In early December 1944, the 36th Infantry Division broke through the ST. MARIE PASS and fanned out in the RHINE VALLEY to occupy a front from LEISTRAT to MAINZ. On Hill 393, finger-like projection of the VOESEN MOUNTAIN, covering the entrance to the ST. MARIE PASS and dominating the Northern approaches to COLMAR, the Division anchored its right flank. Against this key terrain feature, the 19th AMY (German) directed the main effort of its December offensive to close the ST. MARIE PASS and destroy the 36th Division. It is now a matter of historical record that this offensive was held by the tenacity and courage of the Infantrymen of this veteran Division. In this military achievement, the continuous fourteen day action of the 2nd Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment, stands as a sign of extra-ordinary heroism and valiant performance of duty.

On the night of 7th December the 2nd Battalion, 141st Infantry, was attached to the 143rd Infantry and ordered to attack and destroy an enemy force that had successfully attacked Hill 393 during the day. The attack was made under the completely adverse circumstances of darkness, rain and an obscure situation of friendly and enemy troops that precluded the use of supporting fires. Daylight found the 2nd Battalion in control of Hill 393.

From the 7th to the 17th of December the situation was critical. All three rifle companies and the Battalion anti-tank platoon were committed abreast on a position that had little depth and no reserves immediately available. Although three different Battalions fought and were relieved on the immediate left, the 2nd Battalion was continuously committed.
Against this line a determined enemy hurled thousands of rounds of artillery and mortar in support of nine attacks against the Battalion’s position. Strongest of these attacks came on the 9th, 12th, and 13th of December. The attack at daylight, 9th December made in Battalion strength up the southern slopes of Hill 393 met with initial success but was thrown back after several hours of bitter fighting in the “F” and “G” Company sectors. The desperate and fanatical attack on the 12th that was the initial combat action for seven hundred young Nazi Officer candidates, hastily regimented into a task force and brought across the Rhine with the mission of seizing EQUEVIR and attacking Hill 393 from the rear, reached the very streets of the town before it was repulsed. From the windows, the doorways, the towers and the rooftops the cooks, the clerks, the drivers and the lineman of the Battalion Headquarters fought and destroyed a surprised and confused enemy. In less than one hour the enemy withdrew leaving their dead and wounded behind them— their baptism of fire changed into a blood bath of defeat. The remnants of this force attacked the Battalion’s right flank before daylight the 13th and completely surrounded company before they again fell back to the security of the VOSGES MOUNTAINS, slopes, leaving a costly toll of Germans dead and wounded behind them.

Three times during these fateful ten days the Battalion attacked, twice, when the enemy wrested the dominant ground of Hill 39 from other friendly troops, to restore the position; once, to clear last resistance from the South slopes of the hill. During this entire period the enemy did not seize and hold a single foot of ground occupied by the Battalion.
...on the 17th of December, the 2nd Battalion, matched with a brilliantly performing company of French-manned Sherman tanks from the colorful Le Clerc Division, stormed down the southern slopes of Hill 393 to wrest the bastion cities of HINTERTIIN, KATERSBERG and KIRSTENHOF from the German in a smashing thirty-six-hour offensive, it was its greatest effort, delivered where it would do the most good. From these 13th Century Citadels the 19th German Army in the COLMAR "Pocke" had mounted every attack on the vulnerable right flank of the Division. Their fall abruptly, decisively and completely ended the offensive launched to destroy the 36th Division and retake the ST. MARIE PASS.

Although the Battalion's losses were heavy--40% of its fighting strength wounded or killed during the action, the losses it inflicted on the enemy were disastrous to his offensive intentions. More than six hundred prisoners of war were taken by the battalion during the period it held Hill 393 and subsequently attacked with the Company of French Armor; one hundred and fifty enemy wounded were evacuated through the Battalion aid station and at the conclusion of the operation more than six-hundred enemy dead were removed from the Battalion area on and in front of Hill 393 by the graves registration of the Regiment.

This action climaxed a period of one hundred and twenty six days of continuous offensive action against the enemy since the Battalion landed in the assault of the southern shores of France on the 15th of August, 1944. It is part of the veteran 36th Infantry Division--First American Division to fight in Europe when it hit the Beach at SALERNO, 9th September, 1943.
The actions of the Battalion, 114th Infantry Regiment, during
the month of December, 1944, contributed materially toward the stoppi-
g of the German offensive in the COLMAR "Pocket"; this accomplishment
and its close cooperation with elements of an Allied Army reflects the
highest credit on the Armed Forces of the United States.
PROJECTING TOWARDS THE MAIN RIVER FROM THE FOOTHILLS OF THE \nVOSGES, DOMINATING THE IMMEDIATE APPROACHES TO COLMAR FROM THE N, \nCONSPICUOUS ABOVE THE ALSATIAN VINEYARDS IS A CRITICAL MILITARY TERRAIN FEATURE COMMONLY REFERRED TO BY THE MEN WHO Fought FOR IT AS \NHILL 393, ALTHOUGH THE DOMINATING PART OF THE HILL IS 402 METERS \NABOVE SEA-LEVEL.

ALTHOUGH ELEMENTS OF THREE OTHER BATTALIONS Fought AND WERE \NRELIEVED ON THE EAST END OF HILL 393 DURING THE PERIOD OF 7 TO 13 \NDECEMBER, COMPANY "E", 141ST INFANTRY, ATTACKED ENEMY POSITIONS ON \NSLOPES OF THE HILL, GAINED THE SUMMIT ON THE NIGHT OF 7 DECEMBER \NAND FOR NINE DAYS HELD ITS POSITION AGAINST COUNTER-ATTACK AFTER \NCOUNTER-ATTACK, UNDER INTENSE ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE AND \NSIX SEPARATE OCCASIONS LAUNCHED ATTACKS TO DESTROY ENEMY POSITIONS IN \NITS OWN AND ADJACENT SECTORS, AND ON THE MORNING OF 16 DECEMBER AT\NACKED TO DESTROY THE REMAINING GERMAN FORCES AND REGAIN THEIR OR\NIGINAL POSITION. FROM THIS CRITICAL TERRAIN FEATURE, LATE ON THE \NAfternoon of 17 December, "G" COMPANY WITH A COMPANY OF FRENCH MEDIUM \NTANKS LAUNCHED AN ATTACK TO THE SOUTH THAT IN LESS THAN 36 HOURS \NNETTED MORE THAN 500 PRISONERS, INCLUDING GESTAPO AND SS TROOPS AND \NSECURED THE KEY ALSATIAN TOWNS OF KIENTZHEIM, KAYSERSBERG AND \NAMBERG WEHR.

ON THE NIGHT OF 7 DECEMBER 1944, COMPANY "E" ATTACKED HILL 402 \NFROM THE TOWN OF RIQUEWIHR TO RESTORE AN ENEMY PENETRATION OF ELEMENTS \NOF THE 143 INFANTRY ON THE TOP OF THE HILL. THE ATTACK WAS MADE AFTER \NDark and in a cold rain; the obscurity of the situation of our friend\nLY TROOPS PRECEDED THE USE OF SUPPORTING FIRES.
The difficulty of the task was increased by the fact that the enemy was employing heavy machine guns captured from American troops during the day and identification of the enemy by the characteristics of his fire was impossible. After reinforcing the company with one platoon of Company "G" and a HMG platoon the objective was cleared within the company's zone although sporadic small arms continued in the area until daylight.

A counter-attack reported to take place at 0530, 8 December did not materialize until 1200, 8 December. A penetration on the immediate left of the company was made and at 1700 the company commander attacked east along the top of the hill over running two German machine gun positions and one American machine gun manned by Germans. Six enemy were killed, two prisoners taken and contact was established with the unit on the left. Company "E"'s losses were one killed and two wounded.

At 0700, 9 December, the enemy launched a full scale attack on our position with his main effort in the "E" company sector. The attack was preceded with forty minutes of intense artillery and mortar preparation; our defensive fires with artillery, chemical mortars and our own mortars within the battalion were fired for thirty minutes. Heavy fighting continued within the company position for over an hour and the enemy succeeded in setting up several machine gun positions on the North slope of the hill firing down on the supply and evacuation route; all enemy on the hill were captured or killed by 1000 hours including machine gun crews on the back slope of the hill. During the afternoon between one and two hundred bodies were counted within the company area; seven wounded sorted out of a pile of enemy dead the next morning had all been wounded by hand and
and rifle grenades. At dark 9 December the Company Commander reported the situation well under control and the position secure.

At 1545, 10 December a force of enemy in platoon strength was driven off by small arms fire from the left platoon of the Company. At 1850, Company on the left reported they had been counter-attacked and needed reinforcements. One platoon of Company "K" was ordered to attack to the East to assist Company "B"; contact was made without incident except for spasmodic small arms fire, reported as being mostly friendly.

At 0630, 11 December Company "Z" and Company "G" received a counter-attacked preceded by an artillery preparation. Although slight pressure was brought against the "Z" Company positions the attack was brought in force against the "G" Company position, but was thrown back without any penetration being made. PW reports indicate this attack was made by two Companies of the 326 Infantry and that 22 men were killed and 50 wounded before they were permitted to withdraw from the area.

At 0900, 12 December the enemy successfully enveloped the right and open flank of the battalion, over ran the mortar positions, the battalion supply and evacuation route and the battalion command post in the town of RIQUEWIHR with a new battalion composed of Officer candidate personnel in strength estimated between five and seven hundred. This attack was driven off with such losses to the enemy as to render the unit unfit for further offensive action. During this attack, two of the three rifle companies on position in the battalion sector suffered heavy losses in Headquarters personnel from the attack. Although artillery was extremely active on the "L" Company position during this action no attack in any
Force was made on their position.

Early on the 13th an attack was received on the right flank of the battalion but did not involve Company "E"; a marked increase in the activity of German Armor to the immediate front of the Company was noted on this day.

During the night of 13—14 December, two Companies of Engineers relieved Company "E" and Company "G" on Hill 402 to permit to attack a well defended enemy position to the battalion's right; just after the relief was completed the enemy launched a strong night attack on the position and succeeded in occupying all of the high ground of Hill 402 and captured the machine guns and some personnel of the Engineer unit which had relieved Company "E". At daylight, 14 December, Company "E" and Company "G" launched a counter-attack to restore the positions on Hills 402 and 393. After eight hours of vicious fighting against a well established enemy force all the ground lost was taken except for a small knoll at the very summit of Hill 402. Losses to Companies "E" and "G" in this action were seventeen wounded, including the Company Commander of "G" Company, and four men killed.

At 0900, 17 December, Company "E" attacked the summit of Hill 402 and secured its objective at 1700 with the remnants of one platoon just as a German Company of approximately 60 men again assaulted the Hill capturing five men from Company "E", all but one of which were wounded, and inflicting fourteen additional casualties on the Company. Darkness found the situation temporarily stabilized.

At 0800, 18 December, Company "E" attacked the summit of Hill 402 and by 1100 reported the objective cleared of all enemy; this action concluded nine days of vicious fighting without respite.
Several hundred unevacuated German dead on the top and slopes of Hill 402 bear mute testimony to the price the German Command was willing to pay to deny American Troops this ground that points like a poisoned dagger into the defense of CASSINO.

Company "E" is part of a Regiment that has been committed to action against the enemy since landing at SALerno, ITALY, 9 September 1943, and has been in continuous action since spearheading the assault of the 36th Division on the Riviera Coast 15 August 1944. Immediately prior to this action Company "E" has been continuously committed and in contact with the enemy every day since 21 November 1944 without an opportunity for rehabilitation of any kind. Casualties in this night action for the Company were 31 wounded in action, 9 men killed in action and 5 men missing in action. Through out this entire period a very high state of morale and "esprit de corps" was apparent by this extremely low rate of men evacuated for non-battle diseases and the entire absence of struggling by the men of the Company. On the night of 19 December 1944, the Company was brought out of the line for rest and rehabilitation; at daylight the next morning a large red and white banner stretched across the street of the small Asiatic town where they were billeted fluttered defiantly "EASY DOES IT."

In spite of continuous and concentrated shelling of their position, strongly attacked again and again from their front, threaened at times by enemy penetrations on both flanks and their rear, its ranks reduced by heavy casualties among Officers and enlisted men, Company "E" exhibited extra-ordinary heroism and determination by tenaciously holding its ground. Time and again the tired and battle weary men of the Company left their holes and at close quarters
fiercely attacked and destroyed each enemy that penetrated their position. Their action contributed materially toward the success of the operation in the vicinity of HIESCHIHR, KIENTZHEL, and KAYSERSBERG and reflects the highest credit on the Armed Forces of the United States.
ACTION OF COMPANY "F", 141st INFANTRY
7 TO 19 DECEMBER 1944

Company "F", 141st Infantry, on the right of the 2nd Battalion, attacked and seized the high ground west of Hill 393 on the night of 7th December 1944. For ten days, from the 7th to the 17th, "F" Company held an isolated position that was opened to enemy attacks from any direction; its contact to the left with the rest of the Battalion was across a barren vineyard covered only by fire, to the right— the open flank of the 36th Infantry Division and the rugged, forest covered slopes of the VOSGES MOUNTAINS. During this period it was attacked by a determined enemy from every side; was once surrounded and was continuously forced to shift its men and weapons from foxhole to foxhole to meet each enemy threat. At the end of ten days the right flank of the 36th Infantry Division's front against the COLMAR "Pocket" was still solidly anchored against the VOSGES MOUNTAINS by the tenacity and fortitude of the men and officers of Company "F". When the company relinquished its positions on the VOSGES SLOPES, it was to push forward in a Battalion attack that was in thirty-six hours to decisively and completely break the German offensive spirit in the COLMAR "Pocket".

Early in the morning of the 8th of December a poorly organized enemy effort to dislodge "F" Company from its position was thrown back with heavy losses to the enemy. For three days the Company countered strong enemy patrols probing the exposed flank of the Division and launched limited attacks that secured a pillbox on the top of Hill 621 and a foothold on the south end of Hill 666 by darkness on the 11th of December.

On the 12th of December, simultaneously with the attack on HIRCHMUTH which inflicted heavy losses on the Company Headquarters personnel, the enemy launched an attack on the Company position that
threatened to isolate the platoon defending the strong point on the top
Hill 621. Although the attack was stopped without losing ground after
three hours of bitter fighting, the position of "F" Company was ex-
tremely precarious at darkness on the 12th with the remnants of the
strong force that had failed to secure "K" UNHEDHR dug in on the dom-
inating ground to the Company's right and rear.

Before daylight on the 13th the Company CP was struck by a strong
attack coming down the east slopes of Hill 666 directly in rear of the
Company. A few minutes later the isolated platoon on Hill 621 reported
by telephone that they were being assaulted from every side. For two
hours the badly depleted Platoons of Company "F", reinforced during the
night by the battalion anti-tank platoon fighting as riflemen, fought
back to back while friendly artillery and mortar fire crashed down on
every side of them. One platoon attacked to relieve the siege against
the desperately outnumbered platoon in and around the pillbox on Hill 62
Shortly after daylight the Company Commander notified the Battalion
Commander that they were holding their ground but the situation was
becoming critical. The entire Battalion reserve, a platoon of medium ta
moved across the vineyards toward the steeply rising slopes of the
VOSGES AND BLASTED ENEMY MACHINE GUNS and personnel on the wooded slope
of Hill 666 as the men of "F" Company marked targets with hand grenades
and tracer ammunition. Just before 1200 hours the Company Commander
reported the situation was well in hand. The enemy had withdrawn to
the reverse slopes of the Hill leaving an estimated hundred dead and
wounded. Throughout the rest of the day, their faces set in tense,
hard lines, the men of "F" Company listened to the anguished scream of abandoned enemy wounded and waited for the enemy strike again.
At daylight on the 14th the entire weight of the 2nd Battalion was to be thrown against the enemy force on Hill 666 but a successful enem attack on Hill 393 during the night required a change of plans and on the 14th, 15th and 16th "F" Company faced strong enemy in three directions. During those three days the Company continuously probed the enemy with strong patrols; and with hundreds of rounds of mortar and artillery ammunition kept him from reorganizing to again assault their position.

Early on the morning of the 17th December, "F" Company quietly broke contact with the enemy and assembled in the vineyards at the foot of the hill they had fought to hold for ten days without respite from the rain, mud, shells or German efforts to destroy them. At 1400 hours "F" Company, "G" Company and a Company of French-manned Shermans from the famous Le Clerc Division moved down the slopes of Hill 393 under a continuous pounding by enemy artillery, self-propelled and anti-tank fire and stormed the strongly held town of KEINTHEIM. Although organized resistance ceased in less than an hour with the capture of more than a hundred prisoners the spasmodic rattle of small arms echoed through the walled Alsatian city until the early hours of the morning as mopping up of isolated resistance continued.

At daylight on the 15th of December the Battalion Commander received two orders; ATTACK KAYSERSBERG and "Be prepared to meet an enemy attack in strength of 200 Infantry and six-tanks from SIGOLSHEIM". "F" Company received the mission of holding KEINTHEIM while "G" Company and the French Armor moved on KAYSERSBERG. Although more than a thousand rounds of enemy artillery fell on KEINTHEIM just before daylight the attack from SIGOLSHEIM 600 yards to the east across a flat and barren vineyard, did not materialize.
After dark on the 18th of December a Company of French Armor, exploiting the breakthrough made by the successful, armor-supported attack of "G" Company on KATZERSBERG, was reported moving on AMZERSCHWIR, last VOSGES anchor on the road to COLMAR. The need for infantry to accompany the tanks was imperative; sixty-four weary, mud-covered, battle-numb men—the combatant strength of "F" Company—moved on AMZERSCHWIR through the rain drenched darkness, into a situation so obscure that friendly artillery, unable to keep abreast with the fast moving situation of the day, still sent its harassing fire thundering down along the road on which the company moved. The bridges across the swollen stream between KENTZHEIM and AMZERSCHWIR were found destroyed and the company moved to KATZERSBERG to cross. Between KATZERSBERG and AMZERSCHWIR light resistance was encountered in the form of small groups of enemy trying to escape to the south; however, long before daylight "F" Company had established hasty liaison with the French tankers in AMZERSCHWIR and secured the burned and shelling flattened town.

On the night of December 19th "F" Company turned the town of AMZERSCHWIR over to the 30th Infantry and the men of "F" Company shouldered their M-1 rifles, machine guns, mortars and packs and marched back to RUEWIND across the ground they had fought so long and so courageously to hold, too weary to realize how heroically and valiantly they had contributed toward holding and smashing the December offensive of the 19th German Army in the COLMAR "Pocket".
In the chaotic and bloody fortnight during December 1944 when the 12th German Army launched attack after attack in its attempt to annihilate the American 36th Infantry Division and close the ST. MARIE pass through the VOSGES MOUNTAINS, Company "G", 114th Infantry, with extra-ordinary heroics and gallantry, earned a distinguished place for itself in the annals of modern arms— not for the cost it paid in human lives and almost unbearable hardships, nor the bitterness with which the battle was fought, but with the brilliant record of achievement— a saga of American Infantry men written in human blood and devastating fire power of American Infantry weapons backed with a fortitude and an esprit that sometimes becomes most dominant in fighting men during the climactic phases of a great battle. In the twelve days it faced the full onslaught of the German Offensive, it never lost a foot of ground or a single foxhole to the enemy. Four times, between the 9th and the 19th of December, the men of Company "G" lunged forward in full scale Infantry-Army-Artillery attacks—twice assaulting the high ground of Hill 393 to restore positions lost by other units; once, with a brilliantly performing company of French Armor attacking and holding the Medieval Bastion of KIENTHEIM, mopping up all enemy Infantry opposition in the town without the loss of a single tank due to enemy Infantry opposition; alone with the same French-mounted Shermans, smashing into fortified and tactically important EAYERSBERG against over-whelming superiority in Infantry, reducing all opposition in the town in six hours, begging more than four hundred prisoners, the majority of which were first class German Infantry, SS Troops and Gestapo.

(1)
From the rain and blood soaked red clay slopes of Hill 393 to the heart of "V" KAYSERSBERG, a distance of little more than three thousand yards, forty men were killed, forty two wounded and three times the officer leading the company became a casualty. These are the accomplishments and the costs of Company "G" in the attack on KAYSERSBERG.

Although this report deals largely with the situation which culminated with the Company attacking KAYSERSBERG from the east, it is noteworthy that two days prior to the commencement of the action the Company launched the initial onslaught on KAYSERSBERG by attacking across two miles of rugged, mountainous terrain to cut the main BON HOMME-KAYSERSBERG highway just west of KAYSERSBERG. This action resulted in more than twenty enemy taken prisoner and twenty-two killed including a German Major and two Lieutenants.

On the night of 7 December, one platoon of the Company moved up with "K" Company to reduce an enemy salient on the top of Hill 393 in the sector of the 143rd Infantry. After holding this position for two days, during which time it withstood one German counter-attack in its sector, the platoon rejoined the Company at 0800 hours, 9 December as it launched an attack, supported by four Sherman tanks, over the saddle at the West end of Hill 393 to clear enemy forces from the forward slopes. Before the company reached the line of departure, it caught the full impact of an enemy attack launched with full scale artillery and mortar preparation at 0700 by two companies of German Infantry. In the wintery gray dawn the attacking Germans were caught squarely in carefully prepared artillery and mortar defensive fires dropping within a hundred yards of the forward foxholes of "G" Company; those Germans that fanatically came through found themselves in the
immediate company area and there met a hail of small arms and grenades. One luckless German machine gun crew that succeeded in reaching the reverse side of the Hill fired one burst before a Sherman rumbled up and at point blank range blasted it out of existence. Although the Company Commander had been wounded in the initial melee, the Company quickly reorganized and moved on toward its objective only a short distance forward. Before darkness, the leading platoon of the Company was digging in a position among the bodies of seventy-five dead and wounded Germans in the platoon area.

At 2300 hours, 13 December, the Company was relieved by an Engineer Company to move to an assembly area for an attack at daylight on the 14th. Shortly after midnight the enemy launched an attack in some strength. After suffering heavy casualties and losing one platoon by capture, the Engineers relinquished the top of Hill 393 to the enemy. Daylight found Company "C", followed by Company "E", fighting their way back up the shell-pocked northern slope of the hill. For eight gruelling hours they fought their way from fox hole to fox hole against determined opposition reinforced by the fires of eight heavy American Machine guns captured intact in the German night attack. From the two leading platoons, four men were killed and fourteen wounded, but at dark the fox holes on the top of Hill 393 were occupied by American doughboys. For ninety-six more sleepless hours, the men of "C" Company dug deeper in the rain soaked ground, absorbed the constant shelling, and waited.

Shortly after noon the 17 December, the order came to attack. Leaving the comparative security of its hard-fought-for holes, "C" Company followed a Company of hard-hitting, French-manned, German tanks lumbering through a hail of high velocity anti-tank and
and artillery fire pouring into the saddle at the west end of the hill. A thousand yards down the slope, the ancient fortified town of 
KENTHEIM, with a twenty-foot stone wall encircling it on the south and a moat on the north, definitely rattled with the fire of small 
tank guns, 20 mm. ack-ack and anti-aircraft guns. Two platoons of the French armor raced for the only two entrances to the city—one at the east and the other at the west; a French tank destroyer engaging two Mark 
V tanks was hit by one of the Panzers and burst into flames. As the 
French tanks smashed into the charred and burning citadel from the 
east and west, and American infantrymen from "G" Company flooded 
a cross from the north, organized resistance ceased, yielding 
more than a hundred prisoners of war. In the debris and body litter-
ed streets of KENTHEIM, German staff cars with drivers literally 
overrun by tanks blasting their way into the center of the town; 
horses hitched to supply laden wagons standing where they were 
abandoned; twenty-five wounded enemy lying in a basement used as a 
German aid station awaiting medical aid; an enemy WN cage containing 
unevacuated American prisoners, some wounded—all these unimpeach-
able evidences bore testimony of the suddenness and surprise with 
which the attack had struck, as mopping up of last resistance at 
isolated points in the town continued into the night, the German 
tanks just outside of the town continued to bitterly hurl shell after 
shell crashing into the town. Between 0600 and 0700 the next morn-
ing, more than six-hundred rounds of mixed artillery were thrown into 
the town but no counter-attack developed. Any of the tired battle 
weary men of "G" Company that thought they would now receive a res-
pite were destined for a shock. Before the resistance had ended in 
KENTHEIM, a new order was received—Company "G" with the same
French tanks would attack approximately one kilometer to the west at daylight.

At daylight 17 December, "C" Company with the same French tanks launched an attack across the one kilometer wide, vineyard covered-slopes that separated KINTZHEIM from the strongly held town of KAYSERSBERG. As the force debouched from the west gate of KINTZHEIM, three German tanks opened fire between them and their objective, at a range of less than a thousand yards. For twenty minutes a tank battle raged; all German tanks were knocked out by the French tanks, and the outskirts of KAYSERSBERG was reached at 1000 hours. For three hours the tempo of battle raged was reduced to a systematic house to house fight with the American Infantry and the French tanks over coming resistance in almost every house in the face of heavy bazooka and machine gun fire. Late in the afternoon, the heaviest opposition was encountered in a fortified strongpoint in the heart of the city. After bitterly resisting all attempts to over come the position for two hours, the garrison surrendered, yielding one German Colonel complete with his staff and approximately sixty SS and Gestapo troops. A short time later, elements of the Company joined forces with friendly troops entering the town from the west.

Although both Company "C" and the French Armored support suffers relatively heavy casualties due to the intensity of fire and the fanaticism with which the enemy fought, the operation was a brilliant success in that it netted a large bag of prisoners of war in the 36 hour period, reduced German strongpoints in KINTZHEIM and KAYSERSBERG, paved the way for other French tanks and Company "F" of the 141st Infantry to sweep into ALBERCHEIR almost opposed later that night, relieved a heavy counter-attack against the 30th Infantry above KAYSERSBERG, and broke twelve day offensive of the German 19 Army in the GLASS pocket.
OPERATIONS IN FRANCE
JANUARY 1945
141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

The beginning of the new year 1945 and the month of January found the regiment in bivouac in the vicinity of LORCUIN, France, which lay approximately ten miles southwest of SARREBOURG. The Germans had been engaging in large scale counter-attacks in the area south and east of BITCHE and the regiment had been placed on a six hour alert status by the 36th Division to move to any location designated by XV Corps. Reconnaissance parties had been sent forward to select routes as far as SARREBOURG.

At 0950 hours on 1 January, the Division C-J notified the Regimental S-3 that the entire regimental combat team had been placed on a three hour alert status effective immediately. Trucks were being sent to the regiment and organic transportation was to be loaded without delay. No specific mission was given but it was known that the Germans were attacking in the 44th Infantry Division sector. Operations instructions, which had been issued in anticipation of the movement, were put into effect.

The Division C-J advised at 1110 hours that the combat team would move at once to WALDHAMBACH (62036, Sheet 37/14) and would be attached to the 100th Division. Every effort was to be made to reach WALDHAMBACH before dusk. Considering the lateness of the hour the movement order was received, it was not believed possible to move the entire combat team to its assembly point before darkness. Th. 3d Battalion moved first and crossed the initial point in the vicinity of SARREBOURG at 1630 hours. Th. 3d Battalion reached the area of MONTERONN (683440, Sheet 27/13) at 1930 hours and began effecting the relief elements of the 399th Infantry Regiment along the western edge of the town of LEMBERG (740450, Sheet 37/13). Th. 2d Battalion moved into a defensive position in the vicinity of GOETZENBRUCK (740422) and MONTERONN (742418, Sheet 37/13). Company "F" remained in reserve in the village of ST LOUIS IES BITCHE (723432, Sheet 37/13). Th. 1st Battalion moved into MONTERONN and outposted the town. The Regimental Command Post, which had closed at LORCUIN at 1620 hours, opened again in MONTERONN at 2200 hours. Cannon Company was attached to the 31st Field Artillery while the Antitank Company was instructed to go into a reserve position in MONTERONN prepared to reinforce any of the 100th Division road blocks should it become necessary. The night was extremely cold and visibility was good because of an almost full moon. The entire combat team closed into its respective areas by 2330 hours.

The 100th Division stated that the mission for the regiment would
be to protect the right rear of the Division itself.

The 100th Division C-3 advised at 0610 hours on 2 January that a
prisoner taken by one of its units stated that the mission of his re-
giment was to take LEMBERG by tomorrow (3 January). The 3d Battal-
ion reported hearing enemy wheeled and tracked vehicle movement northeast
of LEMBERG at 0710 hours. The enemy began shelling LEMBERG and all
units were alerted for an expected counter-attack. The extreme left
flank of the 3d Battalion had already received an attack made by In-
fantry and armor, and it was forced to withdraw to the woods directly
north of LEMBERG. Company "I" received the brunt of the attack and
lost contact with elements of the 399th Infantry Regiment on its flank.

The 100th Division Commander advised at 1055 hours that the Ger-
mans had infiltrated between the BOIS DE STAATSWALD and the BOIS DE
DREIBILDERTHAL and ordered the 1st Battalion to move to ENCHENBERG
(710460, Sheet 37/13) to drive the Germans back.

Cub artillery planes reported an enemy tank column moving west at
1015 hours one and one-half kilometers southeast of LEMBERG with Inf-
antry columns still further east.

The 2d Battalion reported at 1145 hours that Companies "E" and "G"
were engaged with the enemy in a small fire fight. Also a reconnais-
sance unit had been pushed back southeast of MEISENTHAL (719408, Sheet
37/13).

By 1205 hours the Regimental Commander notified the 100th Division
that all companies of the regiment were in contact with the enemy and
one platoon of Company "I" had been cut off. The situation was criti-
cal with an estimated company of German infantry advancing on MEISEN-
THAL. The 100th Division Commander stated that a battalion of the 179th
Infantry in GOETZENBRUCK would have to take care of the Germans near
MEISENTHAL.

The 2d Battalion commander advised at 1250 hours that the situa-
tion in Company "I" was uncertain for, besides having one platoon cut
off, the enemy had worked into a second platoon. Efforts were being
made to have the third platoon of Company "I" and a platoon of Company
"K" restore the position. The 2d Battalion received an attack from the
south on its right flank at 1316 hours.

The 100th Division Commander called to say that he had receiv-
ed a report of German tanks in ST LOUIS and if this was so, it would be very
difficult to dislodge them. The Regimental Commander stated that he
believed this information to be false. Upon checking with the 2d Bat-
talion, this rumor was dissipated.

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The 2d Battalion Commander notified the Regimental Commander at 1347 hours that the 14th Armored Infantry was withdrawing from SAREINSBERG and moving to the rear. This left Company "G" holding the town which was not a sufficient force. Company "F" had pushed into MEISENTHAL and was sending patrols out. The Regimental Commander requested the 45th Division to have the 179th Infantry take over the position of Company "G". The Regimental Commander also notified the 100th Division Commander that the 14th Armored Infantry was pulling back.

The 2d Battalion reported that one of its prisoners had disclosed that his regiment had left BITCHE the previous night and moved into the woods. The Germans were without supporting weapons and each company had approximately 100 men. All were wearing British uniforms with light German raincoats over them. Company "E" was receiving small arms fire on its left front from approximately 20-25 Germans.

The 3d Battalion requested at 1610 hours the support of the 1st Battalion inasmuch as Company "I" was spread out very thinly and had only a few men left on position. Tanks having overrun one platoon of the company. The 1st Battalion reported that it had reached Hill 426 (744477, Sheet 37/13) and Company "C" was in contact with Company "I". The 3d Battalion stated that this information was incorrect as Company "I" had not been contacted by any elements of the 1st Battalion and was at the present time engaged in a heavy fire fight. The Regimental Commander ordered the 1st Battalion to move both Companies "B" and "G" in order to contact Company "I". The 399th Infantry, on the regimental left (north) flank advised that Company "C" on the left (north) and Company "I" on the right (south). Company "B" however, while moving across open ground north of the BOIS DE STAATSWAL at 1630 hours, was fired upon from the southeast by a 20mm gun and small arms fire. This small engagement turned into a large fire fight and Company "B" was pinned down. Company "A" was ordered to send a patrol to contact Company "E" while Company "C" dug in on Hill 415 (734476, Sheet 37/13).

The 2d Battalion Commander advised at 1818 hours that the 179th Infantry was to make a two battalion attack with one battalion in reserve. Consequently, this organization did not want to take over the position of Company "G" but agreed to reinforce the sector until its attack order was received. Company "E" continued to hold a very thin line with one platoon of Company "F" on the left (north) of Company "E". Engineers were in MEISENTHAL ready to blow the bridges there upon order of the 2d Battalion or Regimental Commander.

At 2020 hours the 3d Battalion reported 150 Germans assembling in front of Company "I". Artillery was placed on this area and the enemy withdrew in disorder. Artillery fire continued to follow their withdrawal. Company "I" had become so disorganized that it had only about
25 men and one section of heavy machine guns left on position capable
of fighting. It was believed that one section of heavy machine guns of
Company "M" had been captured intact along with the cut off platoon of
Company "I". Company "I" continued to hold the east nose of the hill
in the BOIS DE SCHOEBINGG with one platoon of Company "L" on its left
(north).

The 824th Tank Destroyer Battalion notified the Regimental S-3 at
2235 hours that the situation in MEISENTHAL was serious with a great
deal of small arms fire being received. If no assistance was received,
Engineers were going to blow the bridge and withdraw. The 100th Divi-
sion was notified of this situation. At 2300 hours the 100th Division
C-2 stated that two companies of German tanks had broken through and
surrounded MEISENTHAL. The Regimental Executive Officer checked this
report and found it to be untrue.

The 2d Battalion was notified by the Regimental S-3 at 2332 hours
to inform the battalion of the 179th Infantry in SARRENSBERG that it
would be responsible for the area covered by Company "G". Company "G"
was to be pulled back to a reserve position on the regimental southern
flank. Company "E" was then to maintain contact with the 179th Infantry.

The 824th Tank Destroyer Battalion advised regiment at 0010 hours
on 3 January that the C-2 of the 100th Division had stated that a bat-
talion of the 45th Division would close into MEISENTHAL by 2600 hours.
Reconnaissance elements of the 100th Division were going into MEISEN-
THAL and if the situation remained precarious, road blocks would be
placed between that town and SOUHIT (796,00, Sheet 37/14).

The Engineers reported completion of the mine field in front of
the 3d Battalion sector at 0020 hours.

Company "C" was contacted at 0105 hours and was returning to ENCH-
ENBERG. Patrols from Company "C" had moved 700 yards south without
contacting Company "B". The situation regarding Company "B" remained
couded but it was known that the Battalion Commander and S-3 were with
the forward elements of the company.

The Regimental S-3 notified the 100th Division Commander at 0150
hours that progressive evidence of armored and Infantry threats was
building up within the regimental area and continued attacks were ex-
pected. The 100th Division advised that the situation at MEISENTHAL
appeared to be cleared up inasmuch as a portion of a battalion had mov-
ed into the town shortly after midnight. The road between MEISENTHAL
and GÖTZENBRUCK was found clear by reconnaissance units.

On the morning of 3 January, the Regimental Commander, Colonel
CHARLES H. OWENS, 06957, of Boise, Idaho, instructed the 3d Battalion to plan an attack to take Hill 397 (735465, Sheet 37/13) in conjunction with Company "C". The battalion's supporting antitank guns and tank destroyers were also to be prepared to meet an enemy armored attack from the east and northeast. The 1st Battalion was ordered to be prepared to extend its defenses south from the position of Company "A" by using Company "C". Also, a blocking force was to be placed on the ridge running from ENKENBERG to LEMBERG.

The 2d Battalion was requested by the 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry, to fire on any American tanks if they approached from the direction of MEISENTHAL as it was known that the Germans had a number of captured American tanks and were using them. Company "E" was engaged in a heavy fire fight at 0900 hours and Company "F" was sent to its assistance.

At 0951 hours the 1st Battalion reported Company "B" moving into the position occupied by Company "A". The 1st Battalion was instructed to keep in close contact with the 399th Infantry on its left (north) flank.

The Germans continued to try and find a weak spot along the front of the 2d and 3d Battalions. At 1054 hours an enemy force of approximately twenty men attempted to work around the flank of Company "I", but was stopped by mortar fire. Company "F" was still being attacked across its entire front. Company "G" continued to hold the ground around GOETZENBURG. The Germans had worked in between Companies "E" and "C" but after several fire fights were driven back. Over fifteen prisoners were taken and several Germans were killed in these encounters.

The Regimental Commander telephoned the Regimental S-3 at 1217 hours from the 2d Battalion. He stated that the situation within the battalion area was serious and Company "C" was to proceed down the LEMBERG road with the mission of stopping any enemy infiltration. The 3d Battalion was notified that the Germans had penetrated the position of Company "F" and both Companies "I" and "L" were to withdraw to the vicinity of LEMBERG inasmuch as Company "E" could not hold out much longer. Small enemy groups were in the woods east of ST LOUIS and the 2d Battalion was alerted to take care of this. Company "G" was still in position but had no one on its right (south) flank. Company "D" was to be attached to the 2d Battalion. At 1308 hours information was received from the 100th Division that a request had been sent to the Commanding Officer, 179th Infantry Regiment, for assistance in the Company "E" sector.

At 1334 hours the Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion Commander to hold Company "I" where it was instead of withdrawing to

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Lemberg as previously ordered. The situation in the Company "E" sector had cleared up somewhat although one platoon of the company was believed to be captured.

The Regimental Commander notified the Assistant Division Commander of the 100th Division at 1411 hours that command on the regimental right flank was completely muddled up. Elements of many units were in position, but there was absolutely no coordination among them. Authority had been given to the 2d Battalion Commander to take charge of the 2d Battalion sector. The Division Commander of the 100th Division called back at 1411 hours and said that it was satisfactory to take command of any troops in the 2d Battalion sector. The 393rd Infantry Regiment had been pushed back a little but this did not affect the position of Company "I".

Company "I" received a German attack on its right flank at 1440 hours. Machine gun and mortar fire were placed on the enemy and the attack was repelled with many enemy casualties.

