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Who You Know: Local Party Presidents and Minority Candidate Emergence

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There is growing attention to the descriptive representation of racialized minorities in politics. Because of a systematic lack of data on nomination contestants' racial backgrounds, most research looks at outcomes on election day, thus ignoring the crucial stages that help to shape minority candidate emergence. Using a unique data set on nomination contestants and local party presidents in a recent Canadian election, this study demonstrates that while district diversity is one determinant of minority candidate emergence, the presence of a racialized local party president is also substantively important. The findings show that racialized party gatekeepers play a key role in the emergence of minority candidates, and these networks matter most in the districts with lower levels of racial diversity. The findings further suggest the general pattern of left-center parties facilitating minority candidate emergence may not apply in the Canadian context.

Keywords: candidate selection; candidate emergence; political parties; race; party elites; minorities

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1. Introduction

Elected institutions are key sites of demographic representation and yet they often numerically under-represent the diversity of the populations whom they purport to represent (Andrew et al., 2008; Black, 2013; Black and Hicks, 2006). This under-representation begins early on in the political process. The candidate slates advanced by political parties frequently do not reflect the general population and dramatically under-represent women, minorities, and other traditionally marginalized groups (Black, 2013; Carbert, 2012). To the extent that research on descriptive representation has examined minority candidates – a site where there is a dearth of systematic data – much of it has focused on the demographic match between the population and the seats in the legislature following an election (Bloemraad, 2013; Casellas, 2009). This research tells us about the endpoint of minority candidate emergence process, but less about the critical junctures leading up to it.

A first critical juncture is that of political aspiration. Research suggests that political ambition is gendered (Fox and Lawless, 2004; Lawless and Fox, 2010) and that women's political ambitions are more likely to be realized when party gatekeepers encourage them to run (Crowder-Meyer, 2013). Gendered recruitment effects have been identified in experimental and observational studies; whereas the presence of women party elites has been shown to increase the emergence of women candidates (Cheng and Tavits, 2011; Crowder-Meyer, 2013; Tremblay and Pelletier, 2001), recruitment by men may dampen it (Pruysers and Blais, 2018). Less research has examined racial differences in political ambition, but some literature suggests that minority aspirants are in fact *more* politically

ambitious than their white counterparts (Shah, 2015). Even so, there is some evidence that party gatekeepers discriminate against political aspirants with immigrant backgrounds (Dancygier et al., 2015), although other research suggests that co-ethnic political networks will bolster minority candidate emergence (Akhtar and Peace, 2018; Ocampo, 2018).

The candidate selection stage is a second critical juncture because the support of a registered political party offers organizational and financial support, as well as legitimacy and brand recognition, all of which are assets that are less available to candidates who run as independents. The party nomination serves as a chokepoint that will either close off entrants or, alternately, open up the pathway into politics and whom parties choose to nominate ultimately helps to structure the composition of elected institutions (Rahat, 2007), but because there are few readily available datasets that include nomination contestants' racial backgrounds, it is an area that has received less attention in the literature on candidate emergence. This study provides valuable expert-coded nomination data to help specify the process through which minority candidates gain a political toehold.

The third critical juncture occurs when voters decide which candidate to send to the legislature. Most of the literature focuses on the final stage of candidate selection – election day – and suggests that minority candidates do not suffer an electoral penalty (Bird, 2016; Black and Erickson, 2006; Tossutti and Najem, 2002). Other work argues that representational deficits in electoral institutions are embedded during the recruitment

and party selectorate stages, long before voters make their choices (Juenke and Shah, 2016). To help unravel the threads, I focus on the early stage of candidate emergence.

The study makes four central contributions.

First, it looks at the emergence of racialized candidates, a key contribution because although the literature on gender and candidate emergence is quite robust, race and gender may operate in different ways, and we know far less about the former (Shah, 2015). Second, using an original dataset, it casts backwards into the candidate pool to pinpoint the early stage correlates of minority candidate emergence. Third, it focuses on Canada, a country that has been identified elsewhere as one that does not fit the standard pattern of association between left-center parties and minority candidate emergence (Farrer and Zingher, 2018). Fourth, although the importance of district- and party-level factors to minority candidate emergence is clear (Farrer and Zingher, 2018; Shah, 2014; Sobolewska, 2013), this study adds a third element – political networks – to demonstrate the role that party gatekeepers play in mobilizing political aspirants (Akhtar and Peace, 2018; Cheng and Tavits, 2011; Cross and Young, 2013; Crowder-Meyer, 2013; Ocampo, 2018; Pruyers and Blais, 2018). Even when the electoral context is amenable to minority candidate emergence – namely when there is a large minority population in the district – I show that the presence of a racialized local party president is significantly related to the emergence of racialized candidates, and this importance grows in districts with smaller populations of racialized voters. Institutions and networks matter, and the role of the local party president is key.

2. Factors Affecting Candidate Emergence

2.1. Parties, Districts, and Candidate Emergence

Many studies of numerical representation focus on the “rules of the game” (Bloemraad, 2013), but several recent studies have shown electoral rules alone provide an insufficient basis for explaining the representation of racialized minorities (Bloemraad, 2013; Dancygier, 2014; Tolley, 2017a); these studies set their sights on party- and district-level factors.

One key finding is that center-left parties are more likely than other parties to field diverse candidate slates (Farrer and Zingher, 2018; Sobolewska, 2013). Partly, this is ideological, but it is also a matter of electoral incentives: left-leaning parties see the advantage of appealing to like-minded racialized voters; they do this in part by advancing more diverse candidate slates. This pattern has been observed across a number of countries, but does not hold in Canada where the federal center-left New Democrats (NDP) are no more likely than other parties – and often times the least likely – to nominate racialized candidates, particularly in winnable districts (Black, 2017). Given that the NDP has an explicit affirmative action policy, its failure to nominate more minority candidates is somewhat surprising, but it may simply be a reflection of traditional party preferences among racialized voters. To be sure, no party has a stranglehold on the country’s so-called “ethnic vote,” but historically the centrist Liberals have held the allegiance of most racialized voters. However, the advantage is quite thin, and the Conservative party has attempted to whittle it away in recent years (Blais, 2005;

Harell, 2013; Tolley, 2017b). Immigration and diversity issues have rarely been the electoral wedge issues that they are elsewhere, so the NDP has little to gain by explicitly alienating racialized voters (not to mention that such a move would be ideologically incongruent). At the same time, even if the NDP would like to bring more racialized voters onside by presenting a more diverse candidate slate, it is possible that the party lacks the diverse networks needed to recruit such candidates, and the electoral incentives have not yet been strong enough to propel them to do so.

