Status of the Border Carbon Adjustments’ international developments

15 March 2021

Andrei Marcu

Dariusz Dybka
**Background**

This paper is intended as an update on the status of discussions on border carbon adjustments (BCA) around the world and will be updated for new developments, as appropriate.

A BCA is seen as a tool to address the impacts of asymmetrical climate change policies that are emerging under the national determined contributions (NDCs) which Parties to the Paris Agreement have to submit. As a result, the level of effort in different jurisdictions is asymmetrical, resulting in potential impacts on competition and carbon leakage. Countries, especially those that have set ambitious targets and have put in place carbon pricing mechanisms (such as an ETS or Carbon tax), have concerns regarding the impact of carbon leakage and competitiveness on energy-intensive-trade-exposed (EITE) industries.

While under the Kyoto Protocol this was the case only for developed countries, under the Paris Agreement all countries are concerned. Therefore, they seek solutions that will allow them to decarbonize while ensuring that they maintain their competitive stance during this transition period.

Among the solutions put in place to address these issues, free allocation for direct emissions has been the one that has been most used, together with compensation for indirect costs, in some EU jurisdictions.

As the level of effort increases, together with the corresponding rise in cost of domestic compliance and the decrease in the amount of free allocation available for EITE industries, new solutions are being explored.

BCAs are not something new, but the EU’s political commitment and the expected proposal for a BCA from the European Commission in June have galvanized discussions and raised interest around the world. So far, California is the only jurisdiction where this tool is used for electricity imports.

**EU process**

After the 2019 announcement of the European Green Deal, consultations began to prepare the proposal for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), to be included in the “Fit for 55” legislative package expected in June 2021. As part of the official consultation process, the Inception Impact Assessment and the Public Consultations took place in 2020. Following this process, the European Commission will finalize the Impact Assessment, which will accompany the proposal in June.

The European Commission appears to be considering four options for a CBAM design: 1) Import tax; 2) ETS extension; 3) Notional ETS with a separate pool of allowances; 4) Consumption tax (excise or VAT type). Currently, No. 3 is widely considered the preferred option.

In the meantime, the European Parliament used its prerogative to build its own non-binding position through the Own Initiative Towards a WTO-compatible EU Carbon border adjustment mechanism. The Plenary vote took place at the beginning of March and provided some indication on where the EP
stands on the CBAM, before the EC put forward its proposal and formal negotiations start among the European Commission, Parliament and Council in the second half of 2021.

The heated debate during the European Parliament’s plenary on March 8th resulted in a compromise. The resolution includes the removal of a reference to CBAM as an alternative to current carbon leakage measures and avoids calling for the gradual phase-out of free allowances. The Parliament’s resolution still underlines the absence of a double protection for the EU industry, which can be interpreted as the coexistence and not the overlap between free allocation and CBAM.

US overview
A series of recent White House announcements have put the climate policy at the center of the political agenda of the new Administration: a commitment to a decarbonized power sector by 2035, a net zero economy by 2050 and the organization of a climate summit in April are expected to give a legislative action boost on a federal level. That said, US climate envoy John Kerry warned the EU to wait until after the COP summit to move forward with the CBAM.

The Biden Administration might consider a border carbon tax as part of its trade agenda. As it was an integral part of the presidential campaign, it would follow the logic that expects domestic polluters to bear the full cost of their carbon emissions and would impose carbon border adjustment fees or quotas on carbon-intensive goods from countries that are failing to meet their climate and environmental obligations.

What is less clear, however, is how a BCA could be calculated without a federal carbon price. A number of more detailed policies already exist or are under discussion at a State level.

California BCA for Electricity Imports
California’s ETS contains a provision of “first deliverers” of electricity being liable for emissions of electricity imported from outside California (in the US). Where the carbon intensity of an electricity source is unspecified, it is assumed to be above the coverage threshold and subject to a default emissions factor.

This can create the challenge of resource shuffling – entities which lower their compliance obligation by substituting low-carbon electricity and swapping out related PPAs. This has been addressed by updating the regulatory framework, which now expressly forbids resource shuffling and sets out a detailed list of “safe harbor” practices. In a nutshell, these are changes to electricity offtake arrangements that are not considered resource shuffling.

---

1 https://carbon-pulse.us10.list-manage.com/track/click?u=98e16e4087837ec9f0445f260&id=e45b3fb931&e=01ed772568
2 https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/
**New York**

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), covering 11 North-Eastern and Mid-Atlantic States, puts a regional cap on emissions from power generation. The program began in 2009 and the price of carbon in RGGI is around $6/ton. In the **State of New York**, the Independent Service Operator (NYISO) released its final draft of a Carbon Pricing Proposal to formally put a price to carbon dioxide emissions on the wholesale power market – and it contains a BCA provision. To avoid creating distortions, the NYISO proposes to apply carbon charges to external transactions so as to make them compete with internal resources (and each other) as if the NYISO was not applying a carbon charge to internal suppliers (i.e. on a status quo basis).

**Canada: federal level**

Canada is exploring the potential of a border carbon adjustment and has committed to discussing this idea with international partners. This type of adjustment is intended to prevent carbon leakage. The **policy instrument** would presumably be the output-based pricing system (OBPS), a regime established under the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act. The GGPPA gives flexibility to provinces by establishing a minimum CO2 price. The charge, which will rise to $50 per ton of CO2 by 2022, began at $20 in 2019 and will increase by $10 per year until 2022, in discussion is $170 by 2030.

The type of policy instrument matters, too. The Canadian Supreme Court will decide whether the GGPPA is a tax or a regulation. Calling the regime a tax, it could probably take advantage of leeway under WTO law to adjust taxes on exports (A. Cosbey, 2021). It must also be recalled that in the past Canada has cohosted MoCAs together with the EU and China. As long as that initiative remains operational, it could also be a format where BCA discussions could take place.