The Regimental Commander notified the regimental S-3 from the 2d Battalion that an enemy armored column was reported moving toward Sarreinsberg and Götzenbruck. Both the 2d and 3d Battalions began receiving heavy concentrations of an estimated 17cm shell or rockets. The 2d Battalion moved Company "G" out of Sarreinsberg to the north to strengthen positions around Company "E". Elements of the 179th Infantry Regiment and the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron took over Sarreinsberg. Information secured from prisoners indicated that seven companies of Germans with supporting armor were attacking toward Sarreinsberg. As darkness closed in sporadic small arms fire continued. All units were particularly alert and maintained close contact with each other to prevent any infiltration.

The 2d Battalion Commander, Lt. Colonel JAMES H. COTCHFIELD, 022656, of Fargo, North Dakota, arrived regimental headquarters at 2105 hours that two battalions of Germans had been identified as being on the 2d Battalion front. The battalion commander stated that he would request a thirty minute concentration in the morning of artillery, mortar and tank destroyer fire and then attack with Company "G". It was believed that the Germans were reinforcing their position and extra heavy concentrations of harassing artillery fire were requested to be placed on known enemy occupied areas.

At 2210 hours Company "E" received a small attack and called for defensive artillery fires. By 2300 hours the attack was broken up and activity subsided except for intermittent harassing enemy artillery fire falling throughout the regimental area. However, Company "I" received a heavy concentration of enemy artillery at 2400 hours and lost its light machine guns. At the same time approximately 20 Germans...
attempted to break into its positions. This attack was repelled but a strong counter-attack was expected in the morning.

The 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry, reported at 0445 hours on 4 January, that it had secured information from prisoners which indicated an attack of which the objective was thought to be SARREINSBERG. Both the 171st Field Artillery and 100th Division Artillery units placed heavy concentrations on the ALTHORN area.

At 0520 hours Company "I" received a small counter-attack during which one of its men was captured. The enemy was driven back, however, by mortar and small arms fire.

The 2d Battalion Commander advised at 1040 hours that his sector was fairly quiet. He planned to attack at 1230 hours with Company "G" in the lead and supported by two M-7 self-propelled guns of Cannon Company.

The 3d Battalion units received mortar and rocket fire throughout the morning. Shortly after noon, mortar fire of all calibers began falling throughout the battalion area. The battalion commander was warned to alert his troops for a possible counter-attack.

The 2d Battalion attack began at 1250 hours with a platoon of Company "F" passing through Company "E" and the main effort being made by Company "G". The Company "F" platoon began receiving machine gun and small arms fire 150 yards beyond the position of Company "E". Company WEISSBERG 1000 yards southeast of LENZBERG, Company "E" was receiving tank and artillery fire.

At 1445 hours the regiment was detached from control of the 100th Division and reverted to control of the 36th Division. The regimental boundaries remained the same. No plans for an attack were being made by the 36th Division although consideration was being made for release of the regiment by the 142d Infantry.

At 1501 hours the 824th Tank Destroyer Battalion reported two American tanks, which were being operated by the enemy, knocked out by artillery fire.

The 2d Battalion reported at 1512 hours that both Companies "E" and "G" were receiving heavy concentrations of tank and mortar fire, although Company "G" was almost upon its objective. Company "F" had been held up by machine gun and small arms fire and had held its position. Germans were digging in 300 yards in front of the right platoon of Company...
"E" and artillery and mortar fire was placed on this area.

The 3d Battalion continued to be harassed by unusually heavy concentrations of enemy artillery, tank and self-propelled gun fire.

Company "G" was pressed very hard on its position and its left flank was forced back 150 yards. This left a 250 yard gap between Companies "F" and "G" although Company "G" continued to hold the ridge line. The Company "F" platoon on the left of Company "E" was ordered to close 150 yards of this gap while Company "G" closed the other 100 yards. Company "G" took over the former position of Company "F" before it made its attack. By 19:30 hours the 2d Battalion had established a line along the edge of the woods east of LEMBERG--COETZENBRUCK road and was in contact with the enemy all along its front. The battalion had suffered over forty (40) casualties during the attack.

The Division G-3 was informed at 21:30 hours that both Companies "F" and "G" were back in their original positions. The Germans had counter-attacked with an estimated three (3) companies and although the 2d Battalion had been forced back from its original gains, it had recovered the ground again. Plans for relief of the 2d Battalion by the 1st Battalion had been dropped.

The Division G-3 advised that the 1/2d Infantry would move into the towns held by the regiment during the night and following morning and would relieve elements of the regiment on the following night.

During the night of 4-5 January, all units maintained contact patrols. Small arms fire was heard in the vicinity of ST LOUIS but it was mostly American weapons. Intermittent enemy artillery fire harassed the forward elements and particularly units in LEMBERG.

At 06:30 hours on 5 January, Company "L" received a small counterattack made by Infantry which was easily repelled. The 2d Battalion was receiving small arms fire at 06:15 hours but no concentrated enemy attack occurred.

The 1st Battalion was informed at 12:20 hours that it would be relieved during the afternoon by a battalion of the 1/2d Infantry. The 1st Battalion was then to move by foot to the town of SOUCHET. Company "G" would be relieved from the 2d Battalion during the night and rejoin the 1st Battalion. Antitank Company was also ordered to move into SOUCHET and outpost the town.

The 2d Battalion advised at 17:35 hours that it was being relieved by the 3d Battalion, 1/2d Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 1/2d Infantry, had gone to ENGENBERG to relieve the regimental 1st Battalion. At
2035 hours the 1st Battalion relief was completed and at 2300 hours the 2d Battalion was relieved. The 3d Battalion's relief was completed by 2335 hours and at 0400 hours command of the sector was officially turned over to the 142d Infantry. The regimental command post moved to a wooded area one mile south of MONTBRONN.

The Assistant Division Commander visited the regimental command post on the morning of 6 January, and discussed the situation of moving one battalion into a town and moving the remainder of the regiment into tents in an area yet to be designated. The Regimental Commander suggested that it would be preferable to keep the troops in houses as much as possible due to the extremely cold weather.

At 1305 hours the Regimental Commander held a meeting with all the battalion commanders. He stated that the Division Commander desired the regiment to get some training and move to an area where there was no danger of shelling. He stated that he was going to try and retain the towns of ST LOUIS and SOUPT and the 3d Battalion would have to move into that area from EICHENBERG. All battalions were to reconnoiter areas which would be in the woods. Squad shelters with logs and boughs over the top were to be dug and laid out in an orderly fashion in company groups. Shelter was to be prepared within from five to six hours.

At 1508 hours the 3d Battalion was instructed to send a quartering party to VOLKESBERG (690388, Sheet 37/14) and to reconnoiter routes to the north as movement of the battalion to that town from EICHENBERG depended entirely upon the condition of the roads.

The 1st Battalion established motorized patrols in its area and maintained foot patrols with units in contact with the enemy.

The Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion at 1920 hours to move to VOLKESBERG the following morning infiltrating two trucks every twenty minutes. The 3d Battalion closed into its new area in VOLKESBERG at 1130 hours on 7 January.

Training programs were instituted for all units of the regiment covering both night and day problems for the period the regiment was in reserve.

The Regimental Commander held a meeting at 1900 hours on 9 January, with all battalion staff officers. He stated that the regiment was to organize a switch position which could be prepared and manned in the event the enemy broke through. This was to be a defensive area and fox holes, machine guns and all types of weapons were to be dug in. The general line would run from VOLKESBERG to RATZWILLER (637398, Sheet 37/14) to LORENZEN (590395, Sheet 36/14). All positions were to be camouflag-
ed and wired in. All approached were to be mined and obstacles placed on all trails and tank approaches. Defense was to be set up with two companies on the line and one in reserve. The 3d Battalion was to remain in VOLKSBERG while the 1st Battalion moved to RATZWILLER and the 2d Battalion would select a bivouac area in DIENERINGEN (59531, Sheet 35/14), LORENZEN or WALDHEMBACH (5620365, Sheet 37/14). Units having to move must be in their new areas by 1400 hours on 10 January. Another meeting of battalion commanders would be held in RATZWILLER at 1100 hours at which time the main line of resistance would be set up and final defensive plans made. All battalions were to start working on this project at 0500 hours on 11 January.

At 0120 hours on 10 January all units were alerted against all civilians near their installations. A wholesale plan of sabotage by persons dressed as refugees had been uncovered.

Antitank Company was instructed on the morning of 10 January to move to WEISSLINGEN (64.6355, Sheet 37/14) where the Service Company installations were set up.

At 1745 hours the Division G-3 suggested that the Reconnaissance Platoon of Company "B", 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion be used to patrol and protect the rear areas, running from VOLKSBERG to TIEFFENBACH (64.5310, Sheet 37/14) to FREMMER (66.7316, Sheet 37/14) to PUNERG (69.2345, Sheet 37/14) to VOLKSBERG. This plan was put into effect on 11 January.

The Division G-3 issued instructions at 0927 hours on 11 January to the effect that the regimental combat team would move from its present position to the vicinity of ST LOUIS and ENCHENBERG starting about 0800 hours on 14 January so that relief of the 143d Infantry on the line would be effected by 15 January. The 142d Infantry was to move from its present position on 14 January and occupy the present regimental positions.

The Commanding Officer, 142d Infantry, made a reconnaissance of the switch position and main line of resistance set up by the regiment on the afternoon of 11 January.

At 0940 hours on 12 January, the Regimental Commander held a meeting with all unit commanders of the combat team. He informed them that an attack was contemplated for the 36th Division to reduce the German salient. The attack would be made toward MOUTERHOUSE (79.5426, Sheet 37/13) in a column of battalions with the 3d Battalion leading followed by the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The 141st Infantry would be on the left (north) and the 142d Infantry on the right (south). If the regiment relieved the 143d Infantry and orders were not received to attack prior
to 13 January, the attack would be made by the 142d and 143d Infantry Regiments. The Division Commander had requested XV Corps for a twenty-four (24) hour notice on the attack and if possible the regiment would be given this much notice. If word was received to attack, the regiment would go into an assembly area in the vicinity of ENCHENBERG and attack from that position. The possibility of relieving the 143d Infantry was held likely, however, and all units were to reconnoiter positions of that regiment. The regiment would take over corresponding positions of the 143d Infantry with the 1st Battalion on the right (south), the 3d Battalion on the left (north) and the 2d Battalion in reserve. The battalions were to make plans so they could carry out orders to attack if such an order was received.

The Division G-3 advised at 1443 hours that XV Corps had ordered all mines laying suspended in the Division sector until receipt of further orders. Mine fields could be dug in, but the mines must be left out of holes.

On the morning of 13 January the battalions moved forward in preparation to relieving the 143d Infantry. All areas had been cleared by 1554 hours. The regimental command post moved into MONTEBONN.

Division G-3 advised at 2115 hours that the 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry, would attack at 0900 hours on 14 January and the regimental right flank would be left open. The 1st Battalion was to be prepared for this.

Relief of the 143d Infantry was completed by the regimental units at 2130 hours.

At 0947 hours on 14 January, the Division G-3 stated that the regiment should keep contact with the 179th Infantry on the right (south) as long as possible but if they pulled out, only patrols would maintain the contact. The regiment would then be responsible for its own right flank.

The 1st and 3d Battalions were informed at 1310 hours that two platoon size raids into enemy territory were to be made—one by night and the other by day—to secure information and capture prisoners. Before any raids were made regiment was to be advised, but the battalions were to make plans for them.

Allied planes were active during the afternoon, strafing and bombing the area around MOUTERHOUSE. Company "K" received mortar fire. Enemy tanks were also heard 1000 yards east of LEMBERG. Artillery fire was placed on the enemy areas from which the mortar fire was being received.
During the early part of the night or 14–15 January, all units reported hearing tracked enemy vehicles moving on a line parallel to the front and about 1500 yards distant. The Germans began using air-burst artillery in the 2d Battalion area. Patrons reported the enemy digging in all along the front. Several skirmishes occurred and small fire fights resulted. Company "K" reported at 0325 hours that there was at least a 1100 yard gap between the 3d Battalion and the next unit of the 399th Infantry Regiment. It required one and one-half (1-1/2) hours for a patrol to make a round trip at night. The 399th Infantry reported that the gap was not this large and patrols from each unit could cover the area on alternate hours.

Division G-3 informed regiment at 1045 hours that two flights of medium bombers would be cut—one at 1300 hours and the other at 1400 hours to bomb BITCHE and CAMP DE BITCHE. Air panels were placed by the battalions before 1245 hours to mark the front line for friendly aircraft. However, due to weather conditions the bomber flight did not take place and the air panels were taken in by 1400 hours.

The Division G-3 advised the Regimental S-3 at 1410 hours that the regiment would be relieved on the night of 18–19 January by either the 142d or 143d Infantry Regiments.

All units patrolled their areas almost constantly. Company "L" took one prisoner and Company "F" captured two on the evening of 15 January. All prisoners stated that their moral was poor and they had suffered many casualties from artillery fire.

On the morning of 16 January, the battalions were ordered to emplace aircraft recognition panels between 1430 and 1500 hours for a proposed allied bombing north of their sectors. Plans were completed by the 1s and 3d Battalions to make their raids into enemy territory on the morning of 17 January at dawn.

At 1130 hours on 16 January, Company "K" received between 20–30 rounds of 105mm artillery fire on its position from the east.

The Division G-3 cautioned the Regimental S-3 that when the raids were made the following morning, the raiding parties should try to determine whether any enemy fire they received was of a defensive nature or not. This information would be valuable if an attack plan went into effect.

The 2d Battalion was instructed at 1319 hours to prepare a regimental reserve line down to and including the ST LOUIS valley. Engineers would be available to assist in the work of digging emplacements. Plans were to be formulated for the amount of wire, mine fields,
number of sandbags and dug in emplacements required.

The two raiding parties were formed and oriented on their mission. The first party from the 3rd Battalion, composed of one officer and twenty (20) enlisted men was to raid houses along the edge of the BOIS DE OBERBILDUNGER east of LEMBERG, taking prisoners and determining enemy dispositions and strengths in that vicinity. The party was to leave at 0300 hours and return prior to 0700 hours. Artillery fire on pre-registered targets were available on call. If communications were severed, a red star cluster flares would be the signal for artillery and a white star cluster flares to stop it. The second raiding party from the 1st Battalion, composed of one officer and thirty-two (32) enlisted men had the mission of moving through an area 500 yards wide and 1000 yards long in the BOIS DE TANNENKOPF 600 yards due east of SARREINSBERG, destroying all enemy equipment and personnel. Prisoners were to be taken if practicable. This raiding party was to start at 0630 hours preceded by artillery, mortar and tank destroyer concentrations to cover the forward movement of the patrol. From 0640 hours to 0730 hours, artillery, tank destroyer and 4.2 mortar fire was to be placed on the area north and east of the raiding sector.

Company "L" patrols took two more prisoners shortly after darkness by following a path to a dugout and covering the entrance and then calling upon the Germans to surrender. Company "K" also captured two (2) prisoners. These prisoners all report morale in their units as being low, declaring they did not fire upon our patrols because the war would soon be over anyway. They stated they only fired at night for self preservation. Rumors of relief were present but no units had arrived to substantiate them.

Three Germans attempted to cross over the railroad between the position of Company "L" and Antitank Company about 2140 hours but were driven back by a few mortar rounds. The 2nd Battalion reported many enemy flares -- red, yellow and white-- and increased German artillery. The Division G-2 stated that a prisoner taken in this 44th Division sector stated there was supposed to be an attack during the night. All battalions were notified to be especially alert.

The Division Commander informed the Regimental Commander at 2320 hours that the 1/79th Infantry on the regiment's right (south) flank was pulled out and would leave this flank open. It would be a regimental task to take care of this flank. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was to be attached to the regiment to take care of the gap. The 1st Battalion was advised that the reconnaissance troop would be under its command.

The 3rd Battalion raiding party moved out on schedule at 0300 hours...
on 17 January. However, it accomplished nothing as it spotted three Germans going to an outpost. The patrol lay in ambush for one hour waiting for an enemy relief party to come up, but which did not materialize. By then it was so late that the platoon leader had to bring the patrol back, arriving at the battalion at 0640 hours. The Regimental Commander ordered a patrol to be sent out in daylight with a limited objective close to the front line.

The 1st Battalion raiding party ran into an enemy mine field and the patrol leader was seriously wounded. This was believed to be a new mine field as no one had received reports on it. The objective of the raiding party was not accomplished.

The Division Commander notified the Regimental S-3 at 0912 hours that on the shift to the right (south) to take over the 179th Infantry sector, the 36th Reconnaissance Troop would be used temporarily. All three battalions were to be committed. However, each battalion was to have but two companies on the line with one in reserve, making six companies on the main line of resistance and three companies in reserve. The 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, would be attached to the regiment as a reserve but would not be committed without the Commanding General's authority. The Regimental Commander had contacted the 179th Infantry and stated that the relief would be effected during the evening. The Commanding Officer, 36th Reconnaissance Troop, was sent to contact the Commanding Officer, 179th Infantry, to make final plans. The 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, which was attached to the regiment, was ordered to occupy the outposts of the 2d Battalion as soon as that unit moved to relieve elements of the 179th Infantry.

At 1310 hours the 2d Battalion Commander advised that he was moving Company "G" and one platoon of heavy machine guns of Company "H" to ALPHORN. As many units of the 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry, as possible were to be relieved by the regimental 2d battalion during the afternoon with all remaining elements being relieved during the night.

The 3d Battalion reported at 1517 hours that it was receiving one round of enemy artillery fire in LEMBERG per minute. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop also reported receiving 150mm artillery fire in MIESENTHAL.

A patrol from Company "G" was engaged by the enemy at 1545 hours. Two Germans were killed and the patrol suffered one casualty, but it was able to withdraw under the fire of machine guns of Antitank Company.

The 3d Battalion Commander was informed that he could stage his raiding party during the night if it was practicable, and he planned to send his patrol on the same mission as the previous one at 2400 hours.
The 2d Battalion advised at 1848 hours that its relief of the 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry, was completed. Contact had been made with the 3d Battalion, 179th Infantry, on the right (east) flank.

A Company "B" patrol became engaged in a fire fight from 2000 to 2015 hours in the woods northeast of GOETZENBRUCK. Three trip flares were set off between the positions of Companies "A" and "B" and an ambush was prepared for any enemy who might attempt to come through that area. Patrolling was continued throughout the night by both the 1st and 3d Battalions. The enemy also endeavored to penetrate battalion positions on several occasions but were dispersed by mortar fire. The 3d Battalion raiding party moved out on schedule but was fired upon by machine pistols after proceeding a short distance. The patrol believed its failure was due to tracks in the snow left from the previous raiding party and the Germans were attempting to ambush the latter patrol.

At 2310 hours the Division G-3 ordered a liaison officer sent to the 100th Division immediately. When this officer arrived at the 100th Division, the 111th Regimental Combat Team would be attached to the 100th Division. The 131st Field Artillery Battalion; Company "C", 753d Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company "B", 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company "A", 111th Medical Battalion, and Company "A", 111th Engineer Battalion, were attached to the regiment.

On the morning of 16 January, Company "A" reported Germans eating food 500 yards in front of the 1st Platoon's position at 0750 hours. A 81mm mortar concentration was placed on the area with good results. A great deal of crying and shouting could be heard after the concentration.

The Assistant Division Commander notified the Regimental Commander at 0942 hours that the Division Commander believed it absolutely essential that front line units be rotated with reserve units. The battalion of the 143d Infantry attached to the regiment was being taken away and the regiment would have to shift its units where they were needed unless the 100th would furnish the regiment with a reserve force.

At 1100 hours the Regimental Commander held a meeting with all unit commanders of the combat team. He informed them that the 36th Division had been ordered to move to the HAGENAU sector and the 141st Infantry Regiment would be left in its present area. Security was to be maintained about all troop movements. Front line units were to be rotated as often as possible. Wire, flares and anything else that would hinder the enemy was to be put up, especially when its placement would relieve a squad or more that could be placed in reserve. The type of weather favored armored attacks and bazooka teams were to be organized and every man was to be instructed on how to fire the weapon. Patrolling
muster be very active within the sector and each patrol must be given de-
finite information and accomplish its mission or be sent out again. In
a static position the Germans would be able to locate defensive posi-
tions by patrolling. Consequently the positions of weapons were to be
moved frequently. Civilian curfews and restrictions were to be placed
into effect and strictly enforced. The Regimental Commander closed the
meeting with the warning that the Germans could make a strong effort in
the sector and there was not a great deal to stop them unless every
means of security and protection were taken advantage of.

Company "A", 753d Tank Battalion moved into ENCHENBERG. A platoon
of the Reconnaissance Company, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, was also
ordered into ENCHENBERG and instructed to patrol the area every two
hours day and night.

The 2d Battalion reported at 1800 hours that between 1500-1600
hours it had received 50-60 rounds of enemy artillery fire which knock-
ed out one antitank gun, two jeeps, killed one man and wounded another.
One round of artillery fire was falling on the battalion sector approxi-
mately every two to three minutes.

At 1850 hours and enemy patrol of between six to eight Germans at-
ttempted to work its way in along the left flank of Company "B", firing
rifles and throwing grenades. The company drove them off with machine
gun and small arms fire. The right flank of Company "B" received small
arms and mortar fire. This same action was repeated at 2110 and 2235
hours by German patrols. No casualties were suffered by Company "B"
in these altercations.

ENCHENBERG began receiving enemy artillery fire of a large caliber at
0200 hours on 19 January, which fell intermittently throughout the
night on the 3d Battalion headquarters.

Company "L" received an enemy mortar concentration at 0500 hours.
The company engaged a four man German patrol and killed one man.

A 3d Battalion patrol ran into four or five Germans in foxholes
during the afternoon of 19 January. The patrol leader called upon the
Germans to surrender, but they threw hand grenades and the patrol lead-
er was wounded. German mortars also fired on the patrol and it was
forced to withdraw under somewhat ineffective supporting fire of Com-
pany "L". Efforts were made to secure the patrol leader who could not
be evacuated during the patrol's withdrawal but no trace of him was
found upon returning to the area.

An artillery observation planes, whose markings were foreign within
the sector, was observed flying over the 3d Battalion area at 1645

-19-
hours for the second consecutive day. Since a great deal of artillery fire had followed the appearance of this plan on the preceding day, the 3d Battalion advised that it was going to shoot at it.

During the night of 19-20 January, all battalions maintained active patrols which brought back valuable information on enemy positions. Intermittent enemy artillery fire fell throughout the night with a heavy concentration falling on one platoon of Company "F" at 0620 hours, 20 January. Company "G" relieved Company "A" and Company "I" relieved Company "K" on the front line during the night.

Counter-Intelligence reports from the 100th Division indicated that enemy agents were being sent through the front lines of the division area especially between 0300 and 0600 hours. All companies were alerted to this fact.

Patrolling continued throughout 20 January, with no notable events. Permission was received from the 100th Division to lay two (2) mine fields in the 1st and 2d Battalion sectors and attached Engineers put them in. Sporadic artillery fire fell within the regimental area and Nebelwerfer fire was received around Goetzenbruck. A heavy snowfall complicated all vehicle movement and Engineers were called upon to work on the Enchenberg--Lemmerg road. Four prisoners were taken by Company "F". A heavy artillery concentration fell along the 1st Battalion front causing casualties in Company "B".

At 0937 hours on 21 January, the Regimental Commander suggested to the Regimental Commander of the 398th Infantry Regiment that he have his battalion and company commanders contact the regimental battalions to be prepared for a relief in the event it was ordered. Overlays of all front line and regimental reserve line positions were furnished to the 398th Infantry.

At 1200 hours the Commanding Generals of the 101st Airborne Division and the 100th Division and the Assistant Division Commander of the 101st Airborne Division visited the regimental command post and discussed the situation within the regimental sector.

The G-3 of the 100th Division advised at 1505 hours that the regiment should be prepared to complete a relief by the 398th Infantry Regiment by 2300 hours on 22 January.

The 2d Battalion receiving intermittent shelling between 1615 and 1645 hours which included air bursts. Three mortar shells, landing near the battalion switchboard, knocked out seven wire lines.

A Company "K" patrol ran into a shu-mine field northeast of -20-

SECRET

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
By NARA, Date 10/24/72.
LEMBERG in the BOIS DE KOLLERT. Evading the mine field, the patrol proceeded up a trail and waited in the woods to ambush enemy personnel. After an hour and one half (1-1/2) the patrol returned without making enemy contact. Company "F" captured one German who had been sentenced to hard labor with enemy Engineers. The prisoner was part of a detail of German prisoners detailed to lay barbed wire in forward areas. The regimental area continued to be harassed by enemy artillery throughout the night and early hours of the morning.

The 3-3 of the 100th Division informed regiment at 1111 hours on 22 January that a message had just been received from VI Corps which changed the destination of the regiment. The route and time of movement was the same but the assembly point was to be in the vicinity of STEINBOURG (763190, Sheet 37/15). The regimental S-3 called for a quartering party to meet him in DETTWILLER (800170, Sheet 37/15).

The 1st Battalion advised at 1153 hours that a battalion of the 398th Infantry had gone into an assembly area in its rear and would begin effecting a relief at 1300 hours.

The 100th Division C-3 called again at 1237 hours to state that operation instructions had been received from XV Corps which stated that the 141st Infantry would be on the road moving at 0001 hours 23 January. The 100th Division stated that it would try to complete relief of the regimental units by 2200 hours.

A report of German armor in the BITCHE area was received and the 100th Division inquired at 1634 hours if the regimental supporting tank destroyers were still in position. The division was informed that the regimental tank destroyers would remain in position until relieved by another unit.

The regimental S-1 checked with the C-3 of VI Corps who stated that the original time of the regiment crossing its initial point for departure would be at 0630 hours on 23 January. This information was telephoned to the Regimental S-3 who, in turn, checked with the 100th Division. The Division Traffic Officer stated that 7th Army had issued instructions for the regiment to clear BALSBOURG (650198, Sheet 37/15) by 1030 hours on 23 January as another large unit would be on the road following that time. Arrangements for the movement continued on the former schedule of movement at O001 hours. All attachments of the regiment, except the 131st Field Artillery Battalion, were to move into an assembly area just north of SAVERNE. The 131st Field Artillery Battalion was to rejoin the 36th Division while the remainder of the regimental combat team was attached to VI Corps.

The 398th Infantry Regiment officially relieved the regiment at
SECRET

2045 hours. The regimental command post closed at MONTBRONN at 2330 hours and opened at 0310 hours on 23 January in MONSELLER (755174, Sheet 37/15). The G-3 of VI Corps was notified at 0755 hours that the regimental combat team had closed into its new area. Antitank and Cannon Companies were located in MONSWILLER, Service Company in SORNHOFF (741170, Sheet 37/15), the 1st Battalion in ERNOISHEIM (755173, Sheet 37/14) the 2d Battalion in STEINBOURG and the 3d Battalion in ECKARTSWILLER (721187, Sheet 37/15).

Company "A", 111th Engineers, notified regiment at 1558 hours that it was detached from the regiment and was rejoining the 36th Division in the vicinity of BRUMATH (961145, Sheet 38/15).

The Regimental Commander notified the three battalion commanders at 1647 hours that he had visited the two divisions to which the regiment might be attached and committed. These divisions reported no immediate need for the regiment within the next twenty-four (24) hours. The Regimental Commander ordered that the companies be located so that they could be quickly assembled in the event the regiment was needed. Heavy weapons were to be kept loaded.

On 2d January, the Regimental Commander, accompanied by the battalion commanders, made a reconnaissance of routes in the 36th and 79th Infantry Division and 3d French Infantry Division sectors--units to which the regiment might be attached depending on tactical necessity.

Training programs were inaugurated and carried out for the period 25-28 January, although the regiment remained on a two-hour alert status as VI Corps reserve.

At 1728 hours on 28 January, the 36th Division G-3 notified regiment to send a quartering party to BRUMATH,DONNERHEIM (933132, Sheet 38/15) and BILWISHEIM (943123, Sheet 38/15) as there was a possibility that the regiment would be released from VI Corps reserve and return to the control of the 36th Division. A reconnaissance party with an antitank representative was to be sent to a 142d Infantry command post on 29 January. The 2d Battalion was alerted to make the contact with the 142d Infantry.

The 2d Battalion, Antitank Company and Company "A", 753d Tank Battalion, left the regimental area at 1300 hours on 29 January, and moved to WEITBRUCH (030172, Sheet 38/15) where it was attached to the 143d Infantry. Cannon Company moved to the vicinity of MITTELSCHUEFFELHEIM (938112, Sheet 38/15) and was placed under control of the 131st Field Artillery. Company "A", 753d Tank Battalion, was detached from the regiment at 1313 hours and reverted to control of the 753d Tank Battalion.

-22-

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DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

NARA, Date 1/10/92
The regimental command post closed at MONSWILLER at 0730 hours on 30 January and moved to WINGERSHEIM (926136, Sheet 38/15) at 0930 hours. The command post remained but three hours in WINGERSHEIM and displaced forward to GRIES (057170, Sheet 38/15) at 1420 hours.

The Division Commander informed the Regimental Commander at 1655 hours that the 142d Infantry had sent a patrol to the MODER River and had encountered no enemy. He ordered a patrol sent into HERRLISHEIM (126145, Sheet 38/14). The 2d Battalion was notified to send this patrol out.

As of 1800 hours the 2d Battalion and Antitank Company reverted to regimental control and the 141st Infantry took over the command of the sector south of BISCHWILLER (090185, Sheet 38/15). Company "A", 733d Tank Battalion was also returned to regimental control.

The Division G-3 inquired at 2200 hours how much of the 2d Battalion was committed as the regiment might have to occupy the BOEF DE LANGENAU (093143, Sheet 38/15) which was being patrolled. At that time, Division stated that this area could be used by tanks and tank destroyers from which to fire provided the streams to the west of it were not obstacles. The 2d Battalion advised that it was necessary to cross two streams to reach the woods. The first stream had a bridge that would support tanks but the second stream was a tank obstacle. The woods were full of S-mines and there was no means of supplying troops in that vicinity. At 2250 hours the Division Commander ordered the woods occupied by a platoon with telephonic communication. The Regimental G-3 stated that artillery was being placed on the woods at the present time, but it was planned to send patrols into them. Division stated that a platoon from Company "A", 111th Engineers, would report to the regiment to go with the Infantry platoon that outmosted the woods provided the woods were found to be unoccupied. In the meantime the regiment was to send patrols to the vicinity of HERRLISHEIM and GAMBSHEIM (110104, Sheet 38/15).

The 2d Battalion advised at 2345 hours that it had sent a patrol to the LANGENAU woods. From a house 200 yards north of the woods a white flare had been shot over the patrol. A few minutes later a white flare followed by two amber flares shot up from the house toward the stream. Two machine guns opened up from the north edge of the woods. The 2d Battalion commander stated that he did not believe one platoon could hold the woods. The men had to wade a stream one and one-half (1-1/2) feet deep as there were no bridges and the Germans could pick them off from two directions. At 0035 hours on 31 January the 2d Battalion informed the Regimental G-3 that a Company "T" patrol had penetrated to a point 200 yards north of the woods. A white parachute flare was sent up and machine guns fired from the south edge of the woods. By 0200 hours...
it was estimated that machine guns were situated 200 yards apart throughout the woods. The Regimental S-3 notified the Division G-3 at 0245 hours that a platoon would not be sent to the woods that night as the sector was held by the enemy.

At 0850 hours on 31 January, the Division G-3 inquired as to what plans were being made to occupy the LANGENAU woods. He was advised that patrols would be sent there during the day as it was believed the Germans occupied the woods during the night. Division stated the troops should be infiltrated into the woods and if the Germans attempted to return to the woods after dark, they could be driven back. It was contemplated that one battalion of the regiment would take over the sector held by the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron and a reconnaissance party was to contact this unit during the day. After this change was made, one troop of the squadron would be attached to the regiment in addition to two companies of tank destroyers, 11 tanks and 4.2 mortars except one platoon.

The 2d Battalion was ordered to infiltrate a company into the LANGENAU woods during daylight if at all possible. The 2d Battalion Commander requested that friendly mines laid in the area be picked up.

The 117th Reconnaissance Squadron reported at 1010 hours that it was sending a patrol along the east-west road between GAMESHEIM and WEYERSHEIM and thence to OFFENDORF (132125, Sheet 36/15). The French were in GAMESHEIM and had found the town heavily mined and booby-trapped. Another patrol was being sent to reconnoiter the BOTZ DR STAINWALD north of GAMESHEIM.

The 2d Battalion was ordered at 1150 hours to send a combat patrol to the vicinity of HERRLISHHEIM during the night with the mission of capturing prisoners.

The 2d Battalion took seven SS Troup prisoners from the south edge of the LANGENAU woods but were engaged in a heavy fire fight. The Division Commander ordered at 1438 hours that the LANGENAU woods be occupied if it was necessary to fight for it. A second patrol returned from the woods at 1442 hours and reported that the north edge of the woods was found to be unoccupied. The 2d Battalion immediately sent a platoon of Company "E". Arrangements were made for Engineers to install a bridge so that tanks could be moved into the woods. The 2d Battalion advised that it was sending three tank destroyers and its light tanks forward and believed they could be moved into the woods. However, if they were to proceed any further, it would be necessary to erect a bridge. Physical contact had been established with the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron to the southeast.
The 1st Battalion moved up to DRIES while the 3d Battalion was ordered to move into KURTZENHAUSEN (052157, Sheet 38/15) on 1 February 1945.

The Division Commander called at 1730 hours to state it was believed the Germans were pulling back. Consequently the patrol into HERRLISHEIM was not to leave until after 2400 hours, and was to be assigned the mission of seeing whether or not the enemy was pulling back.

Information taken from the seven prisoners captured during the afternoon indicated that a composite of two battalions was in HERRLISHEIM. Positions of nine machine guns and eight 81mm mortars were secured as well as information regarding tanks and antitank weapons. The Germans also had prepared positions all along the ZORN River Canal into HERRLISHEIM.

Company "E" moved into the LANGENAU woods in its entirety by 1645 hours and telephone communication was established. At 2300 hours Company "E" reported small arms fire into its right front from 500 yards away. Antitank Company also reported that one of its patrols had received small arms fire just short of its objective. Intermittent enemy artillery fire fell on forward battalion positions during the night.

During the month the regiment was committed almost exclusively to static defensive warfare. On the first of the month the regiment was hastily brought up to the 100th Infantry Division sector and immediately placed in the line southwest of BITCHE to assist in breaking the strong German attacks made in the BITCHE salient. The Commanding General of the 100th Division stated in commanding the regimental combat team for its work during the time it was attached to the division, that the Germans surely would have taken the ground if it had not been for the quick, aggressive action of the regimental combat team in moving into the area at a critical time and stopping the German attacks in the immediate vicinity. After the enemy attacks in the BITCHE area waned, the regiment was mainly occupied with straightening the front lines and conducting almost continuous patrols. When the 36th Division moved to the BITCHE area, the regiment was returned to its control on 4 January. The regiment was again attached to the 100th Division on 17 January, when the 36th Division moved to the LANGENAU sector. Upon being relieved from the 100th Division's control on 22 January, the regiment moved north of Saverne under VI Corps control and did not rejoin the 36th Division until 29 January, when it was committed in a defensive area southeast of BISCHWILLER. The great percentage of casualties during the month occurred within the first five days. As is usual in static positions, few prisoners were taken.
German prisoners of war taken by the regiment during the month of January 1945, are listed by days as follows:

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TOTAL... 38

Fourteen (14) officer and 409 enlisted men reinforcements were received during the month of January. Of the enlisted reinforcements sixty per cent (60%) were riflemen, twenty-six per cent (26%) machine gunners and eleven per cent (11%) antitank gunners. The remainder was divided among clerk typists, mechanics, cooks, basics and radio operators. Of the officer reinforcements six (6) were commissioned from enlisted men of the regiment and one was a former warrant officer of the regiment. One Major, previously attached, was assigned.

Reinforcements continue to be received without shoe pace which are so necessary to prevent trench feet during the winter. Their training is adequate for the most part. Some of the reinforcements are reconverted personnel from other branches of the service. These men have served in a creditable manner in combat.

Reinforcements were retained with the regimental Service Company for a minimum of forty-eight (48) hours to receive orientation lectures and to completely equip them for front line duty. Reinforcements joined their companies whenever they were placed in reserve positions in order that the men might become acquainted and know their officers and enlisted non-commissioned officers.

Morale of the troops improved considerably during the month principally due to the length of time the regiment was able to spend in reserve positions which permitted opportunities to train small units effectively. This type of training had been impracticable heretofore due to the tactical commitments of the regiment. The training...
gave the men confidence in themselves, their leaders and their unit to fight as a cohesive, effectual and combatant force. However, the period of training was very brief and a great deal more time was required to bring the men to the desired state of combat proficiency.

END OF NARRATIVE

Report of Operations written by:

Sgt. Robert D. Dieterle
M/Sgt ROBERT D. DIETERLE, 16062508
Service Company, 141st Infantry
Regimental Sergeant Major
OPERATIONS IN FRANCE

FEBRUARY 1945

141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

The opening of the month of February found the regiment in a defensive sector south and southwest of Bischwiller, 059185, Sheet 38/19. The terrain in this sector was flat and open, criss-crossed by numerous streams and canals, and with a poor road network. The weather had turned unseasonably warm and the heavy snowfalls of January were rapidly melting and flooding large tracts of the flat ground and turning the streams into swift-flowing, icy torrents. foxholes filled with water almost as rapidly as they were dug. The clothing of the troops were soaked with mud and soaked, making living conditions on the front line miserable.