Incumbency is a second party determinant that bestows a significant advantage on those who already hold office (Krebs, 1999). Incumbents not only enjoy much higher rates of re-election, but their very presence may ward off competitors at the nomination stage. Within parties, leaders may offer some protection to incumbents, paving the way for an uncontested nomination that allows the candidate to skip the party selection stage and proceed directly to the election (Pruysers and Cross, 2016). In Canada, federal party leaders retain the power to call nomination meetings. They thus control the timing of selection contests and can use this power to advantage preferred candidates. They can, for example, call a nomination meeting early on in an electoral cycle before competitors have a chance to organize. Party leaders can also directly appoint nominees, although this mechanism is only rarely used because it can lead to conflict with local party members. Outside these more formal mechanisms, party officials – both local and central – may act informally to discourage competitors from running against a preferred nominee, such as an incumbent. Such intervention will close off opportunities for new candidates and, because incumbents are still proportionately more likely to be white, such a move will

decrease the representation of minorities among election contenders. Outside the incumbent's party, prospective candidates may similarly be dissuaded by the sitting member's presence. They may opt to wait for another election cycle before throwing their hats in the ring, or choose to stand for nomination in another district. For this reason, minority candidates might emerge more often in districts where there is no incumbent (Shah, 2014).

District-level factors are a second theme in the literature on minority representation. Here, demographic determinants predominate, and there is extensive research linking a minority group's district population to its probability of electing a co-ethnic candidate (Casellas, 2009; Saggar and Geddes, 2000). Although minority candidates tend to be elected in districts where their own ethnic or racial group forms a sizable proportion of the population, this relationship is not absolute (Ocampo, 2018), and there is some evidence that parties are now more open to nominating minority candidates in a broader range of districts, including those where the white population comprises a strong majority (Sobolewska, 2013). This may be particularly likely in districts that lean ideologically to the left, where voters are less likely to discriminate against minority candidates, so the incentives to run them are stronger and the potential penalty for doing so is weaker (Besco, 2018). In the Canadian case, where minority voters' support for the NDP is less robust than their affinity for either the Liberals or Conservatives (Harell, 2013), the center-left party's strategic calculation is less clear and is worthy of investigation.

This need for a second look is confirmed in a recent study by Farrer and Zingher (2018) who argue that district- and party-level factors should not be looked at in isolation but instead in interaction. They find center-left parties in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia are most likely to nominate minority candidates, particularly in districts with large minority populations, but two outliers bear mention. First, the results of Farrer and Zingher's exploratory analysis of the 2011 Canadian election ran counter to expectations and suggested a somewhat different pattern of minority candidate emergence in that country. Second, the propensity for center-left parties to nominate higher numbers of minority candidates in minority-dense districts was less evident in Australia, where (unlike in the US and UK), there are several smaller minority groups, a context that mirrors the Canadian case. While most explanations of minority candidate emergence focus on center-left ideology and large minority populations, the exceptions in Farrer and Zingher's analysis motivate the additional analysis I provide here.

2.2. Political Networks, Recruitment, and Candidate Emergence

I argue that while district and party matter, so too do political networks. Indeed, there are numerous examples of majority-minority districts and center-left parties electing white candidates, suggesting that the role of district and party may have been over-stated, or that alternative explanations should be sought (Ocampo, 2018). Political networks help to explain why some qualified candidates choose to run and others do not, or why a candidate opts to run under one party's banner or in a particular district instead of another. The gender and politics literature confirms that discrimination by party

selectorates helps to explain women's under-representation in elected office (Ashe and Stewart, 2012; Crowder-Meyer, 2013; Sanbonmatsu, 2006), and women candidates are more likely to emerge when the party president or leader is a woman (Cheng and Tavits, 2011; Crowder-Meyer, 2013). With a few important exceptions where race or ethnicity are explored (Akhtar and Peace, 2018; Casellas, 2011; Dancygier et al., 2015; Ocampo, 2018), most research on recruitment applies a gendered lens.

That literature demonstrates that the role of local party recruiters is important because candidates rarely emerge without some encouragement (Cross and Young, 2013; Fox and Lawless, 2010). Local party elites form the bridge between prospective candidates in a district and the parties wishing to recruit them, and those elites rely on their networks to make that connection. We know, however, that networks are relatively homogenous and often segregated along demographic lines, with similar people tending to connect to one another more frequently and strongly than dissimilar people, a phenomenon that is known as social homophily (McPherson et al., 2001). Beyond simple preferences, however, a large body of the literature on social capital demonstrates the influence of tight racial and ethnic networks on political mobilization (Fennema and Tillie, 1999). The size, density, and durability of these networks vary across racial and ethnic groups, and these group-specific factors interact with a country's political context and structures to produce different patterns of mobilization across groups and within countries (Michon and Vermeulen, 2013). As Michon and Vermeulen (2013) point out, "There is no simple formula," and my data do not permit me to unpack the precise mechanism here. The main point is that local party elites play a key role in candidate recruitment, and those elites'

networks and preferences help to structure the pool of political aspirants; past research demonstrates that elites have a tendency to favour candidates whose demographic characteristics resemble their own (Ashe and Stewart, 2012; Cheng and Tavits, 2011; Crowder-Meyer, 2013; Dancygier, 2014).

Most minority candidates say they were recruited to run by the local party (Cross and Young, 2013), and the influence of these networks is likely to be strongest in the districts with large racialized populations. However, as parties look to expand their base of support and advance candidate slates that reflect the country's demographic diversity, they may feel the need to recruit racialized candidates from outside the most diverse districts, and the work of local party recruiters might vary as the size and composition of racialized populations fluctuates (Sobolewska, 2013). Understanding racialized candidate emergence in these varying contexts becomes even more important.

3. Case Study

I test the role of political networks in minority candidate emergence by focusing on the Canadian case. The decentralized and zero-sum nature of candidate selection in Canada makes it an ideal site for testing the relationship between party, district and candidate emergence (Cheng and Tavits 2011). Canada uses the single-member district simple plurality electoral system. Each party exercises internal control over candidate recruitment and selection, but across all major parties the unifying principle is that local party members operating at the district level nominate the single candidate who will carry

their party's banner in the coming election (Carty and Eagles, 2005; Pruyzers and Cross, 2016). Although party leaders ultimately approve all candidates and can intervene to select one of their own choosing, most wish to avoid conflict with local districts, so direct interference is quite rare. As a result, a small number of local party members have considerable influence over candidate selection; the most prominent of these local members is the local party president. In many cases, the local party executive or a recruitment committee might have a role in identifying potential candidates, but the local party president's influence is nonetheless clear.

