672 although Company "E", 143d Infantry, was still in contact with the Germans. The 2d
Battalion, 143d Infantry, was advised that it would be relieved by the 3d Battalion, 161st Infantry, on the morning of 14 December. Arrangements for the relief were to be handled direct between the two battalions. Antitank Company was to take over the position of Company "L" which was still attached to the 2d Battalion.

The planned relief on Hill 351 by the 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, was delayed and finally cancelled because of a counterattack on the 3d Battalion, 143d Infantry. This necessitated placing Companies "A" and "B" of the 11th Engineer (C) Battalion to garrison Hill 393 while the regimental Companies "E" and "G" cleaned up resistance on Hills 666 and 621.

At 1630 hours the 3d Battalion was alerted for a possible counterattack as enemy tanks and tank destroyers were observed moving from KIENZMANN toward Companies "F" and "G". Company "L" received the expected counterattack at 1728 hours with German tanks and tank destroyers trying to work up the saddle between Companies "E" and "G". The 2d Battalion Commander was advised that if Company "L" could not handle the attack, Company "F" was to be used with Companies "E" and "G" in reserve. However, Company "F" became engaged in a fire fight at 1758 hours. The German advance was turned back by friendly artillery fire. Company "G" was relieved by Company "B", 11th Engineers, and Company "E" was relieved by Company "A", 11th Engineers, while Company "B", 143d Infantry, relieved Company "I" after darkness. Antitank Company, 143d Infantry, took the wrong trail and was delayed in relieving the regimental Antitank Company. This relief was a key point in the exchange of positions of the two regiments and other unit reliefs were stopped pending the straightening out of this situation.

The 143d Infantry Commander reported enemy infiltrations to the right (east) of MITTELWINK at 0020 hours. Company "A", 11th Engineers, reported at 0110 hours on 14 December, a counterattack on its left front and called for defensive fires. The Germans were reported to have broken through the saddle between Hills 351 and 393. Company "B", 11th Engineers called for defensive fires and Antitank Company was receiving small arms fire from its rear (northeast). Company "A" fired flares and Company "I", which had just been relieved, was ordered to return and drive the Germans from the saddle between the two hills. The 143d Infantry Commander was notified that all reliefs would be halted and all units would remain in position, including the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry. The 3d Battalion commander reported that the regimental Antitank Company seemed to have cleared up the infiltration in its sector and was holding its own, while Company "A" also stabilized its area.
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The 2d Battalion commander advised at 0720 hours that the two companies of Engineers were receiving a strong attack. Germans overrun part of their positions. The Battalion commander asked whether or not he should attack. The Regimental Commander stated that if the Engineers could not clear up the infiltration, Companies "E" and "G" were to assist them. However, the two companies were not to be committed unless it was absolutely necessary. At 0758 hours Companies "E" and "G" were ordered to restore the position of the Engineers. When this was done, the Engineer Companies were to be placed in reserve. The 143d Infantry was advised that Company "I" would be attached to it if assistance was needed in eliminating enemy resistance in the MITTELWIHR sector. If Company "I" was committed, however, it was to be relieved as quickly as might be possible. It was verified by 0953 hours that Germans were dug in on the lower north slope of Hill 393. Company "I" advised at 1000 hours it was attacked to the 143d Infantry and had been ordered to attack due east to help Company "A", 143d Infantry, which had been cut off and surrounded in MITTELWIHR.

The Regimental S-3 notified Division at 1030 hours that the situation in the regimental sector remained critical on Hill 393. The enemy had taken the western part of the hill and was dug in on the lower northern slopes, Companies "G", "E" and "G" were attacking south to restore the position. Information gained from prisoners indicated that three German companies had taken part in the attack against Hill 393 during the morning. Company "A", 111th Engineers, continued to receive enemy attacks. One platoon had been surrounded and another near the company command post was having trouble with German infiltration. Tanks were being brought forward to aid in routing the enemy. The Regimental S-2 requested Division for an air mission against the German positions to the south. This mission, Division advised, had already been requested from higher headquarters.

The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, notified regiment at 1054 hours that it was firing artillery, mortar and machine gun fire on enemy positions and was receiving artillery fire back.