The 2d Battalion was the only battalion committed on the first of the month. The 1st and 3d Battalions were in reserve in the vicinity of Gris (058172, Sheet 38/15) and Wingersheim (925137, Sheet 38/15). Operations instructions issued on 31 January covered disposition of regimental units in support of a Division attack on Oberhoffen (099200, Sheet 38/15) and Drugenheim (159183, Sheet 39/15). The regiment was to continue to occupy and defend a line south from Bischwiller to a wooded area (080153, Sheet 38/15) 2000 yards southwest of Bischwiller to the stream line (076147, Sheet 38/15) 300 yards south of the woods. The Langenau woods (093143, Sheet 38/15) which had been occupied by Company "E" on 31 January, was to be secured. Contact was to be maintained with the 14th Armored Division on the north left flank, and with the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on the right right flank. Upon capture of Ornhwiler (124175, Sheet 38/15) by the 143d Infantry, the 1st Battalion was to occupy a line extending from the town to the woods southwest of Bischwiller, taking over the Langenau woods and relieving the 2d Battalion positions in that area; and finally seizing and holding a strong point on the flat ground approximately 1200 yards northwest of Herrlisheim (125145, Sheet 38/15).

During the night of 31 January-1 February, most of the enemy activity centered around the Oberhoffen area where the 142d Infantry, was engaged. A four man patrol from Company "E" left the Langenau woods and moved northeast along the bank of the Zorn River to the edge of Herrlisheim. Enemy contact was not made west of the canal but German tanks and trucks could be heard moving within the town itself.

At 0945 hours on 1 February, the Division G-3 reported six (6) bridge sites along the Zorn River canal and requested that they be checked for mines and condition of the crossing sites. The 2d Battalion was instructed to send patrols to these crossing sites and report their condition.
A meeting was held at the regimental command post at 1115 hours with the battalion commanders and the regimental staff. The Regimental Commander, Colonel CHARLES H. OWENS, 06957, of Boise, Idaho, advised that the 1st Battalion would relieve the 2d Battalion with one company of the 1st Battalion taking over the position of Company "B". The 2d Battalion was to relieve the 3d Battalion in the vicinity of ORLIE and was to be held in reserve awaiting commitment by division order. The exact mission of the 3d Battalion was not known--its commitment being based upon the report of patrols to be sent out during the afternoon. If no enemy was found to the regimental front, a roadway bridge was to be established across the ZORN River as quickly as possible. The regiment was planning to attack HERRLISHEIM from the southwest while the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron screened the regimental right flank. The 3d Battalion was to make a reconnaissance of the area and formulate a plan of attack against HERRLISHEIM. The Regimental S-3, Maj. HERBERT E. BURT, G04186, of San Antonio, Texas, outlined the plan of the 143d Infantry which was to attack at 0000 hours to take ROHRWILLER. The Regimental S-2, Maj. ROSEVELL K. DOUGHTY, G080728 of LoRoy, New York, informed the staff that the enemy's main line was along the MODER River and the area to be attacked by the regiment was probably heavily mined and booby-trapped.

A request was made to Division for additional tanks and engineers. The Division G-3 advised that an additional platoon of tanks would be furnished. Corps Engineers would be made available to put in the roadway bridge which it was estimated would take a minimum of ten (10) hours. Company "A", 116th Engineers, were to put in two foot bridges and sweep and clear the roads of mines.

A German patrol engaged a Company "E" patrol in a fire fight during the afternoon of 1 February, 1500 yards west of HERRLISHEIM. Another patrol that attempted to cross the canal north of the STAINWALD woods also encountered enemy fire from the opposite bank.

A reconnaissance was made of the canal in front of the 2d Battalion by personnel of Company "A", 116th Engineers, who reported they had encountered no mines. A six foot pole did not touch the bottom of the canal and the current was very swift. The Engineers suggested running a rope across the canal to use as a guide for rubber boats. They also stated that it would require a 100 foot bridge to span the canal.

The Regimental Commander ordered rubber boats and a guide rope sent to the 2d Battalion. He also instructed the battalion to establish two strong points of approximately forty (40) men each along the banks of the canal. The 2d Battalion commander was cautioned not to withdraw his force too quickly during the 1st Battalion relief and thus weaken the sector prematurely.

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDHR 12356, Section 3.3. NARA 250/7

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

By NARA, Date 1/04/72
At 1720 hours the Regimental Commander notified the Regimental S-3 that the operation for the night had been called off, but the relief of the 2d Battalion by the 1st Battalion would take place, with the 1st Battalion occupying the points previously specified.

The Division G-3 was notified at 1827 hours that a strong point of 28 men had been established along the canal 800 yards south of the LANGEBAU woody division was advised that an attempt would be made to establish a bridgehead on the south bank of the canal. The 3d Battalion had moved into KURZHAUSEN (052156, Sheet 38/15). Engineers were moving along the road paralleling the canal from WEYERSHEIM (0513, Sheet 38/15) toward HERRLISHEIM clearing as much as possible of it of mines.

The rubber boats did not reach the 2d Battalion until 2110 hours and were taken forward to the Company "E" strong point south of the LANGEBAU woods along the canal. It was then too late for the 2d Battalion to cross the canal inspite of the 1st Battalion was effecting its relief which was completed at 2300 hours.

Engineers arrived on the 1st Battalion position at 0100 hours on 2 February with bridging equipment and were taken to a position (101134, Sheet 38/15) approximately 1000 yards southeast of the LANGEBAU woods where a foot bridge was put in by 0445 hours. A platoon of Company "E" moved to the east side of the canal at 0300 hours prior to the foot bridge being erected.

At 0850 hours the Division G-3 called to inquire whether the main bridge to span the canal could not be put in at a position (098129, Sheet 38/15) 800 yards south of the LANGEBAU woods as the original position selected was very muddy and it was not believed that the ground would support heavy vehicles. Permission was granted to erect the bridge at the newly selected site. At 1055 hours the Division G-3 stated that the route from WEYERSHEIM to KILSTEIN (090008, Sheet 38/15) to CAMERON (110105, Sheet 38/15) would be worked upon by engineers who would then proceed north to the bridge site. Division suggested that consideration be given to bringing armor across both roads. At 1150 hours the Division G-3 advised that an attack by all regiments of the Division would start at 1900 hours. The regiments mission was to take HERRLISHEIM by daylight with the attacking force assembling in the STAINWALD woods. Division stated, also, that guns of the 443d Anti-aircraft Battalion would be placed in the STAINWALD woods to help cover OFFENDORF (132125, Sheet 38/15).

The Regimental Commander held a meeting with the 1st and 3d Battalion and supporting unit commanders at 1500 hours to discuss the
attack against HERRLISHEIM. The commander of Company "A", 753d Tank Battalion, stated that everything was covered by fire except OFFENDORF, and the road running south from that town. The Regimental Commander stated that a platoon of tank destroyers from Company "B", 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, would be moved into the STAHLWALD woods to cover OFFENDORF. The Engineers were advised that rubber boats were to be moved to HERRLISHEIM and a footbridge erected within the town across the canal as soon as environmental conditions permitted. Artillery was to be prearranged by the 3d Battalion with the 131st Field Artillery Battalion. The 1st Battalion was ordered to send a combat patrol northeast along the ZORN Canal.

The Regimental S-3 requested smoke generators for the attack and Division advised that the generators would be available to screen OFFENDORF.

Company "A", 11th Engineers, informed the Regimental S-3 that by 1524 hours that the water in the canal was rising, having risen three feet in three hours. However, the area to the canal was still passable.

The Division Commander visited the regimental command post at 1630 hours and issued orders that if the 3d Battalion encountered enemy fire while attacking HERRLISHEIM, the troops were not to retreat but were to run for safety of the buildings as this was the safest way and only the way of success. The Regimental S-3 informed the Division Commander that supporting armor was moving forward at daylight. HERRLISHEIM was not going to be harassed with artillery during the night. Instead, OFFENDORF was to be harassed in an effort to make the Germans believe that was to be the object of an attack. The Division Commander stated that the 2d Battalion was not to be used on OFFENDORF. The General stated that he believed 200 Germans were in HERRLISHEIM.

At 1645 hours the Regimental S-3 coordinated movements for the attack with the 143d Infantry. The Regimental S-3 advised that the 1st Battalion was to reach its objective line by 2200 hours while the 143d Infantry requested the move be made at 2300 hours in order to keep contact with its elements.

The 1st Battalion commander, Major RICHARD G. CICCIARELLA, 03890177, of Brooklyn, New York, informed regiment at 1745 hours that his original objective was going to be more difficult to take than was originally contemplated. Reconnaissance had shown a platoon of Germans dug-in on a northeast line near the battalion objective. The 1st Battalion combat patrol which had moved northeast along the south bank of the ZORN Canal reported that it had not encountered enemy opposition, having penetrated as far as the southern outskirts of the town.
The weather continued unseasonably warm, melting the snow and flooding wide tracts of the flat land. The 3d Battalion commander, Major WALTER R. BRUYERE, III, O22644, of Montclair, New Jersey, was advised that guides would be sent to his battalion to lead the troops to the STAINWALD woods as water had covered the original route and it was believed that a dike wall would have to be used a portion of the way. The 3d Battalion advised that the road north of the canal had approximately six (6) inches of water over it.

The 1st Battalion informed the Regimental S-3 at 2150 hours that Company "K" had jumped off in its attack at 2140 hours. Water had come up over the road the 1st Battalion had intended to use and the troops were forced to walk through it.

The Engineers advised at 2305 hours that one foot bridge had been completed and two others started.

The plan of the 3d Battalion attack was to have Company "I" cross the footbridge erected across the LANDERBERG canal at the northwest tip of the STAINWALD woods (105122, Sheet 35/15) and move northeast toward HERRLISHEIM, using the main road from GAMBISHEIM as a guide. Contact was to be made with Company K, which was crossing a footbridge over the ZORN canal approximately 800 yards southeast of the LANDERBERG woods, at the southern edge of HERRLISHEIM. The south bank of the ZORN River canal was to be the left (north) flank of Company "K". The main GAMBISHEIM -- HERRLISHEIM road was to be the boundary between the two companies. Both companies were to begin crossing the footbridges at 0300 hours and were to attack HERRLISHEIM at daylight. One squad of Company "I" was to remain at its bridge site and move into HERRLISHEIM with a supporting platoon of tanks at daylight. Company "I" was to be in reserve and cross the Company "K" foot bridge behind Company "K" and go into position 1100 yards west of the Company "I" and Company "K" contact point, prepared to assist either company on call, and defend from any counter-attack from the southeast. Company "I" was to attack one platoon of heavy machine guns to Company "I" and one section of heavy machine guns to both Company "K" and Company "I". Its 88mm mortars were to be set up in the STAINWALD woods to assist the advance of the rifle companies. Two platoons of tanks were to support the operation— one platoon moving across the bridge erected at the Company "I" crossing site and another platoon at the Company "K" crossing site. The tanks were to cross at 0300 hours and pressed into HERRLISHEIM to support the advance of Companies "I" and "K". Artillery support was to be on call only.

Both Companies "I" and "K" crossed the line of departure at 0300 hours on 3 February -- Company "I" in a column of platoons and Company "K" with two platoons abreast and one platoon following in reserve.
The approach march north toward HERRLISHEIM was very difficult. Cloud overcast the sky and the troops waded through flood waters to their hips. In an effort to keep the men out of as much water as possible, the route of Company "I" was almost due north rather than in the planned northeasterly direction. This resulted in placing the leading platoon of Company "I" abreast of and one on the immediate right (east) flank of Company "K". The ground was very muddy and extremely slippery causing many men to fall in the mud and water and created a condition where malfunction of weapons occurred.

When the leading elements of Companies "I" and "K" were approximately 400 yards from the southwest tip of HERRLISHEIM an enemy automatic weapon began firing 200 yards to their front. This fire was directed at the left flank of Company "I" and the right flank of Company "K". The leading elements of both companies engaged this enemy weapon and silenced it, after which they resumed their advance. The commanding officer of Company "I", Captain EUGENE BAFFORD (020589, of Rosebud, Texas, changed his formation at this point from a column of platoons to two platoons abreast and one platoon following in reserve. After an advance of from 200-300 yards, three German automatic weapons began firing on them from the southern outskirts of the town. The troops were under the impression that they had encountered the enemy main line of resistance at this point. After a short fire fight, the enemy guns were silenced and three prisoners were taken. However, there was but a brief lull before the Germans opened up with very heavy fire along both companies' direct fronts. Concurrent with this, two enemy machine guns began firing from the eastern bank of the ZORN River canal 600 yards from the main road between GAMESHEIM and HERRLISHEIM and two other machine guns fired from the south edge of HERRLISHEIM. It was still very dark and the troops had no knowledge that they were so close to the buildings of the town. Troops in the rear had somehow gained the impression that their forward elements had been cut off from the main body of the attacking force. A heavy fire fight occurred which lasted until approximately 0545 hours. During this time the left flank squad of Company "K", commanded by Captain WILLIS B. McCARTHY, 0454452, of Casper, Wyoming, engaged the two German machine guns along the ZORN River canal and silenced them. A rocket that had been fired at an estimated enemy machine gun position hit a house and ignited some rags in a cellar window at approximately 0545 hours. This light gave the troops the first indication that they were in close proximity to HERRLISHEIM - the distance separating them from the house on the edge of town being approximately 100 yards. A few minutes later dawn broke and clearly outlined the houses ahead.

Excellent control was maintained of the attacking force, until the men saw the houses ahead of them. They then, dashed for the cover of the buildings and became disorganized. Between them 150-175 men gained...
the cover of the buildings. A great deal of confusion occurred after reaching the buildings and despite the efforts of the officers and non-
commissioned officers, little was accomplished in reorganizing these troops. The Germans had strong points in eight houses on the edge of
town. To counter this the attacking force took up firing positions
within buildings and in foxholes around eight other buildings. The
area being attacked was virtually a lake. Automatic weapons clogged
with mud and water fired but single shots. Many men attempted to clean
their weapons at the same time they were receiving heavy fire from the
Germans. The commanding officers of Companies "I" and "K" and a plato-
on leader of Company "K", 2nd Lt RANDOLPH PRESTON, 01325238, of New
York, New York, made several trips between the houses in a vain effort
to re-organize their units. The heavy volume of enemy fire over the
entire flat terrain, however, prevented this accomplishment. During
this action Lt PRESTON was killed. The situation became static until
approximately 1030 hours. During this period the troops hopefully
watched for the supporting tanks which it was felt would knock out
enough German opposition to permit reorganization. However, the tanks
never appeared.

A platoon of Company "F", 40th Engineer Regiment, had the mission
of building a trestle bridge across the LANDCRABEN canal north of the
STAUNAWALT woods. The Engineers originally estimated that the bridge
would be completed by 0200 hours on 3 February, in plenty of time for
the tanks to move forward at 0500 hours. However, flood conditions
which caused the canal to rise four and one-half feet in six hours cre-
ated great difficulties and the bridge was not completed until 0800
hours. Upon leaving the bridge area at 0800 hours, the Engineers saw
between six and eight tanks in the south edge of the STAUNAWALT woods.
These tanks did not cross the bridge.

At approximately 1030 hours two German tanks came north toward
HERRLISHEIM from OFFENDORF and took firing positions south of the rail-
road track on the road between OFFENDORF and HERRLISHEIM. From this
position the tanks concentrated on the house around which the 3rd plato-
on of Company "I", commanded by 2nd Lt WILLIAM E. JARBOE, 02005927, of
Elizabethtown, Kentucky, was situated. During this action Lt JARBOE
was killed. The enemy tank fire lasted for approximately thirty min-
utes after which between twenty and thirty German riflemen launched an
attack against the platoon position from the northeast. The 3rd plat-
on held off the armored and infantry attacks for approximately forty-
five minutes after which, its ammunition expended, the position fell
to the Germans. The loss of this position enabled the German to re-
occupy dug in positions along the east side of the GAMBRESHEIM--HERRLIS-
HEIM road and the enemy brought up reinforcements.

The commanding officers of Companies "I" and "K" considered their
Inability to maneuver and expand their position, the information that tanks would not cross the river and give them the support needed, the apparent build-up of enemy power to their front, depletion of ammunition and no chance of resupply and the knowledge that they could not cover the approach of reinforcements. The two commanders then decided that they must withdraw. A route was selected for the withdrawal and the order was issued to fall back. Some riflemen and automatic riflemen delivered effective fire during the withdrawal, but the majority of the troops drew back without any semblance of organization. Very intense enemy fire was directed against the men as they withdraw and the Germans conducted a limited pursuit.

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion had established its objective line at 0445 hours extending from ROHRWILLER to the LANGONNE woods and had sent a contact patrol to meet the 4th Battalion, 143d Infantry. This terrain was also covered by vast stretches of water from the melting snows. The contact patrol waded through waist deep water and finally the 143d Infantry recovered the contact point. The 143d Infantry had taken ROHRWILLER and was awaiting its armor to push forward toward HERRLISHEIM. The trackage bridge over the ZORN canal, which was to be erected for tanks supporting Company "K", was abandoned because water was three feet deep on the flat land on the other side.

At 0715 hours the 3d Battalion commander had advised regiment that the troops could not get into town from their present position and if caught in that position without tank support in the daylight, it would be disastrous.

The Division C-2 advised that information had been received that the bridge into HERRLISHEIM across the ZORN River was intact and ordered the 1st Battalion to secure it. Efforts were also made to get tanks into position to fire east of the railroad, but from the STAINE WALD woods this was impossible. Heavy artillery concentrations were fired on the north portion of HERRLISHEIM by order of the Division and Regimental Commanders. All efforts to maneuver the tanks forward seemed to fail because of water and mud. By 1020 hours both companies "B" and "C" had moved along the north bank of the ZORN River canal past the position of Company "K" elements on the opposite side of the canal.

At 1023 hours the Regimental Commander notified the Regimental S-3 that he was going to the position where the tanks were supposed to cross and determine personally what was happening to prevent their moving forward. At 1056 hours the Regimental Executive Officer, Lt. Colonel DONALD A. MACGRATH, 0260431, of New York, New York, notified the Regimental S-3 that he was with the 753d Tank Battalion and every
time a tank attempted to cross the bridge, it drew direct fire. Artillery fire was requested on the enemy gun position. At 1127 hours the Regimental Commander stated that the Engineers could put a float bridge across the ZORN canal but it would take permission from VI Corps to put it in. In the meantime the Regimental Commander was seeking information from the Division Commander as to whether or not the operation should be carried on.

Company "B" reached a point along the north bank of the ZORN canal 400 yards from HERRLISHEIM where it drew heavy enemy fire and was unable to advance farther. At 1305 hours the 3d Battalion troops began withdrawing from HERRLISHEIM with Company "B" furnishing protective fires. The Germans also counter-attacked against the 143d Infantry and drove its troops out of the BOIS DE DRUSENHEIM but ROHRWILLER was held.

The 3d Battalion was ordered to re-assemble in WEYERSHEIM while the 1st Battalion outposted the bridge site southeast of the LANGEVAU woods.

At 1519 hours the Regimental Commander advised that he was proceeding to Division Headquarters and requested the Regimental S-3 to meet him there. The 1st and 2d Battalion Commanders and separate unit commanders were ordered to report to the regimental command post at 1700 hours. In the meantime the 2d Battalion was to start planning an attack against OFFENDORF from GAMSHEIM.

The 1st Battalion was notified at 1706 hours that it would outpost its present position with one company and assemble the remainder of the battalion in KURZENHAUSEN as quickly as possible. Long range machine gun fire was received by the 1st Battalion troops in the LANGEVAU woods at 2040 hours.

The 40th Engineer Regiment platoon was informed that it could forget about installing a pontoon bridge unless present orders changed.

Arrangements were completed to move the 2d Battalion to KILSTETT and then north to GAMSHEIM in preparation for an attack on OFFENDORF. However, at approximately 2345 hours the entire operation was postponed and the movement called off. However, units attached to the 2d Battalion still planned to contact the 2d Battalion commander in the morning to make a reconnaissance of the area. At 2350 hours the regimental command post moved from GRIES and reopened at WEYERSHEIM.

At 0040 hours on 4 February, the Regimental Commander ordered a meeting of all 3d Battalion officers to be held at the 3d Battalion command post at 1000 hours. The 2d Battalion was ordered to have a
detailed plan of fire drawn up by 1200 hours.

The Division C-3 ordered at 0937 hours patrols sent to the vicinity of HERRLISHEIM to the same proximity as those of the previous day. The 1st Battalion was instructed to send two patrols toward the town. One patrol was to cross the south bank of the ZORN River and determine enemy positions. If no Germans were encountered, the patrol was to enter the town. The other patrol was to proceed along the north bank of the canal and determine if the bridge into HERRLISHEIM was still intact and whether or not it was defended. If the bridge was not defended the patrol was to retrace and send one man back to report the information.

At 1453 hours the Division C-3 notified the Regimental S-3 that the regiment would effect the relief of the 314th Infantry Regiment which was in position southeast of HAGENAU. The regiment was to hold a line running from a point (053235, Sheet 38/14) approximately 700 yards east of HAGENAU to the town of KALTENHOUSE (073213, Sheet 38/14) inclusive. The 142d Infantry was the right (south) flank unit of the regiment. The relief of the 314th Infantry was to take place on the night of 5-6 February. The 117th Reconnaissance Squadron was to take command of the present sector in conjunction with Combat Command "F" of the 14th Armored Division."The Regimental Commander ordered the 2d and 3d Battalions at 1747 hours to reconnoiter the 314th Infantry positions during the night. The 2d Battalion was to relieve the 1st Battalion, 314th Regiment, while the 3d Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion, 314th Regiment. The 1st Battalion was to relieve the 2d Battalion, 314th Regiment, which was in reserve position.

The 143d Infantry advised at 2008 hours that its contact patrol had attempted to reach Company "H" but had to wade through waist deep water and finally had to turn back. Company "H" also stated that its contact patrol had encountered the same difficulties. The previous signal of a single rifle shot by each patrol was answered, however, at an estimated distance of 200 yards between the two patrols.

The 1st Battalion began moving to the new sector at 1130 hours on 5 February, and with the exception of Company "H" which remained on the line, closed out of their area at 1230 hours. By 1532 hours all elements were relieved. The 3d Battalion cleared its area by 1735 hours and moved to its new area by marching and organic transportation. The regimental command post closed at WEERSHEIM at 1830 hours and displaced to MARIENTHAL (057230, Sheet 38/15) at 1915 hours.

The 2d Battalion informed the Regimental S-3 at 1926 hours that all
its companies were forward relieving units of the 314th Infantry. Company "E" had received a little shelling during the period it was making the relief. The 1st Battalion notified regiment at 2012 hours that the entire battalion had closed into its new area by 1712 hours. Since that time it had been receiving intermittent enemy artillery fire in the area. The 2d Battalion completed its relief at 2039 hours and the 3d Battalion at 2145 hours. The Regimental Commander notified the Regimental Commander of the 314th Infantry at 2200 hours that command of the sector was officially assumed as of that hour.

The Division G-2 issued an intelligence report at 0600 hours on 5 February indicating that both OFFENDORF and HERRLISHEIM had been entered and found clear of the enemy.

The Regimental S-2 ordered both the 2d and 3d Battalions to make plans to send combat patrols across the MOER River during the night. The patrols were to cross either by boat or via blown bridges which former patrols had used.

The Assistant Division Commander visited the regimental command post at 1100 hours. He informed the Regimental S-2 that tentative operations instructions planned for the 143d Infantry to take over the sector ROHRWILLER, HERRLISHEIM, OFFENDORF and BISCHWILLER inclusive. The 142d Infantry was to take over an area from BIESCHWILLER to KALENHOUSE. The regiment, itself, was to be relieved on 6 February by the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron, and be pulled back for 24 to 48 hours rest. Following this, the regiment would relieve the 143d Infantry and set up an attack problem, using the 3d Battalion officers and men in the same positions they were when they reached HERRLISHEIM on 3 February.

At 1050 hours the 2d Battalion commander informed the Regimental S-2 that two and one-half ton trucks were using the main road between KALENHOUSE and HAGEBNAG, just behind the 2d Battalion positions. It was requested that this traffic be stopped as its continuation would only draw excessive fire into the battalion area. The Division G-3 was notified and stated that the traffic would be stopped and only essential vehicles would travel the road.

At 1220 hours Company "A", 111th Engineers was instructed to so hours five assault boats and twenty-five life preservers for both the 2d and 3d Battalions to be used by raiding parties crossing the MOER River. The boats and life preservers were furnished the battalions during the afternoon.

The 2d and 3d Battalions were instructed at 1620 hours to submit an overlay to regimental headquarters indicating what engineering work
was being contemplated on the main line of resistance in the way of mines and barbed wire.

Both the 2d and 3d Battalions made detailed plans for sending patrols across the MOSSER River. The 2d Battalion patrols were to start between 2000 and 2100 hours and go between CAMP DIBERSHOFEN (082217, Sheet 38/14) and TERRAS TÀUBENGÖCH (072225, Sheet 38/16). Division was requested to have the artificial moonlight searchlights turned off during the time the patrols were out.

The Regimental Commander left for the Company "E" command post at 1940 hours to check on the patrols of the 2d Battalion. At 2130 hours the Regimental Commander notified the Regimental S-3 that the boats carrying the 2d Battalion patrols had overturned in the swift stream and it was not deemed advisable to risk the 3d Battalion patrols by making a similar attempt. Consequently, the 3d Battalion was instructed to call off its patrols. Three men were missing from the 2d Battalion patrols. All of the boats were recovered but one.

The 3d Battalion's front line troops were harassed for several hours after midnight on 7 February by friendly tank fire that fell in close proximity to the troops.

The day of 7 February was relatively quiet. Enemy mortars and artillery fire fell intermittently in the regimental area. The Regimental S-1 was informed that a new plan was being formulated and the regiment would not move to areas previously selected. The 2d Battalion and Antitank Company would move to WEYERSHEIM and the regimental command post to the vicinity of HERRLISHEIM. Cannon Company was to remain attached to the 131st Field Artillery Battalion and remain in position to support the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron.

During the night of 7-8 February, the 2d Battalion received several heavy mortar concentrations, but all sectors were rather quiet. Contact patrols were made between friendly units but no patrols crossed the river.

At 1406 hours on 8 February, the Division G-3 was notified that the 3d Battalion was moving to HANNOFFEN (090174, Sheet 36/15), the 2d Battalion to WEYERSHEIM and the 1st Battalion to DISCHWILLET.

The Regimental command post moved to HERRLISHEIM at 1745 hours, leaving staff personnel in MARIENHEIM until the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron completed relief of all of the regimental units. At 2205 hours the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron completed the relief and took command of the sector.
On the morning of 9 February at 0730 hours the Division G-3 called to state that the regiment was to hold up the relief of the 143d Infantry and remain in its present position until further orders from Division Headquarters. Division stated that the regiment would more than likely remain in its present position throughout the day and possibly through 10 February, while the 143d Infantry would probably attack DRUSENHEIM. At 0953 hours the Division Commander ordered one battalion to relieve the 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, immediately. This battalion was to be attached to the 143d Infantry. The 2d Battalion was informed it would be attached to the 143d Infantry and effect relief of that unit's 1st Battalion at once. Also Antitank Company took over the guarding of the bridges in WYERASHEIM for which the 143d Infantry had previously been responsible.

At 1532 hours the Division Commander arrived at the regimental command post to discuss the disposition of the regiment.

Whereas the regimental sector was very quiet on the night of 9-10 February, action on both flanks by the 142d Infantry (north) and the 143d Infantry (south) was heavy. Company "G" relieved Company "B", 143d Infantry, in OFFENDORF. Companies "E" and "F" relieved other elements of the 1st Battalion during the afternoon and evening of 9 February, in the area northwest of HERALISHEIM. Company "F" closely followed up the advance of the 143d Infantry in its attack on DRUSENHEIM.

A German jet-propelled plane appeared over the front lines at approximately 0630 hours on 10 February, bombing BISCHWILLER and strafing the BISCHWILLER-KÖCHWILLER road.

The 143d Infantry encountered increasing heavy resistance in DRUSENHEIM and was forced to withdraw to the edge of the woods west of the town. At 1009 hours the 2d Battalion advised that Company "E" was 800 yards south of DRUSENHEIM and had the mission of clearing 400-500 yards of a wooded area in that sector over to the RHINE River. An enemy tank and dug in Infantry had to be driven from this stretch of woods. Company "E" was receiving heavy mortar fire from enemy positions east of the RHINE and from the vicinity of AU POINT DU RHIN (170175, Sheet 39/15). Company "F" was in position around the water works 900 yards southwest of DRUSENHEIM and was receiving machine gun fire while attacking German positions in farmhouses 500 yards to the east. Company "G" occupied the outposts of the sector. At 1140 hours Company "G" was directing artillery fire on the tank 300 yards to its front.

By 1530 hours Company "G" was still meeting opposition from Germans dug in along the BOIS LE JUNGGRUND (166162, Sheet 39/15) and were making no advance. Plans were formulated for Company "G" to relieve elements of Company "E" on outpost so that the entire company could participate.
in an attack. Two tanks were brought forward and efforts were being made to get them in position to assist Company "Z".

The Division Commander ordered the Regimental Commander at 1530 hours to have one battalion relieve the regimental 2d Battalion in order that the 2d Battalion, in turn, could take over the position of the 143d Infantry around DRUSENHEIM. The 3d Battalion was immediately ordered to move to HERRLISHEIM and then take over the positions of the 2d Battalion. The Division G-3 clarified the movement for the Regimental Commander on request in that the 2d Battalion was to be relieved so that it might continue on with the 143d Infantry. Companies "J", "K", and "L" of the 143d Infantry had been pushed out of DRUSENHEIM and were in bad condition. The Division Commander desired to pull these companies out of the line. Upon receipt of this information the 2d Battalion commander was ordered to effect the relief of the 143d Infantry companies as quickly as possible. However, at 1620 hours the Division G-3 called to state that the 2d Battalion should be held while it was and the 1st Battalion should relieve the 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, in the ROHRWILFER area. All Battalion commanders were advised of the change in plans. Trucks originally intended to move the 3d Battalion were sent to the 1st Battalion with instructions that after the battalion was moved, they were to return and transport the 3d Battalion to HERRLISHEIM in time to arrive before daylight on 11 February. By 1900 hours the 1st Battalion had closed into ROHRWILFER and was proceeding with the relief of the 1st and 3d Battalions, 143d Infantry, which relief was completed by 2330 hours. The relief was delayed by the large number of friendly mines and booby traps in the area.

At 1906 hours the 2d Battalion reported that Company "G" was going to attack at 2100 hours. Company "F" was to move back to HERRLISHEIM. However, the 143d Infantry Commander requested that the attack be held off until several pill boxes 700 yards southeast of DRUSENHEIM could be reduced.

The Division G-3 notified the Regimental S-3 at 2028 hours that the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, would be attached to the regiment until a consolidated line was established, after which it would be relieved to its parent organization.

Company "G", 143d Infantry, made two attempts during the night to take the pillboxes which blocked the path of the regimental 2d Battalion attack. Each attack failed due to the German strength which was estimated to be one company and the excellent positions of the Germans. Artillery concentrations failed to dislodge the Germans from their entrenchments. Consequently, the 2d Battalion attack was postponed.

The 3d Battalion closed into HERRLISHEIM at 0730 hours on 11
February. All armored attachments of the 143d Infantry reverted to the regiment and control of the area was taken over by the 141st Infantry as of 0030 hours on 11 February.

The 1st Battalion was instructed at 1017 hours to send a patrol into the BOIS 1E MATTERNAI north of ROERWILLET to probe the woods as far north as possible. Antitank Company was attached to the 2nd Battalion while guarding of the WYERSEHEIM bridges was taken over by the 11th Engineer Battalion.

The 36th Division Air Officer was requested to have an air mission flown to bomb DRUENHEIM and the area east of the town to the RHINEN River. Information was received from the 1st Battalion that the 3d Battalion, 143d Infantry, had approximately 100 man captured within DRUENHEIM and it was not known whether they still were there. It is deemed that the air mission should be flown as it was very improbable that any captured troops remained within the town.

The 1st Battalion advised at 1518 hours that a five man patrol started into DRUENHEIM but had proceeded only 75 yards from its starting point when it was pinned down by machine gun fire. A tank was brought up but it was hit by an enemy self-propelled gun and was forced to withdraw. The 2nd Battalion was instructed to locate the self-propelled gun that fired on the 1st Battalion tank so that eight inch artillery might be fired on the area.

The 1st Battalion was ordered to send a patrol to the southern portion of the BOIS DE SOUFFLENHEIM (142199, Sheet 39/15). The patrol accomplished its mission, reporting two enemy machine gun emplacements and approximately fifty Germans dug in around the area. Artillery was immediately placed on this sector.

Antitank Company was ordered to relieve the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, during the night of 11-12 February, which relief was completed at 2245 hours. The 1st and 2d Battalions sent numerous patrols into enemy territory to probe their positions. The Germans used flares extensively throughout the night to keep patrols constantly and they frequently fired machine guns upon areas where no patrols were moving, indicating their extreme nervousness. German patrols were more active in the 142d Infantry area on the left (northwest) flank than in the regimental sector.

The Division G-3 issued orders at 1315 hours to place several antitank guns in position to fire on enemy machine guns reported by patrols. Antitank Company was ordered to dig in several of their 57mm guns at locations where the guns could be fired on previously reported German strong points.

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DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.1, USA 735017

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

By NARA, Date 10/1/92
The Regimental S-3 informed the 1st Battalion that he had received information of German troop movements from the former COLMAR pocket to the HAGGENAU area and suggested that the area to the left (northwest) be patrolled extensively.

Throughout the day of 13 February and the night of 13-14 February, almost constant patrolling was maintained by forward units. Antitank Company was subjected to intense harassing fire from enemy tanks but this subsided when artillery fire was placed on the areas from which the tank fire originated. Company "F" relieved Company "G" on the line by 2145 hours and Company "E" moved into HERRLISHEIM. Engineers laid mine fields in front of the Antitank Company position and along the DRUSENHEIM--HERRLISHEIM road.

The water of the RHINE River began rising on the morning of 13 February, and one outpost was made untenable and several bridges were almost covered. The 2d Battalion requested rubber boats be sent to it. An artillery observation plane reported several rubber boats along the east bank of the RHINE and artillery fire was placed on a group of approximately twenty-five Germans carrying one boat. Division was requested to have an air mission flown to strafe the enemy rubber boats.

At 1047 hours the 1st Battalion commander advised that the bombing mission on DRUSENHEIM had resulted in two sets of bombs hitting the center of the town and the road running northeast from it. The planes strafed DRUSENHEIM four times and received some antiaircraft fire from the northern part of the town. Fires were started by the bombing. No bombs dropped on the southern section of DRUSENHEIM nearest the front line.

The Regimental S-2 informed the 1st Battalion to send a combat patrol into enemy lines as there had been shifting of enemy troops and identifications were needed for higher headquarters.

At 1815 hours the 2d Battalion advised that the RHINE River was still rising and only three outposts were still able to be manned. A new outpost line was being established as quickly as possible. Both the 1st and 2d Battalion patrols had difficulty in moving about due to the many flooded areas around DRUSENHEIM. A large 2d Battalion patrol, ran into a mine field and three were wounded.

A combat patrol of the 1st Battalion left its position at 0600 hours on 14 February and attacked and overran the enemy road block (141196, Sheet 39/15) and then attempted to clear the southern neck of the BOIS DE SOUFFINHEIM and cut the road leading through the woods southeast into DRUSENHEIM. The patrol encountered heavy resistance from machine guns, mortars and self-propelled gun fire. The German
fire was so intense that the patrol was forced to withdraw at 1030 hours.

The 2d Battalion fired a 155mm gun directly at the pillboxes south- west of DRUSENHEIM without beneficial results. The gun finally had to be pulled back as it drew direct fire from German positions near DRUSENHEIM. 4.2 mortars were then placed on the pillbox area.

The road between RODWILLER and BISCHWILLER was temporarily closed to vehicle traffic due to the large volume of enemy artillery fire placed on it which had knocked out a number of vehicles.

Company "O" heard considerable movement at 2050 hours in front of its observation post along the RHINE River due east of HERRLISHEIM and believed the Germans were placing boats in the water. Mortar flares were fired and the enemy activity ceased. Patrolling was conducted by all front line units without noticeable activity. The enemy continued to make extensive use of flares to illuminate the front line.

On the morning of 15 February, Division smacked the area around BISCHWILLER and it created such a haze in the regimental sector that visibility for firing direct fire by tank destroyers was limited. Upon request Division had the smoke stopped.

At 1210 hours the Regimental S-2 instructed the 2d Battalion to send one patrol down the main HERRLISHEIM-DRUSENHEIM road through Anti-tank Company positions with the mission of penetrating as far as possible into DRUSENHEIM. Another patrol was to proceed along the east side of the LANDGRAFEN River north to the LS JUNGRUND woods.

Relief of the 1st Battalion by the 3d Battalion was begun during the afternoon of 15 February, and was completed at 1717 hours without incident except for some harassing fire from German self-propelled guns. The 1st Battalion moved into HERRLISHEIM by 1831 hours.

The waters of the RHINE River receded slightly during the night which permitted the re-establishment of one abandoned outpost on the bank of the river. A propaganda broadcast was made at 2400 hours from a position 700 yards south of DRUSENHEIM. Enemy flare activity was unusually restricted during the night.

Engineer obstacles and antitank mines were installed during the early morning of 16 February. The sector remained generally quiet with only moderate enemy harassing artillery fire throughout the regimental sector.

Antitank Company elements were relieved by elements of the 2d
Battalion by 2121 hours on 16 February. The entire sector was unusually quiet with but little enemy harassing artillery fire from DRUSEHEIM. Patrols continued to probe the German defenses throughout the night of 16-17 February. Visibility was very bad during the night and information secured was limited.

The Regimental S-3 notified the 3d Battalion to make plans for a raiding party. The 3d Battalion requested that this raid be held the following night as they had set up an ambush for the night of 17-18 February on a German outpost.