**Canada: provinces and territories**

Although there are regional carbon markets linkages on a subnational level (California/Quebec), establishing a border adjustment is a federal competency. Provincial regulations are supported by local statutes and autonomies. The Government of **British Columbia** introduced a carbon tax in 2008. **Quebec** participates in an international emissions trading scheme with the US state of California. **Alberta** announced a carbon tax in 2015. **Ontario** joined the Western Climate Initiative in 2017 but later withdrew. In the event of no single carbon price in Canada, will there be a need for an adjustment on the provincial border? It’s more likely that any BCA would assume that the Federal level GGPA was the prevailing policy instrument. This could be justified by the legal assumption, made in the GGPA, that if the provinces don’t have regulations of equivalent effect in place, the GGPA will apply as a federal backstop.

A key issue for Canada is how to move forward with any BCA or similar instrument, given Canada’s intense and complex trading relationship with the United States. The US, as noted above, do not have

---

3 NYISO Carbon Pricing Proposal
4 Statement (roadmap)
5 Strengthened climate plan
6 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/ministerial-climate-action_en
a carbon price, so it is not clear either how they might protect their EITE firms in the context of high climate ambition, or how Canada might coordinate with whichever policies the US do put in place.

With the support of the WTO Secretariat, Canada has recently organized a webinar on border carbon adjustments for WTO negotiators including a significant number of other stakeholders, and which attracted significant interest⁷.

**China**

China remains cautious towards the EU CBAM, especially because of trade issues. China’s NDC and climate policy is based on the announcement of carbon neutrality by 2060 and putting the power sector under an emissions trading scheme.

The impact of the EU CBAM on EU–China relations will depend largely on how it is designed and negotiated. This will also depend on making any EU CBAM WTO compliant. Using revenues and allowing for crediting of existing policies will be important considerations in these discussions.

**UK – COP 26 and G7 presidencies**

The UK is also preoccupied with how to address competitiveness and carbon leakage, considering that it is not part of the EU ETS anymore. It is currently assessing different options and identifying sectors vulnerable to leakage, while evaluating policy options and their implications.

The UK will have an important and visible role in 2021 as Chair of G7 and president for COP 26 in Glasgow. Recent statements from Prime Minister Boris Johnson point to consideration being given to making this an item for discussion at the G7. Raising this at COP26 may be politically sensitive.

**Ukraine – geographic scope example**

Ukraine is in a transition period towards establishing the ETS system and eventually linking it with the EU ETS. Ukraine may consider mechanism like EU CBAM⁸ as a part of such transition. This could be supported by existing bilateral or regional arrangements – such as the EU Association Agreement – as grounds to merit an exemption. Firstly, countries in such relationships have close and deepening trade relationships with the EU. Secondly, as part of their agreements, those countries have typically committed to strengthen environmental and climate policies by adopting the EU’s *acquis*.

**Japan**

Japan announced its target of carbon neutrality by 2050. This pledge should be fulfilled mostly through electrification and decarbonization, including negative emissions. However, on the carbon market this is still limited to the automotive sector through carbon offsets and the first mandatory ETS was established in the Tokyo Metropolitan area⁹. In the view of summer 2021, Japan is considering a carbon border tax that would impose tariffs on imports from countries with insufficient environmental standards.¹⁰

---

⁷ https://twitter.com/CarolynDeere/status/1367381457602232320/photo/1
⁹ https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/?option=com_etsmap&task=export&format=pdf&layout=list&systems[]=51
Russian Federation

The Russian Federation has been alarmed by the discussion on an EU CBAM and, together with China, Paraguay, Uruguay and the United States, sought assurances from the European Union that its European Green Deal would be consistent with the WTO principle of non-discrimination.

WTO members discussed the European Union’s plans for a carbon border adjustment mechanism at the virtual meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods held on 10-11 June 2020.\(^\text{11}\)

WTO

WTO discussions on BCAs are still at a relatively initial stage. At this point, the EU is the only stakeholder with a working plan aiming to achieve a BCA – other WTO members are at a less advanced stage (e.g. Canada is only starting to explore how/whether a BCA could be designed).

The Council for Trade in Goods required further details on how a BCA would be implemented and the assurance that it will not be used as disguised barriers to trade. The EU presented the Green Deal at the Committee on Trade and Environment and received questions on the design and implementation of the BCA.\(^\text{12}\)

On 12\(^\text{th}\) and 16\(^\text{th}\) November 2020, at a meeting of the WTO Committee on Market Access, WTO members raised a number of trade concerns, including the EU’s planned CBAM. During this meeting, members were concerned about the consistency of a future CBAM with WTO rules and requested the EU to shed light on the status of the relevant legislation, as well as the sectors and products affected. Several members pointed out this measure needs to be designed and implemented fairly, recognizing carbon pricing systems already in place in other countries (including at the sub-national level) and recalled the Paris Agreement’s principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.”

Similarly, some members criticized the EU’s intention to use the CBAM as a new source of EU own revenue. Not aiming at climate protection, this would set economic and fiscal objectives.

In March 2021, the WTO convened the inaugural meeting of a new “Trade and Environmental Sustainability” joint initiative group, which is expected to be a forum to discuss carbon border taxes. Over 50 WTO member countries have already expressed their interest in participating to identify goals and objectives related to trade and sustainable development through “structured discussions ... on actions and deliverables” in this area.

\(^\text{11}\) https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/good_11jun20_e.htm
\(^\text{12}\) https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/envir_20nov20_e.htm