By 1113 hours Company "I", supported by two tanks and two tank destroyers had entered MITTELWIHR. It had not contacted Company "A" 143d Infantry, but could see it fighting ahead of them. Company "K" was engaged in a stiff encounter but was holding its own despite the fact that Germans were behind its position. Company "I" contacted Company "B", 111th Engineers and Company "G" had managed to contact Company "A", 111th Engineers. All units were engaged in small arms fire fights. At 1159 hours a radio message from Company "K" was intercepted wherein it advised that it was receiving an attack on its
right (west) flank and needed help. The 3d Battalion was ordered to notify Company "K" that Company "E" had established contact with Company "B", 11th Engineers on Company "K"'s right flank and Company "E" would push to the left (east) to be on the right of Company "K". The 2d Battalion commander advised at 1309 hours that Companies "E" and "G" had worked up the hill but were not in a very good position. The Regimental Commander stated that both companies were to push to the top of the hill, clear it, and then push on to contact Company "K".

The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, continued to push forward but its advance was very slow. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop, which had sent a force to Hill 672 after the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, had left it, stated it had gotten into a fire fight and the patrol leader had been killed. The Regimental Commander ordered the troop to send an officer with its patrol and continue on with the mission.

The 3d Battalion commander stated at 1417 hours that it appeared as though Company "K" would be pushed off of its position. Personnel of Antitank Company were moving forward as riflemen to assist the company. The enemy was using flares and laying heavy mortar concentrations on the company area. The Regimental Commander requested the 143d Infantry release Company "I" or send Company "B", 143d Infantry, to the assistance of Company "K". The 143d Infantry stated that it was sending its Antitank Company to rid Company "K" immediately and the regimental Company "I" would probably be released within thirty minutes and returned to the regiment as quickly as possible. The Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion commander to send Company "I" into the position of Company "K" as soon as it reached the 3d Battalion. If Company "K" lost its position, it was to be retaken and then Company "D" was to return to the 1st Battalion.

Company "G" had passed through both Engineer companies by 1557 hours and had regained a little ground. Company "G" was following Company "E". Company "K" continued to be attacked on three sides and was barely holding its position. Its casualties had been heavy and during snipers were very active. Antitank Company, proceeding to the assistance of Company "K", received heavy artillery concentrations. Division was advised at 1700 hours that the situation on Hill 393 had been partially restored and most of the positions along the high ground had been retaken with Company "E" working on the last high ground held by the Germans. Enemy groups remained in the area of Company "K", on the east slope of Hill 393 and in the saddle to the east. Both Companies "I" and "C" were proceeding to the assistance of Company "K". By 1852 hours, however, Company "K" had regained all but 150 yards on its right flank. Company "E" was to
relieve Company "K" while Antitank Company, 143d Infantry, relieved the regimental Antitank Company.

The 143d Infantry notified regiment at 2000 hours that the Germans had broken through north of MITTELIHR and were heading for ZELLENBERG. All units were alerted. Company "F" was ordered back to the high ground north and west of RIQUEWIHR where it could overlook ZELLENBERG. Antitank Company, having been relieved, was attached to the 3d Battalion and placed south or RIQUEWIHR. The night passed with sporadic artillery fire, many enemy flares and German sniper fire in the forward areas.

At 0900 hours on 15 December, the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, jumped off in an attack. The Regimental Commander also notified the regimental 2d Battalion to be prepared to attack at 1000 hours. The 30th Infantry Regiment of the 3d Division, which had been attached to the 36th Division, moved into position on the regiment's right (west) flank in preparation to attack to the south.

The 3d Battalion advised at 1052 hours that it had coordinated with the 2d Battalion and was working on the enemy took it on Hill 393.

Division advised at 1210 hours that it had intercepted a message from the 30th Infantry Regiment stating that its 2d and 3d Battalions had crossed their line of departure in an attack at 1110 hours. This attack had not been scheduled until 1200 hours. The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was informed of the attack and at 1300 hours was ordered by the Division Commander to send a patrol to contact 30th Infantry units.

Approximately 60 German Infantry on Hill 666, supported by mortars and machine guns, were placed under artillery and mortar concentrations by Company "F". Efforts to dislodge them by such means were unsuccessful and this enemy force blocked any movement onto Hill 621. Company "F" continued to attack the Germans from their dug in positions.

At 1450 hours the 30th Infantry was cutting across the right flank of Company "G", 143d Infantry. Both organizations were in physical contact with each other. Company "F", 143d Infantry, was almost on Hill 666 and was endeavoring to contact Company "F", 141st Infantry. The Regimental Commander ordered Company "G", 143d Infantry to move off of the ridge due to its being pinched out of position by the advance of the 30th Infantry. At 1510 hours the 2d Battalion was ordered to push both Companies "F" and "L" forward with all personnel and not as patrols. Units on their right flank were pushing forward also.