Approximately 1000 mines stored on the northern outskirts of ROHRWILLER in a cemetery blew up at 1630 hours causing several soldier and civilian casualties within ROHRWILLER. The explosion was heard and felt for miles around and created a crater six feet deep and fifty feet wide. No evidence could be procured to determine what set off the mines.

During the night of 17-18 February, four men on patrol from the 3d Battalion were wounded north of the BOIS DE MATTAWALD and the patrol was forced to return. Evacuation parties returned to the minefield and removed the wounded men before daylight.

At 0628 hours on 18 February, the Regimental S-2 informed the 2d and 3d Battalion to make each patrol a combat patrol with a minimum of five men. An attempt was to be made by each patrol to take prisoners.

An examination of the minefield in which the 3d Battalion patrol men were wounded disclosed that the enemy was using glass or plastic mines approximately six to eight inches in diameter and in a bowl shape. On top of each mine was a thick glass plate. The battalion Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon cleared one lane fifty yards outside of the woods. A second band of mines was found fifty yards beyond the first band.

The 111th Engineers requested a fifty-man carrying party to take mines up to the 3d Battalion sector during the night. The 1st Battalion was ordered to furnish this detail.

Company "K" relieved Company "F" by 1930 hours and Company "G" re-established its outposts along the RHINE River west bank inasmuch as the water had receded sufficiently to do so. A combat patrol of platoon strength from the 3d Battalion moved to a point (137205, Sheet 39/14) 2000 yards south of SCHIRRHOFEN (137227, Sheet 39/14) in an effort to ambush prisoners. However, no Germans entered the patrol area. Also, a 2d Battalion platoon strength patrol penetrated to the southern tip of the BOIS DE JUNGRUND (168166, Sheet 39/15) without establishing enemy contact. A four-man patrol from Company "K" with
the mission of contacting the 143d Infantry on the left (west) flank left at 2400 hours and failed to return. Patrols were sent out to locate these men but no trace of them could be found.

During the night of 19-20 February, an eight man patrol from Company "F" was fired upon by five riflemen and two light machine guns north of the BOIS LE MATTREMAULD and engaged the Germans in a fire fight for fifteen minutes. Two of the enemy were wounded and one man from the patrol was missing as a result of the action. A Company "F" patrol killed a German sentry in the BOIS LE JUNGRUND but was unable to search the area due to enemy fire placed upon them. Fires were observed in DRUSENHEIM which were started by mortar and artillery fire and several explosions were heard which probably were German ammunition dumps.

At 0930 hours on 20 February, the Division G-3 advised that a quartering party of a unit assigned to relieved the regiment would be in the regimental area during the day to reconnoiter positions for the relief.

Four American P-51 planes erroneously strafed the road between GAMBSHEIM and WEYERSHEIM at 1345 hours, hitting several vehicles and causing one casualty in Service Company. One plane was shot down and the pilot was interrogated by Division officers.

Information secured from a prisoner indicated that the Germans were laying a mine field at the south tip of the BOIS LE JUNGRUND. The prisoner stated that the men were cleared at 2400 hours and started work at 0200 hours. While working, two machine guns were placed in the corner of the woods to cover them. The 2d Battalion was ordered at 1550 hours to send a patrol to ambush the enemy Engineers.

Division was advised that the regiment had no definite idea as to when the relief by the 9th ZOUAVE Regiment of the 3d French Division would be accomplished. Consequently, trucks were requested to be placed in a motor pool and furnished to the companies on call from the Regimental 9-4 in WEYERSHEIM.

At 0050 hours both Companies "F" and "G" sent out combat patrols to ambush the enemy Engineers laying the mine field south of the BOIS LE JUNGRUND. Company "F" became engaged with the enemy near the woods. The Germans began firing a machine gun and small arms and the patrol was forced to withdraw. The Company "F" patrol encountered no enemy opposition.

The 2d Battalion advised at 1015 hours on 21 February that French
troops would begin relieving it at 1100 hours.

The Regimental S-2 instructed both the 2d and 3d Battalions at 1320 hours that they would send out combat patrols during the night to protect the relief. However, the patrols were to be given definite locations to proceed to and a time limitation on which to return.

By 1630 hours all of the 3d Battalion except Company "I" and all of the 2d Battalion except Company "F" had received transportation to move to their new areas. Relief of the regiment went on by infiltration as quickly as the units were relieved. The Regimental command post opened up in HOLZENHEIM (912127, Sheet 18/15) at 2030 hours. At 2100 hours the Regimental Commander notified the Division Chief of Staff that the regimental sector had been turned over to the 9th ZOUAVE Regiment. Division was advised at 0100 hours on 22 February that the regiment had closed into its new areas. Only patrol personnel from the 2d and 3d Battalions remained in the former area and were to rejoin their units as quickly as their mission was completed.

At 1015 hours on 22 February, the Division G-3 informed the Regimental S-3 that one battalion would be kept on a three hour alert status but this arrangement would not interfere with training programs nor require vehicles to be frozen in a pool for a movement. The regiment was to work out counter-attack plans with a tentative assembly area for a move toward OHLENDorf (975236, Sheet 38/14)--NEUBOURG and HAGENAU--SCHWEIGHAUSEN (904267, Sheet 38/14).

Three (3) German prisoners were taken and evacuated during the month of February—one (1) on 15 February, and two (2) on 20 February. The scarcity of prisoners was entirely due to the defensive type of warfare in which the regiment was committed during the month. During the attack against HERNESHEIM at least eight prisoners were taken but when the attacking force was ordered to retreat under intense enemy fire, the prisoners could not be brought back.

Ten (10) officer and 242 enlisted men reinforcements were received during the month of February. The bulk of both officer and enlisted personnel were received into the Infantry from other branches of the service—mainly Antiaircraft. For the most part these men had an excellent morale and the majority of the enlisted men desired to be placed in rifle companies. Many of the reinforcements were technicians and non-commissioned officers. The absorption of these ratings...
creates a minor problem in units which have a high percentage of men in the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh grades who have not been promoted because of lack of table of organization, vacancies but who have had combat experience which qualifies them for a higher rating over that of reinforcements with ratings. The ratings of each unit were analyzed to make an equitable distribution of non-commissioned reinforcements in order that one unit would not be forced to absorb though attrition a greater number than a corresponding unit. The men were also checked and assigned in an effort to apportion them in accordance with their Army General Classification Test (AGCT) grades.

Morale of the troops continued to rise. The rotation of battalions on the front line afforded the men opportunities to secure additional training, clean, dry clothes and recreation from movies and USO shows. The 36th Division rest camp at BAINS-LES-BAINS, the VI Corps rest camp at NANCY and passes to PARIS, BRUSSELS and the UNITED KINGDOM afforded both officers and enlisted men needed rest and recreation.

END

Report of Operations Written By:

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OPERATIONS IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

MARCH 1945

113th INFANTRY REGIMENT

The period 1-3 March found the regiment in bivouac in an area southeast of RHEINLU. The regiment had been withdrawn from combat on 21 February, and up to 4 March, had been training. The reinforcements received into the organization during February...

The regiment had been alerted to move to the vicinity of RHEINLU on the night of 4 March, to relieve the 113d Infantry Regiment by 2200 hours.

The Division Q-3 notified the Regimental S-2 that the RHEINLU sector had been quiet except for scattered and sporadic machine gun fire receiving from the left flank positions north of the IJDDER River.

The 113th Engineer (C) Battalion requested the Regimental S-2 at 1110 hours on 4 March to take over three (3) bridges and a factory in the vicinity of RHEINLU which had been prepared for demolition in the event of an enemy breakthrough. The 1st Battalion was ordered to take over these installations but the Engineers were instructed to leave one of their men at each point and these men would be responsible for accomplishing any demolitions that might be ordered.

The Division Q-3 advised at 1100 hours that the 2d Battalion, which was to remain in regimental reserve, would occupy the town of B.ZEHGDORF (978205, Sheet 38/14), less one company which would be placed in KLEMPHUSEN (995210, Sheet 38/14).

The regimental command post closed at KLEMPHUSEN (978228, Sheet 38/14) at 1045 hours and opened in RHEINLU at 1740 hours. The 1st Battalion reported at 1900 hours that two platoons of Company I, and two platoons of Company K, plus all of Company H, were in position on the regimental left (west) flank. The 3d Battalion advised at 2000 hours that the relief was proceeding satisfactorily although small arms fire was coming into the area. The 3d Battalion expected an attack on patrol activity in the vicinity of the railroad tracks north of KLEMPHUSEN (978214, Sheet 38/14) and was prepared to repel any German effort. Contact patrols were set up with the 113d Infantry on the regimental left (west) flank.

Corps of the sector was taken over by the regiment at 2300 hours although relief of all units of the 113d Infantry was not completed until 2355 hours. The Germans sent several flares up along the 1st Battalion area while the relief was being effected and several bursts of machine gun fire from the north bank of the IJDDER River followed. Mortar concentrations were placed on the area and the machine gun fire ceased. Contact was established with French units on the regimental right (east) flank 500 yards east of KLEMPHUSEN.

One platoon of Company I, which was established in four (4) houses on the north side of the IJDDER River called for a mortar concentration at 0600 hours on 5 March. Approximately twenty-five (25) Germans attempted to cross the IJDDER River...

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
By F7 NARA, Date 1/10/72
in the vicinity of KLETZHOUSE in the 3d Battalion sector but were dispersed by artillery fire. At 0750 hours an observation post reported small arms, tank and tank destroyer fire along the north edge of HUEBELAU. Enemy mortars fired into the regimental area from a factory area north of theobe RIVER.

The Division 5-2 issued orders at 0923 hours that a combat patrol was to be sent out each night from each battalion. The 3d Battalion was instructed to send a patrol across in the vicinity of the railroad bridge east of KLETZHOUSE at 0000 hours in an effort to gather some of the enemy and secure information for intelligence purposes. Also, two (2) reconnaissances patrols were to move along the south bank of the FRIED RIVER northeast of KLETZHOUSE to report any possible crossing sites. The 1st Battalion was also ordered to send out a combat patrol of which the size was to be determined by the battalion commander to locate suspected German mortar positions in northeast HUEBELAU. A reconnaissance patrol from the 3d Battalion was to screen the river bank near the railroad crossing in HUEBELAU for possible crossing sites. Previous reports of the 3d Battalion indicated that the water in the river was eight (8) feet deep in the middle, thirty-five (35) feet wide, very swift current and steep banks.

During the afternoon of 5 March, the houses occupied by Company "M" on the north bank of the FRIED RIVER were subjected to heavy mortar concentrations. Three (3) of the houses occupied by the troops were demolished and the rear was forced to abandon them. However, at 1000 hours the enemy made a limited attack and regained the ruins of the buildings which had previously been abandoned.

That enemy used flares along the 1st Battalion front intermittently during the night. Enemy activity was confined to patrols and harassing artillery with scattered shelling of HUEBELAU. Patrols sent out by the battalions during the night were unable to effect a crossing of the river at any point because of mine fields and the swiftness of the current.

The Regimental 5-2 believed the concentrated artillery being placed on the small bridgehead on the north bank of the river and the render manner in which German artillery was directed on HUEBELAU proper was indicative of a German belief that forces were gathering in the sector to launch an attack to the north and northwest of HUEBELAU. Due to the hesitancy of the German commander to use Infantry to eject the small bridgehead was believed to be caused by a probable thinning out of enemy troops along the river line.

During the morning of 6 March, the enemy continued to place harassing artillery on HUEBELAU and BLATZENDORF. One German soldier swam the river and surrendered to Company "M." He indicated that the morale of the enemy troops was very low due to heavy casualties suffered in the vicinity of HUEBELAU. Information as to the location of German gun installations and mine fields was secured from this prisoner.

Company "M" enlarged its bridgehead by taking two more houses. A flare fire flung ensued before the additional houses could be taken. Four German soldiers were killed and another captured. The prisoner escaped, however, when the attackers were forced to take shelter from heavy enemy fire.

The battalions continued their patrolling, reporting the current in the river to be very swift and consisting wire was found to be submerged.
dangerous for boats to attempt a crossing.

At 1020 hours on 6 March, the 1st Battalion notified the Regimental S-3 that an attempt was going to be made to relieve the run in the houses on the north bank of the river during the evening. A squad of Engineers was requested to be present to remove any rubble that might be found in the yards of the houses as it was planned to place the run in dug in positions outside of the houses rather than inside of them. A platoon of Company "H" affected the relief of the company "L" platoon. It was decided to occupy the houses during the day and establish outposts around them during the night. The construction of a footbridge to the small bridgehead was also accomplished by 1740 hours.

The 3rd Battalion patrols were again unable to cross to the north bank during the night of 6-7 March. Two patrols made three efforts each to reach the other side, but the swiftness of the current precluded this accomplishment. One soldier swam the river in an effort to cross a line on the opposite bank but he was unable to do so due to the steep bank and swift current.

Company "K" continued to make contact with the 112th Infantry on the left (west) flank and Company "M" contacted the French on the right (east). A patrol from Company "H" succeeded in crossing the river northeast of Huy but was only able to proceed 500 yards before it was fired upon by German machine guns. After establishing the position of the guns, the patrol was forced to withdraw.

Many tanks and tracked vehicle movement could be heard in the woods one mile northeast of the left battalion sector between 0600 and 0615 hours on 7 March. Artillery fire was placed on this area by the 131st Field Artillery Battalion.

The 3rd Battalion requested that Engineers be contacted to build a footbridge in its sector. However, the Engineers stated that it would be necessary to use boats on that stretch of the river and that they would not be able to cross the river as it was extremely hazardous for the men in the deep, swift water. The Engineers were then instructed to build a footbridge for both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions.

Company "H" sent up flares along its front at 2200 hours when sounds were heard which indicated some men were attempting to cross the river. However, no definite signs of German activity were observed. Machine guns and mortars which had been harassing the 3rd Battalion were quiet and it was believed the enemy weapons had either been destroyed or disabled by artillery fire placed in that sector. Tanks or other tracked vehicles could be heard moving along the 3rd Battalion front at 2310 hours.

A three-man reconnaissance patrol from Company "H" moved to a listening post 400 yards north of the Huy River where it reported hearing considerable enemy vehicle and troop movement on the main road running into the woods 1000 yards northeast of Huy. Unoccupied trenches and holes were found 300 yards to the north of the river. The ground was firm but it was believed that it would not support armored vehicles.

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

NARA, Date 2/10/93
combat patrol from the 3d Battalion, consisting of one (1) officer and twelve (12) non-com, crossed the river northeast of KLEINHUSEN. The river at this point was between four (4) and five (5) feet deep, thirty (30) feet wide and with very soft banks. The patrol followed a line of telephone poles to within 200 yards of its objective. The patrol was unable to locate the mines and wire entanglements which had been reported in this area. Footprints of the patrol were harbored by overhead fire coming from the woods approximately 1000 yards northeast of KLEINHUSEN which was directed into the town itself. A company V1 patrol investigated the LUBENHOF farm (07222h, sheet 36 24) 1000 yards north of KLEINHUSEN but found no signs of the enemy in the abandoned buildings.

On the morning of 8 March, the Assistant Division Commander issued orders that all patrols would leave on their missions after 2000 hours. Both the 1st and 3d Battalions were advised accordingly.

The 3d Battalion was informed it would be relieved on 10 March, and was instructed to prepare a training program. However, the Battalion Commander, Major RICHARD V. GUTIERREZ, 01320, of Iowa, Tennessee, stated that he believed his troops were receiving the needed training in their present defensive position and requested that the battalion be allowed to remain on the line.

At 2007 hours the 3d Battalion advised that Company VI would relieve one of the other rifle companies on the following night. Company VI reported hearing a boat on the river in front of its position at 2005 hours but flares revealed nothing. Plans were formulated to ambush any enemy attempting to cross in this sector.

Two enemy machine guns were fired into the 1st Battalion positions from north of the LUBENHOF at 2105 hours. Since no patrols were in that area, it was not known why the enemy was firing. However, the machine guns were silenced by a mortar concentration placed on the area. Machine gun fire and a few rounds of artillery were also reported by the 3d Battalion at 2105 hours. A few scattered rounds from self-propelled guns fell in the artillery company sector shortly after midnight. An observation post reported the location of the self-propelled guns as in the vicinity of HÜBESHOF (03026h, sheet 36 24).

The 3d Battalion questioned the Regimental S-3 at 0530 hours on 9 March as to the status of French patrols in the regimental sector. A patrol, supposedly French, had been stopped during the night and several members spoke English. The battalion was advised that regiment was not aware of any French patrols moving around in its sector and if the incident occurred again, the patrols were to be brought in for questioning.

A Company IV patrol crossed the river at midnight and proceeded 150 yards north where it encountered a double-strand barbed wire fence running northeast for 150 yards. A nearby house was searched but nothing was found. Five (5) men of the twenty (20) man patrol were left at this position to ambush German troops and the rest of the patrol proceeded on with its mission. The patrol moved into the PEINT IT HÜBENHOF where it could observe the main road running east from HÜBENHOF. Lines and additional barbed wire were encountered. Three (3) enemy tanks covered all approaches to this road.
Company "I" patrol crossed the river one mile northeast of KLOTENHOUSE with the aim of reaching the KESTER 51 farm (072236, Sheet 38/14) and capturing a prisoner. Enemy positions were found manned along the farm and the patrol was unable to maneuver around the farm and the patrol was unable to maneuver around a machine gun which fired from a position near the farm itself. The patrol returned to its company position at 0730 hours on 9 March, having left at 2330 hours on 8 March.

The 2d Battalion Corzine 5-4, Lt Colonel J.J. S. CHIHONFIELD, 022650, of Fargo, North Dakota, notified the Regimental S-3 at 1330 hours on 9 March, that he was making a reconnaissance of the 1st Battalion positions preparatory to relieving the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion, in turn, informed the Regimental S-3 of the availability of training areas, 1750, and billeting which the troops used. A suitable training area southeast of FRANZM was located for the battalion.

During the day and night of 9 March, activity within the regimental sector was confined to the usual enemy forces and scattered artillery fire on H.G. 7061U. A few bursts of German machine gun fire were heard along the front of the 3d Battalion but it was believed to be harassing fire only. The Company "M" platoon on the north bank of the river encountered a few rifles and bong bong tents but suffered no casualties. Its patrol from this platoon was fired upon at 0037 hours on 10 March by an enemy machine gun and bazookas as it endeavor to enter additional houses. Company "D" patrol crossed the river but was unable to reach the main road east of H.G. 7061U because of machine gun fire directed to it. Patrol activity in the 3d Battalion sector was limited by searchlights which prevented free movement.

On the morning of 10 March, Company "M" undertook to enlarge its bridgehead on the north bank of the river against fierce and stubborn enemy resistance. At 0915 hours the nucleus of the enemy were still engaged. The company held ten houses and another house was knocked down by friendly fire from two destroyers. Two cannons were killed as they ran from the house. The Germans counter-attacked and drove the Company "M" back to the critical first house they held by extensive use of bazookas. Friendly artillery fire was directed against the buildings lost during the counter-attack and the Germans were unable to occupy them. However, the enemy covered the sector with fire so effectively that Company "M" did not move into the ruins either. The Regimental Corzine 5-4 ordered an artillery observation plane aloft to direct artillery fire on this sector. The artillery advised that the low ceiling prevented keeping a plane over the area but it would be sent up as quickly as the weather permitted.

The Regimental Corzine 5-4, Colonel CHARLES H. STAPP, 069617, of Wallace, Idaho, notified Division Headquarters at 1037 hours that the 111th Engineers, to be detonated by Engineers if it became necessary, was a distinct hazard and requested its removal. The Division 5-3 stated that the demolitions could be removed from the factory as well as from the trees along the KLOTENHOUSE-CRIES road. The 111th Engineers called to state that they would remove the demolitions during the night.

The 2d Battalion notified the Regimental S-3 that Company "D" had closed into H.G. 7061U and was preparing to take over the position held by Company "L", while Company "C" took over the sector of Company "D", and Company "K" would be held in reserve. One platoon of heavy machine guns was attached to each company.
The Division C-2 advised at 1614 hours that a prisoner was being sent to the regimental command post so that the regimental commander might make a decision to use him for propaganda purposes. The prisoner had indicated that he believed his entire company might surrender with a little persuasion and was willing to talk to them over a loud speaker system. Division stated that a raiding party might be the needed pressure to cause the Germans to surrender.

The 1st Battalion reported at 1629 hours that the relief by the 2nd Battalion was underway and proceeding satisfactorily. All of Company "F" except the platoon across the IJzer River had been relieved and Companies "H" and "M" were in the process of being relieved.

All battalions were notified at 1730 hours by the regimental S-2 that two (2) civilian volunteers were crossing the river during the night and would return the following night with whatever information they could secure. Also, the propaganda broadcast by the German prisoner would be made the following night. The 11th Infantry advised the 2nd Battalion that it was to make an attempt to secure some houses north of the river in its sector during the night.

Activity in the early morning hours of 11 March, was confined to flares along the front and maintaining contact with the 11th Infantry and the French. A few rounds of enemy artillery fell in the southern part of HUGUENOT. Some tanks and self-propelled gun fire fell in the 3rd Battalion sector.

The engineers found the factory, continue the demolitions to be removed, to be booby-trapped. ... Diagram of the booby-traps had been given to an "F" Company squad leader who had been seriously wounded and hospitalized. The engineers were informed that the 11th Infantry could furnish them with the information as to the location of the booby-traps. No action was taken as the bridge between HUGUENOT and LAQUERRE (00055292, sheet 36/4th).

An eight (8) man foot patrol from Company "H" was assigned the mission of checking the bridge 1000 yards northeast of the railroad tracks north of the IJzer River. The patrol left at 0000 hours on 10 March, and crossed the first stream by boat at a distance approximately 200 yards west of the railroad tracks, leaving west approximately 500 yards, and patrolled across the road leading to the bridge. The patrol returned a crossing for tanks at a point approximately 500 yards west of the railroad tracks (00055290, sheet 36/4th) to a point where the road crossed the river.

At 0000 hours on 11 March, the IPW (Interrogators of Prisoners of War) team attached to the regiment informed the regiment that the FFI (French Forces of the Interior) had reported five (5) GIs missing in the cellar of a house near the northeast edge of HUGUENOT (00055290, sheet 36/4th). Additional GIs were believed to be in a rail 100 yards south of the house (00055289, sheet 36/4th) and in an air raid shelter behind the rail. No signs nor trip flares were observed. It was estimated that there were approximately 100 GIs in a concentration around the bridge at the north end of town.

Observation post No. 5 reported at 1217 hours that rocket-type guns had fired twenty (20) rounds from the edge of the woods northeast of HUGUENOT. The shells made a whistling noise going up and burst in the air—the bursts leaving no smoke.
The Division 0-2 reported at 1345 hours that an air observer had noticed fresh cut trees along the highway leading northwest from HÜNEBURG. The Regimental S-3 requested Division to furnish flame throwers so that the battalions might practice with them before an attack was made. Division stated that they would be made available the following night as the 112th Infantry was using them on the afternoon of 12 March.

The Engineers advised at 1940 hours that the demolitions in the factory building in east HÜNEBURG had been removed. A visual inspection of the sides and front of the building disclosed no anti-personnel devices.

An officer of the 11th Armored Division visited the regimental command post at 2036 hours to advise that the 19th Armored Infantry was taking over the sector of the 112th Infantry, the regimental left flank (east). The 3d Battalion was notified to establish its usual contact patrols with the 19th Armored upon the relief of the 112th Infantry.

A large German combat patrol attacked the 3d Platoon of Company "M" on its right flank at 2119 hours. The fire from the platoon’s position pinned down the enemy and resulted in a fierce small arms fire fight. The Germans made no aggressive attempt to cross the river. Artillery and mortar fire were placed on the area and the Germans were dispersed.

The 3d Battalion notified regiment at 2335 hours that the French had been attacked from CHATEAUGUAY and they were assisting in repelling the attack by using H-2 mortars and artillery fire. A fire was burning at either the CHATEAUGUAY or KÖSTLER farms and the battalion was not sending out any of its patrols until the fire died down.

Everything was quiet in the Company "N" sector at 0010 hours on 12 March. A Company "N" combat patrol reached the edge of the woods northeast of HÜNEBURG (293H/2, Sheet 38/12) but no enemy activity was observed. The ground on the north side of the river was reported capable of supporting armor. Considerable enemy fires were used along the front and intermittent bursts of German machine gun fire could be heard. A Company "N" patrol left at 2330 hours and moved to the location of the demolished bridge approximately 1000 yards east of HÜNEBURG (293H/2, Sheet 38/12) where it placed some planks across the stream. The patrol had moved but a hundred yards when the Germans sent up a flare and fired upon the patrol with a machine gun from the edge of a patch of woods (293H/2, Sheet 38/12). The patrol returned at 0115 hours and reported no troop fires nor mines were encountered. Another house on the Company "N" bridgehead was occupied after a patrol found it empty.

Three (3) men sent on a contact patrol between 1st and 2d Platoons failed to report on schedule. Several patrols were sent out to look for these men but they were not located and it was presumed they were captured.

The 2d Battalion suggested on the morning of 12 March that other units that might be interested in the front of the antitank Company for attack purposes reconnoiter this area. The battalion commander desired to send out three 5’s as many patrols as were going out on regimental order. The Regimental Commander stated that he would notify the 2d Battalion on this matter as soon as he returned from a meeting with the Division Commander.
Little enemy activity occurred during the day. An enemy self-propelled gun kept firing into SCHREINHUSEN from the vicinity of ION 284 SHULICH and the 11th Field Artillery fired several concentrations on the area to silence the enemy gun. The 3d Battalion reported that the Engineers had not completed laying wire in front of the battalion's position. The 11th Engineers stated that they believed sufficient wire had been laid but would put it out here if it was desired. Arrangements were completed with the 94th Reconnaissance Company of the 34th Armored Division to send patrols to the vicinity of the woods east of CLAUSENFELD (023465, Sheet 38/14). The Division Chemical Officer advised that four new type and one old type flame throwers were available to the regiment. The 2d Battalion was ordered to pick them up from the Regimental S-4.

The Regimental Commander informed the 11th Field Artillery that the 2d Battalion was making an attack to enlarge the bridgehead across the MOISHE River on 13 March, and the battalion was to have preference on artillery missions over all other targets. The 3d Battalion was ordered to place its reserve company in an assembly area in HAGEME. This company would not be detached from the battalion unless it was committed with the 2d Battalion in the attack to enlarge the bridgehead.

A twelve (12) man patrol from Company "A" was assigned the mission of going to the KULLENDorf area and securing a prisoner so that information could be obtained for the attack across the river. The patrol crossed a footbridge between HAGEME and KULLENDorf which had been prepared for demolition by the enemy. Six (6) men of the patrol were placed on each side of the bridge in an effort to ambush the enemy. However, no activity took place and the patrol returned to Company "A" at 0330 hours. Another patrol could not cross the river because of the softness of the ground and the inexperience of the boat crew. Company "B" patrol crossed the river and moved 300 yards toward the KULLENDorf farm where it encountered a three (3) man German patrol. The enemy patrol shot up fences and the patrol returned to its company position. It was sent out again, however, to accomplish its mission.

Observation posts reported several bursts of enemy machine gun fire along the regimental front during the early morning hours of 13 March. No fire was placed on them as friendly patrols were in the area. A small group of Germans were observed on the main bridge east of KULLENDorf but they were dispersed by mortar fire and withdrew toward O.P. 304065.

At 0700 hours on 13 March, the 2d Battalion began its attack. After a short artillery preparation, Company "A" moved out and achieved tactical surprise on the enemy forces. A short but fierce fire fight ensued and the battalion secured its objectives. Thirty-six (36) prisoners were taken during the action. After gaining its objectives, Company "A" immediately began consolidating its position. The company was subjected to intense mortar and self-propelled gun fire during the remainder of the morning. Otherwise the right flank sector was comparatively quiet with moderately heavy mortar and artillery fire falling in HAGEME. The 2d Battalion was instructed to send a squad to the 2d Battalion area to clear mines and build a footbridge across the river in the same area. Division notified that the 2d Battalion had reached its objective after taking the main road of houses and moving north on the left fork of the road running into SCHREINHUSEN. Several casualties occurred due to S-mines in the sector.
The 2d Battalion informed the Regimental S-2 that facts gained from prisoners indicated the enemy force opposing it included approximately four (4) companies consisting of from 30-40 men each. The main road from HAGUEHOU to SUNBURG (O.B.314, Sheet 38/14) had been mined and blocked two weeks before the attack. One prisoner stated that the woods to the east and west of the road had also been mined.

The 111th Engineers were notified at 1115 hours that the footbridge ordered constructed for the 2d Battalion had not been begun. The Engineers were urged to speed its construction as the bridge was needed for immediate operational purposes.

The Regimental S-3 notified the 2d Battalion that a platoon of tank destroyers would be attached to it to be used as the battalion commander desired while another platoon would fire on any targets of opportunity. One company from the 3d Battalion and Antitank Company were designated to support the continuation of the attack with fire from positions south of the river. The 155th Field Artillery was instructed to register its guns in on targets immediately for the continuation of the attack, plans had been formulated for the 1st Battalion to attack at 0300 hours on 15 March, with the objective of reaching the southwest spur of the Bois de Hurschvatz east of HAGUEHOU by daylight while the 23 Battalion cleared HAGUEHOU and swung to the left (west) to clear the enemy from the northern outskirts of HAGUEHOU.

At 1140 hours the 2d Battalion requested that a company of the 3d Battalion take over the position of Company "H" in order that Company "H" could be moved to the north bank of the VERDEN River to reinforce the bridgehead as the Germans were beginning to react against the attack with increased resistance. Company "H" had continued its attack and had moved into HURSHUCH where it reached the main road running eastward in two places.

French forces requested the use of the NORTHEAST-WESTERN Highway road in the regimental sector for a twenty-four (24) hour period beginning on the night of 13 March. The French Commanding General visited the regimental command post at 1625 hours to discuss the situation and coordinate efforts for the main attack.

The 2d Battalion advised at 1727 hours that it was receiving a counter-attack on positions north of the river and that the Germans had ten armored vehicles in the area. The battalion commander requested supporting fire be sent across the river as quickly as possible as it was urgently needed. Word had been received that Company "G" was losing ground due to a strong counter-attack launched against its position from the north and northeast at 1730 hours. Counter measures were taken to repel the counter-attack and by 1931 hours the situation had quieted down somewhat, but enemy tracked vehicles could still be heard moving around in north HAGUEHOU. By 1958 hours the enemy tanks moved into the Company "H" position and were firing point blank at the troops. The company was instructed to hold its positions at all possible. However, the German tanks began knocking down the houses held by Company "G" and the troops lost much of the ground it had previously gained, the Regimental Commander ordered the tank destroyers in the Company "G" sector to fire into the area of the enemy tanks and also instructed the artillery to box in the tanks by supporting fires. The Division Commander issued orders at 2315 hours that a bazooka team was to knock out the enemy tanks before morning. Division was informed that the 2d Battalion had a patrol out looking for the German armor and supporting tanks and tank destroyers were moving into position to fire on the enemy armor the following morning. Meanwhile, the Germans shelled the bridgehead with intense concentrations.
The Germans launched another counter-attack against the 2d Battalion early on the morning of 11 March. Enemy Infantry, supported by two (2) tanks, moved close defensive unit in the house was furnished with a bazooka team which fired 60-mm mortars and destroyed the attack. Patrols north of the river were reporting no enemy activity. A division was informed at 1000 hours on 11 March that a few houses had been retaken and the sector was relatively quiet except for German artillery and mortar fire from HAGUINU.

The Regimental Commander held a meeting at the regimental command post at 1105 hours with the regimental staff, battalion commanders and all unit commanders. The Regimental S-2 in earned the commanders that the enemy forces along the regimental front were estimated to be approximately 300 infantrymen with a few self-propelled guns along the edge of the woods north of the OUPIR River. It was believed that these would strike an area of 700 yards north of the regimental front. The Germans would keep most of their infantry in direct support of their artillery, and any units that were attacked. The Regimental Commander stated that the enemy force had limited reserves but it could be expected to counter-attack whenever an objective was taken.

The Regimental S-2, "Major Robert E. Petty, O601161B," of San Antonio, Texas, informed the commanders that the 1st Armored Division was to use the road leading through the HAGUINU forest in order that it might be used as the supply route for the 1st Armored Division. It was expected that the Germans would withdraw most of their infantry and use the road south of HAGUINU as fast as possible if the enemy withdrew. The main purpose of the attack was to get through the forested area west of the 1st Armored Division and envelop the right flank of the 2d Armored Division on the left of the 1st Armored Division. The 36th Division was to push up the road northeast of HAGUINU as fast as possible if the enemy withdrew. The 36th Division was to push up the road northeast of HAGUINU as fast as possible if the enemy withdrew. The 36th Division was to push up the road northeast of HAGUINU as fast as possible if the enemy withdrew. The 36th Division was to push up the road northeast of HAGUINU as fast as possible if the enemy withdrew.

Plans had been made for engineers to construct bridges across the OUPIR River in both the 1st and 2d Battalions areas. The bridge was built long enough to support the bridgehead on the north bank of the river prior to the beginning of the main attack. The Engineers expressed concern that the bridge could be completed by 1000 hours. If proper artillery support was provided, the noise of explosions necessary to move some concrete was terminated at the beginning of the attack but was to revert to the control of the 3d Battalion.
Arrangements were made to haul lumber and iron to the western sector of MELGOULU to confuse the enemy as to the location of the bridge crossing site. The tank company and elements of the 11th armored were scheduled to stage a fake attack early on the morning of 15 March, to cover the attack on the right (east). The French were also to attack on the right in the morning to take BLP D'EOLHOFF, in conjunction with the 2nd battalion attack. The 1st battalion moved into a tactical assembly area east of MELGOULU at 0615 hours and reported everything was ready and progressing as planned. The construction of the bridge in the 2nd battalion sector was progressing satisfactorily at 2215 hours and everything was quiet except for a few rounds of enemy mortar fire landing near the bridge site.

The regimental commander stated that he inended to move supporting armored elements across the bridge as soon as it was completed so that they would be on the ground when the attack started. It was expected that the enemy would shell the bridge site heavily once the attack began. The regimental command post moved to the southwest edge of MELGOULU at 2000 hours and a forward command post was opened north of the RUBY river at 2205 hours.

A small force counter-attack was launched against Company 17th north of the river at 2230 hours but it was of brief duration and the enemy forces were quickly dispersed. The 2nd battalion was ordered to place area infantrymen at the bridge site as the engineers stepped up work under the supposition that they were without support. The reserve platoon of Company 17th was used to prevent any enemy patrol infiltrating across the canal and learning plans of movements which might disrupt the scheme of maneuver.

The 131st Field artillery was notified at 0007 hours on 15 March that there was a possibility of enemy tank being less behind friendly lines as the regimental cannon company had received enemy fire from a distance of approximately 600 yards. The regimental commander stated he had received no indication on any enemy armor behind the lines and expressed the belief that it was a self-propelled gun firing from just north of the RUBY river canal.

The 1st battalion began its attack at 0000 hours on 15 March, with Company 17th crossing the RUBY river approximately 1000 yards east of MELGOULU. After finally establishing a bridgehead against moderate resistance, the battalion moved to the edge of the BOIS 13 MURGULU, advancing with companies 17th and 10th in echelon. By 0300 hours Company 17th had established a roadblock on the road running from RUBY to MELGOULU. Company 10th encountered heavy resistance while moving north from enemy prepared positions. Supporting tanks were not able to get forward from MELGOULU and the infantry was on a wide and fierce fire fight throughout the morning.

The attack of the 2nd battalion was delayed until 0300 hours until the bridge over the river could be completed and it then began attacking RUBY. Stubborn pockets of resistance were encountered but the infantry, supported by tanks, continued to advance steadily. The 3rd battalion continued to be ready to move to the assistance of either the 1st or 2nd battalions. After an intense artillery concentration, the French began their attack at 0615 hours to encircle and capture BLP D'EOLHOFF.

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DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NARA 25S017
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NARA, Date 01/10/99.
The Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion commander to orient his company officers on the attack and its progress as the battalion would pass through the 2d Battalion and continue the attack provided plans continued as originally set up.

At 1158 hours the 1st Battalion advised that the attack had proceeded satisfactorily and positions were being organized. Ten (10) prisoners had been taken. Scattered resistance was still being met and progress was slow due to the many mines in the area. The French were reported to have been driven from the factory building in C.J. DOUBRAU F.E.R. but were re-organizing for another attack. Heavy artillery fire continued to be placed on the 2d Battalion bridge site.

During the afternoon of 15 March, the 1st Battalion continued to attack the German b-forts area northeast of HOGUIN. The resistance of supporting tanks which had broken through from HOGUIN. The barracks were taken by 1230 hours. Company "A" moved from an assembly area and passed east of Company "M" to continue the advance north along the edge of the BOIS DE BISSOUP. Discouraging but light resistance, the company moved through the wooded area and established road blocks approximately 1 mile northeast (062255, Shh. 38/1H).

The 2d Battalion continued its attacks on HOGUIN during the afternoon and by darkness Company "A" had fought through stiff resistance to reach the railroad junction (062255, Shh. 38/1A) north of the town. Company "B" was engaged in clearing the last resistance from buildings in the northern part of HOGUIN (062255, Shh. 38/1H). Company "C" fought its way to the area between the stationary and the railroad tracks in north HOGUIN. Intense enemy fire from mortars artillery and self-propelled guns was placed on all sections of northern HOGUIN.

Prisoners stated that the German command had planned a withdrawal along the HOGUIN front on the night of 12 March, but the attack to harass the 2d Battalion brigade had delayed it. They also stated that the area northeast of HOGUIN was heavily mined and all large trees along the roads had been prepared for demolition to create road blocks.

Company "B" was still moving forward in a northerly direction at 2000 hours without meeting resistance, while Companies "N" and "M" held positions in the woods northeast of HOGUIN. Contact with the 11th Infantry Division was maintained by an infantry company on the regimental left (west) flank.