Party presidents can signal to prospective candidates that their entry into the race is desirable or they can informally discourage potential challengers from contesting the nomination of a favoured incumbent or rookie. Party presidents can also sway the membership to support one candidate over another. Party presidents are thus a crucial link between the district and the party. Because the Canadian context allows us to directly observe the relationship between candidate race and that of the local party president, we can better understand the conditions under which minority candidates emerge.

These conditions are generalizable beyond Canada precisely because the country offers a "hard test" of minority candidate emergence (Cheng and Tavits, 2011). Local party members may only select a single candidate; they thus face a clear choice between selecting a minority candidate versus a white candidate. Party members cannot, in the interests of appearance, pepper their party lists with a few token minority candidates. In this context, if minority candidates are more likely to emerge when there is a minority

party president, it is likely that those network effects would occur when the decision to select a minority candidate occurs in a less restrictive electoral environment (Ashe and Stewart, 2012).

Coupled with this “hard test” is Canada’s comparative openness to immigration and multiculturalism (Besco and Tolley, 2018). This is a country where there should be fewer attitudinal barriers to minority candidate emergence. In such a context, we should expect minority candidates to emerge in a range of electoral districts (not only the most racially diverse), for all major parties (not only those at the center-left), and irrespective of the background of the party president. If in this comparatively hospitable climate, minority candidates are still clustered in the most diverse districts, running for a single party, and reliant on the presence of a party president with a minority background, then we should expect these conditions to hold elsewhere.

I look specifically at the emergence of racialized candidates (or “visible minorities” as they are often referred to in Canada). This is a category defined in the Census as “persons, other than aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour;” this includes individuals who identify as South Asian, Chinese, Black, Filipino, Latin American, Arab, Southeast Asian (e.g., Cambodian, Thai), West Asian (e.g., Iranian, Afghan), Korean, and Japanese (Statistics Canada, 2017). Racialized minorities make up 22% of the Canadian population. Following the 2015 Canadian election, the number of racialized minority Members of Parliament (MPs) grew dramatically, rising

from 28 to 47, with racialized minorities making up 14% of the House of Commons. I examine the context in which this increase transpired.

4. Research Design

I expect racialized candidates to emerge most frequently in districts with larger racialized populations and where there is a racialized local party president. I do not expect to find significant variation by political party because the major parties in Canada do not differentiate themselves significantly on immigration and multiculturalism issues, so ideological explanations for minority candidate emergence provide little purchase.

I focus on the 136 electoral districts where racialized minorities make up 15% or more of the population. This 15% cut-off is the average racialized minority population in all districts at the time of the 2015 federal election. Although racialized minorities do run outside of the most diverse districts, this is quite rare (Black and Hicks, 2006). One can imagine that the political dynamics for racialized minorities and for parties who encounter prospective racialized candidates will be different when the candidate is an outgroup member running in a predominantly white district or an ingroup member running in a predominantly racialized minority district. My own analysis confirms just how rare it is for racialized candidates to run outside the more diverse districts. In 2015, just 16 racialized candidates ran for the major parties in the districts with racialized populations below 15%. In other words, although I focus on a sample of districts, this sample captures 89% of all racialized candidates who ran for the major parties in 2015.¹

Even within this sample of districts, there is still significant variation, with populations that range from 78,545 to 121,055. According to Statistics Canada's 2013 Federal Electoral District Profiles, these districts have a mean racialized minority population of 38%, with a range that extends all the way to 90%. Half of the districts are in Ontario; the rest are in British Columbia, Quebec, Alberta, and Manitoba. There are five Canadian provinces and three territories where there are no districts with significant racialized minority populations, and these have thus not been included.

I look at the individuals who ran for the nomination of the country's three main federal political parties: the Conservatives, the Liberals, and the NDP. Most of the other parties are fringe, do not run full slates of candidates, or have not elected more than a single candidate to Parliament.² Since candidates for these other parties have little chance of being elected, I have excluded them to reduce the noisiness of the data. Across these three parties, there were 408 separate nomination contests, and I created an original dataset with data on the contestants in those 408 nomination contests. I distinguish nomination contestants (those vying to represent their party) from electoral candidates (those who ultimately were selected as their party's representative).

4.1. Racial Background

The main variable of interest is *contestant race*. Electoral district associations are required to report information on nomination contests to Elections Canada, the independent agency that administers federal elections, but many associations do not fully

comply, and the database is incomplete. To construct the list of nomination contestants, I supplemented the data from Elections Canada with information from media reports and nomination meeting notices. From there, I used biographical materials, social media, photographs, and name analysis to code contestants as white (0), racialized (1), or Indigenous (2). I required a positive identification from at least two sources in order to code an individual as racialized or Indigenous (for a similar approach, see Andrew et al., 2008).³ Using this same approach, I also coded the main independent variable, *local party president race*.⁴ Recognizing the limitations of a macro “racialized” category, I had hoped to also code more fine-grained racial identifications (e.g., Black, Indo-Canadian, South Asian). Specific racial identifications are rarely reported in biographies or news reports, particularly for local party presidents, so confirmatory evidence often came from photographs and name analysis. It is difficult to derive reliable coding on racialized subgroups from these latter sources, so I have not included these data in the main analysis, but I return to this issue in the discussion of the findings. Because Indigenous peoples are not included in Statistics Canada’s definition of racialized minorities, I have excluded the 22 contestants identified as Indigenous,⁵ leaving a total of 782 nomination contestants.

4.2. *Political factors*

The “sacrificial lamb” thesis suggests that even if parties are willing to nominate candidates from under-represented groups, they might only do so in districts where the party has little chance of winning (Thomas and Bodet, 2013). To understand whether minority candidates emerge in contexts where they have a reasonable chance of winning,

I include a measure of *district competitiveness*, which is the difference between a party's percentage of the vote in the district and that of the victor in the previous election. There was a redistribution of electoral boundaries in 2013, and the majority of electoral districts changed. As a result, I cannot directly apply 2011 vote margins to the districts from which candidates were nominated in 2015. I therefore rely on the transposition of votes data produced by Elections Canada to estimate of the number of votes a party would have received in 2011 – and, ultimately, their vote margin – if the 2015 electoral boundaries were in place (for details on how votes are transposed, see Elections Canada, 2013). This is a reasonable facsimile of the party's competitiveness. It is also publicly available information to which party selectorates would have had access during the time at which nominations were occurring.