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The 2d Battalion commander notified regiment at 1625 hours that a reinforced platoon of Company "G" was engaged in a heavy fire fight on the battalion's right (west) flank. The Battalion commander had been fired upon from Hill 666 by four enemy machine guns while returning to his command post. The 30th Infantry was attacking Hill 666 but its forces had been scattered by a very heavy enemy artillery concentration.

Both Companies "B", 117th Engineers and "E" received a counter-attack at 1737 hours and Company "G" was alerted to go to their assistance if it became necessary. Company "I" began attacking at 174 hours. Germans were firing from the north side of Hill 393 close to the bottom of the hill.

The Division Commander called regiment at 1930 hours to determine the situation on Hill 666. The Regimental S-3 notified him that the hill would have to be cleared of the enemy from the north and both Companies "E" and "G" 143d Infantry were to approach it that way. The Division Commander suggested infiltrating Company "F" into the German positions as the 30th Infantry would expect the hill to be cleared. The Regimental Commander stated that he had a different picture of the situation. The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was being pulled out of the line with the exception of one platoon and one section of heavy machine guns in its Company "E" position.

By 2009 hours Company "E" had cleared up its area around Hill 393 with the exception of some sporadic small arms fire on the north slope. Company "I" was reported on its objective at 2030 hours, having definitely knocked out one enemy strong point.

Company "B", 117th Engineers, was relieved during the night of 15-16 December, by Companies "E" and "G". Intermittent enemy artillery fire fell throughout the regimental area while defensive fires were laid along the front by friendly artillery units.

On the morning of 16 December, efforts were made to clear the hill around Companies "I" and "E". Company "I" fired at everything that moved in its sector. The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, and the 30th Infantry Regiment continued their attacks. Both organizations were engaged in sharp engagements at 0942 hours but reported they did not believe resistance was as heavy as on the previous day.

The 1st Battalion was ordered to assemble Companies "A" and "B" in RHUSWIHR in preparation for a movement to another area that was contemplated by higher headquarters.

The 3d Battalion received three minor counter-attacks during the
morning— all of which were repulsed. Patrols between Companies "E" and "I" were engaged by enemy units as they attempted to make contact. Considerable enemy activity could be heard in the 30th Infantry sector. Company "G", 30th Infantry, was attempting to contact Company "F", 113th Infantry, but was receiving heavy fire from six machine guns and riflemen. However, elements of the 30th Infantry pressed forward and were on the outskirts of RAYERSBERG by 1130 hours and were meeting only sniper resistance. The 2d Battalion was ordered to get its armor and infantry ready to rush forward and assist the 30th Infantry pushing into KIENTZHEIM. The Battalion realized that its armor could not move because the roads in front of it were mined and the main route was blocked by a knocked out tank. Engineers were sent forward to assist in removing mines.

Germans on Hill 666 and 621 continued to give Company "F" a great deal of trouble. Requests to fire artillery and mortar concentrations on the hills were forestalled by the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, which stated its troops were too close to this area.

The Division C-3 notified regiment at 1632 hours that each regimental combat team of the Division would send one officer per company and one sergeant per platoon on a quartering party to a new area in the vicinity of STRASBOURG. Regimental and battalion S-2's were to remain with the units effecting relief of the regiment for thirty-six hours after the relief was effected. All maps, aerial photographs and relief maps of the present area were to be left with the relieving units.

Neither the 30th Infantry nor the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, had been able to clear the enemy from Hill 666. Companies "G" and "F", 113th Infantry, could not move forward unless this position was cleared. Arrangements were finally made to register mortars on the hill. The Regimental Commander ordered four tanks to go over the saddle between Hill 621 and Hill 393 and shell the south slope of Hill 393 and the towns of SIGOLSHEIM and KIENTZHEIM.

Arrangements were completed for Cannon Company and the 1st Battalion to move north to the STRASBOURG area on 17 December. Both units were ordered to arrive at REZAULVE by 0700 hours.

The 2d Battalion was ordered to send two reconnaissance patrols into KIENTZHEIM during the night to secure all possible information about conditions within it. Company "F" was to be pulled back and be placed in regimental reserve. At first light on the morning of 17 December, the battalion was to attack and clean out all opposition in its sector from the southern slopes of Hill 621 toward the north. The 3d Battalion was ordered to send two reconnaissance patrols into
SIGSHEIM  The 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was relieved and rejoined its parent organization.