At 0115 hours on 16 March, the 3d Battalion advised that patrols had reported no enemy to the battalion front which was believed to be clear of Germans. The Division S-2 informed the Regimental S-2 that all units should be alert for time bombs as the 1st Division had found two (2) in HOGUIN (390310, Shh. 38/1A)--one in a culvert and the other in the road--both were covered with dirt. It was believed by Division that no time bombs might be in the regimental sector. All units were notified accordingly.

The Regimental Commander informed the Division Commander at 0720 hours on 16 March that the 3d Battalion had been cleared to move north on the HOGUIN-SUPBOURG road. The 1st Battalion was re-organizing to move along the trails east of this road while the 2d Battalion was to remain in north HOGUIN with the mission of clearing any remaining elements of resistance that might remain in the city. The regimental
right flank was to be protected by road blocks previously established by the 1st Battalion. The Division Commander stated that the 3rd Battalion should not move north as yet, but should be used to clear LORCHI if it was necessary. Preparations were to be made for a possible move west to EVERTZHELL (960300, Sheet 38/11) incase such as the 3rd in entry was encountering strong opposition in that sector.

Arrangements were made to contact French forces by patrol action in the edge of the woods east of the ANPOZELLE farm (068240, Sheet 38/11). Both the 1st and 3rd Battalions were alerted at 0615 hours that they would move out in the direction as previously planned. Companies "A", "F", and "I" were to push forward. The 1st Battalion reported no opposition in its sector.

The Regimental S-3 requested Division to notify the Air Corps to have its planes watch for troops moving up the roads to the north and northeast of HAGUENAU as French forces on the right had been reported by American planes.

During the afternoon of 16 March, one platoon of Company "F" moved along the HAGUENAU-HEYDELFIELD (065316, Sheet 38/11) road without opposition. The remainder of the 1st Battalion remained in an assembly area (065251, Sheet 38/11) northeast of HAGUENAU. Companies "A", "F", and "I" assembled in the vicinity of the KLVT farm (064252, Sheet 38/11) north of HAGUENAU while Company "H" cleared EVERTZHELL (064229, Sheet 38/11) and established roadblocks in the vicinity of KLEINHEITZ. A combat patrol from Company "F", supported by mortar, moved down the HAGUENAU-HEYDELFIELD road without encountering enemy opposition. The 3rd Battalion made slow progress moving up the HAGUENAU-SURBERG road as the Germans had fallen many trees and placed numerous mines along the route. Patrols were sent out to find detours around these long enemy roadblocks but few were found because of mined sectors and enemy sniper activity still remaining in the woods on a delaying force. The Engineer tank destructor was knocked out by a mine while clearing trees from the road to complicate the advance still further.

The 1st Battalion, supported by a platoon of tanks, was mobilized and moved from its positions in the woods north of HAGUENAU with the mission of north to EVERTZHELL, skirting the HAGUENAU Forest on the left (west) and reaching SURBERG as quickly as possible. The trucks began moving at 0615 hours on 17 March and proceeded to EVERTZHELL without incident. Upon nearing LORCHI (968325, Sheet 38/11), the motor column was ordered a 15-mile road block and the troops dismounted to engage the enemy force. Four (4) prisoners were taken at this point after a brief firefight.

At 1110 hours Company "H" was advancing up the HAGUENAU-HEYDELFIELD road while Company "A" moved up the HAGUENAU-SURBERG road with Engineers to remove roadblocks and mines. Troops were sent ahead of the road blocks and to both flanks during the movement north through the forest. The 2nd Battalion continued to remain in an assembly area north of HAGUENAU.

The 3rd Battalion reported at 1110 hours that the first roadblock on the HAGUENAU-SURBERG road—half way through the HAGUENAU Forest—had been cleared. Another roadblock began 300 yards further north which had not been investigated. The battalion was instructed to send out patrols to determine obstacles along the route in order to maintain superior plans could be made for a rapid movement through the forest.
to SURBURG. Information secured from prisoners indicated that they were fighting a delaying action to cover the withdrawal of the main body of troops from the sector.

The 1st Battalion, having moved north to HUSENBOUG-SURBURG (066335, Sheet 38/14), in a line, began moving southwest toward BOSBURG (023330, Sheet 38/14) during the afternoon of 17 March, against light opposition. The battalion moved into DRAMBOCH without encountering opposition within the town and began assembling its troops in preparation for another movement at 1700 hours. Company "C" moved east to contact the 36th Battalion along the HUSENBOUG-SURBURG road. Company "C" moved west to the railroad tracks in the HUSENBOUG forest and then turned north to move on SURBURG. Meeting no resistance, Company "C" moved out of the outskirts of the town.

The 2d Battalion remained in its assembly area north of HUSENBOUG awaiting commit- ment. 2d Battalion, remaining south of the road leading from HUSENBOUG to the northeast. The 3d Battalion proceeded with its mission of clearing enemy roadblocks from the HUSENBOUG-SOLITAZ highway. The Germans had used every means of deception, mines, and machine guns to delay the advance on this main transportation artery. Elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions made contact at a road junction (066211, Sheet 38/14) approximately two miles southeast of SURBURG. Movement of the 3d Battalion was faster as it moved SOUTZ as enemy minefields were fewer and the roadblocks had been hastily and poorly constructed.

The 1st Battalion entered SOUTZ from the west at 0715 hours on 18 March, while the 3d Battalion moved into the southern section of the town after 0330 hours. Company "C" moved through the town and proceeded east to occupy SOULET (103337, Sheet 38/14). The 2d Battalion and 3d Battalion were massed around the right end on the morning of 18 March, then the battalion moved by truck to SOULET (103375, Sheet 38/14) and 3d Battalion Company moved to HUSENBOUG (123176, Sheet 38/14). Preparations were made by the 2d Battalion to continue the attack to the northeast as soon as it was able to assemble and reorganize in SOUTZ. By 0945 hours the road from HUSENBOUG to SOUTZ was open to jump traffic and enemy was worked as quickly as possible to expedite bridges for further traffic.

The Division Chief of Staff received at 1000 hours on 18 March that the Division Commander had issued orders for the regimental combat team to move to WISSELDOUCHAR as soon as possible by whatever means were available. The SOULET-SOULET road was to be used for the movement. Plans were formulated to have the regiment on the road by 1100 hours with the 2d Battalion leading and the 1st and 3d Battalions following in order. It was believed that the troops would have to march from SOULET as all bridges were destroyed.

The 2d Battalion moved by motor truck along the HUSENBOUG-SOURBURG-SOULET highway and crossed into SOULET at 1330 hours. The advance continued to the north immediately via the SOULET-HUSENBOUG-PALMERIT-HUSENBOUG route with the battalion arriving in SOULET at 1600 hours without meeting enemy forces. The bridges along the route were either destroyed or badly damaged. By-passes were either located or damaged bridges sufficiently repaired so that support could move forward with the battalion. Foot columns crossed the 12 HUSENBOUG river at IRUNZITZ (159438, Sheet 39/13) and encountered heavy resistance several hundred yards north of SOUTZ.
of the town from artillery fire and self-propelled guns. Company "G" occupied the area north of the river while the remainder of the battalion waited for the arrival of support armor to assist in an attack. Patrols were sent out to the front and flanks to make enemy contact and look for possible routes and by-passes where bridges had been blown. A platoon size patrol was sent to STEINSLEITZ (116p77, Sheet 39/13) at 2305 hours to contact (German) forces.

The 1st Battalion followed the route of the 2d Battalion during the afternoon of 18 March and moved into INGLSHEIE (116p77, Sheet 39/13) at 2100 hours while the 3d Battalion closed into SOULZ at 2200 hours. Antitank Company moved into RHINELLCH and supporting elements of the 753d Tank Battalion closed into SCHOFBOURG (133p, Sheet 39/13) during the evening. Progress of rear elements was retarded by the number of bridges that had to be replaced to support heavy traffic.

Described Russian and Polish prisoners of the Germans reported that they had worked on gun placements southeast of WISSEBORG on 17 March, and at that time there were approximately 500 prisoners in the area formed into labor companies who were doing forced labor for the enemy.

The 2d Battalion continued its advance toward ALTSTADT (116p, Sheet 39/13) on the morning of 19 March, encountering but light resistance from German delaying forces. The battalion cut the WISSEBORG-ALTSTADT road (116p77, Sheet 39/13) approximately on (1) mile southeast of WISSEBORG despite concentrations of enemy tank and artillery fire. All resistance was by-passed for units to try up which were following. With Company "G", commanded by 1st Lt. P. R. SULLIVAN, O1201466, of Alexandria, Louisiana, leading, the 2d Battalion crossed into Germany at 1100 hours on 19 March—the first unit of the 36th Division to fight its way into Germany. Armor and vehicles were able to locate a by-pass road into ALTSTADT and joined the 2d Battalion. The remainder of the regimental combat team continued to move forward clearing out by-passed resistance left in the sector by the 2d Battalion's rapid advance. The 1st Battalion moved to INGLSHEIE and the 3d Battalion moved into INGLSHEIE while Antitank Company closed into STEINSLEITZ. The regimental command post moved close in the van of the leading elements and established itself in ALTSTADT. The regimental G-3 requested division to furnish air support to attack the German columns withdrawing to the north and northwest along the highways leading into Germany from WISSEBORG.

During the afternoon of 19 March, the 2d Battalion continued its advance into Germany with elements of the battalion reaching a road junction approximately two (2) miles northeast of KASSEXY (116p77, Sheet 39/13). The Germans placed small arms and artillery fire on the forward elements. By 1900 hours the battalion had reached a line directly east of CHER-OFFREICH (116p84, Sheet 39/13) toward HEPPEL-OFFREICH (224p15, Sheet 39/13) where it encountered the first formidable defenses of the vanguard SIEGBERG line. The battalion launched a two (2) company attack at 2000 hours in an effort to find a weak place in the line and determine if enemy personnel were in the dragging teeth and pillboxes. As the companies approached the line, they were fired upon by approximately fifteen (15) well hidden and fortified machine guns. Unable to move forward, the fire power the troops withdrew to defensive positions but maintained their contact with the enemy.

The 1st Battalion, following the route of the 2d Battalion, moved into...
ATTEMPT at 1700 hours and then moved northeast through SCHMIDEBERG (150L90, Sheet 39/13) and thence north to positions east of BUNZLÄTTE (155S14, Sheet 39/13) where it assembled while plans were formulated to launch an attack against the SCHMIDEBERG line in that sector. The 3d Battalion moved from INGHOLT to ALTINSTEIN during the afternoon and continued its advance during the night to join the line which the 2d Battalion had formed.

Preparations were made to launch a three (3) battalion attack against the SCHMIDEBERG line during the morning of 20 March. The attack was originally planned for 1000 hours but was changed to 1000 hours due to delays caused by the 1st Battalion having to move through territory occupied by the 11th armored division. The attack was preceded by intensive artillery concentrations and was made under cover of smoke and supported by direct fire from tanks placed on the ridge overlooking the positions of the pillboxes. The attack plan placed the 2d Battalion on the left (west), the 1st Battalion on the right (east) and the 3d Battalion in the center, covering a large front of which each battalion was attacking with one (1) rifle company abreast and one (1) in reserve.

The 2d Battalion attacked the line at a point approximately one (1) mile southwest (17516, Sheet 39/13) of OBEROTTENGRESS and extending east to join the 3d Battalion line at the crossing of the OTTENBERG river north of BUNZLÄTTE. Company "A" attacked on the left (west) and Company "B" on the right (east) with Company "C" in reserve. The battalion advanced for a distance of 600-900 yards against moderate resistance but upon encountering to press still further, encountered strong concentrated machine gun fire that the advance was halted. Company "B" reached the dragon's tooth obstacles but was unable to move beyond them.

The 3d Battalion attacked in the center, had company "A" on the left (west) and Company "B" on the right (east) with Company "C" in reserve. The companies were pinned down from the time they jumped off by heavy machine gun and self-propelled gun fire and were unable to advance.

The 1st Battalion moved forward approximately 1000 yards on a line northwest of SCHMIDEBERG (212501, Sheet 39/13) where the advance elements ran into intense machine gun and other automatic weapons fire. Infantry elements supported the attack but they were unable to move through the fortifications or penetrate any of the SCHMIDEBERG defenses. Advance elements were withdrawn from forward positions when it became apparent that the enemy's defenses could not be penetrated by the attack.

The 1st Battalion was withdrawn to a reserve position in ALTINSTEIN while the 2d and 3d Battalions maintained a thin two (2) company front across their sectors in order to maintain contact with the enemy. The 2d Battalion instituted a fake attack at 2330 hours with artillery and machine gun fire to determine how the garrison would react. This fire drew heavy machine gun fire and many flares were shot into the air by the alert enemy. The 1st Battalion closed into ALTINSTEIN at 2340 hours and rested during the night. At 0800 hours on 21 March, the battalion moved by truck to SCHMIDEBERG (160593, Sheet 39/13) with the regimental artillery company.

Both units upon reaching SCHMIDEBERG were attached to the 122d Infantry Regiment.

The regimental commander called a meeting of all unit commanders on the morning of 21 March for the purpose of making plans for a coordinated attack on the
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SECRETED Line at one (1) point in the regimental sector. The most favorable point in the area was deemed to be in the 2d Battalion with a second choice to the front of the 3d Battalion. Patrols were ordered maintained during the day to keep contact with the enemy as it was believed the Germans were evacuating some parts of the line. The 113d Infantry regiment sector was weakening where an appreciable advance had been made to the west and also in the 11th Armored Division sector on the right (east). Tanks and artillery were given the mission of knocking out as many pillboxes as possible during the day. An attempt was made during the night to place Bangalore torpedoes in position to blow a path through the wire to the enemy pillboxes. The regimental commander expressed the belief that the SECRETED Line would be broken within two (2) days. Instructions to the 112d Infantry or the 11th Armored Division, however, were enjoin that their troops as much as possible and move only when absolutely essential.

The regimental commander arrived at the regimental command post to inform the regimental commander that the 1st battalion would probably remain attached to the 112d Infantry and follow that command to EBERBACH (16550, Sheet 39/13), plug up resistance which was by-passed in the pillboxes located in the 112d and 113d Infantry regiments sectors.

The 2d and 3d Battalions remained in position during the morning of 21 March, with activity centered to driving armor into firing positions and registering artillery on individual enemy fortified positions. During the afternoon the two companies of tanks were assigned to the 112d and 113d Infantry regiments. The Company B patrol was successful in destroying several of the enemy pillbox emplacements. Concentrated fire succeeded in destroying several of the emplacements.

The regimental commander ordered the battalion commanders at 1900 hours to inform him that the regiment had been ordered to withdraw from its present position and move west to the area of the 112d Infantry. Support, tanks were to remain in positions and continue firing until the &OCTBER-BERLIN road was clear, at which time they would rejoin the regiment. The 2d and 3d Battalions withdrew to assembly areas and continued firing until 2200 hours on 21 March. The 3d Battalion continued to fire on the vicinity of EBERBACH (16550, Sheet 39/13), while the 2d Battalion moved forward to move on to the vicinity of OBST-EBERBACH. The 112d Infantry moved the regimental 1st Battalion into position in the woods northwest of OBST-EBERBACH. The 112d Infantry moved the regimental 3rd Battalion into position in the woods northwest of OBST-EBERBACH. The 1st Battalion launched an attack north through the woods. Progress was made along the many German pillboxes and by 2200 hours Company F had reached a point approximately one (1) mile northwest (16550, Sheet 39/13) of OBST-EBERBACH, while Company G knocked out forty (40) prisoners were taken by the battalion during the morning. The regimental command post moved to REICHENFLACH at 0600 hours on the morning of 22 March.

During the afternoon of 22 March, the 1st Battalion continued to attack the

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DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, AND 755017

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

By NARA, Date 01/07/92
SIDE LD defences and advanced by isolating and demolishing individual positions. Several pillboxes were rendered useless by placing explosives on the air pipes and letting the explosion force smoke and steam into the fortress which forced the Germans to surrender. By 1800 hours Company "C" had reached a road of forts atop a large hill on and one-half (1½) miles south (1655/0, Sheet 39/13) of OSTERHOLCH (1655/0, Sheet 39/13) with Company "A" continuing to clear the woods north of OSTERHOLCH. By 1800 hours Company "B" reached and cleared a large fort 400 yards southeast (1655/3, Sheet 39/13) of OSTERHOLCH, but the company was forced to withdraw to defensive positions under heavy enemy artillery and rocket concentration. The battalion cleared approximately twenty-five (25) pillboxes and forts during the night, resulting in a general weakness of the German defences. The Germans began surrendering more readily during the early morning of 23 March. By 1200 hours the 1st Battalion had cleared the area south of OSTERHOLCH and was moving by 1500 to an assembly area near OSTERHOLCH (2655/0, Sheet 39/13).

The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve during the afternoon of 22 March, and moved into OSTERHOLCH at 2000 hours. During the early morning of 23 March, the battalion moved west of OSTERHOLCH and prepared to move through the 1st Battalion and continued the attack. By 1000 hours on 23 March, the battalion had cleared OSTERHOLCH and was moving by foot toward OBERHOLZHEIM since all vehicle transportation was held up pending opening of the OBERHOLZHEIM-BIKE highway.

The 3rd Battalion cleared OSTERHOLCH (1655/0, Sheet 39/13) during the afternoon of 22 March and by 1700 hours had assembled to move north through OBERHOLZHEIM with the mission of bypassing the 1st Battalion and attacking north. The 3rd Battalion had reached a point north of OBERHOLZHEIM at 0300 hours on 23 March, when an almost complete cessation of enemy resistance caused a change in plans and the battalion was ordered to assemble in the vicinity of MARE-HEIL (3655/5, Sheet 39/13) and be prepared to move to OBERHEIM.

mittank Company, which was attached to the 1st Battalion, served as carrying parties and captured several of the pillboxes on 22-23 March.

The 2nd Battalion reached OBERHOLZHEIM at 1300 hours and assembled its troops and equipment. The regimental headquarters and a battery Intelligence & Reconnaissance Platoon were sent west to reconnoiter a route for the battalion to reach LEBLOTH (2555/9, Sheet 68/1) so that the attack could be continued toward the northwest. The battalion advanced throughout the afternoon and evening against light resistance, reaching LEBLOTH and then moving northwest cross country to STENTFELS (2555/2, Sheet 68/1) where it assembled at 2200 hours on 23 March.

The 3rd Battalion closed into NABEPH at 2300 hours while the 1st Battalion remained in the vicinity of OBERHOLCH. During the morning of 23 March, the 1st Battalion prepared to move to OBERHOLCH (3657, Sheet 68/15).

Activity within the regimental sector on the morning of 23 March, consisted of picking up numerous prisoners from pillboxes and fortresses in the surrounding countryside and preparing to advance to the northeast toward the RHINE river. Over 50 prisoners were taken from noon 22 March to noon 23 March.

The regimental command post moved to HELI (3655/3, Sheet 68/15) at 1230 hours on 23 March. The battalions remained in assembly areas throughout the night and at 1000 hours on 24 March began moving by motor truck to clear and occupy the SPYTH (5180, Sheet 68/16), "VIBERT" (1656/0, Sheet 67/10) area along the west bank of the RHINE river. The regimental command post moved from HELI to VIBERT (12872/5).
sheet 6715) until the afternoon of 25 March. The 1st Battalion closed into
KONMEN (497750, Sheet 6715) at 1215 hours while the 2d Battalion moved into
7777 (160750, Sheet 6716). Company "C" occupied KONMEN (497750) Sheet
26-27, while the remainder of the 3d Battalion moved into KONMEN (497750) Sheet
26-27, where 120-1 and 155 mm artillery elements of the 15th Infantry Division
were located.

Defensive works were set up along the RHINE River west bank and patrols were
maintained on both sides. The 1st Battalion retained its dug-in positions while the 2d
Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion in regimental reserve. The 2d Battalion was
ordered across the river during the night of 26-27 March, and troops were
moved over roads on the east side of the river to create an impression that I Corps
was a large force. The 1st Battalion was ordered to cross the river at a point on the
east side of the river near Ledeburg. The 3d Battalion was also ordered to cross
the river to the north of LEBEN and south of OBEN. The patrol reported no activity
on the island. Positions of the 1st Battalion were captured by the 15th Infantry
Division, and the remaining troops were evacuated to the east bank of the river.

Little activity occurred in the regimental sector on 27 March. Tank destroyers
were set up in OBEN and fired on enemy installations on the east bank of the
river, concentrating on machine gun positions which had been firing into the 3d
Battalion area. The Germans were caught with mortar concentrations in the southeastern
sector of OBEN.

A Company "C" patrol moved through positions of the 2d Battalion to attempt a
crossing of the river. The patrol was forced to wait until 0230 hours on 28 March
to launch its boats due to the height of the water. The lead boat was halfway across
in the swift current when it was fired upon by enemy machine guns from four (4)
different directions. The boat capsized and the occupants were lost. The officer
commander of the patrol in the lead boat was picked up and rescued by the same
boat. The patrol was ordered to the east bank of the river near OBEN and an
attempt was made to search the river with an outboard motorboat but the noise of
the motor drew heavy fire from German positions and the attempt had to be abandoned. A
request was made to the command on the regiment's north flank to send the river
forces for the missing members of the patrol.

The 3d Battalion advanced at 0830 hours on 28 March, and troops were
manoeuvred across the river and then engaged in heavy fighting in an effort to cross the river. The patrol drew heavy automatic weapons fire from the
middle of the river and was forced to return to the next bank.

French troops began arriving in the regimental sector on 29 March, and the

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Division C-3 was called for information as to why these units were moving. The division advised that the regiment was to be relieved by elements of the 3d French and 2d French division on 29-30 March, and be pulled back to an assembly area. The 1st Battalion, which was in regimental reserve, began moving at 1000 hours on 29 March, and closed into VINCENT (183990, Sheet 69S1). Relievers of the 2d Battalion were delayed until 2100 hours when it moved to PUSSY (185500), Sheet 69S1. The 3d Battalion, Grenade Company and the 111st Field Artillery were attached to the 113th Infantry until their relief could be completed on 30 March. Command of the regimental sector was turned over to the French at 1900 hours on 29 March, and the regimental's rear area moved to SEQUELLE (185980, Sheet 69S1). The 3d Battalion, Grenade Company and the 111th Field Artillery moved during the night of 30-31 March to the regimental assembly area. Preparations were made on 31 March to move the regimental combat team to an area northwest of KUEBELAUMEN, to assist the Allied military in controlling conquered German territory.

The (9) officers and (1) enlisted man reinforcements were received during the month of March. Two (2) of the officers were commissioned from the enlisted ranks of the regiment. The other seven (7) officers came from reinforcement drafts which were awarded to the regiment.

All of the commission officers were well liked by the enlisted men.

German prisoners of war taken by the regiment during the month of March, 1945, are listed by days as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>5 March</th>
<th>13 March</th>
<th>15 March</th>
<th>16 March</th>
<th>17 March</th>
<th>18 March</th>
<th>19 March</th>
<th>22 March</th>
<th>23 March</th>
<th>26 March</th>
<th>27 March</th>
<th>30 March</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A vast quantity of enemy war material was captured and destroyed during the month. The rapid movement of the regiment, plus the rapid advance of the American forces, and the resulting demoralization of the enemy, accounted for the quantity of prisoners captured.

- 154 guns
- 22 tanks
- 71 mortars
- 1500 Projectiles
- 500,000 rounds
- 125 French guns, unknown type
- 2 20mm guns
- 1 105mm gun
- 1 155mm gun
- 1 88mm gun
- 1 120mm gun
- 1 75mm gun
- 1 47mm gun

Stores of food and ammunition were seized. The villages in the STTWELLE defenses were filled with all types of arms, ammunition, and other war material.

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By

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The actual collection of enemy war materiel was left for following units in the area traversed by the regiment.

The morale of the troops during the month was excellent. The brief training period at the end of February and the first three (3) days in March afforded units their first opportunity to work together as a cohesive force and establish reliance on each other of the officers and enlisted men. Although the training period was of short duration it bore fruit in the successful attack operations of the regiment later in the month.

The division rest camp at D. HUS-LES-1, the VI Corps rest camp at NANT, and passes to PARIS, BRUSSELS and the UNITED KINGDOM afforded both officers and enlisted men needed rest and recreation from combat.

Four (4) officers and sixteen (16) enlisted men returned to the United States for rest, rehabilitation and recuperation during the month.

END

Report of operations written and prepared by:

S/Sgt ROBERT D. DILGER, 6665208
Service Company, 1st Infantry
Regimental Sergeant Major

S/Sgt HERMAN L. SCHOFING, 6777155
Company H, 1st Infantry

T/Sgt HARRY L. HANSEN, 1h19589
Service Company, 1st Infantry

SECRET
The month of April opened with the 11th Infantry Regimental Combat Team moving to the vicinity of REICHENBACH (5000, Sheet 37/11) to assist the Allied military government in policing the area west and northwest of FAUSSELAND. The regiment had finished its active combat on 30 March, along the west bank of the RHEIN between SPEYER and PEREGRINE and had moved to an assembly area north of HEBENSTADT. Preparations were made there for the movement to the new area via motor truck. Early on the morning of 2 April, the first march unit began moving and the 1st Battalion closed into its new area around JETSHEIM (5704, Sheet 37/11) at 1100 hours, while the 3rd Battalion arrived in the vicinity of SCHONEBURG (7930, Sheet 37/11) and the 2d Battalion moved to STROMSGEBERG (7922, Sheet 37/10) at 1205 hours. The 11th Field Artillery Battalion and the Regimental Censored Company closed into the PLANSENSHEI ZERO (7897, Sheet 37/11) area at 1300 hours.

The problems of assisting the Allied military government were new and foreign to a combat unit. Certain directives had been issued by higher headquarters as a basis to begin such operations but the actual work of carrying out these instructions had to be initiated by each unit. At 1700 hours on 2 April, the regimental Commander held a meeting with all of his unit commanders to prepare them for their new assignment. All commanders were notified that they would be held responsible for the support of the military government in the area assigned to them. The security of the area was to be insured by adequate patrolling with personnel stationed at check points throughout the area to scrutinize all movement of traffic and civilians. Patrolling instructions called for a minimum of two (2) patrols daily. The patrol was to be maintained between the hours of 1500 and 2100, while the other would be maintained at irregular intervals during the curfew hours of 1800 to 0600 hours. All patrols were to be motorized with tow vehicles being used on each patrol. The lead vehicle was to be followed by the other vehicle at a distance of not less than one (1) minute. The patrols were to observe all civilian traffic, curfew hours for civilians, civilian conduct, inter-town traffic, contact with all check points in patrol areas, and obfuscation by civilians of the military government regulations within the area.

Check points were to be established on important avenues of communication. Commanders were instructed to keep the number of check points to a minimum consistent with adequate security for the area. Each check point was to employ a minimum of two (2) sentries—one to challenge and the other to cover the challenged from a distance of at least fifty (50) feet. Check point personnel were to be instructed that all military personnel would be required to have knowledge of the password and were on authorized business within the regimental area by all civilians possessed a pass allowing their circulation in the area; the observance of curfew hours by civilians; and to prevent the passage of civilian vehicles except where it was definitely determined that specific authority had been given by regimental or higher headquarters for the operation of the vehicle.

All towns and villages within the regimental area were to be screened for...
Norman military and political personnel. Prior to the screening operation, all exits to each town or village were to be blocked. The local burgomaster would then be instructed to assemble all citizens over twelve (12) years of age at a central location to be interrogated and have their identification papers checked. All persons found to be in a political or military category were to be evacuated as prisoners of war. The local burgomaster was to be required to furnish the officer in charge of the screening with the names and locations of all males of the required age who could not be present because of sickness or other reasons. An officer was to personally check each one of these individuals. The population of the villages was to then be informed that any personnel apprehended after the screening operation would be treated as a spy and not as a prisoner of war. While the males were being screened, a minimum of ten percent (10%) of the houses within the town were to be checked for personnel who might be hiding. The screening town was to collect all firearms, radio transmitters and military stores of any kind within the village. A receipt in duplicate was to be made for each article collected with one copy of the receipt being given to the owner of the property while the other copy was forwarded to regimental headquarters with the collected article.

Each battalion area was to be divided into an area of town responsibility for the collection of all military stores and equipment. Civilian personnel could be used for collecting these stores provided adequate military guards accompanied them. All such stores and equipment collected were to be assembled in a central location and held under adequate guard until instructions could be issued to forward them to a rear echelon collecting point.

Each town was to be held responsible for clearing trash and rubble from roads and gutters as well as for the collection and burial or burning of all trash from dismantled vehicles and storage piles. The removal and burial of dead animals was to be the responsibility of the town where the animal was located. Any excess edible food prepared for the troops and not consumed was to be turned over to the local burgomaster for distribution to the civilian population. Arrangements by military personnel with individuals for disposing of excess food was prohibited.

In view of the expected food shortage within cavalry, it was deemed advisable to convert unused edible food for civilian consumption rather than dump it into pits as garbage.

Medical personnel were informed that the Army would not provide medical personnel were expressly forbidden to render medical aid to civilians except on specific order of the area commander. It was expected that existing civilian channels of medical aid would be used. Only in an emergency would Army medical supplies and assistance be diverted to civilian use and only then upon the decision of the area commander. Evacuation of civilian cases was to be handled through civilian agencies or Army medical clearing companies. The local burgomaster was to report all cases of sickness within his town. Upon receipt of this report, the battalion surgeon was to conduct an investigation to determine whether or not the case was contagious. If the case was contagious, the person was to be quarantined together with such persons who were suffering the diseased case. An immediate report was to be made to higher headquarters of all contagious diseases located within the regimental area.

The area commanders were to appoint military personnel to act as civil affairs.
Office for each town. This Civil Affairs officer was to have certain hours designated for conducting official business during the day. All civil affairs were to be handled through the town Burgemeister by both the Civil Affairs Officer and the civilians themselves. The Civil Affairs officers were to handle the granting of "farm's identification cards" which permitted the travel of farmers from the local town to his farm; permission to conduct burials; supervision of the state of police and conduct of the civilians; the preliminary investigation of all disorders and disciplinary reports; taking of a census of the town personnel by the local Burgemeister; continuous checks on the presence of unauthorized civilian personnel within the town, insuring that a list was posted on the outside of each building indicating the name and number of occupants therein; and the securing of necessary data for the issuance of DEP military government exceptions passes which permitted travel between towns.

All displaced personnel of other nationalities than German were to be collected, if they so desired, and taken to the Displaced Personnel Center in VIENNA. If such personnel indicated their desire to remain in their present locations, they were to be treated as German civilians and would be required to abide by local regulations.

The regimental commander closed his meeting with the statement that units should not rush into the problems of assisting the military government without adequate preparation. Patrols and check points were to be instituted immediately, but the screening of personnel within towns and villages was to be planned and carried out by thoroughly instructed military personnel.

Division Headquarters issued instructions on April 1 that any enemy supply dumps located within the regimental area should be guarded, if possible, the ammunition was to be collected and turned into the division collecting point. Any enemy dumps that were found to be minor were to be destroyed in place. However, if the enemy dump was a very large ordnance dump it would be detailed to clear the mines and take charge of any unexploded bombs found in the sector.

On 5 April the companies were moved to the area to which they had been assigned in order to begin screening operations. Companies N, N, and N moved into JETTENBACH (870), Sheet 37/10) while Companies W, W, and W occupied AUSSEBERG (893053, Sheet 38/10). Companies W and M moved into WÖFELN (704879, Sheet 37/11) and Company H located itself in RÖMLEIN (765789, Sheet 37/11). While those units moved, the other companies remained in their original locations of 2 April.

The area assigned to the regiment was extensive, to travel its outer boundaries would entail a trip of 164 miles. The regimental area's lateral width was twenty-two and one-half (222) miles and its greatest longitudinal length was sixty-six and one-quarter (626) miles. The terrain was very hilly and wooded with numerous villages and intensively cultivated fields. The civilians were very docile upon the entrance of the troops into their towns. Some villages had been bombed or shelled badly while others were not touched at all. The wreckage of many German vehicles lay along the sides of the highway—a great many had been destroyed by supporting aircraft, while others had been abandoned or destroyed by the Germans themselves.

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On 4-5 April the companies began their screening operations, giving the townspeople no warning, all exits to the village were closed. Minimum of a platoon of troops commanded by an officer and accompanied by a regimental or battalion staff officer moved quickly into the town. The Burgermeister was summoned and instructed to notify all males within the village to assemble at a central location. Upon notification from the Burgermeister that all males were present, the males were required to show their identification papers to the senior officer, quite a few discharged German army soldiers were picked up in this manner. The officer then checked the homes of these males to determine if they were in hiding or that they concealed any weapons. A number of these males were given 24 hours to escape military control by donning civilian clothes and moving to villages to the east. A number of these males were transported to a camp in civilian homes. A great many displaced persons were transported to a camp in civilian homes. A great many displaced persons were transported to a camp near the displaced persons center in RAISSTAL. The town of RAISSTAL (862.942, Sheet 37/11) was occupied and controlled by the 3rd Battalion, 11th Armored Regiment, being the furthest town within the regimental jurisdiction of the regimental commander.

The area commanders were also instructed on 5 April, that a search was to be made of wooded areas and other places of possible concealment for any hidden enemy war material or German soldiers. Places to be searched were to be isolated and searched by automatic weapons. Guards were to be placed outside the perimeter of the area to insure the safety of all exits. Civilians were to be used to guide units through the areas around any known military fields. A strafing line was to be formed after sufficient guards were placed outside wooded areas and the troops would then move through the sector. If resistance was encountered, it was to be dealt with aggressively and eliminated.

The regimental commander notified all units to send quartering parties to the regimental command post at 0600 hours on 2 April, as the regimental combat team had been ordered to move to a new area which included the cities of WÜRZBURG (1515, Sheet 25/2), OBERERHEIM (6600, Sheet 25/2), SCHIFFHEIM (1668, Sheet 25/2) and NEUSTADT (3082, Sheet 25/2).

Company "A" moved from HASSELBACH (7803, Sheet 37/10) at 0600 hours on 7 April to LÜNINGERHEIM (1600, Sheet 25/2). Closing into its new area at 1045 hours, Company "A" relieved the Antitank Company of the 11th Infantry Regiment of the 103rd Infantry Division by 1200 hours. The remainder of the regimental combat team began its movement by truck to the new area at 1330 hours on 7 April. The 2d Battalion, the regimental command post moved into OBERERHEIM. The 3d Battalion moved into SCHIFFHEIM at 1330 hours and Company "A" was sent on an advance mission to relieve elements of the 103rd Division which were guarding a displaced persons center near the town and effect the relief by 1500 hours. Antitank Company marched through SCHIFFHEIM (165293, Sheet 25/2) and Service Company occupied RUSSTAL (32506, Sheet 25/2).

The command post had been established but a few hours when information was

- 6 -
the west bank of the RHINE River. Without exception they had all experienced a great deal of Allied bombing. Large areas of HOFFS, LUDWIGSHAFEN, FRANKENTHAL, and BAD DURKHEIM had been leveled to the ground or were masses of twisted wreckage and debris. The outward appearance of the cities was a nightmare, but many people still lived within them. Industry was at a complete standstill and from the outward appearance of the gutted factories, it looked as though it would be for a long time to come. Farm life went on much as usual with the people laboring in the fields each day. The green, well-kept, cultivated fields were in striking contrast to the desolate cities.

At dawn on 10 April, the 1st Battalion conducted its raid to check the area reported to be harboring 10-20 German soldiers. Fifty (50) men were picked up but only five (5) of them were found to be German soldiers. The remainder were released upon checking their identification papers. Division requested information at 0533 hours as to the guarding of a warehouse in FRANKENTHAL containing 230 tons of German frozen meat. Division was informed that the 3d Battalion had posted guards on this building earlier in the morning. The 3d Battalion reported that the roads around the railhead in FRANKENTHAL, which were not used by military traffic, had been blocked in order to keep civilians away from the railhead itself. The 3d Battalion was called upon during the day to furnish guards to the military government in LUDWIGSHAFEN to help evacuate displaced persons. All units maintained their three moving check points during the day and motorized patrols during the hours of curfew.

Information was received from Division on 11 April that Swedish prisoners of war and vehicles, marked with red triangles and Swedish flags, were known to be in Germany under civilian hospitals and institutions of the Swedish government. A truck with a red square in a white circle, were located in the country. These units were to be given the same protection as the Red Cross emblem and all personnel were instructed accordingly.

The Division Commander arrived at the regimental command post at 1200 hours on 11 April, and accompanied the regimental Commander on a tour of the regimental area. Information was received that Division was starting a series of inspections and the administration, motor vehicles, equipment, kitchens and sanitation would be checked.

On 13 April, an elderly man came to the command post of the 131st Field Artillery Battalion and reported that there was a movement planned by the Hitler Youth Organization for a general uprising on 20 April—Hitler's birthday. The man was held and interrogated by the Intelligentsia Corps personnel questioned him but no facts were found to substantiate his claims.

Information was received on the morning of 13 April, that President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT had died on 12 April, and all flags within the regimental area were ordered to be flown at half-mast in his honor. The President's funeral was to be held at 1000 hours on 15 April, and units were advised to have appropriate retreat ceremonies on that day.

The 1st Battalion was instructed to make a reconnaissance of the area around EISENBERG (207, Sheet 5-5) with the view in mind of moving to that vicinity for

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received that the military government was experiencing trouble in MUTTERSTADT from displaced persons. French, Polish, Russian and other nationalities were reported to be looting and killing cattle. A reinforced platoon from company E was sent to MUTTERSTADT at 1930 hours to control the disturbance.

The regimental combat team was the only unit of the 36th division which moved. Other divisional units remained in place with the exception of taking over the former regimental area. The regimental mission in its new area was the same as in its former sector. The division commander had issued orders that more work was to be done on training the troops for combat.更重要的是, patrols were to be spread out over much of the security of the area although check points were to be maintained by each area commander. Troops were not to be separated from their units as it was desired that adequate strength be maintained at all times. The military government requested assistance to eliminate any disturbances. The regimental commander informed the area commanders that check points were to be set up at different roads each day for two or three hours to check civilian traffic moving between towns.