The presence of an incumbent may also influence the context of the race. Incumbents have access to resources and name recognition and, additionally, parties often formally or informally protect incumbents from nomination challenges (Pruysers and Cross, 2016; Schwindt-Bayer, 2005). Given the composition of the legislature, the incumbency boost still mostly accrues to white candidates, and this diminishes opportunities for minority candidates. If a contestant was an MP in the previous parliament, I coded 1 for *incumbent*, and 0 in all other cases.

Whether a nomination was contested or acclaimed also influences the context of candidate emergence, although it could do so in different ways. On the one hand, an acclamation may signal a party's strong preference for a particular candidate, typically an

incumbent, or a so-called “star” candidate. Alternatively, an acclamation may indicate that the seat itself is undesirable or a lost-cause for the party; as a result, very few contestants come forward to secure it. Because parties are highly motivated to run a full slate of candidates, they will often seek anybody who is willing to stand as a so-called “paper candidate” in these undesirable districts. Sometimes these sacrificial candidates are members of the local party executive. The literature suggests that women are more likely to be nominated in lost-cause districts, although it is less clear that this is the case of minority candidates. I coded 1 for *acclamation*, and 0 when the nomination was contested.

Likewise, a district’s history of selecting racialized candidates could affect both the supply of minority candidates and party selectorates’ demand for them. If a district has previously elected a racialized candidate, party selectorates are likely to assume that voters are open to – or even prefer – such candidates and that they have the potential to win (Shah, 2014). Meanwhile, minority candidates may be more willing to put themselves forward in contexts where minority candidates have succeeded; the importance of this signaling has been demonstrated in the women and politics literature (Ladam et al., 2018). To measure district history, I tracked how many racialized MPs have represented each district since 2004 – a period that includes four different election cycles – calculating the *district’s history of racialized representation* as a percentage of all MPs who have represented the district in that time period.⁶

Finally, candidate emergence may be influenced by party ideology. Although the association of center-left parties with minority candidate emergence is fairly well established in the comparative literature, there is some evidence from Britain that center-right parties are attempting to shed their image of intolerance (Sobolewska, 2013), suggesting that the center-left's hold on candidate diversity may be loosening. In Canada, the center-right Conservative party was the first to elect a racialized candidate to Parliament (Douglas Jung in 1957) and the first to name a Black Cabinet minister (Lincoln Alexander in 1979). Longitudinal analysis suggests that the Conservative party frequently nominates as many racialized candidates as either the NDP or Liberals, and sometimes more (Black, 2017). The general story in Canada is that although racialized voters are most likely to support the Liberal party, followed by the Conservatives, the major parties do not differ significantly (or at least not in the expected ways) when it comes to the incorporation of racialized candidates or the promotion of immigration and diversity (Black and Hicks, 2008). Research similarly finds that district ideology is unrelated to the emergence of women candidates in Canada (Cheng and Tavits 2011). Although I do not expect party to exert significant influence in the analysis, I have included *party* dummies in the analysis below; the Conservative Party is the reference category.

4.3. *Demographic factors*

In addition to political factors, candidate emergence may be affected by demography. One of the central correlates here is the proportion of racialized minorities living in a

district. Racialized candidates are most likely to emerge in districts with sizeable racialized populations, a pattern that has been observed in Canada, the UK, and the US, among others (Black and Hicks, 2006; Saggar and Geddes, 2000; Shah, 2014). *Percent racialized* is the proportion of the population in the district who identify as racialized. I also ran the analysis using the proportion of racialized citizens by district but found no difference in the results.⁷

Beyond the racial background of the electorate, resources may also play a role in minority candidate emergence. I include measures of education, income, and unemployment, because these factors are correlated with some of the standard explanations for minority candidate emergence, including district diversity. *Education* is the proportion of a given district's population, aged 15 years and over, with a bachelor's degree or higher. *Income* is the district's average family income measured in Canadian dollars. And finally, the *unemployment rate* is the proportion of the district's population aged 15 years and over that was not employed; this is expressed as a percentage of the district's labour force. In addition to these demographic factors, given Canada's regional make-up, there might be some variations across provinces. To account for this, I included *province* dummies in the analysis; Alberta is the reference category.

5. Analysis and Findings

In total, 297 racialized minorities ran for their parties' respective nominations, which represents 38% of nomination contestants in these districts. Of these, the three major

parties selected 137 racialized candidates, for a total of 34%. Table 1 shows the distribution of contestants and selected candidates by party. Here, it is clear that the NDP does not fit the pattern of center-left parties observed elsewhere; racialized contestants are the least common in this party. This finding is somewhat counter-intuitive given that the NDP has the most explicit equity policy of the three major parties, and that policy applies to a number of under-represented groups, including women and persons of color. Nonetheless, it does fit with the racialized voters' pattern of support for the major parties, as discussed above.

[Table 1 about here]

It is noteworthy that three-quarters of contestants are vying for their party's nomination in districts that have not elected a racialized MP in at least the previous decade (data not shown); this suggests that most districts have very little recent experience with racialized representatives. Table 2 similarly confirms that racialized patterns characterize incumbency and acclamation. Very few racialized contestants are incumbents and, compared to white contestants, they are also less likely to have benefitted from an uncontested nomination contest. On these two measures – incumbency and acclamation – racialized contestants arguably face a more uphill battle than white candidates.

[Table 2 about here]

The competitiveness of a district may influence the types of contestants who come forward or are recruited. Following Carty and Eagles (2005), I defined competitive districts as those in which the party's vote margin in the previous election was within 10 percentage points of the winning party. About half of all contestants (49%) seek the nomination in districts where their party is competitive. Table 3 shows that the bulk of the contestants vying for the nomination in competitive districts are white (61%), although this difference does not meet conventional levels of statistical significance.⁸ Many of the contestants who seek a party's nomination are incumbents, and these are districts where the party is most competitive; because most incumbents are white, this might explain the high number of white nomination contestants. When the 104 incumbents are removed from the analysis, the bulk of contestants vying for the nomination in districts where their party is competitive remain white (55%), but the gap has narrowed; 45% of the contestants in competitive districts are racialized, which actually exceeds the proportion of racialized Canadians living in these districts (37%). It does not appear that racialized candidates are being systematically shut out of competitive districts; to the extent that they are not coming forward or being recruited in those desirable districts, it appears to be primarily a function of the advantage wielded by incumbents, the majority of whom continue to be white.