The 2d Battalion reported at 0415 hours that a Company "G" patrol had proceeded to the outskirts of KIENTHEIM and made contact with two enemy outposts there. The patrol heard motorcycles and vehicles moving and a great deal of loud talking. A Company "J" patrol went to the rear of Hill 393 and heard Germans talking and walking around. The 131st Field Artillery was instructed to continue its harassing fire on these two places.

The Division advised regiment on the morning of 17 December that a French armored unit was rolling into the area and guides were to be furnished to show its officers routes over the hills to KAYSERSBERG.

A coordinated attack made by the 2d and 3d regimental battalions and the 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, was scheduled to begin at 1000 hours. However, the attack was delayed pending clearing the Germans from Hill 393 by the 2d Battalion.

The 30th Infantry received a counterattack at 0944 hours which cut off its forward companies "A" and "B". The 143d Infantry reported German tanks and infantry forming between KIENTHEIM and KAYSERSBERG in the 30th Infantry area. By 1045 hours Company "G" was working around the west edge of Hill 393.

The Regimental S-3 notified the 2d Battalion that French tanks were going over the saddle between Hills 393 and Hill 621 and the battalion was to push forward with these tanks. All elements of the battalion were to be notified that the French tanks were friendly. Hill 666 was declared cleared by 1330 hours and a platoon of Company "G", 143d Infantry, which had been left behind for that purpose, was garrisoned there pending results of the French armored 2d Battalion attack.

The 1st Battalion had departed from the RHUEWIHR area at 0400 hours and moved into positions south of STRASBOURG along the RHINE River. The battalion was attached to the 15th Infantry Regiment of the 3d Division.

The Division G-3 was informed at 1201 hours that the regimental attack had not fully begun as yet. The 2d and 3d Battalions were occupied in clearing a strong point just north of Hill 393 where the Germans seemed to have many automatic weapons and ammunition. French armor was ready to pass through the regimental sector. Division stated that the 30th Infantry was holding off a German attack in KAYSERSBERG while French forces were hitting mined roads and receiving fire from the south.
SECRET

The 2d Battalion was advised at 1209 hours that French forces were moving out of RIQUEWIHR and would pass through the 2d Battalion area shortly. Division ordered at 1250 hours what progress the French tanks were making as the French commanding officer stated there were three German tanks in KAYSERSBERG which were causing a great deal of trouble. Enemy troops had penetrated as far as the middle of the town. The 3d Battalion advised at 1300 hours that it was still waiting for the 2d Battalion to clear Hill 393. A 143d Infantry patrol to Hill 391 found an enemy strong point directly in front of Company "K" which consisted of two machine guns and at least nine riflemen.

At 1318 hours the Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion to begin attacking SIGOLSHEIM immediately and the 2d Battalion to attack KIENTZHEIM. The 2d Battalion was ordered to send Companies "E" and "G" forward with tanks. Battalion boundaries were to be disregarded if it became necessary to move into position to take the town of KIENTZHEIM. The 3d Battalion commander advised that his attack would start in five minutes although Germans were in position in front of both Companies "I" and "K" and the ground to be covered was devoid of cover.

The 2d Battalion commander was notified by the Regimental S-3 at 1351 hours that Companies "E" and "G" were to push south behind the French armor while attached supporting armor of the battalion followed. The French armor was going into KAYSERSBERG while the 2d Battalion must take KIENTZHEIM to protect the 3d Battalion's right (west) flank. While this order was being issued, the Germans launched a counter-attack against Company "E". The enemy also began to lay heavy artillery concentrations on the advancing armored units.

The attack against Company "E" came from the north in the vicinity of Company "I". Company "E" was forced from the hill and lost more ground than it had taken during the morning. Company "F" was being sent forward to restore the situation, while Company "I" maneuvered to get a better approach against the attacking enemy. American planes, assisting the attack by strafing enemy positions, were receiving antiaircraft fire from COLMAR. French tanks had penetrated into KIENTZHEIM. The Regimental Commander notified the 2d Battalion that two companies of the 143d Infantry were on their way to RIQUEWIHR as reserve while Companies "F" and "G" moved into KIENTZHEIM.

The Division Commander stated at 1528 hours that the 2d Battalion, less Company "E", was to remain in KIENTZHEIM until relieved by the 30th Infantry.