The 1st battalion reported at 2135 hours on 8 April that several disturbances had occurred in the HORDS sector. Company A's patrol had been fired upon while making its rounds in the city, while troops guarding a wine cellar had been fired upon by officers and men of the 2d replacement depot located in HORDS when they had been refused admittance to the cellar. This matter was immediately reported to the commanding officer, 2d replacement depot. A man dressed in civilian clothes was picked up in the 1st battalion area for creating a disturbance. He revealed that he was a German soldier and upon being questioned further gave the location of approximately 40-50 other German soldiers in the area. Plans were formulated to make a raid on this sector at dawn.

On 9 April, the 3d battalion was relieved of its responsibilities in HORDS by elements of the 36th division artillery by 1100 hours and moved to the outskirts of FRANKENVIELT (W.O. Sheet V-3).

The regimental commander attended a meeting at the Allied military government office in FRANKENVIELT at 1100 hours on 9 April to investigate previous disturbances and acts of sabotage within the city. The regimental commander also checked with the provost marshal of the 33d military police company as to whether or not any attempt had been made to load empty trucks moving west with displaced persons. The provost marshal stated that he had never attempted to stop these trucks and believed that this was not a matter for the military government to handle.

The regimental S-2 was informed that all British nationals found within the regimental area were to be taken to the division provost marshal where they would be taken care of by that office.

Plans were made to establish training programs for the units with such men as were available after the military government details were taken care of. The 2d replacement depot took over the area selected by the 1st battalion on 10 April, for training purposes and the battalion advised that it would require additional time to locate another one.

The area taken over by the regiment consisted of a number of large cities along


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several days' training, Company A, Antitank Company, and one company from the 3d Battalion would take over the 1st Battalion area. These units would be designated the regimental 4th Battalion for this purpose.

The Regimental Combat Team continued with its mission of garrisoning, policing, and supporting the civilian government by motorized patrols, random checks, and guard details. Eighty-three (83) German prisoners were taken by these units in this sector through 14 April, as they continued to search and protect the towns and their areas.

The Allied military government informed the Regimental S-2 at 1500 hours on 14 April, that German were crossing the Rhine River in boats and wanted to know what would be done about it. The military government officials were informed that the regiment could not possibly patrol the river front without motor boats which were not available. To place guards along the river from Luneburger to Worms would have entailed more personnel than were available.

A number of American soldiers were picked up in Worms on the evening of 14 April, for causing a disturbance. All soldiers were from the 2d Replacement Depot. Two of them were turned over to the Provost Marshal while the others were returned to the replacement depot.

The 131st Field Artillery Battalion reported at 2000 hours that it had located seven (7) box cars of ammunition and hand grenades in Schiffestadt (1680). Ammunition was also reported in nearby woods.

Division instructed the Regimental S-3 on 15 April, that before anything could be moved from a German dump or Ordnance depot by any person, it would be necessary to secure a written form signed by the Seventh Army Ordnance Office and countersigned by the Division S-3.

The Commanding Officer of the 2d Replacement Depot informed the Regimental Commander at 1900 hours on 15 April that guards had been doubled in the city of Worms. The Depot Commander stated that all ammunition had been taken from the area within the depot except that on guard duties and ammunition would be issued only for training purposes to those who were on guard. The Depot Commander indicated that he desired and would cooperate with the regiment in every way possible to maintain law and order within Worms.

On 16 April, thirty (30) guards were attached to the 2d Battalion to assist it in clearing up its area of small arms and ammunition. The Regimental S-2 was advised by the 2d Battalion that it was experiencing trouble in Luneburger with civilians who were disobeying curfew regulations. To stem the increase in curfew violations patrols were sent to various localities and all violators were rounded up, fined, and after being kept under confinement for twenty-four (24) hours, were released. Curfew violations dropped abruptly after a few such incidents. In the 131st Field Artillery area thirteen (13) people were picked up for curfew violations while the 1st Battalion picked up 250 who were turned over to the Allied military government. Some of the violators were reported to be high ranking Nazi officials who were taken into military custody.
SECRET

June 16, 1945. The 1st and 3d Battalions and the 131st Field Artillery Battalion reported they had finished policing and screening their areas.

At 0800 hours on 17 April, the 1st Battalion was relieved by the newly constituted 3rd Battalion. Cannon Company took over the 1st Battalion Headquarters installations, Antitank Company occupied Company "C" area and Company "E" the Company "E" sector. All guard details were taken over by Antitank Company and Company "E", with cannon Company in a reserve status conducting training. The 1st Battalion and one battery of the 131st Field Artillery moved into tents in the vicinity of Raveng 3702, for training programs. Prior to departure to its training area, the 1st Battalion sent a patrol to Westhoffen 3702, Sheet V-2, at the request of the military government to investigate a disturbance reported to have been caused by approximately sixty (60) Polish displaced persons with weapons.

Another disturbance was reported at 2005 hours on 17 April, in Butt Slid, when approximately 100 Italians led by a Frenchman broke into a warehouse and stole a quantity of sugar. The Frenchman was armed and had fired on some civilians. Company "E" placed outposts around the warehouse and plans were made to raid some of the houses known to contain displaced persons in an effort to regain the loot taken from the warehouse.

The 4th Battalion received information from a German boy of about fifteen (15) years to the effect that the youth had recognized German SS troops in civilian clothes crossing the Rhine River in the regimental sector. The boy stated to the Counter Intelligence Corps personnel who questioned him that these men wereSelected to do sabotage work.

On 19 April, the 4th Battalion requested ordnance and Engineer personnel be sent to WoFFS to pick up ammunition and rifle dumps located within the city. The battalion was informed that the Engineers were very busy collecting enemy material and would take care of the dumps as quickly as possible.

At 1030 hours on 19 April, the division G-3 called for a unit deployment list which was to be submitted by 20 April. The list was to include companies, missions, locations, number of posts and the total number of men employed during a twenty-four (24) hour period on all the details. Division also ordered adequate guard placed on the grounds of an electrical factory on the outskirts of Westhoffen 3702. This factory was reported to contain motors, wire, welding machines and a large quantity of paint. Company "E" was detailed to guard this equipment. The regimental G-2 was cautioned by the Division G-2, that all regimental units should be especially alert on the following day since it was Hitler's birthday, and if any popular uprisings occurred, the men should be prepared to handle them. Six (6) prisoners were taken during the day of 19 April by Check Points and mined patrols.

A quartermaster party from the 38th Infantry Division arrived at the regimental general post at 0955 hours on 20 April to discuss the general situation of the battalions and billeting arrangements. Future plans called for the regimental combat teams being relieved by elements of the 38th Division and the following units advance party had arrived to check the sector and secure adequate billeting room. The Commanding Officer of the 38th Infantry Regiment, 28th
SECRET

Pocatello, Idaho, reported a summary of the regimental problems in support of military government to the 36th Division Commander. Colonel GHINS stated that the reinforcement of military government insofar as civilian personnel were concerned was a comparatively simple matter. The civil populace, except for displaced persons, were very amenable to military direction and in general endeavored to comply with military directives. The exceptions to this were the increasing number of curfew violations and an increase in the circulation restriction violations. The former was corrected by the good practice of setting up curfew violations checks wherein the entire community would be locked by the entire military garrison. This would cause the violations to drop to zero and then there would be a gradual increase. This was believed due to the compliant attitude of the military government officials who undoubtedly were anxiousing to get people settled in their homes and permit them sufficient freedom to insure the initiation of self-supporting conditions.

The regimental commander reported displaced persons caused few difficulties when they were regulated and kept under surveillance. However, if they were allowed to become scattered out it resulted in many cases of looting, disorders and violence. These difficulties were reduced by the collection of displaced persons and putting them in central locations.

The most serious problem within the regimental sector was the control of American military personnel. American military personnel in the area were of a transient nature and had such divergent activities that identification and control by the security command troops was exceedingly difficult. Such troops might be in the area overnight or for a protracted stay. Their attitude was that of individuals who acknowledge and admit no responsibility for their conduct. The greatest problem of such personnel fell into three classes. First, colored troops who were mainly from Southern states and units were the least disciplined and the majority of the disorders within the area were traceable to this group. The identification of personnel in these groups was very difficult due to their transient activities, the inability of civilians to recognize offenders and the lack of properly trained police identification personnel on the part of the security troops. Second, personnel from the reinforcement center in HQ/OBS presented the next greatest problem. Difficulties here, however, were reduced by cooperation of the reinforcement center commander and the area commander. The administration by the security commander of security of installations was subject to many conflicting authorities and in many cases resulted in duplication of effort such as two organizations placing guards on the same installation.

The Counter Intelligence Corps detachment with the regiment was deemed to be of great assistance in locating focal points of civil disorders on the part of displaced persons. Almost all reports of probable or incipient trouble were usually exaggerated.

As a result of his observations the regimental commander recommended that a central billeting and registration officer be established in each major community for all military organizations stationed within the area. Whenever duty time their duties required them to be there. No soldier should be permitted to carry arms or ammunition except when on duties that required them. A curfew was recommended for all military personnel effective at 2100 hours with the only
Division, advised that his regiment would not take over all of the 11th Infantry sector but would take over LINDENHOF, MUTHEN, PLUNKERTHAL, and OCHSENSCHEID. A portion of the 11th Infantry Regiment area would also be taken over by the 109th Infantry.

On 21 April the 3d Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion, less company "K", in PLUNKERTHAL and the 3d Battalion moved to RAISSEN for a period of training. Company "K" relieved Company "A" with the 11th Battalion in WURZ and Company "A" rejoined the 3d Battalion in RAISSEN. All units continued to occupy and secure their sectors, maintaining guard, patrolling, and roving check points. Each unit of the regimental combat team conducted small unit training with such personnel as was available, conditioning exercises and games.

German civilian was killed in PLUNKERTHAL on the night of 21-22 April, and the investigation was turned over to the Counter Intelligence Corps. Another case was investigated wherein an American soldier had been killed by other soldiers in PLUNKERTHAL. It developed that it was a case of self-defense wherein the man who was killed had been threatening others with a loaded rifle. This case was taken over by the 910th Antiaircraft Battalion whose personnel were involved.

Elements of the 109th Infantry Regiment, 38th Division, commandeered the regimental 2d Battalion at 1200 hours on 22 April and the relief was completed by 1515 hours. The 2d Battalion moved into the assembly area in HERTENHEIM (2204, 8606), an advance party of regimental headquarters, 10th Infantry, moved into OPFELHEIM. Although orders had not been received by the regiment to move, in order to accommodate the relieving unit the regimental command post was moved to EISENER (2106, 8702) by 1915 hours. The 11th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved in SCHRITZ and also moved to the vicinity of EISENER by 1800 hours. A curfew was put in force for military personnel not on duty by 2000 hours in the city of HEUS.

On 23 April, the regiment continued to train and prepare for a movement east of the RHINE river to a destination as yet not disclosed. The 11th Battalion continued to occupy and secure the WURZ sector. A disturbance at the prisoner of war camp in WURZ was reported caused by the guards at the camp. The disturbance did not involve regimental personnel.

A quartering party of the 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion arrived at the 4th Battalion headquarters in WURZ at 1200 hours on 24 April to effect plans for a relief which was to start at 1000 hours on 25 April.

Instructions were received from Division G-3 that the regiment would move east of the RHINE river to the vicinity of the towns of FORSTENNAU (4277, 8604), OBERHEIM (7062, 8604), and SCHWABACH (1659, 8604). Upon closing into this new area the regiment would be in 1st Army reserve prepared for immediate offensive operations. The regimental intelligence and reconnaissance was instructed to precede the march column to make area reconnaissances and check with the military police circuits so that roads would be cleared for the motor columns.

Upon completion of the mission of supporting the military government in the West RHINE sector, the regimental command, Colonel CHARLES H. KENES, O657, of...
exceptions being those on duty status. The curfew should be set by higher authority than the area commander. The responsibility for the control of military personnel should be placed on the commander of the unit to which personnel were assigned. The mutual exchange of ideas by the military governor and the security commander on common problems confronting both individuals was also recommended. The military governor should be made to realize that the presence of security troops within his area was to suppress disorders and not to maintain police officials.

On 26 April, the regimental combat team began its move to its new area in the vicinity of UBLOCHEN (146N, Sheet V-L) by motor truck. Before the movement began, Company "A" reverted to control of the 1st Battalion. Cannon Company was attached to the 111th Field Artillery Battalion and Antitank Company reverted to regimental control. The order of march was the 2nd Battalion, Regimental Headquarters and Company "A", 111th Field Artillery Battalion, 111th Field Artillery Battalion and Cannon Company, 1st Battalion, Antitank Company, 3rd Battalion and Service Company bringing up the rear.

While still en route to its new area, the regiment received orders to move still further southeast to the vicinity of LANGENAU (7921, Sheet X-L), KÜTENDE (6074, Sheet V-L), and GLENG (7851, Sheet V-L). The 2nd Battalion moved into LANGENAU at 2300 hours with cannon company and the 111th Field Artillery Battalion arriving in the town at 2340 hours. The regimental command post was established in LANGENAU at 2340 hours. Upon arrival in its new area, the regiment was to be attached to the 63rd Infantry Division. At 0400 hours on 27 April, all elements of the regimental combat team had moved into the sector and the 63rd Division was advised accordingly. The regiment was notified that it would relieve the 23rd Infantry Regiment of the 63rd Division.

On the morning of 27 April, the regimental commander instructed the regiment to secure all of the positions of the 23rd Infantry Regiment and for the entire front of the 63rd Division. All battalion commanders were notified to meet the regimental commander in LANGENAU (9455, Sheet V-S) at 1100 hours for a conference. The battalions were instructed to start moving immediately after the noon meal and go into an assembly area in the general vicinity of LANGENAU. The tactical situation was somewhat confused. The Germans were retreating south and the 63rd Division was following up its advantage and pressing them closely. Consequently, relief of the 23rd Infantry Regiment could not be accomplished until a more opportune time. It was felt that the regiment could do to keep its units in close contact with the 63rd Division with a limited number of trucks upon which to move.

Crossing the DANUBE River at GUNZBERG (8867, Sheet X-L) with the 2nd Battalion leading, the regiment moved through LANGENAU and then south to the two-lane autobahn, traveling through the SCHRAPPACHER forest, it was noted the ingenious methods the Germans had used to conceal a large and suitable airfield. By paving the strip of land between the two lanes of the highway with concrete and coloring it green for camouflage, the Germans had utilized their super-highway for an excellent runway for airplanes. Numerous planes were hidden a short distance from the highway in camouflaged clearings. None of the planes had motors but most of the fuselages appeared new. However, they were almost all badly damaged by the Germans to preclude further usage.
After proceeding approximately four kilometers into the forest, a cut-off was taken on a secondary road leading to the south. The road soon gave way under heavy vehicles and it took hours to build up the road with rocks and logs sufficiently to shave and haul the vehicles through its worst stretches. The regimental command post moved into DINKELSCHMIDT (215762, Sheet 7-5) at 1635 hours and the 1st Battalion occupied DINKELSCHMIDT (215762, Sheet 7-5) by 2030 hours. The 2d Battalion, 111th Field Artillery and Cannon Company moved into SPEINEXICH (105717, Sheet M-5) with Company H, 11th Medical Battalion, in FLEINERICH (097777, Sheet M-5).

The regimental commander informed the Regimental S-3 at 1812 hours that the tactical situation still was not clear and that he had not been able to talk to the commander of the 253d Infantry Regiment. However, the 1st Battalion was advised at 2110 hours that it would relieve a battalion of the 253d Infantry. All trucks were being used in the rear to shuttle troops and supplies forward and it was necessary for the troops to march. The 2d Battalion was also informed that its troops would be required to march forward. The 3d Battalion and Antitank Company remained in the vicinity of LANGENAU due to the shortage of transportation. The foot movement was to begin at 0600 hours on 28 April.

The 111th Engineers were instructed to improve the roads being used by the regiment and finish clearing the road blocks encountered as the regiment moved forward. The 1st Battalion was ordered to send 200 men to meet the 111th Field Artillery trucks in SPEINEXICH at 0615 hours on 28 April, so that they could be transported forward in the motor column.

The regimental command post moved into DINKELSCHMIDT at 0600 hours on 28 April and displaced forward with the motor column. The regimental commander instructed the 1st Battalion at 0710 hours that it was to move forward and occupy the town of WETL (21751, Sheet Z-5) and be prepared to move eastward from there. The troops were to move by truck as far as possible and if any resistance or obstructions were encountered, they were to move forward on foot. The regimental intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon was instructed to maintain contact with the 8th Infantry Regiment on the regimental north flank.

Two platoons of the 822d Tank Destroyer Battalion were attached to the 1st Battalion after it relieved the 2d Battalion, 253d Infantry Regiment, and one platoon was attached to the regimental 3d Battalion. The Reconnaissance Company of the 822d Tank Destroyer Battalion was ordered to make a reconnaissance of the streams and roads in the regimental sector. The reconnaissance unit advised that its work would be limited to only a portion of its personnel had arrived within the sector.

The Commanding General of the 63d Division sent a message to the regimental commander that the regiment would assume command of its present sector at 0700 hours on 29 April. The 263d Engineers Battalion informed the Regimental S-3 at 0815 hours that it had received orders to support the regiment until the arrival of additional engineers. The weather had turned quite cold within the two previous days and it was anticipated that it would become still colder as the troops moved towards the Austrian Tyrol region with its high mountains. Winter clothing had been turned in before leaving the west bank of the VIENNE River and the men had difficulty keeping warm.
The Regimental Commander informed the Regimental S-3 that although the troops were not meeting enemy resistance, they were not to push too far eastward until supporting armored elements were able to catch up to them. Information gained from prisoners indicated that there were between three (3) and four (4) German divisions of 55 troops in the MUNCH area on 22 April. Two of these divisions were identified as the 5th SS Panzer Division and the 4th SS Panzer Grenadiers. Other reports indicated a large concentration of 55 troops in the SCHRÖNHÖHN forest (2722, Sheet X-5) area on 22 April. Both similar and goblets were reported to be with this latter group of 55 troops. At 1015 hours, the Regimental S-3 was advised that the platoons from a Chemical Porta Company were attached to the regiment. Antitank Company reported that it had lost eight (8) trucks near MUSGEBURG (2380, Sheet X-5) the previous night. The vehicles had taken a wrong turn and had encountered an unoccupied road block. A Cold Reptiled gun was responsible for knocking out the vehicles. The 12th Reconnaissance Division made an attack in this sector and cleared it so that the trucks could be recovered. One man was killed and another wounded in the ambush.

The regiment reported to control of the 56th Infantry Division at 1500 hours on 28 April. The Regimental Commander was instructed by the Divisional Commander to let the 1st and 2d Battalions obtain a night's rest inasmuch as it was advisable to move a portion of the troops across the LEBACH river until they could cross. The regimental command post was established in SCHWABMÜNCHEN (2356, Sheet X-5) while the 1st and 2d Battalions moved into UNTERTITLINGEN (2356, Sheet X-5). A liaison officer of the 5th Infantry Regiment visited the regimental command post in SCHWABMÜNCHEN to discuss plans for the following day. He was informed that the regiment intended to employ the battalions, if necessary, to keep moving forward. The 3d Battalion was ordered at 2200 hours to hold two (2) rifle companies on call to be used as guards for displaced persons being collected in SCHWABMÜNCHEN. The Division Commander visited the command post at 2230 hours and ordered the regiment to move until daylight and possibly not until the given priority on the roads and there was not sufficient routes available to move the regiment.

Hundreds of displaced persons and German political prisoners in their orange-striped prison garb moved along the highway as they were liberated by Allied forces and turned loose. They were desperately hungry and clad in tattered rags; they were a pitiful sight as they moved to the passing troops.

A summary of the situation on 28 April, by the Regimental S-2 indicated that the enemy had no front lines, no organized resistance was evident and no regimental units were in contact with the enemy. The sixty-six (66) prisoners taken during the day had all deserted their units two or three days prior to the time they were captured. They had remained behind as the enemy fled and had waited to be picked up by American units. These prisoners reported that HIMMLER had made a speech in LANDSBERG (3454, Sheet X-5) over the weekend.

On 29 April, a number of personnel from the regiment inspected a German concentration camp two kilometers east of UNTERLING (2366, Sheet X-5). It was beyond the comprehension of the soldiers' minds for the wholesale slaughter of humans that had occurred at this camp. Hundreds of dead foreign and political prisoners lay within and outside of the camp grounds. Pitifully thin bodies lay...
stretched in rows as German civilians collected them and dug burial plots under military guard. Wood huts thatched with sod had been the detention homes of these unfortunate men whose identity was irrevocably lost. Barbed wire fences had been erected around them, and the roofs had collapsed. Some bodies lay along a railroad track where the Germans had driven the prisoners upon the approach of the American troops. Still further from the camp along the railroad track were dismantled bodies of prisoners.

Division advised that the regiment should be prepared to move one motorized battalion across the LIECH River as soon as the 12th Armored Division had cleared the roads of its vehicles. The 1st Battalion was ordered to lead this movement and move southeast within the regimental sector to relieve elements of the 12th Armored Division. Contact was to be maintained with the 12th Armored Division to the front, the 1st Infantry Division on the left flank and the 11th Infantry Regiment on the right flank. The 1st Battalion was to protect the left flank of the regiment. The 2d Battalion and its attached units were to cross the river in the rear of the regimental mechanized column and aid the 1st Battalion in clearing any strong points that might be encountered and at the same time protect the flanks and rear of the regiment. The 3d Battalion was to continue with its security mission west of the LIECH River and be prepared to follow the 1st and 2d Battalions after 1200 hours on 29 April. Any obstacles encountered were to be eliminated by coordinated infantry and armor attacks or if deemed advisable, the resistance was to be by-passed. Reconnaissance elements were to be kept forward at all times.

The regiment was unable to obtain clearance for its vehicles to cross the LIECH River until 2000 hours on 29 April. At 2000 hours on 29 April, the 2d Battalion began crossing near SCHLESWIG (328547), sheet X-5) with the 2d Battalion following. The regiment pressed southeast to P الجديدة (5723, sheet X-3), arriving at this town at 0615 hours. The column split at Pاعدة with the 1st Battalion moving south-southeast through DORNDorf (6026, sheet X-3) and SELLERBURG (6652, sheet X-3) to reach STEINHUPF (8120, sheet X-3) on the southeast shore of the WARM See at 1020 hours. The 2d Battalion moved south from Pاعدة to HELMHEIM (5621, sheet X-5) closing into this town at 1000 hours. The regimental command post moved into STEINHUPF at 1012 hours. The movement had been 28 to 30 kilometers per hour with intermittent rain, hail and snow. The terrain changed from hills to mountains, thousands of displaced persons and G-Race prisoners who were freed by the rapid Allied movement lined the highways.

The battalions remained in position until late afternoon of 30 April, when the 1st Battalion was ordered to advance to BILD TOLZ (8611, sheet X-3) along the general route of BERGEBERG (7521, sheet X-5), KONIGSHEIM (8020, sheet X-6) and BILD TOLZ. The 2d Battalion was ordered to move south of FENZBERG (7312, sheet X-6).

The 1st Battalion met resistance in the woods southeast of STEINHUPF from enemy road blocks which consisted of a heavy volume of small arms and artillery fire companies. The road blocks were cleared by the neighboring woods, capturing fifteen (15) prisoners. Continuing eastward into ST. HEINRICH (598205, sheet X-6), German snipers were cleared from the town. Another road block was encountered at BERGBERG but the block was eliminated and the town cleared of all enemy resistance. Reconnaissance elements of the battalion found all bridges across the LIECH River had been destroyed. While efforts were made to locate a crossing site, the
battalion remained in an assembly area.

The 2d Battalion moved from WELHELD at 1221 hours and proceeded southeast toward FENZBERG. Four (4) 88mm guns and two (2) flak guns fired on the advancing troops from an area two (2) kilometers south of FENZBERG at 1500 hours. All resistance was eliminated, however, and the battalion closed into FENZBERG at 1930 hours. The battalion set up a defensive position and made plans to move on to BAD TOLZ.

2200 hours on 30 April, found the 3d Battalion assembled in WEL, preparing to move by motor to the vicinity of FENZBERG. Antitank Company remained in SCHWA- FUNCHEN assisting the Military Government in the control of displaced persons.

The close of the month of April found the regiment pursuing a retreating and apparently disorganized enemy toward the Austrian Tyrol. The highhazard and hollowhearted stands made by the Germans with their infrequent road blocks proved no serious deterrent to the regiment although casualties were incurred. Demolitions to bridges and the resultant loss of time in looking for by-passes by the regiment was the enemy's negligible gain during the period of pursuit. The snow and cold temperature, without adequate winter clothing for the troops, caused the soldiers much discomfort. However, the men could sense that the end of the German Army as an effective force was not far distant and continued their drive with zeal and high morale.

Prisoners of war taken during the month were divided into two classes—first, German soldiers apprehended during military government operations and second, enemy troops captured in combat. The first period extended from 1 April through 25 April, while the second period was from 26 April through 30 April. The number of prisoners taken during the month are tabulated by days as follows:

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Wadhouses of all types of war material, innumerable ammunition dumps, guns, aircraft, and all types of vehicles were captured by the regiment during the month due to tactical necessity which kept the units constantly moving in the latter phases, no accounting system was formulated to tabulate these enemy stores. The rapid movement of the regiment created a situation where many captured German vehicles were pressed into use to transport the troops forward.
SECRET

Four (4) officers and sixty (60) enlisted men were returned to the United States during the month of April for rest, rehabilitation and recuperation. The majority of these men returned as prisoner of war escort personnel.

Morale of the troops during the month was excellent. Duties in support of the Allied Military Government were not too confining nor exacting and permitted both training and recreation periods. Until 26 April, both officers and enlisted men attended rest camps in PARIS, BRUSSELS, LYON, GENEVA, RIVIERE and UNITED KINGDOM. The movement deep into central Germany on the 26th, with resultant shortage of transportation, precluded sending men to rest camps after that date.

END

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DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, AND 235017

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

By 77
NARA, Date 3/1/72
OPERATIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND AUSTRIA

1-10 MAY 1945
11TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

The month of May opened with the 11th Regimental Combat Team continuing the rapid advance toward the regimental objective at RAD TOLZ (7611, Sheet X/6). The 1st Battalion was billeted in the town of HEP RŽC (7521, Sheet X/6) where their advance had been temporarily halted as they reconnoitered north and south along the LOTRABOK River for a crossing site. The fast retreating Germans had succeeded in blasting bridges across the river before the arrival of the advance troops. The 2d Battalion spent the night in TLMOH (7512, Sheet X/6) where the troops were furnished with hot meals and a night's rest before pressing forward on the attack at daylight, moving east on foot towards the regimental objective. The 3d Battalion was assembled at BRESL (3751, Sheet X/5), the Service Company at IFFELDORF (8021, Sheet X/5) and the regimental command post at SUPSIK (8270, Sheet X/5).

Patrols sent out by the 1st Battalion discovered a bridge intact at ZURASBERO (7621, Sheet X/6) during the early morning and sent elements commenced crossing the river at 0915 hours. The bridge had been prepared for demolition, but the fast moving troops had arrived in time to cut the wires leading to the demolition charges. The troops of the 1st Battalion, followed by the medium tank and tank destroyers, moved into HEP RŽC (7521, Sheet X/6) at 1100 hours, meeting no resistance from the enemy. Company "A" of the supporting infantry continued moving and arrived at KARPIKOK (7820, Sheet X/6) at 1225 hours with Company "F" and Company "G" following close behind on foot. Company "F" continued to push forward and reached SPIEVL (8021, Sheet X/6) at 1400 hours and here came into contact with the 2d Battalion on the right (north) flank. A 75 mm German gun was destroyed as the battalion moved through SPIEVL. As the battalion continued along the road to the northeast, they came under heavy machine gun fire from a strong point set up by the enemy as a delaying force in the woods to the northeast of the town. The lead elements of the battalion succeeded in destroying the resistance and moved forward in an attempt to reach RAD TOLZ before the enemy could set up an effective defensive line.

The 2d Battalion moved east but encountered a partially blown bridge near RAD TOLZ (7611, Sheet X/6) and the advance was delayed until a bulldozer could be secured to reinforce the end of the bridge so that the column could be moved across. Upon completion, the battalion moved forward and reached TITRŽ (7609, Sheet Y/6) at 1020 hours. The column continued to the northeast without opposition and at 1330 hours enemy sniper fire was encountered north of TITRŽ (76011, Sheet Y/6). The advance elements eliminated the enemy resistance and pressed forward until stopped by small arms and machine gun fire from well dug in positions located in the heavy woods between TITRŽ and RAD TOLZ. The battalion remained in position until tanks could be brought into position to support the attack launched against the positions taken by Company "A." The combination of tanks and rifle fire routed the enemy and with Company "A" and Company "F" threat, the battalion moved into HEP RŽC (7521, Sheet X/6) against scattered opposition and at 2100 hours, security was posted and the companies billeted for the night.
The 1st Battalion pressed forward and entered BAD TOLEZ at 2200 hours. A ten man patrol from Company "A", led by Lieutenant E. F. A. G. 10722, of St. Peterburg, Florida, captured General Field Marshal Field Marshal BUSHI TOLEZ in BAD TOLEZ. A prisoner taken by the 1st Battalion had stated that Field Marshal BUSHI TOLEZ was in the area and when further questioned, revealed the house in which he was quartered. The patrol met no resistance as it entered the house and took the Field Marshal prisoner. He was taken to the battalion command post by the patrol and from there was escorted to the regimental command post by the Regimental Commander, COLONEL CHARLES E. C. D. W. O. 24957 from 245, 2450, then questioned he revealed that he had been in BAD TOLEZ for the past twelve (12) days for health treatments since being relieved of his command of the troops on the western front. The Field Marshal left for Division Headquarters accompanied by his son and aide, 1st Lt. W. W. W. W. W.

The advance of the 1st Battalion was supported by the 121 Field Artillery as they moved into BAD TOLEZ while the 155 Field Artillery and the Regimental Cannon Company supported the 2d Battalion's progress. The 3d Battalion started movement from TSAR during the morning and closed into RUY to where it remained in regimental reserve throughout the day, prepared to assist either the 1st or 2d Battalion in the attack if unexpected resistance was met before reaching BAD TOLEZ. The 3d Battalion also helped the collection of displaced persons and political prisoners that were causing a critical transportation situation as they closed the roads and moved from one town to another in an effort to start a homebound movement and to find food upon their release from the concentration camps. Many of them had not received any food from the Germans for several days and were in a half-starved condition which often made them unresponsive to control, unless they were placed in a concentrated area and guards placed around it to keep them from wandering. Temporary plans were formulated to evacuate the civilians from ST. PETERS (7020, Sheet 7/6) and collect the displaced persons into the town where they could be controlled and furnished with food until they could be taken over by the American Military Government.

The Antitank Company was relieved of their responsibilities in ST. PETERS and moved forward to join the regiment. The regimental command post closed at 1000 at 1011 hours and opened at BAD TOLEZ (7009, Sheet 7/6) at 1011 hours. The town was made through a light snow which continued throughout the night and reached a depth of several inches before morning, making progress slow and transportation hazardous. The regimental combat team captured three hundred and seventy three (373) enlisted men and seventeen (17) officers throughout the day.

Division was informed at 0200 hours on 27 July that the 1st Battalion had taken the west side of BAD TOLEZ and that they had moved through the town to the TSAR River, which separated the town, and here had run into strong resistance from a large force of SS troops that had erected machine gun emplacements on the east bank of the river and here were making a determined stand. Company "A" and Company "C" had established a firm bridgehead across the river and construction was under way on the partially destroyed bridge so that light armor could join the troops on the far side of the river.

The Regimental Commander informed the 1st Battalion at 0530 hours that they were to evacuate all high ranking German officers from BAD TOLEZ as soon as possible and to place a guard on all staff cars in the town so that it would be impossible for any...
Battalion which was occupying LINTHORPE.

The 11th Regimental Combat Team, less the 3d Battalion, commenced the attack to the east with the 1st Battalion, motorized and loading, followed by the 2d Battalion on foot. The 1st Battalion reached WASHINGTON (5516, Sheet Y/6) by 1100 hours and continued moving north to the north end of the WESTERN SEE at 1600 hours. The 2d Battalion was received by the 1st Battalion as it moved forward but all was eliminated or driven back into the hills to be picked up by the following units. Company "C" turned south upon reaching 4TH STREET and encountered strong enemy machine gun, mortar and 88 mm fire. The advance was continued against resistance and the battalion reached the outskirts of TETTISSE (015096, Sheet Y/6) at 2110 hours and remained in this position to reorganize the companies and to rest the men.

The 2d Battalion followed the advance of the 1st Battalion on foot and after reaching CUNH (015087, Sheet Y/6) at 1900 hours, they remained assembled while sending reconnaissance groups to the east to maintain contact with the enemy and to clear out small groups of resistance which the 1st battalion had pushed into the hills on their rapid advance by night. Three hundred and seventy-five (375) prisoners were taken as the Regimental Combat Team pushed forward against strong but sporadic resistance.

The Regimental S-2 informed Division at 0600 hours, 1 May that the German personnel being held as they came through the lines to surrender had volunteered the information that there were approximately four thousand (4,000) hospital patients in the towns of WILHEMSTH (015057, Sheet Y/6), NUTSCH (015067, Sheet Y/6) and WEISSACH (015077, Sheet Y/6). The Regimental S-2 stated that an attempt was being made to reach the towns by telephone in an effort to get the SS troops to surrender or to pull out of the towns. It was reported that many of the troops were changing to civilian clothes because they believed that they would be shot if captured in uniform. The Regimental S-2 voiced the opinion that if pamphlets, explaining the terms of the surrender, could be dropped and induce them to give up. Division informed the Regimental Commander thatGeneral WESSEL was expected to surrender his forces during the night or the next day. If any contest was made the casualties were to be conducted to punish by the fastest means available.

The Regimental S-2 was told by Division at 0730 hours that fighter bombers were bombing and strafing a convoy of German vehicles along the road in the vicinity of WUNNENSTH (015077, Sheet Y/6). Information gained from prisoners showed that a large concentration of troops was located in that area. The Regimental S-2 took WAX APPARATUS, fieldshower of the press, into custody as a prisoner of war at 0914 hours from his luxurious summer estate located near the shore of the WESTERN SEE in the outskirts of TETTISSE.

The 1st Battalion resumed the attack at 0530 hours on 1 May, clearing TETTISSE and the other smaller towns at the south end of the WESTERN SEE without any contact with the enemy, but capturing many prisoners. The battalion turned southeast in the vicinity of WEISSACH and reached VALLEPPEN (015066, Sheet Y/6) at 1045 hours. Finding the roads impassable for heavy vehicles, the battalion, less Company "C", dismounted and continued on foot to VALLEPPEN (122893, Sheet Y/6) arriving at approximately 1200 hours where it assembled for the night. Company "A", reinforced, moved to STURMING -

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NARA, Date 01/01/92
officers to leave the town without proper authority. The battalion was to assemble in AD TOLS and prepare to push south. The majority of the town was cleared by the 1st Battalion by 0830 hours and Company was supported by tanks, had occupied the town. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop moved south along the river to reconnoiter the area for any enemy installations and crossing sites while the 1st Battalion was clearing the town. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was at the town center, clearing the area for any enemy installations and crossing sites while the 1st Battalion was clearing the town.

The 2d Battalion was preceded by a twenty (20) man patrol as it moved out of FUCHEN at 0735 hours with the mission of entering RAD TOLZ. The battalion, with the aid of tanks, cleared the area and secured the town at 1030 hours. The 3d Battalion was occupied and secured the town of FAGHORN (871721, Sheet 7/6). The 3d Battalion was reinforced with a number of troops and sent Company "C", reinforced with armor, to the town. The 11th Company was at the town and sent Company "C", reinforced with armor, to the town. The 11th Company was at the town.

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River and reach the Junction of the "AACHEN" River (579H, Sheet 7/6) near the southwest edge of the "SIEDE" MOUNTED FOREST. The battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 110th Infantry Regiment at 1330 hours and assembled in the vicinity of BERMOUTH to await further orders.

The regimental command post closed at BERMOUTH at 1745 hours and opened at "FRANZEN" at 1745 hours and had been up only a short time when the Commanding General notified the Regimental Commander that orders were to be given for all units to remain in place and only to fire if necessary. Division had been notified by the 7th Army that the German Army to the front was to surrender effective at 1200 hours 9 May and all firing was to cease at 1300 hours 9 May to enable the German commanders to get word of the surrender to their troops which were scattered throughout the hills and mountains in the sector and with which they had no contact.

Upon hearing of the anticipated surrender of the German troops, several units of the regiment showed their feeling by firing their weapons into the air, fearing that the gun fire might cause the German troops to hasten in their surrender, Regimental S-3 issued orders to all units at 1230 hours to pick up all ammunition but to hold it in reserve in event of an emergency.

All available captured vehicles were utilized to evacuate the prisoners from the sector and if possible they were to be sent to the corps enclosure at "FRANZEN" (2052, Sheet 7/6). Guards were to be placed on the vehicles and the same vehicles were to be shuttled back and forth. Several entire German motorized units surrendered during the day and these trucks were used in transporting a large number of the prisoners to collecting points. A count of the prisoners for 9 May showed a total of 1593 enlisted men, 105 officers and 600 patients in a hospital in BERMOUTH.

The forward elements of the 110th Regimental Combat Team remained in place on 9 May awaiting orders on the surrender of the German troops in the sector. The retreating German units had been so scattered among the hills that it was impossible for the German command to reach the units and notify them of the surrender. For this reason the American troops had agreed to stay out of the area so that there would be no unnecessary fighting. Patrols were sent out into the hills from the various units during the day to contact the Germans and to notify them of the surrender. The patrols carried white flags so they would not be fired upon by the Germans hiding in the hills. Pamphlets were prepared and distributed among the Germans to acquaint them with the unconditional surrender terms.