However, even in districts with no incumbent running, parties do not appear to be making any additional effort to recruit more diverse candidates. This is surprising since such districts would be a fruitful venue for pursuing affirmative action measures. Of the 293 nomination contestants who came forward in districts with no incumbent, 33% were

racialized, which falls below the proportion of racialized contestants – 41% – who came forward in districts where there was an incumbent running (data not shown). Perhaps parties do not see these districts as ones where racialized contestants should be specially targeted, or perhaps racialized contestants are simply not turned off by a competitive electoral context and are thus no more likely to come forward in districts without incumbents. Future research should explore these possibilities.

[Table 3 about here]

Past research suggests minority candidates are most likely to be elected in majority-minority districts. I find that in districts where the racialized population is more than 70%, fully 76% of the contestants are racialized. In districts where the racialized population is less than 30%, 78% of contestants are white (see Table 4). More than half of white contestants (59%) run in the least diverse districts, while racialized contestants are more evenly distributed. District diversity is a clear correlate of candidate emergence, and as is noted below, it is also related to the race of the local party president.

[Table 4 about here]

The majority of local party presidents are white (75%), with little variation by party: 31% of Liberal local party presidents are racialized, compared to 23% of Conservatives and 22% in the NDP, but this difference is not statistically significant. Nearly half (47%) of racialized local party presidents serve in the 33 districts where racialized Canadians make

up more than 50% of the population.⁹ In other words, racialized party elites are clustered into a narrow band of electoral districts where racialized minorities make up a majority of the population.

In the 96 district associations where there is a racialized party president, 61% of nomination contestants are racialized. Meanwhile, in the 284 district associations where there is white party president, 31% of nomination contestants are racialized. Consistent with expectations, there is a positive relationship between the race of the local party president and that of the individuals who present themselves for nomination (see Table 5). Even in the country's most diverse districts, 52% of the nomination contests do not include a single racialized contestant (data not shown). Most of these zero-diversity contests (82%) are presided over by white local party presidents. Maybe political elites simply gravitate toward candidates whose characteristics mirror their own. But, perhaps the relationship is a function of geography, in that candidates and local party presidents of similar backgrounds are likely to be drawn from the same electoral districts. In that case, the key factor is geography, a possibility that is best explored using a multivariate model.

[Table 5 about here]

5.1. *Multivariate analysis*

In the multivariate analysis, I use probit regression because the dependent variable, *contestant race*, is binary. The independent variable of interest is the race of the local

party president, and the model includes the controls specified above.¹⁰ Table 6 shows the results. As expected, the presence of a racialized party president is positively and significantly related to the presence of racialized nomination contestants. All else equal, racialized candidates are most likely to emerge when there is a racialized party president. To understand the substantive effect of a racialized party president, I calculated the predicted probability of a racialized nomination contestant emerging, holding all other variables at their mean. When the local party president is white, the probability of a racialized nomination contestant is 0.34, compared to 0.45 when there is a racialized party president. In other words, the probability of a racialized nomination contestant is 11 percentage points higher when the party president is racialized, an effect that is significant ($p < 0.01$). My data confirm a clear association between racialized party elites and the diversity of the candidate pool.

[Table 6 about here]

The relationship between the race of the local party president and that of nomination contestants holds when I control for confounding factors, and the influence of the local party president's race remains significant across districts with varying racialized populations. In other words, although district diversity is an important factor in minority candidate emergence, political networks – the influence of a racialized local party president – remain important. The typical narrative is that minority candidates are most likely to emerge in center-left parties, but Canada runs counter to that finding. My research demonstrates the limited purchase that partisan affiliation provides when trying to explain minority candidate emergence in the Canadian context.

The results also support the assertion that acclamations are likely to depress the emergence of minority candidates. This is partly because incumbents are most likely to be acclaimed and also to be white, but even when incumbents are removed from the analysis, white candidates are more likely to benefit from acclamation than racialized candidates (data not shown). Specifically, in acclamation situations not involving incumbents, the probability of a racialized nomination contestant is 0.29, compared to 0.41 when the nomination was contested, meaning that the probability of a racialized nomination contestant is 12 percentage points higher ($p < 0.01$) when there is more than one candidate to choose from. Since incumbents have been excluded from this part of the analysis, the advantage that (predominantly white) incumbents wield cannot explain this difference. It could be that racialized contestants emerge in more electorally desirable districts thus decreasing the potential of an acclamation. Alternatively, political elites might more often use informal means to turn off competitors so that a white candidate is acclaimed, but less often intervene in contests involving racialized candidates. I am not able to isolate the cause of this difference, but regardless, racialized candidates do not appear to be turned off from competitive nomination contexts; rather, this is the scenario in which minority candidates are most likely to emerge, but one that makes their ultimate selection less certain.

Finally, a history of racialized representation is significantly and positively related to the presence of racialized nomination contestants. This can be explained in two ways. First, nomination contestants are most likely to emerge in contexts where they believe there is

the potential for victory. For racialized contestants, the fact that a district has previously been represented by a racialized MP signals that the electorate is open to candidates from diverse backgrounds. But second, racialized former MPs may play a role in seeking out and encouraging racialized contestants to run in much the same way that racialized local party presidents too. In their study of female local party presidents, Cheng and Tavits (2011) posit that this mechanism may be at play, other research finds more support for the symbolic or signaling mechanism than for one based on recruitment (Ladam et al., 2018). In either case, although this history of electing racialized MPs is significant, the independent effect of a racialized party president on the emergence of racialized candidates remains, which underscores the importance of political networks.

Interestingly, however, the effect of a racialized party president disappears when it comes to the *selection* of a racialized candidate. Table 7 zeroes in on those contestants who were ultimately chosen to be their party's candidate. The results show at the point of selection, district diversity and a history of racialized MPs are the only factors that appear to be important. Although local party presidents play an important role in the *recruitment* of minority candidates, ultimately it is the party membership who decides upon the candidate. Local party presidents are able to exert some influence on the process, but at the end of the day, they have a single vote, just like every other member. Whereas party presidents may feel some commitment to the diversification of candidate slates, party members may be more swayed by other criteria.

[Table 7 about here]

This point is confirmed when I look at the relationship between racialized local party presidents and the *proportion* of racialized nomination contestants in each nomination contest. This is a bimodal distribution, with three-quarters of nomination contests having slates where either none or all of the contestants are racialized. In a simple bivariate analysis, the presence of a racialized local party president is positively associated with the proportion of racialized nomination contestants, but that relationship disappears when I add controls, particularly district diversity (see supplementary appendix).¹¹ In other words, while the influence of racialized presidents on the emergence of racialized contestants is robust, their presence does not demonstrably affect the proportion of racialized contestants nor their ultimate selection. Perhaps this is because the relationship itself is non-linear. For instance, those racialized presidents who desire the selection of racialized candidates may wish to focus their resources on a single racialized contestant. Another explanation is that although racialized presidents can encourage racialized contestants to come forward, they might not be able to prevent white contestants from also running. At best, racialized local party presidents can help get racialized contestants to the gate, but the context and outcome of the contest is out of their hands.