By 1742 hours Companies "F" and "G" were within KIENTZHEIM and Company "E" had regained part of the ground it had lost in the
counter-attack. The 2d Battalion commander was worried about the
defense of KIENTZHEIM and the Regimental Commander ordered that all
elements of the battalion, including supporting armor and artillery
observers, with the exception of Company "E", move into KIENTZHEIM
and establish an all-around defense. If the German counter-attack in
KAYSERSBERG was broken up, the Division Commander had ordered the 30th
Infantry to push on and make contact with the 2d Battalion at
AMMERSCHWIHR. Two companies of the 143d Infantry were in reserve be-
hind Hill 393 if a counter-attack developed. The Regimental Commander
notified the 2d Battalion commander at 1815 hours to contact the French
Commanding officer in KIENTZHEIM and plan the defense of the town with
him. The 3d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was behind Hill 393 with the
30th Infantry on the nose of the hill overlooking KAYSERSBERG.
Regimental was sending a 284 radio and a switchboard to be installed in
KIENTZHEIM. The 2d Battalion advised that there were still plenty
of Germans between Companies "E" and "I" who had not been cleaned out
when the attack order was received. Also, there were three tank de-
stroyers, ten tanks and two sections of forty men each of the French
forces within KIENTZHEIM. No French armor had gone into KAYSERSBERG
from the regimental sector.

The French requested at 0445 hours on 18 December, that one
platoon of Infantry proceed into KAYSERSBERG with their armor and
the 2d Battalion was ordered to furnish this platoon and one section
of machine guns. Also, arrangements were made with the 131st Field
Artillery for a fifteen minute artillery preparation to precede the
movement into KAYSERSBERG.

The Germans threw concentration after concentration of heavy
artillery into KIENTZHEIM during the night and intermittent mortar
and artillery fell throughout the remainder of the regimental area.

Division was advised at 0821 hours on 18 December, that the
French had postponed their attack until 0900 hours to await the
arrival of additional Infantry.

The Regimental Commander notified the 3d Battalion commander at
0832 hours that the 143d Infantry had sent a patrol to the top of Hill
351 and found no enemy there. The 3d Battalion was ordered to occupy
the hill before the French attack began. The 3d Battalion, itself,
was not to attack during the morning but was to organize for one
while armored units fired on both its flanks and on SIGOLSHEIM.

The 143d Infantry Commander called at 0946 hours to determine the
time of the 141st Infantry attack. The 143d Infantry was going to
attack MITTELWIHR and BEINWIHR at 1000 hours but might change to ad-
just their attack with that of the regimental units. The 143d Infantr:
was notified that the 141st Infantry would attack at 1100 hours and it
changed its attacking time to correspond.

At 1000 hours elements of the French armored forces entered
KAYSERSBERG. One platoon of Company "C" accompanied this unit.

The 3d Battalion commander notified regiment at 1053 hours that
it was receiving a counter-attack from the direction of Hill 351.
Artillery and tank fire were laid on the Germans and the 3d Battalion
was ordered to attack as soon as the enemy's counter-attack had been
smashed. The German effort was launched against the Company "K"
left flank and on Company "B", 143d Infantry.

The Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment,
reported to the Regimental S-3 at 1142 hours that his troops were
marching from RHEAUDEAUVILLE to RIQUEWIHR and he was sending a re-
connaissance party forward to check the situation.

The 30th Infantry reported at 1152 hours that it had made contact
with the French forces around KAYSERSBERG. The Company "G"
platoon which had moved forward into KAYSERSBERG with the French, reported at
1155 hours that contact had not been established with the 30th Infantry
which was reported in the southern part of the town. The platoon had
taken sixty prisoners and the French had taken more. Two companies
of Germans were within KAYSERSBERG and heavy small arms fire fights
were going on. The Company "G" platoon requested that the remainder of
its company be sent into town to assist moving up the area. Enemy
shelling was averaging 200-300 rounds per hour and it was very
difficult to maintain communications.

By 1255 hours Companies "I" and "L" were engaged in a large fire
fight and the 3d Battalion commander requested that Company "B" tie in
on the right (west) flank of Company "G". The 3d Battalion was still
in contact with Company "B", 143d Infantry. Requests for tank and
tank destroyer fire were made to be fired from KIENTZHEIM.

The 2d Battalion was ordered by the Regimental Commander at 1305
hours to return all of Company "G" from KAYSERSBERG when mapping up
operations were completed. Company "E" was to assist the 3d Battalion
immediately by a flanking attack on the right (west).