Instructions were received by the Regimental Commander that the German troops surrendering at 1200 hours 9 May would be required to assemble by units and remain in place pending detailed instructions from higher headquarters. All arms were to be stacked and all munitions assembled near a railroad station or highway. These stores were to be placed under American guards. The German Commanders were to be held under unit custody until further instructions were given. The terms of the surrender were to be unconditional and all Allied prisoners were to be turned over to the American forces. The German units were to be instructed to remain intact under their own officers with their equipment, transportation and maintenance. The local American unit commanders were to designate the assembly areas.
(0914, Sheet Y/6) to assist a platoon of the 636th Tank Destroyer Reconnaissance that had made contact with the enemy and to aid in setting up a road block.

The 2d Battalion attacked east from CERNY (0313, Sheet Y/6) at dawn and at 0930 hours had reached SCHIESS (0013, Sheet Y/6). At 1100 hours light resistance was encountered in the town which was easily overcome and the advance to the southeast continued. The battalion encountered an enemy column attempting to withdraw a short distance west of ANRICH (1510, Sheet Y/5) and it was destroyed by tank destroyer fire. The battalion pushed through scattered resistance and closed into PARSCHVILL (2106, Sheet Y/6) at dusk. Several large German hospitals located in the town were surrendered intact and the patients were allowed to remain under command of German officers.

The 3d Battalion attacked at dawn from the vicinity of CHARTRES (1810, Sheet Y/6) and encountered stiff resistance in the form of anti-aircraft and artillery fire as they moved south along the river and after a hard day's fighting against enemy strong points, the battalion broke through the enemy's defensive positions and advanced to FLOK (954040, Sheet Y/6) where plans were formulated to set a protective line and to secure rest for the men. The 3rd Reconnaissance Troop moved along the west bank of the ISAR River and encountered stiff resistance near HELLE (890010, Sheet Y/6) where they were relieved by the 636th Tank Destroyer Reconnaissance which became attached to the 1st Regimental Combat Team.

A record number of three thousand two hundred and ninety seven (3,297) prisoners were taken by the 1st Regimental Combat Team throughout the day including five (5) generals, eighty (80) officers, and fifteen (15) field officers. Prisoners became so numerous that the companies could not handle them and after disarming them they were started marching or riding their own vehicles toward the rear elements where they were collected at concentration points and transported to prisoner of war cages.

Action on 5 May started when the 1st Battalion, less Company N, started moving on foot at 0600 hours from their assembly area near MARET and moved north to the new assembly area at the south end of the SCHIERF SIE (105040, Sheet Y/6) arriving there at 1030 hours. After a short rest the battalion entrained at 1130 hours and moved along the road to PARISCHVILL then southeast through the mountains and crossed the Austrian border, closing into KIFSTEIN (138872, Sheet Y/6) at 1700 hours. The enemy offered no resistance as the battalion moved into the sector and although many enemy vehicles were sighted they were not fired upon as the disposition of friendly troops in the area was not entirely clear. Many of the German convoys were moving into the neighboring towns and concentration points to await the arrival of American forces to whom they could surrender. Company N was relieved by elements of the 2d Battalion of the 115th Infantry Regiment at SCHIERFING during the evening and entrained to KIFSTEIN where they joined the 1st Battalion at 0800 hours.

The 2d Battalion resumed the attack at 0800 hours on 5 May and moved east where road blocks and bloom tunnels were encountered near KERNFUR (3105, Sheet Y/6) and as it was impossible to get supporting armor past the obstructions, the attack was changed to the north and although light resistance was encountered from scattered groups of remnants, the battalion reached KRAMPEINSTEIN (276136, Sheet Y/6) at 1205 hours. The 3d Battalion continued the attack at 0700 hours along the east bank of the ISAR.

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By REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

NARA, Date 21-2-70
patrols and check points to see that the curfew was enforced. The battalions were notified at 1550 hours that they would not move any detachments to the new area as plans were being made to collect the men in one area and to assign them to an area to police and control. A fourth battalion, consisting of the Regimental Counter Company and the Antitank Company was formed during the day. Temporary units called for the 3rd Battalion to remain in the present area with the mission of placing guards around the displaced persons camp and to maintain check points and patrols in the Dvina River valley sector.

Division was informed at 0935 hours that the Regimental Reconnaissance unit was leaving NUPESTED at 1330 hours and the remainder of the regiment would follow as they were relieved of their duties in the area. The regimental Initial point was to be in KUKAN (320835, Sheet 2/6). A report on the results of the German surrender of personnel and material was to be submitted to Division by the Regimental Commander upon his arrival in the new sector, covering the number and designation of the units and the number of men and officers in the units. All the number of arms and ammunition surrendered by the units was to be recorded, however each Division was authorized to retain one hundred (100) rifles and an adequate amount of ammunition for the rifles and each officer was to be allowed to retain his sidearms in order to maintain order in their own units.

The 1st Battalion completed movement at 1330 hours by motor and closed into ST. JOHN (5391, Sheet 2/6) at 1700 hours. The 2nd battalion closed into TUWIPEN (5182, Sheet 2/6) and the 131 Field Artillery Battalion located at KALIN (3150, Sheet 2/6) and prepared to relieve the 3rd Infantry at the road blocks near BURWAR (3365, Sheet 2/6) and QUNDABEN (3362, Sheet 2/6) which were being operated to prevent the German soldiers from deserting their units as they surrendered to the American Forces and also to aid in the collection of displaced persons so that they could be placed in a concentrated area. The Antitank Company and the Regimental Cannon Company moved to SUPPA where Cannon Company relieved Company A of the Guard duties on the displaced persons camp and the prisoners of war camp.

Control of the new occupation sector was assumed by the 111th Regimental Combat Team and the supervision of all collection of enemy personnel, arms and ammunition, and other military equipment at designated points was commenced. Check points and guard posts were established throughout the sector and roving patrols were operated in assisting the Military Government to maintain order in the new area.

The 113th Infantry called at 0930 hours on 9 May to inquire if the 113th Infantry of men would relieve the road blocks near BURWAR and the guard posts at NOFFEN (338155, Sheet 2/6) and QUNDABEN (1170, Sheet 2/6). They were informed that the 131 Field Artillery was to relieve the road block at QUNDABEN, but that the guard posts were located in the area assigned to the 753 Tank Battalion and the 636 Reconnaissance Troop.

The 4th Battalion was informed at 1025 hours that they were to be relieved at NUPESTED by the 355 Field Artillery Battalion and upon the relief the German Company was to be attached to the 2nd Battalion to the Antitank Company. The companies were to remain in NUPESTED until the following day when they were to join their parent units.

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By [Signature]

NARA, Date 05/1972
Plans were formulated during the afternoon to move the 11th Regimental Combat Team to the area near ST. JOHN and a liaison officer was sent to the 14th Infantry command post at 1940 hours to secure information concerning the terms of surrender, disposition of troops, and arrangements in the sector near ST. JOHN as set up by the 14th Infantry.

Instructions were received at 1945 hours to the effect that the prisoners removed to the rear from forward elements were to retain their personal equipment upon being moved as the rear was not equipped to replace it. The equipment retained to include overcoats, blankets, base equipment and personal items. Division requested a report on the amount and location of all salvage overcoats and blankets stored in German warehouses in the area so that needed equipment could be secured for the prisoners.

All battalions were alerted at 2000 hours by the Regimental Commander in anticipation of the move planned for the following day, provided the terms of surrender were accepted and the situation remained the same. These plans did not materialize as the Regimental Commander was instructed that the troops made with the German Army would be at until 1200 hours on 8 May instead of 6 May as originally stated. The surrender terms were to go into effect at that time and the Germans would be prepared to surrender unconditionally. The troops in the area continued to stock arms and surrender in groups throughout the day of 7 May as the terms of surrender were announced to them over public address systems.

All enemy vehicles except those authorized for use were turned in at local assembly points and plans were made to use them in the evacuation of prisoners of war to camps in the rear and to move displaced persons to a central camp at FESTENII where they were to be held until adequate transportation could be furnished. Check points and patrol zones were used throughout the sector to stop the circulation of troops and displaced persons and to guide them to the proper collecting points.

The liaison officer returning from the 14th Infantry command post reported that the 11th Regimental Commander had assured the German commander in that sector that the 11th Infantry Regiment would not move into the new area until daybreak on 8 May. The Germans were to use the roads to move their troops to concentration points within the area and heavy vehicles that could not move were to remain in place and a record was to be submitted of their location. The German corps headquarters and the hospitals were to remain in ST. JOHN. An approximate twelve hundred (1200) troops were reported to be in the new area.

Word was received from Division at 0135 hours that all units should inform the men that the war in Europe was over effective at 0001 hours on 9 May. Information had been received from higher headquarters that conferences had been made and were being signed by the Supreme Allied Headquarters and German High Command. The Germans had signed unconditional surrender to all the Allied forces including Russia. Only troops occupied in occupational duties were to be moved until the surrender was effective.

The Regimental S-1 was informed at 1700 hours that arrangements were to be made to enforce a curfew in the Regimental area. It was to be for civilians and soldiers alike from 2100 hours until 0600 hours. The battalions were to operate motorized
The remanent combat post was closed at HUNAY at 0900 hours and opened at ST. JOHANN at 1200 hours. The Regimental S-2 informed the 2d Battalion commander at 1232.

It was found that the civil authority had instructed both civilians would be allowed to pass with their belongings to another but the civilian soldiers were not to run unauthorized vehicles from one town to another but the Civilian soldiers were to be picked up at collection points. The roads and the small groups of enemy soldiers were to be directed to a collection point. The 2d Battalion had been located in SIEGEN, only a short distance when they were confronted with the problem of an approximate five thousand (5,000) German troops which had moved into SOML (3645, Sheet 1/2). As the town was under heavy attack, they were moved into a large field and arrangements were made for them to use their own field equipment to repair and furnish them.

The remaining units of the 2d Regimental Combat Team moved to their parent battalion on 10 May with the artillery and service companies moving to ST. JOHANN while the service company closed into HUNAY. The remainder of the 2d Infantry Regiment remained in position throughout the day and continued to supervise and collect the enemy personnel and equipment at designated points, and to assist the military government to maintain order.

An emergency alert plan was put in operation to take care of any emergency that might arise. The alert plan was a forty-five (45) hour alert status at all times and this unit was to be assigned duties that might conflict with the effectiveness or strength during the alert period. The battalion was to maintain transportation for the unit at all times and in case of emergency the unit was to be moved by the fastest means available with maximum precaution. One battalion mounted and the riflemen were to carry a basic load of ammunition. One battalion mounted and the riflemen were to carry a basic load of ammunition. The 131 Field Artillery was to be alerted at all times to support the companies if needed.

The end of hostilities found the 2d Regimental Combat Team among the Austrian prisoners waiting for the remanent of the German army to be collected and turned into prisoners of war camps. German convoys were on the move again, but this time going to the rear of Europe to where they would surrender their vehicules, arms and ammunition to the American forces and take their place among the other thousands of prisoners already taken by the 2d Infantry Regiment in the rapid advance from FRANCE into AUSTRIA.

Prisoners of war were counted only during the time they were in combat with the enemy. Prisoners were no prisoners after the truce period elapsed that it was impossible to count them. The number of prisoners taken are, totalled by days as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,559</td>
</tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11,306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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NARA, Date 10/01/92
STOREHOUSES of all types of war matériel, immovable ordnance dumps, guns and all types of vehicles were captured by the regiment during the period 1 thru 10 Nov. Due to constant movement it was impossible to keep a record of the captured matériel. Any of the captured vehicles were used to transport the prisoners of war to prisoner of war caves and displaced persons to collecting points.

E D D

Report of operations written and prepared by:

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SECRET

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NARA, Date 3/14/82
OPERATIONS IN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY
11-31 May 1945

The cessation of hostilities found the 111st Regimental Combat Team located in
and around the village of St. Johann, Austria. The Regimental command post, the 1st
Battalion, and the Regimental Cannon Company, were located in St. Johann; the 2d
Battalion occupied Kitzbuhel (2162, Sheet Z-7) and the 3d Battalion Schiefling (99921,
Sheet Z-5). The Regiment was engaged in the occupation of the sector and with
finding the military government in control of the civilian population and the surround-
ing German soldiers. Enemy personnel and military arms and equipment were being
collected throughout the area under the guidance and supervision of the 111st Reg-
imental Combat Team.

Screening of German civilians and soldiers was carried on by units throughout
the sector and any person having arms or ammunition in his possession was held for
further questioning by the military government. The towns in the area were heavily
collected with German troops and housing facilities were at a minimum. Some of the
conquest was lessened by having the German units move to collecting points where
camps were set up in fields and each unit was authorized to use its own available
equipment in preparing food and for housing the men.

A traffic problem was initiated by the large number of German convoys arriving
in the sector with wounded soldiers. Passes had been issued them to travel on thr
ough the St. Johann sector and into surrounding towns and cities. Many of these con-
voys came from Italy and carried only passes written by American Army units not hav-
ing the proper authority to issue such passes. Several of the convoys were allowed
to pass through the sector while others were pulled off the roads into fields where
they were held for further questioning.

Division called at 0300 hours on 11 May to inform the Regimental S-3 that an
officer of the 1st Infantry Division would arrive at the 111st command post during
the day to arrange for relief of the Regiment in St. Johann. He was to be furnished
with all necessary information regarding the sector including the disposition of
German troops and ammunition. A list of guard posts and checking points was to be
furnished to enable the elements of the 1st to complete the relief.

The 2d Battalion furnished a seven (7) man patrol to accompany the military
government officials as they screened the mountains in the vicinity of Kitzbuhel in
an attempt to find any German soldiers or civilians who might be violating the terms
of surrender.

Plans were formulated to gather the arms and ammunition at collecting dumps and
to evacuate them to the proper places in the rear area as transportation became
available. All captured vehicles were to be used in transporting arms and ammuni-
tion to these collecting points.

Instructions were received from Division at 1735 hours on 11 May that the com-
ing move was to be made as a Regimental Combat Team; however all units except the
111th Medical Detachment, was to be detached upon arrival in the new area.
A reconnaissance and quartering party was to be sent forward to the new area at 0800 hours on the morning of 12 May to mark the route and to select proper locations for the regimental units. The exact locality of the move was not known at the time, but instructions were to be issued during the night.

Regimental G-2 notified Division on 11 May that the situation of the 177th camp at SOLL (3688, Sheet 1-6) was serious. The camp was badly overcrowded and the facilities were inadequate for the twenty-three hundred (2300) men which it contained. He stated that it was impossible to remedy the situation as long as the camp was so overcrowded and that the question of alleviation was being referred to the German 1st Army Headquarters at St Johann.

Plans were received from Division covering the planned move (see 36th Division Operations Instruction sheet for 12 May). The 11th Regimental Contact team was to be relieved in the sector by elements of the 3rd division arriving on 12 May. Upon completion of relief, were to move by truck to the vicinity of OB GLUBSCHER (0120, Sheet 1-5) and KERFUBEN (1629, Sheet 1-5). The initial point of departure was to be near ROSS (1549, Sheet 1-6), a short distance southwest of the 3rd Battalion positions in SCHEFFAU. The leading elements were to cross the line of departure at 0000 hours on 13 May and the remainder of the regiment was to be shipped by motor to the new sector as relief was completed by the 3rd Division elements. Upon arrival in the new sector, the commanders were responsible for the protection of supply installations, supplementing as necessary the installation of guards and coordinating security measures. The units were to place security on railroads, oil lines, and other critical installations which were located in the area. Check points were to be maintained on the main communication routes and aid was to be given to the military government by policing and dispersing the civilian population.

Movement to the new sector was commenced at 1100 hours on 13 May as the last of the units were relieved by the 3rd Division. The departure line was crossed at 1200 hours with 111 Field Artillery leading. The route of march was by way of KUSTRIN, DEUSENDORF, BAD SOLL, PENZBURG, and HÔ SCHOTT. The 2nd Battalion closed into BÜ GILZ and DÖNKHÖN, thus completing a move of one hundred and twenty-five (125) miles from Austria back to Germany.

The problems of assisting the Allied military government were not new to the 11th Infantry Regiment and with the experience gained in the past and from directives issued from higher headquarters as a basis, plans were soon formulated for assisting the military government in the area and in maintaining order among the civilians. All commanders were notified that they would be held responsible for support of the military government in the area assigned to them and that security of the area was to be insured by adequate patrolling with personnel stationed throughout the area. These check points were to be established on all important avenues of communication. Check point personnel were to be instructed that all persons having authority to move about from place to place had been issued passes and any other persons were to be held.

The 10th Cavalry Troop and the 10th Armored Division was contacted at 1000 hours on 14 May to secure information as to the location of their boundaries, check points and disposition of troops in the sector. It was found that their sector lay to the south of the 11th Regimental sector and they were to maintain check points and guard posts on the main highways and to check all persons passing from one sector to another.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NARA, Date 6/4/92
The Regimental S-2 contacted the military government during the morning concerning information as to the extent of support needed from the regiment. He was informed that the regiment could aid in collecting and arms from the civilians, for the issuance of passes to the civilians and in the enforcement of the curfew for both civilians and soldiers. Instructions were issued to the units of the regiment to pick up all displaced persons and hold them until camps could be located in the area. Several complaints had been received from civilians that displaced persons were looting and robbing people in the area during the night. A search of the area was to be made for location of military stores and equipment, such as warehouses, and guards were to be placed where needed.

The Regimental Commander notified the Antitank Company at 0600 hours that their area would be SCHKEUING and the surrounding territory. The Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance platoon was to be attached to the Antitank Company for military government purposes only. The Regimental S-2 received information from the military government that the curfew was to be in effect from 2000 hours to 0600 hours for both soldiers and civilians. The military government representative stated that they would confine their activities to liaison work between the military authority and the civilian government in the sector. An approximate eight thousand (8000) displaced persons were reported to be scattered throughout the sector, the majority of which were non-national.

The 1st Battalion reported to the Regimental S-2 at 1715 hours that two Polish soldiers had been apprehended while looting in BERNSTEIN. Several others had been posing as American military police and taking things from the civilians, orders were given to take them to MARKT OBERROHEM and turn them over to the military government, whose charges would be preferred.

The 2nd Battalion reported that approximately thirty-five (35) deaths had occurred from drinking poisoned liquor in the area. The liquor had been obtained from friendly people, such as displaced persons. All companies were warned that their men should be careful as to what they drank since it might be the result of enemy activity.

The Regimental Commander notified all unit commanders at 0800 hours on 15 May that they were to make an inspection of all installations on which guards were being maintained and upon points which guards had been ordered, and to determine whether the guard posts were necessary. A check was to be made as to whether the guard was adequate or excessive, and if any posts could be eliminated by consolidation of the installations. All units were to immediately initiate reconnaissance for training areas, artillery fields, parade grounds, and firing ranges for all types of organic weapons. Engineer support was to be secured for the construction and preparation of all ranges and no range was to be used without prior approval of the Regimental S-3 officer.

On 15 May the Regimental Service Company was awarded the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque for the following outstanding difficult tasks:

"SERVICE COMPANY, 11th Infantry Regiment, for outstanding devotion to duty in the performance of exceptionally difficult tasks from 15 August to 1 November 1944, in France. During this period, which included the invasion of Southern France and the swift pursuit of the enemy to the Vessey Mountains, the Service Company over-
came seemingly impossible odds to keep the regiment adequately supplied and to insure the proper maintenance of vehicles. Driving hundreds of miles a day over mountainous terrain, improvising and inventing when scanty equipment made it necessary, and working day and night to repair their vehicles, the men of Service Company displayed a willingness and resourcefulness which was exemplary. As a result of the outstanding performance of duty by these men, the regiment was always adequately supplied and the advance was never delayed by disabled vehicles in need of repair. During the entire period the Service Company accomplished its difficult tasks with such a degree of success as to win the complete confidence of the regiment."

Regimental S-3 was informed at 1101 hours on 16 May that the troops of the 2d French Armored Division had been reported as taking radios from the civilian population in REICHELING (2890, Sheet X-S), and in AFFELDING (2892), Sheet X-5), and that they had been running the town. The Military Government was contacted but stated that they had no authority in that sector. The Military Government official expressed belief that it must be the rear troops of the 2d French Division as the entire division had been previously scheduled to move out of the sector. A later investigation showed that the troops had not moved as scheduled and a decision was pending from higher headquarters as to how to handle the situation.

The 2d Battalion reported a large group of non-nationals located in barracks east of HOLZHAUSEN (2713, Sheet X-5). The group was reported to be in dire need of food and medical attention. Many of them were ill and some were starving. The camp was located in the sector policed by the 143d Infantry and it was reported to the Military Government in their area. Plans were made by them to care for the displaced persons in the camp.

A check was made of the regimental sector on 16 May to determine the number of hospitals in the sector and the number of patients contained in each. One was located in OB GUNZBURG (2120, Sheet X-5) with a capacity of three hundred and eighty-one (381) patients and personnel. Another was reported in HOLZHAUSEN.

Plans for a training program were initiated on 16 May with the purpose of correcting deficiencies noted in combat, and stressing the rehabilitation of men and equipment. The training program was to be concurrent with duties required in the occupation of enemy territory. Objectives of the training program were to obtain a high standard of military courtesy, uniform dress, and discipline. An extensive effort was made to perfect offensive and defensive actions of small units and to correct deficiencies noted in recent operations.

All units were alerted on 17 May to be on the lookout for buried or hidden caches of arms, food, and demolition material which had been reported throughout the theater. Reports showed that a large number of these hidden stores had been established by the enemy sabotage group for future activities. The caches had been found in regular tin cans which supposedly contained food. So far none had been found containing booby traps.

Regimental S-2 reported to Division that the food and housing situation of displaced persons was well under control in the regimental area. A survey showed that many of the displaced persons were working on farms where they had been told to remain until further notice. Movement of displaced persons had been reduced to a mini-
men and the condition of the displaced persons' camps had been reported as satisfactory although somewhat overcrowded. The camps had been constructed so that the displaced persons could be controlled by the least possible number of guards. It was found that locating could be kept to a minimum if they were not allowed to wander around the towns. He stated that the Russians and the Poles in the area were a constant source of trouble and requested information as to their evacuation. The policy in effect in the regiment for handling of German refugees was to turn them over to the Bürgermeister of the town from where they were sent to the nearest camp to work until further orders.

Reconnaissance and quartering parties were sent out and plans made to move elements of the 11th Infantry Regiment to the sector around MARKT OBERSHOF (163) where X-5) as the 10th Armored had received orders to move into the area occupied by the regiment in the SCHNAGG district.

Division made a check of the guard posts located throughout the regimental sector on 16 May and notified S-3 at 1045 hours that more checkpoints should be maintained on the main roads to prevent the circulation of the people to other towns. The Regimental S-2 stated that each of the checkpoints was causing problems and that the checkpoints were established for any length of time on the road, the people managed to evade it by traveling on side roads until the checkpoint was passed.

All units of the regiment were informed by Regimental S-3 on 18 May that they were to submit complete information listing the deployment of each unit and giving the location of all guard, security, and check points. Also a list of all units in the sector, other than the 38th Division, was to be submitted so that it could enable a closer check on the other units in the sector and it is the information was to be used in operation patrols and in aiding the Military Government to maintain order in the area.

The 11th Regiment continued to perform the assigned occupation duties throughout the day of 19 May and established an extensive training program among the units with personnel not engaged in re-establishing roadblocks, checkpoints, and patrols. Plans were developed to collect the displaced persons which were scattered throughout the sector into large camps and separating them according to nationality. Arrangements were being made to transport as many as possible to their native country as they were a source of constant trouble as long as they remained in the sector.

Regimental S-3 issued instructions to all units on 19 May stating a general policy on security roadblocks throughout the 11th Regimental area. They were notified that the SHAPE Military Government pass was the only authorized pass for civilian travel. To eliminate the necessity of issuing passes to Germans, the SHAPE had established and authorized free circulation within six kilometers from any established community. In cooperation with military government, existing roadblocks were to be re-established to allow maximum civilian movement within the authorized radius consistent with operational security.

A group of three (3) German men and a Hungarian girl were stopped and held for questioning by road guards in the 1st Battalion area during the morning of 20 May and it was believed they were German SS personnel making an attempt to reach Switzerland. The 1st Battalion turned them over to the SHAPE Military Government officer.
SECRET

In KAUFBEUREN for further questioning. A general alarm had been given out to the units that a group answering their description was wanted by higher headquarters.

The Regimental 5-2 inquired of Division as to the status of any New Zealanders and British which were picked up in the sector. Division stated that the New Zealanders which were being held at the present time should be sent to KAUFBEUREN on the following morning and they would be provided with transportation to enable them to rejoin British units.

All units were notified that during the forthcoming training period, frequent inspections of instruction were to be made by officers of the Division Staff. (See 36th Division Report on Training Inspections). The inspections were to be made periodically throughout the training sector to determine the caliber of the instruction and the results which were being obtained.

The Regimental 5-2 reported to the Regimental Commander that there was approximately thirteen thousand (13,000) displaced persons remaining in the sector, also that a decision had been reached upon which were to start moving. The Italians were to be collected and moved directly to INDREUZEK where they would be taken care of by other units until their evacuation to Italy. Displaced persons from Holland, Luxembourg and Belgium were to be collected and sent to a large camp which had been constructed near KAUFBEUREN and from there were to be evacuated to their native lands. The Franco Red Cross was to handle French displaced persons which were still in the locality. All nationalities were to be handled on a quota basis, with an allotted number leaving each day. The 22nd quota was to be filled on 23 May.

A large displaced persons camp was to handle all Russians and Poles in the area. The Regimental 5-2 expressed the opinion that looting would then be cut to a minimum as all reports indicated the Russians as responsible for a majority of it. He reported that it was necessary to screen all German soldiers and displaced persons in the area. Any discharge that had been issued before the sixth of May was to be regarded as valid, but any soldier whose home was not in the area could be placed on a farm to work until such time as he could be moved to his own territory. Those without discharge papers were to go through regular prisoner of war channels and be screened and demobilized.

Plans for the new training schedule called for a three and a half hour schedule on military subjects. The period was to commence in the morning at 0730 hours and continue until 1130 hours. The afternoon was to be used for athletics and organized games, plus an hour period of instruction and education.

The Regimental 5-3 was notified at 0920 hours on 21 May that the 111th Engineers had an adequate supply of German mines and firing devices if they were desired for use in training programs. Since the mine techniques of the Germans and the Japanese was approximately the same, it was suggested that all men should receive some instruction on the detection and removing of mines.

A quota was received for forty (40) Frenchmen to go to the collecting point at KAUFBEUREN during the day. Regimental 5-2 was notified that all Western Europeans, could be sent directly to their own countries. Plans were arranged to collect them at the Battalions where they would be held until a group of one hundred or more were
at one place and from here the group would be transported to the Division collecting point at KAUFBEURG by trucks furnished from the Regimental Service Company.

The Regimental S-2 received reports from the 3d Battalion that a Warrwolf meeting was to be held in DENKLENSEN. The Military Government was notified of the planned meeting and was asked to accompany the raiding party which was scheduled to close at approximately 1100 hours. When the raiding party arrived at the site of the meeting, they were told that it was only a church meeting, and that it had been postponed.

Division notified Regimental S-2 that a representative of the 7th Army hospital had been refused admittance to the X-ray dump in BUCHIN. The officer did not have a pass and the 2d Battalion guards had not permitted him to enter. Division stated that the 7th Army order which he carried permitted him to enter the building and to remove equipment which was to go to the 7th Army hospital. The 2d Battalion was informed that the officer was to be admitted to the installation.

The Military Government representative informed the Regimental S-2 on 21 May that one hundred (100) Czechoslovakians displaced, were to be delivered to the camp in MARKT GEBRDORF on the following day to be processed and started on their way home.

The 3d Battalion executive officer requested an investigation of the Burgmister in DENKLENSEN by the Military Government. It was believed that he was not to be trusted and was still in sympathy with the Nazi group. He also stated that the station master had been found with two rifles hidden in his home.

A request was made to the Military Government for passes to be issued to the farmers at OR GUNZBERG as it was necessary for them to move from their farms to the towns to deliver goods. The road blocks had been stopping them and refusing to permit them to pass. Plans were made to supply each check point a list of all towns within a radius of six (6) miles, and to allow the civilian to go into the towns as long as they were in the radius.

Officer patrols were operated throughout the regimental sector to check on the uniforms which the men were wearing and to correct any discrepancies which might exist.

Cannon Company moved from FEISSEN (260120, Sheet X-5) to MARKT GEBRDORF (1612, Sheet X-5). They closed into the new area at 1601 hours.

Regimental S-2 inquired of Division if any action had been taken to stop the French from requisitioning radios and food in the area. Division replied that no action had been taken as yet and no orders had been received covering it. S-2 stated that road blocks and check points would be set up in the sector to prevent the circulation of the French between towns.

All units were notified on 23 May that a schedule was to be completed by each unit showing activities of the unit as well as military operational subjects. Athletics showing units competing against one another was to be included. Small unit training was carried on with limitation due to maintaining numerous check points, rowing patrols and guard posts, operated for the assistance and support of the Military Government.

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SECRET

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NAD 25077
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
By
NARA, Date 3/16/1972
The Regimental Commander stated at a meeting of the staff on 23 May that one of the Regiment's biggest problems was that of rations. The supply of rations was inadequate and an actual shortage existed in items such as meat. Much of the food issued was spoiled prior to arrival because it was removed from refrigeration west of the Rhine River. Plans were made to have the Battalion surgeons make a special check of rations issued until their quality improved.

The Instruction and Education officer reported that an educational survey was being conducted throughout the regiment to determine the classes which were most needed and which were the most popular among the men. Also that a number of men had been taken to MUNCHEN, MUNCH, and MUNCHERSCKE, to be trained as guides for tours which were to be conducted to these cities.

Division notified the Regimental S-2 at 0955 hours on 24 May that reports had been received of German SS troops in the vicinity of MUNSTEITE (155885, Sheet X-5) and FRAKENDORF (133894, Sheet X-5). The reports had stated that the men had arms and ammunition in their possession. Patrols sent to the area during the day and one at night were unable to locate the reported troops. The burgemeister in MUNSTEITE reported that he had not been informed of any trouble in the area.

The 2d Battalion reported an unguarded alcohol and gas dump located in HELMIS- HOFEN (252154, Sheet X-5). Two Russians had died from drinking the alcohol and an American soldier was sick from it. The warehouse was reported to contain bomb fluid, oil, and airplane gasoline. Instructions were issued to post guards and to make a search of the area for other installations which might necessitate guard posts. Also a periodic check was to be made of the towns and woods for ammunition and materials.

The Antitank Company took a former SS leader into custody during the day when he was taken as he made a personal check on the local burgemeisters in the area. He was removed to MARKHOFEN and turned over to the military government for further investigation. Division inquired as to the status of the Hungarian displaced persons camp at BERNSTEIN, which had been taken over by the 1st Battalion. The camp was found to contain two hundred and fifty (250) Hungarians with a Hungarian officer in charge. They had adequate food of their own and their welfare was being taken care of properly.

A report received by the Regimental S-2 on 25 May stated that the Polish displaced persons in MUNCHEN had become embittered and had inflicted bodily harm upon the burgemeister and had caused several disturbances in the town.

The Antitank Company was notified at 1536 hours on 28 May that a report had been received of fifty (50) armed Polish displaced persons in GRISSEND (0806, Sheet X-5). A patrol was sent to investigate the report with instructions to place them in a displaced persons camp if they were causing any trouble. The reported troublemakers were nowhere to be found and, when questioned, the burgemeister stated that he knew nothing of any trouble in the area. The investigating officer expressed the belief that the Germans had started the rumor because the poles were not working and had to be furnished with food.

The Regimental Commander informed the S-3 on 30 May that the possibilities of constructing a regimental Known Distance Range should be investigated and also ranges for each battalion. Future plans were made for a three hour training period on
supporting weapons, which was to be divided into supporting armor, supporting artillery and mortars, and air support. Maps and aerial photographs were secured for contemplation during the next meetings.

A regimental review and presentation of awards was held at BUCHILO on 30 May. Forty-four (44) Silver Star medals were presented to members of the Regiment, the Regimental Service Company was presented with the Headquarter Company Plaque while the 2d Battalion was decorated for the following Presidential Citation:

"THE 2D BATTALION, 111TH INFANTRY REGIMENT, for extraordinary heroism, gallantry and esprit de corps from 12 December to 28 December 1944 in France. During the 14 days of this action, the 2d Battalion held the most important single terrain feature on the exposed right flank of the 35th Infantry Division. The enemy hurled thousands of rounds of artillery and repeated infantry assaults against the battalion positions and each attack was thrown back with disastrous losses. On 28 December the Germans infiltrated approximately 700 men to a point 2 kilometers behind the front lines and attacked the rear installations. By desperate fighting, the Headquarters personnel of this Battalion drove the enemy back and inflicted severe casualties. For the next four days units of the Battalion, cut off on three sides, withstood all enemy assaults and prevented the Germans from overrunning their positions. On 28 December, in spite of having lost 70% of its fighting strength, the Battalion launched a tank-infantry attack against the center of German resistance, with outstanding aggressiveness they successively stormed the three towns from which the enemy had mounted his entire offensive. The success of this brilliant attack, coupled with the overwhelming casualties inflicted on the enemy, definitely ended the enemy's offensive capabilities in the area. More than 600 prisoners of war were taken by the Battalion, 150 of whom were wounded, and at the conclusion of the operation, more than 600 enemy dead were found in the Battalion area."

The 111th Infantry Regiment received operational instructions on 31 May that one rifle company or equivalent would be designated each day as an alert force for deployment to quell civil disorder or riot within the regimental sector. The designated force was to be held free from assignment to security guard and check points, but would continue training and regimental programs.

Plans were completed on 31 May for the organization of a Regimental Non Commissioned Officers School to be operated for a four (4) weeks period. The objectives of the school were to increase the non commissioned officers' basic knowledge, to make them aware of their responsibility, and to increase their confidence in abilities and knowledge. The non commissioned officers were to be selected from each company and operation section. The school administrative personnel and instructors were selected from the officers and enlisted men of the regiment.

The month of May closed with the 111th Infantry Regiment, with the 753d Tank Battalion attached (for assistance in support of military government only), continuing to occupy and secure its sector, support the military government therein and to carry on training, instruction and education programs, and athletics with limitations.

Morale of the men in the regiment remained at a high level during the month as activities were not too strenuous and entertainment was adequate. Recreation was furnished during the evenings by baseball games, movies, and the newly organized regi-
mental band. The intensive programs set up on military courtesy, discipline and correct dress began to show results as the men of the regiment began to realize that they were again becoming garrison troops. Cleaning facilities had also become more abundant. The regiment sent forty-six (46) officers and enlisted men to the United Kingdom and Paris rest camps during the latter part of the month as transportation facilities became available. One hundred and thirty-five (135) enlisted men were returned to the states from the regiment under the now "point plan".

THE END

Report of operations written and prepared by:

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OPERATIONS IN GERMANY
MONTH OF JUNE 1945
1113TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

The month of June opened for the 1113th Infantry Regiment by continuing to occupy the sector of OBERBURG (1020, Sheet X-5), MARKT DRESDORF (1613, Sheet X-5), KAUFBEUREN (1624, Sheet X-5) and BUHLHOF (2312, Sheet X-5). The 1133rd tank battalion was attached to the regiment for assistance in support of the military government only. Remaining in this sector for the first fourteen days of June, the regiment spent the remainder of the month in the area of KAUFBEUREN (520302, Sheet X-5) and ULM (5780, Sheet X-4).

The work of the 1113th Infantry Regiment was separated into three groups of problems during the month of June. The primary object of the troops as an occupation force was to support the military government in the sector. To do this in a consistent and efficient manner, it was necessary to keep the morale of the troops as well as their physical fitness at a high level. The former was accomplished by the initiating of an extensive intelligence and education program, which included sending men to points of interest throughout the area, the forming of a regiments band, and numerous picture and stage shows. The 1113th Regiment sent men to Parks, England, Nancy, and the Riviera Rest camps during the month. The quotas received by the regiment became larger as troop movements slackened and more adequate transportation became available. All efforts were made to utilize to the utmost the rest and educational facilities at the disposal of the regiment. The men were kept in physical condition thru training and physical exercises.

Support of the Military Government

The military government was given support by the operation of check points, guard posts, and roving patrols throughout the sector during the entire month. Extensive operations were put into progress during the period to remove the remainder of displaced persons from the areas and to move them to collecting points where they could be separated into groups of the same nationality. The regimental staff received many reports of violence and disorder during the month, but the majority, when investigated, were found to have been greatly exaggerated or confused. Much of this was probably due to the inability of those reporting the disturbances to understand the language. The following report received by regiment demonstrated the confusion caused by many incidents. A report was made on 1 June that fifteen (15) Russian displaced persons were causing a disturbance in BUHLHOF (2312, Sheet X-5). They were reported to be carrying fire arms and to have wounded a Military Government officer when he attempted to quell the trouble. Later investigations showed that the report was entirely false. The investigators discovered that a car in which some Russian officers had been riding had been held up by a group of Ukrainians. During the hold up, the car had run off the road and had collided with a tree, resulting in the Russian officer being wounded. Through mistakes made in interrogating the different nationalities, the story had been completely changed.
petrols continued to screen the territory occupied by the regiment during the month in search of enemy material. Woods, towns, warehouses, and factories were systematically searched for any arms or ammunition which might be used by enemy agents or displaced persons. A close search of small towns and buildings was made as the Germans had moved many of their larger factories to the small towns and housed them in small buildings to escape bombing attacks. The material located was collected and taken to large dumps where it was disposed of or placed under guard. The small dumps were eliminated to reduce the number of guard posts.