So far, only additive effects have been considered, but there could of course be interaction effects. Specifically, the influence of a racialized local party president on minority candidate emergence may vary depending on district diversity. To examine this, I ran the model with *contestant race* as the dependent variable but included an interaction between the race of the local party president and district diversity (see supplementary

appendix). Figure 1 compares the predicted probability of a minority candidate emerging when there is a white or racialized local party president, which has been interacted with district diversity.

[Figure 1 about here]

The implication is clear: political networks matter to minority candidate emergence and especially in districts with smaller racialized populations. In districts where the racialized population is 15%, racialized nomination contestants are 8 percentage points more likely to emerge when there is a racialized local party president at the helm ($p < 0.01$) compared to when there is a white local party president. The effect is significant up until a district's racialized minority population reaches 60% at which point the presence of a racialized local party president wields less influence over the complexion of the contestant slate.

The latter finding is unsurprising: when racialized minorities make up more than half of a district's population, it would be more difficult for local party presidents to prevent their emergence. Political parties that want to diversify their candidate slates should encourage more diverse local party leadership. In districts where the racialized population is below 60%, recruitment by a racialized local party president can have a significant impact on minority candidate emergence. Nonetheless, even in the more diverse districts, those where at least 60% of the population is racialized, there is still a 7 percentage point difference in the emergence of minority candidates when the local president is racialized.

To understand how the interaction of district diversity and a local party president's race might affect the *selection* of a racialized candidate, I ran the model again, this time

focusing only on those candidates who were victorious and secured their party's nomination (see supplementary appendix). Figure 2 shows the predicted probability of a racialized candidate being selected in a district when there is a white local party president versus a racialized local party president. There is an interactive effect between district diversity, the presence of a racialized local party president, and the selection of a racialized candidate. This conclusion nuances the findings reported above and suggests that the race of the local party president may have some influence on the selection of racialized candidates, but only in some districts. Specifically, in districts where racialized minorities make up 15% of the population, racialized candidates are 12 percentage points more likely to be selected in when there is a racialized local party president than when there is a white one ($p < 0.01$). The effect is significant until the racialized minority population in a district reaches 50%, then the influence of a racialized local party president dissipates. Although racialized party presidents may, in general, lack the levers needed to facilitate the selection of a racialized candidate, their presence is correlated with such an outcome particularly in less diverse districts. Nonetheless, even in districts where racialized minorities make up at least 50% of the population, there is a 5 percentage point difference in the selection of a racialized candidate when the local president is racialized, compared to when the local president is white. The upshot: racialized candidates are more likely to enter the electoral arena when there is a racialized local party leader at the helm, and under many district conditions they are also more likely to emerge victorious.

[Figure 2 about here]

6. Discussion

This article demonstrates the importance of political networks to the emergence of minority candidates. It shows that while district diversity does matter, the presence of a racialized local party president is also important. In addition to providing valuable new data on nomination contestants and local party gatekeepers, the present study shows that the relationship between the race of local party presidents and that of minority candidates is not merely an artifact of district demographics: networks matter. My findings suggest that if parties want to diversify their candidate slates, they should pay attention to the demographics of party recruiters and gatekeepers.

Within the findings are several fruitful avenues for further research. First, it is important to understand diversity within the macro “racialized” category that is employed here. This would entail more detailed coding of the racial identification of nomination contestants, candidates, and local party elites and likely necessitates the use of a survey instrument. A key question is how racialized networks support or hinder the emergence of minority candidates from backgrounds that diverge from those of the minority party president. My preliminary analysis suggests that same-race pairings are most common among South Asian contestants and presidents, but that these are concentrated in 26 electoral districts where South Asian local party presidents preside over selection contests with multiple South Asian nomination contestants; often these are districts where South Asian Canadians make up a large segment of the population. In Brampton East, for

example, South Asian local party presidents in all three parties president over nomination contests that each had at least one South Asian contestant. Ocampo's (2018) qualitative case study approach could be fruitfully adopted both for understanding differences across racial groups, as well as those related to intersecting racial and gender identities. Recent work suggests that the factors influencing minority women candidate emergence differ across racial groups (Silva and Skulley, 2018), and political networks and within-group dynamics may carve out different pathways for racialized women and racialized men.

Although racialized minorities are being elected in higher numbers, their presence remains clustered within the most racially diverse districts. Whereas white candidates emerge in a range of electoral contexts, this is not the case for racialized candidates. This clustering may help to explain why the presence of a racialized local party president is so germane to the emergence of minority candidates in the less diverse electoral districts. Future research should unpack whether the clustering of racialized candidates in particular districts is a function of candidates' strategic calculations about the districts in which they are most likely to win, the reticence of party selectorates to choose racialized candidates in less diverse districts, or the interventions and influence of local party presidents. Additional analysis may also help us understand why the presence of a racialized local party presidents is systematically related to the emergence of minority candidates, while their influence on the selection of minority candidates varies depending on district diversity. This latter finding stands somewhat in contrast to research that shows a strong correlation between the presence of a woman local president and the selection of women candidates across districts. There may also be unobserved

heterogeneity between districts with racialized party presidents and those without, and this could be correlated with candidate selection. Social capital seems particularly relevant given that social bonds and civic engagement vary across neighbourhoods and may be related to district diversity.

In addition, there are important questions about the mechanisms that underpin the emergence of local party presidents. Chief among these is whether racialized party activists seek executive positions so they can facilitate the nomination of racialized candidates or, alternatively, whether prospective candidates work to install a friendly executive who will ease their pathway to the nomination. There are some gaps in Elections Canada's public database, but archival research could provide valuable information on the conditions under which local party presidents seize power.