Fires caused by artillery and armored units were observed in
SCHOLZHEIM and Germans could be observed moving across country to
the south from KAYSERSBERG to AMERSCHWIR.

The 2d Battalion commander stated via radio at 1347 hours that the
road to KIENTZHEIM was congested with traffic and resupply of fighting
units and medical evacuation of the wounded was impossible. The battalion requested the road be relaid immediately and three ambulances be sent to it as quickly as possible.

The Division C-3 advised at 1355 hours that operations instructions were coming out on the movement of the regiment to the STRASBOURG area. The 15th Infantry was to relieve all of the 111st Infantry, plus Company "F" and elements of Anti-tank Company, 113d Infantry. The 111st Field Artillery, Company "A", 111th Engineers and Company "A", 111th Medical Battalion, were all to move under regimental control. No trucks were to move south of RIBEUVILLE during daylight.

The 2d Battalion was notified at 1500 hours that it would be relieved by elements of the 30th Infantry as soon as darkness fell and would assemble in RIQUEWIHR.

The 3d Battalion stated that it could not move because of the intensity of German artillery and mortars falling on its position. The Germans were also bombing SIGOLSHHEIM and the valley to the south. The battalion was ordered to establish contact with flanking units and dig in. The battalion was also advised that it would be relieved by the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, during the night.

The Regimental Commander informed the Division C-3 at 1705 hours that the French had a squadron of tanks in AMMERSCHWIHR and also had 400 prisoners in KAYSERSBERG which they wanted someone to take charge of.

The 2d Battalion was notified at 1750 hours that it would not be relieved during the night. It was to be relieved the next day, if possible, but no later than the following night. At 0600 hours on 19 December, the battalion was to revert to the control of the 143d Infantry and upon its relief would move by truck to the STRASBOURG sector. All other elements of the regiment were to be relieved by 0600 hours on 19 December and move to the new area. All supporting armed units attached to the 2d Battalion were notified that they would remain in the line as long as the battalion itself remained.

Company "M" reported at 1912 hours that there was enemy Infantry and tank movement in the west edge of SIGOLSHHEIM. Company "G" was on its way back from KAYSERSBERG to its original position with the 2d Battalion. The Regimental Commander at 2013 hours ordered the 2d Battalion to send a combat patrol into AMMERSCHWIHR. If French forces were within the town, a company was to be sent to assist them. At 2348 hours the Regimental Commander notified the 2d Battalion that it was important to get a company into AMMERSCHWIHR as quickly
SECRET

as possible. Movement was to be made by way of KAYSERSBERG. The German counter-attack received during the day was believed to have been launched from AMERSCHWIHR and it was vital that the town be held. Some French tanks and a few infantry were within the town, but the tanks could not be expected to operate during the night and needed infantry protection of bazookas and rifle grenades. An attack by enemy tanks was almost a certainty.

The Engineers were requested to construct a bridge on the KIENTZHEIM--AMERSCHWIHR road but Division G-3 stated it would not be put in. This entailed a longer route to AMERSCHWIHR and circuitous communications.

The Division Commander at 0021 hours on 19 December, ordered Company "F" to proceed into AMERSCHWIHR. The Regimental Commander notified the 2d Battalion that Company "F" probably would have to fight its way to get into the town. The company moved out at 0200 hours but at 0435 hours a report was received that it was being held up by a friendly unit along the route. While checking this report with the 30th Infantry, a French liaison officer reported that Company "F" had arrived in AMERSCHWIHR at 0630 hours.

At 0715 hours Brigadier General STACK notified Colonel CHARLES H. OWENS, the former regimental commander who had been wounded on 4 December and had returned from the hospital, that he was again in command of the 141st Infantry Regiment and the sector had reverted to control of the 143d Infantry.

The regimental command post closed at RIMEWEHR at 0900 hours and moved to ILLKIRCH-GRAFFENSTADEN (951930, Sheet 38/16), re-opening the command post at 1100 hours. At 1830 hours the regiment took command over the sector south of STRASBOURG from the 15th Infantry Regiment.

The 1st and 3d Battalions occupied positions between the RHONE-RHINE Canal (Canal du Rhone Au Rhin) and the RHINE River. The 1st Battalion was in the vicinity of STOCKFELD (026925, Sheet 38/16) while the 3d Battalion occupied positions in the vicinity of NEUHOF (024935, Sheet 38/16). Both Battalions were instructed to maintain active and alert patrols. A civilian curfew was in effect from 1730 hours to 0630 hours each night and all civilians on the streets were to be picked up between these hours. The 131st Field Artillery was instructed to set up defensive fires between the RHONE-RHINE Canal and the RHINE River.