Hungarians, Austrians, and Spaniards were considered as German refugees and not as displaced persons as the regiment attempted to clear the area of all persons not intended to remain. A survey of the area showed that there was a very small number of Spaniards in the area. The movement of the displaced persons was gradual throughout the month, except for Italians, whose evacuation had been halted by a typhus epidemic in the area.

The problem of keeping the Russians from roaming about and causing disturbances was partially solved by giving permission to the Russians to carry on a training program in their respective camps. The Russians were organized into companies and battalions and drilled in uniforms. Under the direction of regular Russian army officers in the camps, they were allowed to conduct drill and training without arms. The Hungarians in the sector were held in place and the Burgundians were compelled to furnish them with food.

German prisoners of war were secured from the camps and used in the area for work on dangerous jobs such as the moving of powder from storage installations to safer places and the moving of munitions to larger dumps. Many of the prisoners were placed on farms where they worked until time for them to report for processing and final dismissal from the Army.

Reports of well-organized bands of displaced persons were reported during the period the regiment occupied the territory around KAUFBEUREN. Each of these reports was investigated and if any evidence of looting was found, the displaced persons were collected and taken to a displaced persons camp where they were placed under guard.

New problems had to be solved as the regiment moved to the vicinity of WMA. Here the regiment which had occupied the sector before had been very lax on some rules and as the sector was taken over, it was necessary to make new rules and regulations for the civilians and displaced persons. The small towns in the area caused a shortage of billets for the troops and many of the towns were filled to overflowing with American troops. Some of the conditions were remedied by moving the patients from the hospital in the town of BLAUFEBEN. In the new area the Regimental 8-1 was faced with the problem of issuing gasoline to displaced persons. The displaced persons would show up at a gas dump with an authorized pass for enough gas to take them to their destination. The problem was caused by the issuance of passes to persons without proper authority in many cases, and the lack of a set rule covering the situations. The local military government ruled that the local military government ruled that the displaced persons were not to receive any gasoline as they were to be evacuated in all cases by Army transportation.

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RESTRICTED

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.

BY

MARA, DATE 10/1/72

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
All guard posts and check points allowed all vehicles carrying food to pass without delay. The food situation in the cities was becoming critical and all available foods were moved to the cities in an attempt to relieve the shortage.

A large burden was taken from the Regimental and Battalion S-2 and S-3 sections by the issuing of an order by the Military Government to the civilians of the sector. The order provided that all civilian problems or business was to be handled through the town burgomaster. The regimental and battalion command posts had experienced a great deal of difficulty in handling civilian matters due to a critical shortage of interpreters and lack of proper authority to make decisions on the matters.

Several instances of Polish displaced persons wearing American uniforms were found in the area during the month of June. They had secured passes permitting them to operate cars and to carry weapons. The source of these passes was not determined, but all apprehended were taken to displaced persons centers and processed by the military government. Orders were given to all check post guards that the clothing, cars, and weapons were to be confiscated in all cases.

It was found that uniform rules governing the check points in the regimental sector aided in the efficiency and effectiveness of the guards. The rules were set up to cover the following problems:

**CIVILIAN MOVEMENT**

Civilians were authorized free circulation throughout the area, except during the hours of curfew (21:30 to 05:00 hours). This freedom of movement was not permitted to impede vehicular traffic on main roads or supply routes. Doctors and other professional men and civilians concerned with the distribution of food were issued exemption passes, authorizing them to operate a vehicle in the course of their work. Vehicles so authorized were compelled to have passes attached to the windshield. Each occupant of the vehicle was checked for proper pass before the vehicles were allowed to proceed. All civilians found operating vehicles without the passes were apprehended and turned over to Division Headquarters. Spot checks were made at road blocks of all suspected civilians and their baggage checked for firearms, explosives and other contraband. Mass movement of displaced persons or German civilians was permitted only when authorized by Military Government officials.

Individuals and small parties of German Army personnel carrying authorized passes were not detained by the guard posts. Individual enemy soldiers were compelled to show their official demobilization pass before they were permitted to pass. Those not having the pass in their possession were immediately taken to a prisoner of war camp.

**RECREATION AND ENTERTAINMENT**

The Regimental Special Service provided recreation and entertainment for the men of the regiment in various ways during the month of June. While located in the Markt Oberdorf area, arrangements were made to conduct recreational tours to Oberammergau, Ettalineck, Garnisch, Innich, the Brenner Pass, and Berchtesgaden.

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DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.1.

By

NARA, Date 01/12/17

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Those tours served a twofold purpose, providing educational facilities as well as relaxation for the men after the long period of combat. Several stage shows were obtained for the regiment from troops of Russians and Polish entertainers who had been stranded in the area at the end of the war.

The regimental band, formed from musicians selected from the companies, offered many enjoyable hours of entertainment as they toured the sector playing for the battalions and for special occasions. The town of HIMBURG offered excellent facilities for recreation and movies. A large swimming pool with many other recreation facilities attached, offered a place of relaxation and enjoyment for the men of the 51st Infantry. The pool was carefully cleaned and chlorinated before permitting the men to use it and the same procedure was continued during periodic checkups. Although the swimming pool was in the area occupied by the 3rd Battalion, it was also used by the other battalions. A large field adjacent to the swimming pool provided adequate room for athletics and outdoor shows. A regimental baseball team provided an excellent sports program while each battalion operated its own schedule within the battalion. A stage was built in a large field near the baseball diamond and here the traveling shows held several performances.

The shows were attended by a large number of men from the regiment and were greatly appreciated as it was a change from the usual form of entertainment offered by moving pictures. Each battalion special service provided programs of athletics and amusement within the battalion by organized athletics, swimming, and recreation centers.

TRAINING PROGRAM

The 51st Infantry Regiment continued intensive training programs throughout the month of June. They were hampered in many ways, however, by continual movement of the personnel of the regiment and by the use of men for guard posts, check points and piling patrols. A refresher course was set up by Regimental S-3 to keep the men in physical condition as well as to re-establish many of the basic subjects which had necessarily been dropped during the long period of combat through France and Germany. Discipline and courtesy were stressed so that the men would realize that they were no longer a combat unit but were preparing for a long period of garrison duty as occupation forces. Proper dress and smart looks were emphasized as two of the necessities of a garrison soldier. As the month drew to a close the results of the training began to show as the men secured new clothing, better facilities for keeping both clothing and equipment clean and in proper condition were also available.

Ammunition was secured for training programs and inspections were held to determine the condition of the weapons before firing. An extensive study of air support was made along with artillery and other supporting weapons. Representatives of the artillery and tank battalions were present to aid in the functioning of the infantry problems during the training period.

The problem of redeployment hindered the regiment in making plans for training as it was not definite as to which group would remain with the regiment and which would leave. Vacancies caused by men with high scores leaving the regiment to go home were filled by men having a medium score. During the month the majority of the men in the regiment with a score of 85 points or higher were moved.
The functions of the month of June continued to be the main factors faced by the 112th Infantry Regiment throughout the month of July. However, new problems continued to arise which were efficiently handled by all units of the regiment. For the first ten (10) days of July, the regimental command post continued its operations in Blauburger (13580, sheet 7-4), the 3d Battalion, 2d Infantry, in Plauen (15520, sheet 7-4), and the 1st Battalion in Hennigsdorf (16020, sheet 7-4). From the seventh to the eleventh of July, the units of the 112th Infantry Regiment were moved into new areas and the training of individual units began; this was left to the discretion of the unit Commanding Officers since it was too difficult to follow the twenty-six (26) training program established by Division. The 3d Battalion remained in Blauburger and continued to occupy and secure its area and the remaining units of the 112th Infantry Regiment were moved to Hennigsdorf (16020, sheet 7-4), along with the 2d Battalion and Service Company. The 1st Battalion moved into Radevormwald (17520, sheet 7-4), and Antitank Company and Cannon Company moved to their new location at Blauburger (13580, sheet 7-4). Upon completion of the move to new areas, the units immediately set to work on the problems of supporting the military government and also made arrangements to combine the time lost in training so that it could be made up and the troops could gain full benefits which the twenty-six (26) week training schedule offered.

SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

To expedite the support of the military government, which remained the most important function of the occupying forces, some of the units secured permission to use English speaking displaced persons to aid in translating and disposing of problems of a military nature which arose in the area. German personnel, screened and approved by the Criminal Investigation Commission, were also used to speed the completion of cases involving robbery, disposition of German soldiers without proper discharge papers, transfer of displaced persons, and all other problems in which a command of the German language was necessary. While no planned sabotage was encountered, the military government was constantly faced with cases of theft and violence which called for direct support by the troops of the regiment. Several reports of French soldiers requisitioning civilian radios and creating disturbances were received, and these reports were promptly investigated and proper action taken. The aid of checkposts and patrols by the troops was enlisted to prevent French and displaced persons from entering the occupation area without proper passes. By the same token, an Army order eliminated the possibility of troops and persons in the present area from entering other areas without proper authorization.

In addition to their training programs and other duties, Engineers and Bomb disposal squads were frequently called upon to handle large amounts of enemy ammunition and munitions captured by alert troops as they screened the areas in search of enemy weapons, prisoners of war, and evidence of sabotage. Munitions and weapons were found in not too great amounts, the Engineers and Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon from the units exploited the findings in place, but the ammunition in great amounts was sent to Army collecting points where proper disposition was made. Typical of a large amount was the film at U6 where three (3) tons of small arms and numerous other military equipment was discovered and promptly disposed of.
either to another division or sent home to be discharged from the Army. Men with medium and low scores were transferred from other divisions to the 111st Infantry during the latter part of the month in large numbers as the other divisions prepared to go home or to the Pacific Theater. The handling of these reinforcements from other divisions was greatly alleviated by the establishment of a Redeployment Center in BLAUBEUREN. The military hospital, which had been vacated by the Germans, was used to house the men until proper assignment could be made. The majority of the reinforcements arrived late in the evening, and due to transportation, it was difficult to adequately handle them without some type of permanent arrangement, while the men were fed and housed it gave the regiment time to study the qualifications of each man. In each case an attempt was made to place the man in a position similar to the one he had held in his former division.

The month of June ended with the 111st Infantry Regiment situated in the
BLAUBEUREN - Ulm area, and continuing to support the military government in the area and also making new plans for a more elaborate sports and training program to be carried on within the regiment. Berat of the men varied during the month as old members of the regiment returned home or were transferred to other divisions for redeployment to the United States. New men coming into the organization were given the same consideration and privileges as those remaining in the regiment and the necessary readjustments were made so that they would receive passes and furloughs which they had earned in their former units.

END

Report of operations written and prepared by:

Sgt. HERMAN L. SCHOBURG, 35775155
Service Company, 111st Infantry
Regimental Sergeant Major

Capt. E. FISHER
2/5 EARL E. FISHER, 39418624
Company F, 111st Infantry

- 7 -

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NARA Date 9/12/92
The military government solicited the aid of the regiment in suppressing the use of Nazi symbols and stamps on all printed matter. No directive was sent down from Supreme Headquarters to this effect, but the policy of the military government was to suppress wherever possible any activity of a military nature by the Germans.

2d Battalion guards on the displaced persons camps in U.S. found displaced persons wearing United States army uniforms and also in possession of weapons. Several small riots were immediately dispersed by the guards. The regimental G-2 worked out a plan with the military government to remove all United States government property and to disarm all displaced persons. A complete investigation was made and camp commanders were instructed to take action to assure that no further such demonstrations were effected by displaced persons.

Considerable minor dissipative activities on the part of the French units bordering the 11th Infantry Regiment were experienced and an investigation was made by the military government and regimental officers to straighten out these matters and establish more liaison between the French and American units. The French were reported to be passing thru American check points without stopping and were also driving refugees out of their territory. Numerous cases of civilian material being requisitioned and ill treatment of civilians were also noted and the French military authorities were informed and requested to take immediate action to eliminate any further disturbances. A satisfactory agreement and liaison was reached by French and Regimental authorities.

RECREATION AND ENTERTAINMENT

Sports and entertainment continued high on the priority list of the men of the 11th Infantry during the month of July. Competition and morale of the troops was high as baseball games, swimming meets, and sports of all kinds were highlighted in the activities of the regiment. A fine swimming pool, complete with beer and refreshments, was made available to the men in LANGLEY. To commemorate independence day, units throughout the regiment, dressed smartly at their best, paraded with enthusiasm and showmanship down the main streets of the small German towns in the area, leaving a favorable impression of American military might on the people of Germany. The 1st Battalion marched, acted as honor guard at a parade and celebration given by Ninth Corps.

United Service Organization shows visited the regiment during the month offering many varied and enjoyable performances for the leisure hours of the troops. A sports show, which included some of America's top performers in the boxing, golf, horse show, track, and ping pong worlds was presented in LANGLEY and attended by a very large, interested audience, other shows including a legitimate stage play direct from its run on Broadway, and many performers from the theater and radio worlds were made available to the men of the regiment.

Rest camp and furlough quotas were increased, and many officers and enlisted men visited PARIS, THE RIVIERA, and THE UNITED KINGDOM during the month. The newly organized regimental band and special service organizations also provided a variety of entertainment for the men. Recreation halls serving beer and refreshments were established by individual units throughout the regiment, and the Red Cross Club in U.M.Y provided a favorite place for reading, games, and refreshments for the soldiers' leisure hours. The movie world was not neglected and late run movies were shown at least every other day to round out a complete schedule of recreation and entertainment for the men of the 11th Infantry Regi-
Training Program

The extensive training program was carried on among the troops of the Battalions during the month of July with restrictions due to the move to new areas. Inspections, close order drill, lectures, hikes and physical fitness exercises composed the bulk of the training schedule. Variations included orientaitons on the composition of infantry companies, lectures on personal cleanliness, and care and cleaning of equipment and billets. Also retreat parades and inspections were held and training films, to add interest as well as education to the train schedule, were shown. First aid instruction, considered a necessity for the individual soldier, was also provided. The men were given ample opportunity to assert themselves individually in the training and they took an active part in the discussions of problems and in the lectures and orientations given. The 1st Battalion moved out on the range to fire their weapons on the 28th of July. They were scheduled to fire through the fourth of August. The purpose was to familiarize each man with his own weapon, to be given a chance to zero the piece in, and to be given an opportunity to observe and fire every available weapon used in battle by an infantry company. It was also a chance to accomplish qualification in the principal weapon used by the individual.

The instruction and education program for the regiment began to take shape during the month of July. Informational and discussion topics were handled one hour per day, six days a week in each company throughout the regiment. During this time also, a class in German was conducted in all companies two hours per week.

Prior to the official opening of the Army education program, scheduled for the 1st of August, all schools were located, and enrollment was completed and class assignments made. Eleven hundred (1100) students were enrolled in fifty-nine (59) classes.

The "Outpost" newspaper, founded in the last of June, published a regular weekly six page issue of the news and educational and sports programs during the month of July.

Ten men from the 111st Infantry Regiment were selected on basis of personal qualifications to attend civilian universities and army study centers on the Continent. Pre-Army Education program courses in photography and barbering were completed the first week of July.

Civilian Movement

Check posts and guard stations continued to control civilian travel and pedestrian traffic in the towns of the area. Emergency civilian traffic, such as ambulances and emergency equipment, were allowed freedom of travel to and from their destinations. But civilians without proper authorization and identification were detained and confined to their area. The curfew remained in effect and its hours were strictly enforced and adhered to. In an effort to apprehend German soldiers with improper discharge papers, to uncover any concealed weapons and any efforts of sabotage and subversive activity, a forty-eight (48) hour screening of the entire area was carried out by the troops in cooperation with the military government. During this operation, called "Operation Halt", which was carried out throughout the whole of Germany, civilians were confined to their homes and carefully checked by the troops. Many former German soldiers were

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

By REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Date 5/27/1953
During the month of August, the 111st Infantry regiment continued its operations in the same sectors occupied through most of July. The 1st Battalion securing LANGENEN (792, Sheet 1-H), the 2nd Battalion in UHL (676, Sheet 1-H), and the 3rd Battalion remaining in BLAUSCHEN (515819, Sheet 1-H), Regimental Headquarters and Regimental Headquarters Company, Service Company, and the Regimental Antitank platoon stayed in UHL, and Antitank Company and Cannon Company continued in WIBLINGEN (6776, Sheet 1-H).

In supporting the military government, the regiment faced a new problem which grew more troublesome as the month progressed. And this was the problem of black market activities. Many civilians who were arrested for identification violations, were found to have American food, cigarettes, and candy in their possession. Much evidence of government issue clothing being traded, sold, and worn by civilians was uncovered. Beer being sold without proper authorization and approval in houses of ill repute was also found. Where such places were reported, raids were made by the troops and all illegal property was confiscated. Women who were believed to be guilty of prostitution were arrested and sent to be examined at Federal Police centers. The places were closed down and placed under military observation in an effort to stop organized prostitution.

An order was issued forbidding displaced persons and German civilians from wearing American uniforms. The displaced persons on American uniforms were sent to displaced persons camps where they were held until they could procure civilian clothing. German civilians were sent to the city jail where they were charged with illegal possession of American clothing.

In screening the displaced persons camps, troops were informed of the exact amounts of Red Cross rations given the people so that they could differentiate between loot and American goods and food which were given the people. A lot of American material such as candy, cigarettes, etc., was found in the displaced persons camps, but when checked against the Red Cross rations allotted, it was indicated that this material was accumulated from illegal possession of Red Cross rations.

Considerable amounts of enemy ammunition continued to show up during the month and several minefields were discovered. The mines, however, were laid in a pattern for the defense of the city of UHL and maps and exact locations of the minefields were discovered enabling the Engineers to readily dispose of the material.

In the town of UHL, parts of buildings remaining upright from the bombings, presented a hazard to military and civilian personnel alike. The Engineers were contacted and work was begun wrecking these buildings and removing the danger. Part of the work of clearing rubble and debris was being carried out by civilians and former German military personnel, but due to storms and constant hazards.
arrested, along with civilians violating the directives issued them, but very little evidence of undesirable activity was brought to light. Such equipment such as military radios, telephones, and signal equipment, was confiscated, but no large scale contraband or endeavors at sabotage were in evidence. Civilians travelling on roads or railroads without proper passes were arrested and then sent to their homes with instructions to remain there. Civilians, as a whole, seemed willing to cooperate and carry out directives issued to them and no trouble of a serious nature was encountered.

THE END

Report of operations written and prepared by:

T/5 CARL E. FISHER 39478634
Co F 111st Infantry Regiment
this problem had to be disposed of immediately, and the Engineers were best qualified to do the job.

The Engineers proved very helpful also in continuing to dispose of small area ammunition and explosives of mortar, artillery, bazooka ammunition, and all types which were in amounts not great enough to merit their removal to an Army ammunition dump, 5.1, and whenever possible, other explosives were blown in place to eliminate hazards in handling and to get the job done more speedily. The Engineers also made good use of mine detectors to remove all possible chance of future accidents in the area.

In cooperation with the military government, Regimental Headquarters established an investigation department to speed the handling of cases involving military personal in robbery, rape, homicide, and all other criminal actions necessitating the functions of the law. Officers were designated to act as investigators, and each case reported was thoroughly checked into and a complete report sent to division. Wherever action was required by the military government, the Criminal Investigation Division, or Military authorities, it had a complete and thorough history of each case with which to work. Thus, justice and immediate action was assured and all problems of this nature were quickly and smoothly worked out.

CIVILIAN LOOTING

In order to regulate and control civilian traffic, troops continued to operate check points, conduct screenings and check all identification papers and passes of people travelling from one area to another. To eliminate excessive travel and congestion in towns where food shortages and lack of housing prevailed, civilians were forbidden to travel on trains without proper authority or permission. Every possible means was instituted to keep civilians where they were situated, to expedite maximum efficiency in the system of occupation, displaced persons were being moved to their homelands and this exposure on transportation facilities was being concluded as rapidly as possible.

A directive was issued from division forbidding civilians from riding on railroad freight trains. Signs were posted in UNI informing the people not to ride on the trains, and freight trains coming into the area were stopped and the civilians ordered from them.

To eliminate large scale stealing, and to aid the civilian traffic situation, all civilian automobiles were registered and papers issued to owners. When cars were found minus the proper papers, they were confiscated and the owner's investigated. Civilian cars permitted on the roads bore stickers, stamped by the military government, on the windshield.

A liaison between the French and American units bordering each other in this area improved during the month. However, some difficulty was experienced with a group of ex-German soldiers. The men were hospitalized in the French area and when they attempted to come thru the German area on their way home, they were held. Regimental S-2 was contacted, and in short order, the men were cleared and allowed to pass on to their destinations.

TRAINING PROGRAM

The training program continued in effect and methods of instruction and
application improved as the month of August progressed. The company units were hampered by guard posts and check points which were maintained throughout the regiment. This situation was alleviated during the latter part of the month by the elimination of the less important guard posts and by the consolidation of others. Wherever possible, guard posts were taken over by civilian police and designated civilian guards.

As a general rule throughout the units, the mornings were devoted to training and calisthenics and the afternoons to organized athletics and the instruction and education program. Due to guard post duties, the training schedule had to be derailed from by the individual units at times, but qualified substitutions were made and the schedule in its original form was followed for the most part by all concerned.

The morning schedule contained physical training, rifle exercises, and gener physical calisthenics, to make up the physical portion of the training. First aid instruction and evacuation of the wounded was also taught. One hour periods were conducted in demounted drill, care and cleaning of equipment, close order drill, gun drill, tactical field problems, camouflage and concealment, field inspections, and retreat inspections were also held to aid the men in the proper care of equipment and to teach them to take pride in their military duties and in their own personal cleanliness. Awards and decorations were also presented at retreat parades.

The afternoons were devoted to the instruction and education program and to organized athletics. Baseball games, volleyball, horseshoe, and other types of competitive games were held. Competitive sports were used mainly to teach the men a sense of fair play and also to be a good loser. This method served a twofold purpose, that of giving all the troops an opportunity to engage in healthy physical exertion and to improve their minds and ability to use fair judgement which would serve them well in civilian life as well as in the army.

RECREATION AND ENTERTAINMENT

Entertainment continued to be well diversified with United Service Organization shows, performances, movies, track meets, and softball heading the list. A regimental field day was held with the 3rd Battalion running off with top honors.

The 2nd Battalion sponsored a night club for enlisted men in UHL which proved to be popular with the men. The club provided a good place to dance and refreshments and entertainment were in abundance. The Red Cross in UHL continued to be a popular place for the troops to spend their leisure hours. Coffee and doughnuts were provided free of charge, and reading material and games were plentiful.

The pass quota for Seventh Army to LYCH, NAGY, etc. was eliminated due to the constant movement of troops in the redeployment program, and also due.

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DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3, AND 735017

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

By

[Signature]

NARA, Date 2/1/92
The sectors occupied by units of the 111st Infantry Regiment remained the same during the month of September as they had throughout August. The 1st Battalion was stationed in LANGENHAIN (7692, Sheet W-1), the 2nd Battalion in ULM (6700, Sheet W-1), and the 3rd Battalion at LEDsBERG (515610, Sheet W-1). The unlettered units also remained stable with Regional Headquarters and Regional Headquarters Company, Service company, and the Regimental Medical Detachment continuing their operations in ULM, and Antitank Company and Cannon Company were located in WENLOHSM (6774, Sheet W-1).

SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Displaced persons and German civilians continued to create a problem for both the military government and the troops as black market activities and cases of violence increased during the month. However, the problem was not out of hand due to the prompt and efficient action by patrols and investigating officers. In several of the outlying towns of the area, displaced persons, especially males, were reported traveling in bands. They were observed carrying weapons and to have shot and wounded civilians in two instances. The security patrols rounded up the entire group and placed them under arrest in a displaced persons camp in ULM where they were to be investigated.

Generally speaking, the black market activities involved only minor items such as American candy, cigarettes, clothing, and material in small amounts. One exception however, was the case of a military government officer who, in the process of being evacuated to the 5th Evacuation Hospital for treatment, was found to have ninety thousand (90,000) German Reichsmarks in his possession. The Regimental S-2 referred the case to the military government officers and no further report was made to this headquarters on the subject.

A number of cases of civilians reported suspected of Counter Intelligence activities were submitted to the military government and to the troops on patrols and check points. However, when the regimental officials and investigating officers examined them all were found to be either false or of no serious nature. Disciplinary action was taken wherever necessary.

Many civilians and displaced persons alike found themselves in trouble over curfew violations. Persons found on the streets after curfew hours were taken to the city jail and made to spend the night there. Upon release, they were reprimanded and warned to observe the curfew laws in the future. Arreses were made also in many cases of civilian transients who were found on the streets without proper identification and travel papers. These individuals were turned over to the military government for disposition.

One of the major problems which confronted the 111st Infantry and the military government was the necessity to win the displaced persons...
to the fact that those places were meant primarily for rest corps for combat soldiers. But places to Paris, The Riviera, and The United Kingdom, were enjoyed by many of the enlisted men and officers during the month. A number of men also were sent on seven day furlough to Switzerland.

On 25th of August, a division track and field meet was held at the UVM stadium. First honors went to the 13th Infantry Regiment, with division artillery in second place, the 11th Infantry Regiment in third place, and the 12th Infantry Regiment last.

INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION PROGRAM

Some of the subjects taught in the Instruction and Education Program during the month were: Elementary Literacy; German and Advanced German; Auto Mechanics; English; Small Arms; Photography; General; Fundamentals of Selling; Electricity; and Heating. Within the unit command schools, two civilian instructors were engaged in teaching German.

Antitank and Cannon Companies formed their own individual Instruction and Education program schools and offered instruction in Auto Mechanics and German.

Attendance in the program had fallen off in the 2nd Battalion due to the interference of check points and guard duties. However, some decline in attendance was also noted in the 1st and 3rd Battalions which proved to be a discouraging factor. Causes of the drop in enrollment in the 2nd battalion were, of course, to guard requirements. Other causes for all concerned were transportation difficulties, restlessness created by the end of the war, and the realization that the subjects taught were not quite as expected.

A guest speaker from the Seventh Army spoke to the 3rd battalion on American Citizenship and in addition, advertisement education was being conducted in the 1st and 3rd Battalions.

Twenty-five men from the regiment had left or were preparing to leave by the first of September for special study courses in civilian universities, technical schools, and army study centers on the continent.

Recommendations were made for centralizing command schools on a regimental basis in the event that the battalions become zero trained in their areas of responsibility and guard duty requirements. As in larger theaters, it was suggested that men interested in taking courses be placed in temporary duty with centralizing schools for periods of approximately two weeks. The plan was under consideration pending the final designation of the division.

After an inspection by division, the physical facilities and instruction procedure of the instruction and education program were classed as excellent.

THE END

Report written and prepared by:

EARL E. FISHER 217861
265, Service Company
11th Infantry Regiment

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By KARA, Date 1/12/43
The commanding officer of the 51st Infantry Regiment had repeatedly submitted requisitions to division and higher headquarters in an effort to secure the materials needed. There was only a little time remaining until the advent of cold weather and the materials requested were only coming thru in small amounts. At the last report, action was being taken to assure proper housing conditions for the displaced persons who were to remain in camps thru the winter. Every effort was being made however, to evacuate as many people as possible to their homelands before cold weather began.

CIVILIAN MOVEMENT

The majority of check points were eliminated and wherever possible, civilian wards were installed in positions where traffic control and security guard were needed. All targets however, such as displaced persons camps, and installations of major importance were guarded by the troops. The purpose of installing civilian guards was to alleviate interference with unit training schedules and also due to the fact that the 36th Infantry division had been placed in category IV and was scheduled to move to the states in the near future. It was necessary therefore, to prepare the area for the occupation troops which were to move into the division area upon its departure, and thus on easing of the number of responsible guard posts was in order. The civilian guards were made fully responsible to the military government of the regimental area and the troops of the 51st Infantry Regiment. Security patrols, operated by the troops, made constant checks on the guard posts twenty four hours a day.

A steady stream of civilians continued to move thru the area on their way to their homes. Dispatching points were set up in U.S. to secure rides on civilian transportation for people whose traveling papers were in order, and who were permitted to travel. Those people gathered at a given point and all civilian traffic passing thru was stopped by civilian guards and was loaded with people going in the according directions.

To further control civilian traffic and also to place the German railroads on a paying basis, higher headquarters issued a directive announcing that forces would be collected on all passenger trains in the future and no civilians were to ride on the railroads free of charge. The restriction forbidding civilians to ride freight trains continued in effect. This new rule would tend to lessen traffic and civilian movement, thus establishing better control over transportation facilities and keep the movement of civilians to a minimum.

TRAINING PROGRAM

Due to the large number of troops with lay points moving out of the Regiment, and also to guard necessitating, the training program was cut down to three (33) hours a week. The training schedule employed general calisthenics, rifle exercises, dismounted drill, close order drill, tactical problems, care and cleaning of equipment, and other useful military problems. The afternoons were devoted to Information and Education classes and organized athletics.

Full field and show down inspections were held and the troops were cut down in equipment preparatory to the pending redeployment. Retreat purdah
were also held among the units and awards and decorations were presented to the men for combat achievements.

Informational and training films on various military subjects and problems were shown to the units during the month and also films dealing with venereal diseases and their prevention were given particular consideration. Classes were held on military courtesy, military intelligence and justice, procedure, and map reading. The wearing of the uniform properly was stressed at all times.

RECREATION AND ENTERTAINMENT

The advent of the football season was felt by almost every soldier in the regiment, and a very large crowd gathered at the stadium in ULM to witness the opening game between the 36th and 71st Infantry divisions. The illustrious Infantry Regiment was well represented in the division team and the troops were enthusiastic as they displayed their admiration for their team and America's favorite fall sport.

A division review was held in COLOGNE on September 9th to commemorate the anniversary of the landing on the beaches of Salerno by the 36th Infantry division. A parade was held the morning with the entire division passing in review for Corps and division commanders, and in the afternoon, the regiments were entertained with a circus, a show, and a baseball game. The review was a big success and a good time was had by all the troops in spite of rain, which threatened to spoil the affair.

A play, written, staged, and directed by the Information and Education Officer and the Sergeant in charge of special services, was presented by members of the 36th Infantry Regiment on the night of 30th September. The play was well done and the troops were pleased with it. Members of the cast portrayed their parts in a strictly professional manner, and had their audience laughing with laughter throughout the play.

A new enlisted men's club was opened in ULM, called "The Club Bât. A dance orchestra was provided and food and refreshments were served to the troops at a very reasonable price. The club was sponsored and handled entirely by the troops of the 36th Infantry Regiment.

The post exchange in ULM was due to close out right after the first of October, but they had procured a large stock of perfume and other gifts and the men of the regiment were appreciative of the efforts expended by the post exchange staff and officers involved in making possible the opportunity to purchase gifts for their families and friends back home.

First rate movies continued to show in the regimental area and three theaters, one in each battalion area, provided each man in the regiment an opportunity to see all the late run movies. This form of entertainment, one of the most popular both in America and to the troops serving overseas, provided a very effective and useful way for the man to spend leisure hours.

THE I. OBSERVATION AND EDUCATION PROGRAM

The pending re-deployment of the 36th Infantry division, with increasing
No changes were made in the sectors occupied by units of the 111th Infantry Regiment during the month of October. The 1st Battalion remained in Landau (7692, Sheet 14), the 2nd Battalion in ULM (6780, Sheet 14), and the 3rd Battalion in Blaubeuren (51530, Sheet 14). The unlettered units were formed into a 4th Battalion, but it in no way affected their positions. Headquarters, 4th Battalion, was located in ULM (6775, Sheet 14), with Field Artillery Section and the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, as well as Service Company and the 121st Medical Detachment, remained in ULM.

SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Armed bands of DPs created a temporary problem during the month of October, but their depredations were held to a minimum by prompt action on the part of Regimental patrols and Military Government.

Notes were found that propounded the following: "Join the 'Jaffo SS, who will be back to wage the fight against Democracy, the American Forces, and the Jews. Hitler is not dead. The 'Jaffo SS is not dead. Signed for Adolf Hitler," Persons responsible for the distribution of this agitation material were unknown.

Isolated instances of attacks on soldiers by small gangs of Hitler Youth were reported, but other than minor incidents, there were no open indications of either serious or organized resistance. Incidents were investigated by the G 11.

Continuing black market activities were noted, but were not large-scale. Two cases of cigarettes were stolen from the Regimental PX, but the thieves were apprehended by civilian police when they attempted to sell the stolen merchandise.

Numerous instances of illegal possession of arms and ammunition by DPs were brought to light. In all cases, the firearms were confiscated and the offenders incarcerated.

Despite the fact that the Regiment was relieved on 15 October by
changes seriously interrupted the Information and Education school set up. Furthermore, notification around the 15th of September that the Division was no longer in Category I foreshadowed the abrupt end to the Information and Education Program. However, during the month of September, some four hundred (400) men received certificates for various phases of completion of the courses taken.

With the exception of a welding class in the 3rd Battalion, all Information and Education schools of the Regiment were closed by 25th September. The loss of Instructors as well as enrollees made the continuance of the schools impossible.

In addition to the Command School functions, several men were selected from the Regiment during the month for Universities, Vocational and Trade Schools, and one man was sent to a professional training school in Scotland.

The normal two (2) hours a week of the Information phase of the Program continued throughout the unit training schedules and plans were made to collect library books and other Information and Education material no later than two (2) weeks prior to the proposed date of departure, which was set tentatively for the 15th of October.

The last issue of the Regimental newspaper, "The Outpost", was scheduled to be printed the first week of October, 1944. This was to be a seminar addition.

A guest speaker from 7th Army addressed the assembled 3rd Battalion in Bamburg the last part of the month. He spoke to the troops on "The price we must pay for American citizenship".

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THE END

Report written and prepared by:

EARL H. FISHER
39H7863A
Tec A Service Company
3/1st Infantry Regiment

-5-

RESTRICTED

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elements of the 11th Armored, 1st Armored Division, internal security
was maintained and alert platoons prepared for instant action to quell
disturbances. The high level of cooperation with Military Government
was commended in a letter from the local MG Commanding Officer to the
Commanding Officer of the 111th.

Guards were provided for DP movements, and German civilians were
moved from their homes to other quarters with friends or neighbors, to
make room for Polish DPs who were without shelter as a result of closing
2 Polish camps.

CIVILIAN MOVEMENT

Civilians continued to move through the area in large numbers, re-
turning to their homes. They were aided in their travels by dispatch
points where civilian police placed them on vehicles whenever possible.

Supporting a higher headquarters' directive, civilians riding trains
without paying fares were removed from the trains at the rate of 150 a
day. This policy was adopted as a control measure for civilian traffic,
as well as to allow the railroads to realize a profit.

Civilians were utilized wherever possible to facilitate move-
ments, and were responsible directly to MG.

TRANSPORTATION

The training program became of primary importance when on 15 October
the readiness date for redeployment was changed from 2 November to 15 Nov-
ember and the availability date from 17 October to 1 November.

In addition, the 111th gained personnel in the redeployment, and the
number of duties was reduced when the Regiment was relieved. During the
month, 64 Officers and 576 Enlisted Men were sent to other units, while
128 Officers, 7 Warrant Officers and 2215 Enlisted Men were assigned to
the Regiment.

The units followed a training schedule which included inspections,
calisthenics, drill, orientations, marches, and organized athletics. One
retreat parade for each Battalion was included in the weekly schedule,a
at which time awards were presented and the companies were reviewed.

To bring an awareness of the effect of WD on men contracting it,
umerous lectures were included in the schedule. Daily inspections tended
to keep the appearance of the men at its usual high standard, and uniform
regulation enforcement was stressed, particularly since large numbers of
men were assigned to 111 from units where regulations differed.
RESTRICTED

I & E discussion periods were utilized to enlighten the soldier as to procedures in the assembly area, dock, and debarkation centers. Also discussed was the procedure each man must go through upon arrival in the United States.

EDUCATION AND ENTERTAINMENT

October found Special Services providing more and better movies, with each Battalion having an excellent picture every second night.

Enough athletic equipment was procured to enable the competitive sports program to resume. In the touch football league, 2nd Battalion's team was leading the Division. A number of indoor games were obtained, including chess, checkers, and dart boards.

"On the Ball," a USO musical variety show direct from Broadway, appeared at the 2nd Battalion Theater. Two more fine productions were scheduled for the first two weeks of November. Special Services has been instrumental in signing US and German entertainers to appear at the Red Cross Cereal Club.

A 28-piece band was organized to play for regimental reviews, and musicians from that aggregation played for dances sponsored by the various units.

The Regimental Gift Shop remained open, and provided an excellent opportunity for personnel to purchase gifts for their families and friends.

THE INFANTRY AND EDUCATION PROGRAM

Delays in the redeployment of the Division afforded the Regimental Information and Education Office an opportunity to continue its program, although on a much smaller scale because of the uncertainty of the situation.

Nineteen (19) officers and enlisted men were entered in the Division Vocational Guidance School, and the necessary arrangements were made to procure a supply of informative and training material to be used by the personnel during their return to America.

Redeployment was the primary topic for the 2-hour discussion periods scheduled each week under the Information phase of the training program. Material and information was provided by I & E.

Completion of the Regimental History in its creative phase was announced. The History was undergoing its first printing, and the appro

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

By NARA, Date 01/17/22
DATE OF COMPLETION OF THE 10,000 COPIES WAS TO BE THANKSGIVING.
SHOULD THE DIVISION MOVE BEFORE THAT DATE, AN OFFICER HAS BEEN
ASSIGNED TO SUPERVISE THE PROJECT AND ITS SUBSEQUENT DISTRIBUTION.

ON 6 OCTOBER "THE OUTPOST", REGIMENTAL NEWSPAPER, PRINTED ITS FINAL
EDITION, A SOUVENIR ISSUE, DURING FIVE MONTHS OF PUBLICATION. THE ISSUE
WAS A HISTORY OF THE REGIMENT'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS SINCE THE WAR'S END IN
EUROPE.

THE REGIMENTAL PHOTO LAB WAS REOPENED TO CONTINUE WORK UNTIL 28
OCTOBER.

THE END

REPORT WRITTEN AND PREPARED BY:

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