Finally, the findings nuance one of the central tenets in the literature on minority candidate emergence, which is the association of center-left parties with more diverse candidate slates. My findings suggest precisely the opposite, with the NDP having the weakest record of recruiting and selecting racialized candidates, despite having an explicit affirmative action policy. One explanation relates to Canada's cross-party consensus on immigration and multiculturalism and racialized voters' traditional voting allegiances. According to this account, no party has much to gain by alienating minority voters, but at the same time, since most racialized voters support either the Liberals or Conservatives, these are the parties that are most incentivized to recruit and select a diverse candidate slate. The potential electoral payoff of running racialized candidates is,

for the NDP, comparatively smaller. The NDP does set a goal of running so-called equity target candidates in at least 30% of the districts where the NDP has a “reasonable chance of winning” (New Democratic Party, n.d.), but this policy lumps all under-represented groups together. My own interviews with local party activists suggest that although the NDP is committed to equity, their focus has tended to be on the recruitment of women candidates. Whereas the Liberals and Conservatives emerged as cadre or “big tent” parties, the NDP’s roots are more ideological and include strong ties to the labour movement, which has historically been quite white. This is the pool from which the NDP has tended to identify and recruit its candidates. The party’s selection of Jagmeet Singh as leader in 2017 perhaps signals a shift in the party. If that diversification trickles down to local party presidents, we may see a new wave of racialized NDP candidates. Future research should examine the effect of racialized party leaders on local party leadership and minority candidate emergence.

Notes

¹ There would be significant missing data if candidates outside the more diverse districts were added. Pilot coding revealed there was less information available to infer the race of local party presidents in the smaller, less urban electoral districts (e.g., more limited web presence, less media coverage).

² The Bloc Québécois only runs candidates in Quebec, and the Green Party, despite running candidates across the country, has only ever elected a single Member of Parliament to the House of Commons.

³ Although automated tools are being piloted to code ethnicity, these have mostly been based on American surnames, which is important because the validity of automated tools is highly context-dependent. Since immigration and ancestry patterns differ between Canada and the United States, the origins of many surnames do as well, and the importation of an automated tool developed for another context could produce wildly inaccurate estimates. Crowd-sourcing is another alternative, but one recent study shows that expert coding, of the type adopted in this study, remains the “gold-standard” for validity (Shah and Davis, 2017).

⁴ The racial background of 22 local party presidents is unknown. The contestants in those districts have been retained, but excluded from those analyses specific to the race of local party presidents.

⁵ An examination of Indigenous candidate emergence should arguably focus on the electoral districts with significant Indigenous populations.

⁶ To account for changes in electoral districts that resulted from the redistribution of electoral boundaries in 2013 and which prevent a direct comparison between the 2015 districts and those that came before, I adopted a method similar to that of Cheng and Tavits (2011). Essentially, whichever former district contributed the most sizable population to the new districts became the comparator for the 2015 district. I then used the comparator district's history of electing racialized candidates as the measure for this variable.

⁷ To vote in a federal election, one must be a Canadian citizen and over the age of 18. However, all three major parties also permit non-citizens and those over the age of 15 to vote in the nomination of the candidate who will represent the party in that district on election day.

⁸ Data in this study are not drawn from a random sample, but rather from the population of racially diverse districts. For reasons of disciplinary convention, I nonetheless report on measures of statistical significance.

⁹ The mean racialized minority population of districts in which racialized minorities serve as local party president is 50%; the standard deviation is 21, which underscores the skewedness of the distribution.

¹⁰ As a robustness check, I specified the models using a logit model instead of probit. There is no change in the direction or statistical significance of any of the main coefficients of interest, although income is significant at $p < 0.10$ in the candidate emergence model using logit but not probit. The results are shown in the supplementary appendix. The predicted probabilities remain the same regardless of model specification.

¹¹ The dependent variable, proportion racialized nomination contestants, is not binary, so I used a logit model for this part of the analysis. The independent variable is *local party president race*; the control variables remain the same as in the preceding analysis. *Contestant race* is not included in the model. The results are shown in the supplementary appendix.

Table 1. Nomination Contestants and Selected Candidates, by party

	Racialized nomination contestants*		Racialized candidates	
	(n)	%	(n)	%
Conservative	86	37	48	35
Liberal	134	42	51	38
New Democrat	77	33	38	29
All parties	297	38	137	34

Chi-square *p<0.10

Table 2. Nomination Contestant Characteristics, by candidate race

	Racialized contestants		White contestants		All contestants	
	(n)	%	(n)	%	(n)	%
Incumbent***	23	8	81	17	104	13
Acclaimed in the nomination***	64	22	162	33	226	29
Open seat**	97	33	196	41	293	38
Competitive district	150	51	234	48	384	49
Racialized local party president***	115	41	73	16	188	26

Chi-square ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10

Table 3. Nomination Contestants in Competitive Districts, by race

	Racialized contestant		White contestant	
	(n)	%	(n)	%
<i>All nomination contestants (n=782)</i>				
Competitive district	150	39	234	61
Non-competitive district	147	37	251	63
<i>Non-incumbent nomination contestants (n=678)</i>				
Competitive district	127	45	156	55
Non-competitive district	147	37	248	63

Only the results for non-incumbent contestants reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Chi-square=4.019, p<0.05; df=1; Cramer's V=0.077; p<0.05

Table 4. Nomination Contestants, by race and district diversity

Proportion racialized population in district	Racialized contestant		White contestant		All contestants	
	(n)	%	(n)	%	(n)	%
Less than 30%	79	27	287	59	366	47
30-49.9%	70	24	141	29	211	27
50-69.9%	83	28	37	8	120	15
More than 70%	65	22	20	4	85	11
All districts	297	38	485	62	782	100

Chi-square=146.846, df=3, p<0.01; Cramer's V=0.433, p<0.01

Table 5. Nomination Contestants and Local Party Presidents, by race

	Racialized contestant		White contestant		All contestants	
	(n)	%	(n)	%	(n)	%
Racialized local party president	115	61	73	39	188	26
White local party president	166	31	376	69	542	74

Chi-square=54.998, df=1, p<0.01; Cramer's V=0.274, p<0.01

Table 6. Effect of the Local Party President's Race on Minority Candidate Emergence

	Probit coefficient	Standard error
Racialized president	.2787**	.1297
Incumbent	-.4003*	.2100
Competitiveness	.0032	.0039
Acclamation	-.3291**	.1423
History of racialized representation	.0060***	.0019
Percent district racialized	.0284***	.0039
Share of university graduates in district	-.0091	.0080
Average family income in district	-5.48e-06	3.45e-06
Unemployment rate in district	-.0594	.0424
Province dummies ^a		
British Columbia	-.3436*	.2052
Manitoba	-.6819	.4939
Ontario	.0274	.1903
Quebec	.2342	.2337
Party dummies ^b		
Liberal	-.1366	.1490
New Democrat	-.2179	.1405
Constant	-.1121**	.5745
Chi-square	200.31***	
N	730	

The dependent variable is racialized nomination contestant.