The 2d Battalion reported in at 2155 hours stating that Companies "E", "G", and Headquarters had closed into WOLFISHEDT (952985, Sheet 38/16) while Companies "F" and "H" were on route to the area.

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SECRET
During the night of 19-20 December, Company "G" reported hearing armored vehicles on the German side of the RHINE River. The 3d Battalion reported heavy caliber artillery falling near the KEHL-STRAISBOURG bridge.

The 3d Battalion notified regiment at 0102 hours on 20 December that its relief in the RIQUEWIHR area has been completed without difficulties and Company "H" was closing into WOLFSHEIM at that time. The G-3 of the 3 Division was informed of this.

At 0900 hours the 3d Battalion reported a large fire of undetermined origin in KEHL. A few rounds of friendly tank fire was sent across the RHINE from the 3d Battalion sector.

The battalions along the RHINE River formulated alert plans and established patrols between units. Contact was made with French forces at FORT HUCHE (02s83), Sheet 38/16.

A huge explosion of undetermined origin rocked the ground in the vicinity of Company "L" at 1930 hours which evidently came from the German side of the RHINE. Similar explosions were heard in the vicinity of KEHL at 0600 hours on 21 December.

The Regimental Headquarters Intelligence & Reconnaissance (I&R) Platoon made patrols every two hours through the regimental area. Antitank Company also established hourly patrols.

During the night of 21-22 December enemy flares were noted and sounds of a convoy could be heard in Germany across from the 3d Battalion sector.

On the morning of 22 December, the Engineers were called upon to install barbed wire and trip flares in the regimental sector.

The Division G-3 advised at 0930 hours that another task force consisting of one regiment was coming into the Division area and would be located in the vicinity of the 141st Infantry. All battalions were informed at 1652 hours that they were to furnish guides at 0800 hours on 23 December to lead another unit into position in their sectors. The Division G-3 stated that unit would not actually take over the regimental positions until 2359 hours on 24 December. Meanwhile, the regiment was to find locations and billets for the relieving unit.

A trip flare was set off in the Company "L" sector around 2030 hours but patrols were unable to find anyone who might have set it off. The Division G-2 called the Regimental S-2 at 0220 hours and
stated that the 143d Infantry felt certain that their communication lines had been tapped and the mess word had been compromised. All battalions were notified of this. A German machine pistol was heard firing on the left flank of Company "B" in the 3d Battalion area at 0319 hours on 23 December from the French side of the RHINE. The 3d Battalion stated that it had taken over the Company "B" out-post position the previous day. At 0319 hours the machine pistol was fired and someone ran up to this position and threw a German hand grenade which wounded one man. At the same time, a trip flare went off near the Anti-tank Company observation post. Both the 1st and 2d Battalions were alerted and were searching the woods. Again at 0730 hours the machine pistol fire was heard between Companies "B" and "A".

The staff of the 242d Infantry Regiment of the 42d Division, which was the unit relieving the regiment, arrived at the regimental command post at 0927 hours and receiving disposition of the troops and plans of operations.

A cub observation plane of the 132d Field Artillery was sent up at 1135 hours to look for enemy mortar positions and reconnoiter the enemy positions on the German side of the RHINE.

During the afternoon of 23 December, troops of the 242d Infantry infiltrated into positions of the regimental units. Since the relieving unit had not been in combat, every effort was made to assist them and furnish them with tactical information.

The Division G-3 notified the Regimental S-2 at 1950 hours that patrols were to comb the woods on 24 December for any possible enemy. At 2350 hours Division warned that the regiment was to be alerted for enemy paratroopers who had been dropped behind the lines wearing American uniforms.

On the morning of 24 December, both the 1st and 3d Battalions began searching their areas thoroughly. All woods and pillboxes were investigated and no evidence of any enemy was found.

At 2359 hours on 24 December, command of the sector was officially turned over to the 242d Infantry. The regiment thus ended 132 straight days of combat beginning when it stormed the beaches at AGAY on the French Riviera on 15 August and ending on 24 December on the banks of the RHINE River looking into Germany -- a distance of over 650 airline miles, but extending into thousands of miles by the circuitous routes and various fronts covered by the regiment. The regiment had suffered huge losses in personnel -- 395 officers and men killed, 310 missing and over 1600 wounded -- during this period, but enemy casualties were much greater--4916 prisoners alone were taken by
regimental units. The number of enemy dead and wounded were far in excess of this figure.

The regiment spent Christmas Day in bivouac, enjoying its first full day of rest and the traditional Army turkey dinner for the holiday. Quartering parties were sent forward during the day to locate a new bivouac area in the vicinity of LORQUIN which lay ten miles southwest of SARREBOURG. On 26 December the entire regiment moved to the LORQUIN bivouac area, where training programs were begun to prepare the organization for future combat. The end of the year found the regiment still in this sector.

Six (6) officers and 287 enlisted men reinforcements were received during the month of December. Of the enlisted men 169 were riflemen, 39 automatic riflemen, 39 machine gunners, 21 mortar gunners and the remainder were comprised of messengers, radio operators, section leaders, chauffeurs, litter bearers, antitank gunners, cooks, artificers, platoon sergeants, supply NCO's and lst sergeants.

Replacements continued to arrive not fully equipped. Although the majority of the men have most of the necessary equipment, some are received without helmets or rifles. The small number of replacements thus received indicate some of the equipment is probably lost enroute from the Reinforcement Depot. None of the reinforcements arrived with shoe-pacs which continues to be a burden to a combat unit as placing the men in fox holes without adequate clothing for cold weather only increases trench foot and illnesses.

Age of the enlisted men averaged 26 years. This was somewhat better than groups previously received since fewer older men were assigned. Any new reinforcement to an Infantry regiment over 30 years of age is a liability and any reinforcement over 35 years of age is a distinct liability.

Difficulty was experienced in receiving men with technician ratings who are not qualified to do their assigned tasks. Clerks have been received who do not have a basic conception of military correspondence or military administration.

The cancellation of all rotation vacancies was a great morale builder inasmuch as it gave men who had been performing the actual duties for some months an opportunity to be promoted and eliminated the confusion resulting from assignment of rotation replacements without previous combat experience.
SECRET

It has been ascertained that any officer of the grade of captain or above who is assigned to an Infantry regiment which is in combat or about to enter combat is handicapped. This is particularly applicable to front line rifle company commanders. It has been the experience of this regiment that ninety per cent (90%) of such assignments result in reclassification. The experience of this regiment has been that combat appointments prove more satisfactory than the assignment of inexperienced officers above the grade of 1st lieutenant.

Morale of the troops was poor due to the protracted period of time it was necessary to keep them in active combat. When the regiment was relieved at 2400 hours on 24 December, it had been in 132 continuous days of combat. A regimental rest camp was maintained by the Headquarters Section of the Medical Detachment which afforded rest and relaxation for enlisted men and officers who did not require hospitalization for a period of more than four (4) days. The Division rest camp at BAINS-LOS-BAINS also provided an excellent arrangement for sending combat troops of a limited number to secure rest and relaxation. Upon relief from combat the morale of the troops increased immeasurably. The Special Service Section arranged for motion pictures and day rooms during this period. Also, the troops were permitted to go on pass to nearby towns in conformity with Army rules of curfew and conduct.

German prisoners of war taken by the regiment during the month of December 1944, are listed by days as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 December</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 &quot;</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 &quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 &quot;</td>
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<td>5 &quot;</td>
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<td>8 &quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 &quot;</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>11 &quot;</td>
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<td>16 &quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>24 &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL......</td>
<td>700</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

It was known that the Germans suffered casualties of 340 killed and 124 wounded as a result of the regiment's operations during the month. An extremely conservative estimate of additional enemy killed and wounded would be 294 killed and 583 wounded. Reports from
prisoners indicated their casualties had been very high, being caused for the most part by mortar and artillery fire. The caliber of troops used by the Germans was considerably higher than for several previous months. At least 1000 officer candidates between the ages of 17-20 years had been thrown against the regiment at one time. The number of foreign troops used by the Germans decreased sharply.

Enemy war material captured and destroyed during the month of December 1944, was tabulated as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>器材</th>
<th>数量</th>
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<tr>
<td>掩体半卡车</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>自行火炮</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>防空炮</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>反坦克火箭发射器</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>机枪</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An unknown quantity of ammunition, supplies, machine guns and rifles were evacuated through supply channels.

END

Report of Operations written by:

Robert D. Dieterle
M/2t ROBERT D. DIETERLE, 16062508
Service Company, 111st Infantry
Regimental Sergeant Major

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