a. The reference category is Alberta

b. The reference category is the Conservative party

***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10

Table 7. Effect of the Local Party President's Race on Selection of a Minority Candidate

	Probit coefficient	Standard error
Racialized president	.1801	.1798
Incumbent	-.3576	.2436
Competitiveness	.0074	.0055
Acclamation	-.2718	.1748
History of racialized representation	.0087***	.0025
Percent district racialized	.0300***	.0055
Share of university graduates in district	-.0109	.0101
Average family income in district	-3.42e-06	4.49e-06
Unemployment rate in district	-.0436	.0564
Province dummies ^a		
British Columbia	-.2845	.3083
Manitoba	-.0085	.5884
Ontario	.1877	.2857
Quebec	.5254	.3466
Party dummies ^b		
Liberal	-.1420	.1900
New Democrat	-.3151	.1925
Constant	-.7018	.7590
Chi-square	109.40	
N	380	

The dependent variable is racialized candidate (i.e., selection of a racialized nomination contestant).

a. The reference category is Alberta

b. The reference category is the Conservative party

***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10

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
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
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
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— White Local Party President - - - - Racialized Local Party President



— White Local Party President - - - - Racialized Local Party President



SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX

Table S1. Effect of the Local Party President's Race on Minority Candidate Emergence Using Logit Model

	Logit coefficient	Standard error
Racialized president	.4807**	.2165
Incumbent	-.6394*	.3552
Competitiveness	.0052	.0065
Acclamation	-.5787**	.2432
History of racialized representation	.0102***	.0032
Percent district racialized	.0473***	.0067
Share of university graduates in district	-.0153	.0139
Average family income in district	-.00001*	6.31e-06
Unemployment rate in district	-.1152	.0731
Province dummies ^a		
British Columbia	-.6039*	.3548
Manitoba	-1.150	.8568
Ontario	.0605	.3219
Quebec	.3891	.3912
Party dummies ^b		
Liberal	-.2380	.2364
New Democrat	-.3723	.2530
Constant	-.1180	1.0310
Chi-square	200.31***	
N	730	

The dependent variable is racialized nomination contestant.

a. The reference category is Alberta

b. The reference category is the Conservative party

*** $p \leq 0.01$ ** $p \leq 0.05$ * $p \leq 0.10$

Table S2. Effect of the Local Party President's Race on Selection of a Minority Candidate Using Logit Model

	Logit coefficient	Standard error
Racialized president	.3373	.3000
Incumbent	-.6038	.4099
Competitiveness	.0123	.0094
Acclamation	-.4695	.2970
History of racialized representation	.0151***	.0045
Percent district racialized	.0498***	.0095
Share of university graduates in district	-.0180	.0172
Average family income in district	-7.49e-06	8.34e-06
Unemployment rate in district	-0.901	.0984
Province dummies ^a		
British Columbia	-.5254	.5378
Manitoba	-.0243	.9867
Ontario	.3228	.4922
Quebec	.8421	.5848
Party dummies ^b		
Liberal	-.2552	.3186
New Democrat	-.5427	.3304
Constant	-.8270	1.3910
Chi-square	109.32	
N	380	

The dependent variable is racialized candidate (i.e., selection of a racialized nomination contestant).

a. The reference category is Alberta

b. The reference category is the Conservative party

***p≤0.01 **p≤0.05 *p≤0.10

Table S3. Effect of Local Party President's Race on Proportion of Racialized Nomination Contestants in Nomination Contest

	Logit coefficient	Standard error
Racialized president	.1438	.1846
Incumbent	-.4998**	.2321
Competitiveness	.00004	.0053
Acclamation	-.8520**	.1713
History of racialized representation	.0075***	.0027
Percent district racialized	.0249***	.0054
Share of university graduates in district	-.0114	.0101
Average family income in district	-1.36e-06	4.26e-06
Unemployment rate in district	-.0130	.0557
Province dummies ^a		
British Columbia	-.3626	.2867
Manitoba	-.7298	.5752
Ontario	-.3231	.2623
Quebec	-.0724	.3269
Party dummies ^b		
Liberal	-.0952	.1874
New Democrat	-.1143	.1862
Constant	.2778	.7188
Chi-square	120.14	
N	380	

The dependent variable is the proportion of racialized nomination contestants in each contest. A logit model is used here because the dependent variable is continuous.

a. The reference category is Alberta

b. The reference category is the Conservative party

*** $p \leq 0.01$ ** $p \leq 0.05$ * $p \leq 0.10$

Table S4. Interaction Between Local Party President's Race, District Diversity and Minority Candidate Emergence

	Probit coefficient	Standard error
Racialized president	.5338*	.3188
Percent district racialized	.0304***	.0045
Racialized president x percent district racialized	-.0057	.0065
Incumbent	-.4013*	.2102
Competitiveness	.0033	.0039
Acclamation	-.3391**	.1430
History of racialized representation	.0059***	.0019
Share of university graduates in district	-.0100	.0081
Average family income in district	-5.41e-06	3.46e-06
Unemployment rate in district	-.0603	.0425
Province dummies ^a		
British Columbia	-.3421*	.2055
Manitoba	-.6851	.4957
Ontario	.0389	.1912
Quebec	.2310	.2344
Party dummies ^b		
Liberal	-.1314	.1406
New Democrat	-.2182	.1492
Constant	-.1647	.5783
Chi-square	201.07	
N	730	

The dependent variable is racialized nomination contestant.

a. The reference category is Alberta

b. The reference category is the Conservative party

***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10

Table S5. Interaction Between Local Party President's Race, District Diversity and Selection of a Minority Candidate

	Probit coefficient	Standard error
Racialized president	.6198	.4359
Percent district racialized	.0332*	.0063
Racialized president x percent district racialized	-.0098	.0088
Incumbent	-.3544	.2442
Competitiveness	.0076	.0055
Acclamation	-.2891*	.1760
History of racialized representation	.0085**	.0025
Share of university graduates in district	-.0121	.0102
Average family income in district	-3.25e-06	4.50e-06
Unemployment rate in district	-.0427	.0565
Province dummies ^a		
British Columbia	-.2848	.3097
Manitoba	-.0142	.5923
Ontario	.2030	.2877
Quebec	.5050	.3487
Party dummies ^b		
Liberal	-.1361	.1903
New Democrat	-.3115	.1931
Constant	-.8202	
Chi-square	110.61	
N	380	

The dependent variable is racialized candidate (i.e., selection of a racialized nomination contestant).

a. The reference category is Alberta

b. The reference category is the Conservative party

*** $p \leq 0.01$ ** $p \leq 0.05$ * $p \leq 0.10$